my point is that its seeming uniqueness, is not different. It is another case, just with a time displacement from conception to birth or whatever other place you want to consider "valid" (consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.). It doesn't change anything because of the displacement. — schopenhauer1

I was looking for some support for that position. As it stands it's not a common intuition, nor have you given any reason why we should think this way. Putting the word 'just' in front of the thing you want to dismiss doesn't constitute an argument against it.

I can then make a case that because this is so unique, it defies things like, "waking up the lifeguard to save the drowning child" because in this case the person is absolutely being used for X reason and never for its own sake being that it doesn't exist yet. — schopenhauer1

You can't invoke the person's dignity but not their interests. That's just selectively imparting properties on the hypothetical person. If e can consider their dignity on the grounds that they will soon have such a thing then we can consider their interests on the same grounds. Since most people wish to remain alive and happy we can assume those same hypothetical interests of the not-yet-existing child.

If you want to say that we can consider their dignity but not their interests you'll have to make that case.

We currently feel that the non-existence of the subject is sufficient ground to treat infractions against their hypothetical will very differently to infractions against the actual will of an existent person. You feel we should change that intuition to treat them the same. I'm asking why you think we should. All you've provided so far is that you think we should, not why.

we know that if child will born to this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.
These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not creating human life to this world. — Antinatalist

Well no, they're not.

We know that if that child is not born we could also bring about much pain and suffering (in fact are much more likely to), so the pain/suffering argument doesn't work.

We do make the decision without consulting the child but we make decisions for people without consulting them all the time in life and consider it perfectly acceptable in many circumstances, so that argument doesn't work either.

I was looking for some support for that position. As it stands it's not a common intuition, nor have you given any reason why we should think this way. Putting the word 'just' in front of the thing you want to dismiss doesn't constitute an argument against it. — Isaac

I'm actually not sure what your problem with the idea of the cause being displaced from the consequent. You plant the device, and then it blows up later..

If e can consider their dignity on the grounds that they will soon have such a thing then we can consider their interests on the same grounds. — Isaac

Considering someone's interests by forcing X, Y, Z on them is still violating dignity/autonomy for X cause.

We currently feel that the non-existence of the subject is sufficient ground to treat infractions against their hypothetical will very differently to infractions against the actual will of an existent person. You feel we should change that intuition to treat them the same. I'm asking why you think we should. All you've provided so far is that you think we should, not why. — Isaac

Actually not really. I think procreation is very different in a way. Once born, then we have to start weighing suffering against dignity violation and various thresholds. In the case of procreation, this is a case of extremely high degree of causing conditions for unnecessary suffering AND violation of dignity/autonomy. So this case isn't unique in it's being assessed by the rules, but rather to the degree to which the threshold is met for their violation.

I know it is hard for you to agree with my assessment because of this idea mainly:

If 75% of the lifeguards kidnapped identified with their game.. what's wrong with that? Am I right that this is pretty much in line with your greatest objection?

Already posted here:

I consider myself a conscientious antinatalist. — 180 Proof

Yeah, saw it.

But what does that mean? I understand the phrase "conscientious objector" in war time, but can't make out what it could mean in the antinatalist case.

we know that if child will born to this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.
These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not creating human life to this world.
— Antinatalist
— Isaac

Well no, they're not.

We know that if that child is not born we could also bring about much pain and suffering (in fact are much more likely to), so the pain/suffering argument doesn't work. — Isaac

The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).

I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means.

We do make the decision without consulting the child but we make decisions for people without consulting them all the time in life and consider it perfectly acceptable in many circumstances, so that argument doesn't work either. — Isaac

But having a child or not having a child is not a trivial everyday task, which doesn´t have any severe influences.

It´s a question about human life.

My conclusion about having a child or not having a child is not necessarily same as Benatar´s (the foundation of the argument). Here´s my conclusion:

The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.

I'm actually not sure what your problem with the idea of the cause being displaced from the consequent. You plant the device, and then it blows up later.. — schopenhauer1

OK.

So with harm the bad thing is harm. No harm can befall the non-existent child. But the child will be harmed in the future.

Now with deciding something for someone against their will. The bad thing is a decision being made for you against your will. That can't happen to the non-existent child, they have no will. When will that bad thing happen - the decision being made against their will?

Not at the time of conception (there's no will for it to be made against), not at any time after their conception (there's no decision to be made then). So when is the device you planted going to blow up?

With the breach of autonomy there is no cause and consequence. You don't breach autonomy at conception because there's no will to act against. You don't breach it any time after birth because there's no decision to be made against the now existing will.

Am I right that this is pretty much in line with your greatest objection? — schopenhauer1

No, not in the slightest. My objection is as above. When considering harms it is normal to weigh greater goods against them so that argument fails on its own. When considering dignity/autonomy there is no will to oppose at the time of the decision and no decision to be made once there's a will to oppose, so there's no consequence of one's actions to consider so far as dignity/autonomy is concerned. My actions now in conceiving a child will not result in a future situation where their will will be opposed in any but the normal ways we all accept already.

But what does that mean? I understand the phrase "conscientious objector" in war time, but can't make out what it could mean in the antinatalist case. — Manuel

He is saying that it is a personal position but it should not be implemented as a Stalinist social directive.

Now with deciding something for someone against their will. The bad thing is a decision being made for you against your will. That can't happen to the non-existent child, they have no will. When will that bad thing happen - the decision being made against their will? — Isaac

I would say birth. You may place it at some sort of level of consciousness. That is when it goes off. There is now a will at that time, no? A decision was made that (eventually) affected that person born at that time.

No, not in the slightest. My objection is as above. When considering harms it is normal to weigh greater goods against them so that argument fails on its own. When considering dignity/autonomy there is no will to oppose at the time of the decision and no decision to be made once there's a will to oppose, so there's no consequence of one's actions to consider so far as dignity/autonomy is concerned. My actions now in conceiving a child will not result in a future situation where their will will be opposed in any but the normal ways we all accept already. — Isaac

This seems like being born is just an inevitability. But as you know, I don't agree that autonomy is not violated by thinking in terms of the average way we look at future tense. Someone will have X, Y, Z happen due to this prior decision. Is a decision made for a person that affects them greatly? In this case, yes, a whole lifetime of the game of life and overcoming challenges is being imposed and assumed as good for another.

The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).

I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. — Antinatalist

Yes this is along the lines of what I mean by "dignity/autonomy being violated".

But having a child or not having a child is not a trivial everyday task, which doesn´t have any severe influences.

It´s a question about human life. — Antinatalist

Yes, and I was arguing that the threshold is extremely high for both rules of unnecessary suffering and violating dignity.

The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter. — Antinatalist

So I agree with this 100% but what they are going to do is say, "What is the foundation of this specific act"? They will say it is special pleading because in other cases, X, Y, Z causing harm or force on another is necessary... For example, would it be wrong to wake up a lifeguard to save a drowning child? It is "forcing" the lifeguard.. So my response for the foundations includes two rules:

Not violating dignity and Not creating unnecessary suffering. Both would violated in the case of procreation.

But honestly, being that there are only two cases of what you describe (changing states of existence) I don't see how this really has to apply by a broader rule anyways.

The only thing that someone may demand is why this is wrong, in which case you may need a broader rule that explains why there is no moral right to cause something to change the existence of another individual.

The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence  of another individual or –  to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.
— Antinatalist

So I agree with this 100% but what they are going to do is say, "What is the foundation of this specific act"? They will say it is special pleading because in other cases, X, Y, Z causing harm or force on another is necessary... For example, would it be wrong to wake up a lifeguard to save a drowning child? It is "forcing" the lifeguard. — schopenhauer1

Let´s compare the act, having a child, with another question on existence, the termination of life.

Let´s assume that an adult human being seems to outsiders in their right minds to be willing to die and to clearly and unambiguously state “Kill me!” Is this sufficient justification for killing this human being? Juridically surely not, but what about ethically? In my opinion, NO. I believe that a vast majority of people hopefully agree with my view (even though this is no basis for justifying the value of the action).

Nonetheless, in the above example case, the actor has more information on the tendencies of the object of  the action than in the example on bringing about life – i.e. in the active deed that aims at creating a new human being, a child. Hence, there is some information available on the desires and intentions of the object of "mercy killing". As for the object of conception, there is no information available on the desires of the(forthcoming) individual. This is also true in the likely case of the (intended) object of the action not existing yet. The fact that it is impossible to have this necessary information when creating

So my response for the foundations includes two rules:
Not violating dignity and Not creating unnecessary suffering. Both would violated in the case of procreation. — schopenhauer1

I agree.

He is saying that it is a personal position but it should not be implemented as a Stalinist social directive. — Tom Storm

Ah. Gotcha. Thanks.

Same thing. For ethical reasons (i.e. conscientiously) I haven't and will not procreate.

The bad thing is a decision being made for you against your will. That can't happen to the non-existent child, they have no will. When will that bad thing happen - the decision being made against their will? — Isaac


I would say birth. — schopenhauer1

What decision is made against a child's will at the time of birth?

There is now a will at that time, no? — schopenhauer1

Yep, but no decision is being made at that time against it.

A decision was made that (eventually) affected that person born at that time. — schopenhauer1

Yep I agree. I was asking when a decision was made that went against there will, not when one was made that would eventually affect them. There's nothing morally wrong with making decisions that will eventually effect people, we do it all the time.

I don't agree that autonomy is not violated by thinking in terms of the average way we look at future tense. Someone will have X, Y, Z happen due to this prior decision. — schopenhauer1

Again, that something will happen to then as a result of the decision is not in question, the 'bad' thing, the intuitively immoral thing here is making a decision for someone against their will. That is not something that's going to happen in the future.

The form of your argument about cause (bomb planting and bombs - as you delightfully put it) is

if B will cause A in the future, then B is morally bad.
where
A=bad outcome
B=action whose morality we're trying to establish

Substituting with future harms...

A=the child being harmed
B=conceiving a child

if {conceiving a child} will cause {the child being harmed} then {conceiving a child} is morally bad.

Substituting with making a decision for someone against their will (kidnapping to play a game)...

A=making a decision for someone against their will (kidnapping to play a game)
B=conceiving a child

if {conceiving a child} will cause {making a decision for someone against their will (kidnapping to play a game)} then {conceiving a child} is morally bad.

But conceiving a child does not cause, in future, a decision to be made against someone's will.

The best you can say is that a decision is made (to conceive a child) which might be against the will of that child if that child existed at the time and could express a preference). But since that contains a contingent which clearly is not the case, the situation it mitigates never arises.

This is what I mean by equivocating between harms and force. You can't use the 'will happen in future' argument that is associated with harms when talking about force because that is not something that will necessarily happen in future. The harm will happen in future, but the force won't.

The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).

I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. — Antinatalist

Well, I'll bear that in mind next time I ask a cobbler to fix my shoe - 'must not use him as means to an end'. Don't know how I'm going to get this sole re-stitched, but still, we can't go around ignoring the half-remembered edicts of dead eighteenth century Germans now can we?

we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter. — Antinatalist

So you're positing that there is a non-existent individual? You see the contradiction there?

The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).

I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. — Antinatalist

Well, I'll bear that in mind next time I ask a cobbler to fix my shoe - 'must not use him as means to an end'. Don't know how I'm going to get this sole re-stitched, but still, we can't go around ignoring the half-remembered edicts of dead eighteenth century Germans now can we? — Isaac

I think Kant´s point is still valid.
The cobbler has at least at some kind of choice, what she/he will do in the world in general. The forthcoming child has no choice, whatsoever.

we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.
— Antinatalist

So you're positing that there is a non-existent individual? You see the contradiction there? — Isaac

As a matter a fact I´m saying:

Scenario A: There is no individual as an object in the moment of the conception.
Scenario B: What we call "non-life" really isn´t non-life. In some kind of reality, there´s living an individual. She/he doesn´t exist in our world, but when the conception will happen, it starts the process that she/he will born to our world.

The Scenario B is very unlikely, I don´t believe it in myself. I think it is some kind of esoteric BS. But arguing years and years on the topic, I have thought and heard many unlikely scenarios. This one is one of them.
So, personally, I don´t believe there is a non-existent individual at the moment of conception.

Yep I agree. I was asking when a decision was made that went against there will, not when one was made that would eventually affect them. There's nothing morally wrong with making decisions that will eventually effect people, we do it all the time. — Isaac

Yeah, that wasn't your disagreement. You were trying to make an argument that because the decision was made prior to the "existence" of the person, it was somehow invalid because there was no "person" when the decision was made. So you admit that this argument is no longer worth pursuing, and I would agree with at.

But conceiving a child does not cause, in future, a decision to be made against someone's will.

The best you can say is that a decision is made (to conceive a child) which might be against the will of that child if that child existed at the time and could express a preference). But since that contains a contingent which clearly is not the case, the situation it mitigates never arises.

This is what I mean by equivocating between harms and force. You can't use the 'will happen in future' argument that is associated with harms when talking about force because that is not something that will necessarily happen in future. The harm will happen in future, but the force won't. — Isaac

Yes I know what you are saying, but I disagree with it. When the child comes into existence and there was no way for the child to decide this, at that time the violation took place. The decision was made at which future time, the person's dignity was violated. If I do something in the past that causes something in the future to bring about a bad state of affairs, it is still a state of affairs. At conception there was no "person" (maybe), but at birth there is. How did the child become birthed? The decision and actions of the parent of course, and at that time of birth, those decisions and actions brought about the violation regardless if the decision was made in the past. The person did not get "birthed" magically by no action occurring prior. So your whole argument doesn't make sense when you claim:

But conceiving a child does not cause, in future, a decision to be made against someone's will. — Isaac

The decision was made which caused dignity to be violated at a future point. That is the point.

The decision was made which caused dignity to be violated at a future point. That is the point. — schopenhauer1

How was dignity violated at a future point? What is the dignity violating event that's happening at this future point?

How was dignity violated at a future point? What is the dignity violating event that's happening at this future point? — Isaac

Time 1: No state of affairs exists where a baby is in a net that I set in the sand, hidden.
Time 2: A baby is in now in the net.

Time 1 caused the violation at Time 2.

Time 1: No state of affairs exists where a baby is in a net that I set in the sand, hidden.
Time 2: A baby is in now in the net.

Time 1 caused the violation at Time 2. — schopenhauer1

But being in a net is a bad thing, so we're talking about harms here not dignity. I accept that one can set up affairs such that some harm will befall another in the future (even if that other doesn't yet exist). I'm asking you about the dignity argument.

I can explain this better with your oft-used kidnapping example.

What's bad about kidnapping a person to play a game (even if you think the game is brilliant and they'll really enjoy it) is that you're treating them as if they didn't have a will of their own. Their own choices of their own free will have a value over and above how 'right' or 'wrong' those choices are (sometimes).

But we can't apply this to conception because there's no person to have a will, to possess their own choices, until after we've conceived them. A non-existent being doesn't have a will or make any choices of their own.

Once born they will have a will and choices of their own, but we're not doing anything to violate them by then. It's a one-off decision and it's made at a time when there's no will to violate by making it.

We're deciding whether to bring a will into existence, so we can't possibly be violating that will at the same time as deciding whether to create it.

I can explain this better with your oft-used kidnapping example.

What's bad about kidnapping a person to play a game (even if you think the game is brilliant and they'll really enjoy it) is that you're treating them as if they didn't have a will of their own. Their own choices of their own free will have a value over and above how 'right' or 'wrong' those choices are (sometimes).

But we can't apply this to conception because there's no person to have a will, to possess their own choices, until after we've conceived them. A non-existent being doesn't have a will or make any choices of their own.

Once born they will have a will and choices of their own, but we're not doing anything to violate them by then. It's a one-off decision and it's made at a time when there's no will to violate by making it.

We're deciding whether to bring a will into existence, so we can't possibly be violating that will at the same time as deciding whether to create it. — Isaac

Yes I get what you're saying and I can see why you might think that, but I think this is really the same as the causing unnecessary suffering rule.

Well first off let me acknowledge that I wasn't sure if dignity violated or suffering was a subsection of another, so this is something I am working out, the way I am using "dignity violated". However, I think it can be defended as a separate thing. I actually was thinking suffering would be a subsection of dignity violated but may be just a special case of suffering.. etc.

First is, if we are defining dignity as ONLY equating to autonomy of will, then this is still no different than the unnecessary suffering rule. At the time of birth, there is a person's will. That person does not exist in that situation by magic or fiat. Something put them in that situation. Once that situation has started, the dignity was violated. It doesn't matter that the act that caused the violation happened beforehand. Once there is someone experiencing the world, we have dignity being violated. Is there a "will" did this "will" have autonomy to be in the situation it finds itself in? No. That to me is dignity violated.

But here's the thing, I don't think "dignity" just covers autonomy of will, but a basic unfairness or injustice that might be more fundamental (you don't need a will involved at point A, let's say). That is to say, finding yourself in a game you cannot escape, and that was not of your doing, is an injustice.

However, both these things are sort of saying the same thing.. The injustice one finds oneself in, is basically also not having the ability to make a choice for the injustice one finds oneself in. So at the end of the day, it could be the same thing without much distinction.

At the time of birth, there is a person's will. That person does not exist in that situation by magic or fiat. Something put them in that situation. — schopenhauer1

Agreed. And if the very situation itself was overall negative then we'd have a problem, but since it isn't we've no problem at all ... yet.

Once that situation has started, the dignity was violated. — schopenhauer1

This is just plain wrong though. Once born, no dignity is being violated. You can't change the past. You're literally saying that a situation which occurred in the past changes once the kid is born in the future. For something which did not violate anyone's dignity at the time to change as a consequence of something in its future breaks the rules of causality. Something from the future cannot cause a change in the properties of something in the past. So if it wasn't a violation of dignity at the time (which it wasn't because no will existed to act against), then some future event can't change the circumstances of the past to make it something it wasn't.

did this "will" have autonomy to be in the situation it finds itself in? No. — schopenhauer1

That doesn't make sense. Autonomy only means anything when there is a will. The concept can't be applied to the pre-will possibility, you might as well apply it to a stone. Possibilities don't have wills. The act of conception is the act of creating a will, so it cannot possibly be judged against the autonomy of that will, nothing can will itself to be created nor will itself not to be, so there's no view on the matter to take into consideration (or unjustly not do so).

I don't think "dignity" just covers autonomy of will, but a basic unfairness or injustice that might be more fundamental (you don't need a will involved at point A, let's say). That is to say, finding yourself in a game you cannot escape, and that was not of your doing, is an injustice. — schopenhauer1

Most people don't think so, so just saying it is isn't going to be sufficient. You've said before that you can make your case from common intuitions. This isn't one.

But being in a net is a bad thing, so we're talking about harms here not dignity. — Isaac

To be harmed is to lose one's dignity.

To be harmed is to lose one's dignity. — baker

Maybe, but I was referring to the specific use @schopenhauer1 made in his kidnapping for a fantastic game example. No-one harmed at all, but 'dignity' trespassed upon by ignoring the kidnaper's will.

Time 1: No state of affairs exists where a baby is in a net that I set in the sand, hidden.
Time 2: A baby is in now in the net.

Time 1 caused the violation at Time 2. — schopenhauer1

So this is about procreation as entrapment: To procreate (here meant broadly, to conceive and carry a pregnancy to term) is to set up a trap for another being. The evil is in doing so intentionally.


I think this is actually a good enough point, but I don't think many people will be convinced by it, because when presented by this argument from entrapment, they could (secretly) be operating out of a belief "Others have done it to me, so I'm going to do it to others, as revenge" -- an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.
It could be that for antinatalism to be more convincing to such a population, you'd need to first find a way for those people to forgive their parents for giving birth to them.

Maybe, but I was referring to the specific use schopenhauer1 made in his kidnapping for a fantastic game example. No-one harmed at all, but 'dignity' trespassed upon by ignoring the kidnaper's will. — Isaac

In this case, it's about the intention, and it's the intention that is evil. Setting a trap is already evil. The fact that nobody got trapped so far doesn't change the intention to set the trap, it doesn't undo the evilness of setting the trap.

Again, the focus on intention applies only insofar as people really carefully think through why they want to have children. (But which they usually don't seem to do, so the point is moot.)

In this case, it's about the intention, and it's the intention that is evil. Setting a trap is already evil. The fact that nobody got trapped so far doesn't change the intention to set the trap, it doesn't undo the evilness of setting the trap. — baker

Yep, agreed.

the focus on intention applies only insofar as people really carefully think through why they want to have children. (But which they usually don't seem to do, so the point is moot.) — baker

Again, agreed.


Neither are the point at hand though, which is the argument for hard antinatalism.

Agreed. And if the very situation itself was overall negative then we'd have a problem, but since it isn't we've no problem at all ... yet. — Isaac

So we definitely disagree there, because once the situation is "inescapable game, that 'hey you might like some aspects'" I believe there to be a problem, even if it has 'hey you might like some aspects' qualities". At that point, what other choice except suicide or slow death is there of course.. It's not like there's a button that we can just say.. "Next!".

This is just plain wrong though. — Isaac

NOpe.. but let's continue...

You can't change the past. You're literally saying that a situation which occurred in the past changes once the kid is born in the future. — Isaac

The thing that occurred in the past is going to affect the person in the future..that developing fetus will become a person at some point. It's just like suffering.. I have a board ready to smack you in the head when a you step in a certain spot.. you step there, as intended, and it smacks you in the head...

At time T1, you are not on the spot.. no violation.. At time T2, nope.. T3 you step on the spot, smacks you in the head THERE is the violation.

Let's now make this dignity of lifeguard...

T1.. sitting there on the beach.. T2, sitting sipping a lemonade.. T3 wham.. Isaac has a net set, buried in the sand meant for the lifeguard to step on.. Isaac drags him to lifeguarding academy where he will sit there teaching his students.. At no point before T3 was there a state of affairs of dignity being violated.. Right at the time T3 is when the violation occurs. Yet the actions for this to take place happened prior to this state of affairs..

Now let's turn it up a notch..
Isaac has a machine that puts the lifeguard in and out of existence whenever he wants. All of these existences require some sort of challenge/overcoming challenges game-aspect for his prey/contestant/subject. At the moment a person was put into this scenario, that is the violation of dignity.. Could that person be asked whether they wanted to be in this game? Is it something less than a paradise for that individual and they weren't consulted? Was that individual put in a situation where he cannot easily escape? Then dignity threshold has been crossed.

That doesn't make sense. Autonomy only means anything when there is a will. The concept can't be applied to the pre-will possibility, you might as well apply it to a stone. Possibilities don't have wills. The act of conception is the act of creating a will, so it cannot possibly be judged against the autonomy of that will, nothing can will itself to be created nor will itself not to be, so there's no view on the matter to take into consideration (or unjustly not do so). — Isaac

Doing an action that affects someone is messing with someone else's autonomy. Any point where someone's existential situation is assumed for them, would be a violation once someone exists to be the recipient of that existential situation. Besides which, I never originally defined dignity in terms of autonomy of will, so if that is a sticking point for you (because you limited it to this definition) then refer to my broader point here: As I said...

I don't think "dignity" just covers autonomy of will, but a basic unfairness or injustice that might be more fundamental (you don't need a will involved at point A, let's say). — schopenhauer1

These are like arguments people make with the definition of "is".. Was someone put in a situation that they could not control? Was this a substantial enough situation? Things like that.

Most people don't think so, so just saying it is isn't going to be sufficient. You've said before that you can make your case from common intuitions. This isn't one. — Isaac

I think these ideas of fairness and injustice of kidnapping into a game are actually quite common. Rather, this application is what is not.

I mean forcing someone to work for you is wrong. However, people used to think certain people could be forced to work.. But this changed. They applied the same application differently.

Neither are the point at hand though, which is the argument for hard antinatalism. — Isaac

"It's evil to act on evil intentions" -- this seems to be the basic argument for AN here.
"To intend to procreate is to set a trap for another person. Setting a trap is evil. To procreate is evil."

Yes, ?