Aboutness seems to be what intentionality is. These words seem to be inter-changeable. I'm sure some Husserlian can easily dispute that.

I'm simple minded in these topics, or at least I try to be. I often fail. Take a simple example. Look at your laptop or computer now. A large part of your consciousness is now directed at, focused on the laptop. Your conscious perceptions in this case is about the computer. But you could also focus on a word, any word, and as you focus on the word, instead of quickly reading over it, then your intentionality is directed at the word.

But this is speaking about concrete objects. You can have intentionality about your thoughts, absent concrete instantiation. If you think of a pink elephant, your aboutness is related to a thought, not a concretely existing thing.

You could be wrong about the causes of the aboutness. You could be dreaming that you are seeing a tree and you might think that the aboutness you have concerning the tree, is about an existing concrete thing, but it's not in this case.

I'm assuming much of our mental ruminations may not be about anything. That is there is no "directedness" between speech fragments and any object.

The aboutness is its intentionality? — Shawn

I don't think about is the intent. I think the intent is precise, or intends to be, even if it only comes close.

It comes from Franz Brentano, who was one of Husserl's professors and a key source for later phenomenology. 'In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents.' It develops from there into a major topic in phenomenology and philosophy generally.

'In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. — Wayfarer

I had a feeling there was more to it. :wink:

What do you think phenomenologically is aboutness of an object?

The aboutness is its intentionality? — Shawn

As stated by Wayfarer, the term was coined by Brentano, in his "Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint", in a chapter where he's trying to outline what the differences are between mental and physical phenomena. What are those? According to Brentano:

"Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing actually does occur. Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc.
Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a fgure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination.
These examples may suffce to illustrate the differences between the two classes of
phenomena."
-Franz Brentano, "Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint", p.60, 61

On intentionality, he states:

"What positive criterion shall we now be able to provide? Or is there perhaps no positive defnition which holds true of all mental phenomena generally? Bain thinks that in fact there is none.* Nevertheless, psychologists in earlier times have already pointed out that there is a special affnity and analogy which exists among all mental phenomena, and which physical phenomena do not share.
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental)† inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing),10 or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affrmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.‡ This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, defne mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves."
-Ibid. p.68

I'm assuming much of our mental ruminations may not be about anything. That is there is no "directedness" between speech fragments and any object. — Manuel

For Husserl, an intentional object, understood most primordial, is simply a ‘sense’. A mental rumination would certainly qualify as sense.

Ah. Then the question would be where does intentionality not arise in our mental life for Husserl?

A state of dreamless sleep comes to mind. I wonder about such cases as being completely lost in thought such that if someone interrupts you and asks "what are you thinking about?" You might not be able to give an answer.

Then again, it may arise in the latter scenario too.

Then the question would be where does intentionality not arise in our mental life for Husserl? — Manuel

He recognized issues like birth, death, unconsciousness and sleep as problems for the theory but I think he argues that since the transcendentally reduced ego is not a human it does not die or suffer complete loss of consciousness( don’t ask)

Ah. Then the question would be where does intentionality not arise in our mental life for Husserl? — Manuel

The "purely" material aspect of the experience is without intentionality. When you perceive a table, all the stimulus entering your eye is without intentionality. All these sensations are non-intentional material for intentions. Through these material something presents itself as something, in this case the table. There is no "table" in those sensations. Sensations has to be organized in such a manner that they'll (re)present something (if there shall be an "lived experience"). (Material world provides "limits" within which something can "emerge" as a meaningful formation?) So, intentionality doesn't arise when there is only mechanical or physical reactions. When physical objects interact "mechanically" there is no intentionality. For human consciousness there is always intentionality involved? On the other hand, animal wandering in the woods tries to evade all objects in its way. A walking moose in the woods doesn't hit the tree and bounce from it to some direction, but he/she experiences the visual tree as an "obstacle" and accordingly orients itself. Is there some kind of "instinctual intentionality" involved even here, in this animal's behavior?

(All this relates to Husserl's distinction between hyle (matter) and morphe (form), which I think is an interesting distinction.)

A walking moose in the woods doesn't hit the tree and bounce from it to some direction, but he/she experiences the visual tree as an "obstacle" and accordingly orients itself. Is there some kind of "instinctual intentionality" involved even here, in this animal's behavior? — waarala

I'd have to guess certain animal cries refer to things in the world, such as "predator", "food", "danger", "mating", "territory" and so on.

If this is the case, as seems to be with certain monkeys for example, then we'd have to assume they have intentionality, if such animals are conscious, which we can only assume to be the case.

Yes, but I think Husserl wouldn't have used terms like "refer" or "world" here. We don't have any knowledge how these, what appear for us like "signals", are constituted in animal minds i.e. in their "world". There is more causality than "intelligible" motivations involved here. In this sense, visually sensed "possible obstacles" would be "only" signals for animals.

Sure, we have to use some words to communicate, but anything we use will be very inadequate to explain what's actually going on in the case of non-human animals.

Sure, these might be signals roughly automatic. But maybe they have an "inner world", so they may also have something like aboutness in the mind, so it's plausible they have some kind of intentionality. We have no way of knowing.

It boils down to intuition in these cases.

Some of our mental states appear to be 'about' things. Perceptual states 'represent' something to be the case; beliefs are 'about' things; desires are 'for' things.

Of course, such talk is profoundly confused. Philosophers talk of mental states having 'representative contents', meaning they 'represent' somethng to be the case (and thereby become capable of being accurate or inaccurate). But no mental state can 'represent' anything to be the case, for 'representing' is an activity. So it is something one does, not something one - or something - is. A mental state can no more 'represent' something to be the case than it can walk somewhere or go on holiday. I can represent something to be the case; and can do so 'by' being in some mental state, but the mental state itself does not do the representing. To think otherwise is as confused as thinking that thoughts think things.

Minds can represent, minds can desire, minds can believe. But representations do not represent, and desires do not desire, and beliefs do not believe. Representing, believing, desiring: these are all mental activities, not mental states. They are done by a mind being in a certain state, but the state in question is the means by which the mind represents, believes, or desires; the state represents, believes or desires nothing.

It comes from Franz Brentano, who was one of Husserl's professors and a key source for later phenomenology. 'In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents.' It develops from there into a major topic in phenomenology and philosophy generally. — Wayfarer

Sorry to bother you but you seem to be the go-to-person here. So, here goes...

Aboutness, the way I understood it, seems to be the fact the the mind can "hold" stuff - other things, including itself - in it (mental contents). It, the mind, can, in the simplest sense, think on/of, make a subject of, whathaveyou. What must be noted however is that aboutness is only that as described above - there's nothing in aboutness vis-à-vis mind apart from the fact that the mind can make a subject of, can think on/of, other things, itself too.

If so, what about photography? A camera - the processes involved in image formation inside it - can also be about something, usually things other than the camera itself. Just as the mind can think of something, a camera can take a picture of something. Are we to conclude that the camera and the mind - both capable of being about something - are one and the same thing? If no, why? If yes, then cameras are minds!

This is a difficult topic for me and internet sources I referred to are either too superficial or too deep. Ergo, kindly cut me some slack for my errors if any.

If so, what about photography? — TheMadFool

Cameras are artefacts. They are built to capture images, by humans. They're an extension of human intentionality.

Well, shooting from the hip, I would say that 'phenomenologically', what aboutness is, is all those phenomenologically derived 'stuff' a subject can convey to another subject regarding some object. That seems however to be in a framed case. May for instance abstractions have aboutness attached to them? It would seem that at least nominologically, they can.

The aboutness of an object I would probably be more inclined to claim is a product of our inability to convey actual aboutness, distinct from aboutness that may be subject to figments of imagination or the like. Aboutness I would rather say should be seen in the context of reference. An objects aboutness comes with ordinates for carving out some objects from the rest of the world with the purpose of analyzing it.

That 'intentionality' and 'aboutness' is on a par is a definition I must go against, I think. At least my intuition cries out at this fact, so lets look at it a bit closer. I think what I'm getting at is that intentionality is a precursor, and aboutness maybe can be seen as meta. I am now seeing that this may not be so clear.

Aboutness must be applied post-teriori. A subject must have epistemic grounds for claims of aboutness. As when it comes to intentionality, this must surely be possible to apply a priori?

Sorry if I'm way of point.

'In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents.' It develops from there into a major topic in phenomenology and philosophy generally. — Wayfarer

Mental states are not the only things that represent things. All effects represent their causes, of which mental states are just one type of cause and effect relationship. As such, aboutness is everywhere causes leave effects.


Aboutness is the same thing as information. Information is the realtionship between cause and effect.

Intentionality is the aspect of the mind that causes other mental states and body states. The will to remember something brings that memory into consciousness. The intent to move your arm moves your arm. Intentionality seems to be something different than aboutness except for the fact that intentionality is a cause for other mental and body states. As such, you moving your arm is about your intent to move it just as your words on this screen are about your idea and your intent to communicate it.

Intentionality is the aspect of the mind that causes other mental states and body states. The will to remember something brings that memory into consciousness. — Harry Hindu

I imagine your description of intentionality is accurate for certain approaches in philosophy. In phenomenology, however, intentionality and aboutness are quite different from a cause-effect structure.

This thread topic is about "aboutness" and not about intention (or "intentionality").

:strong:

This thread topic is about "aboutness" and not about intention (or "intentionality").
— 180 Proof

— Wheatley

“Intentionality has to do with the directedness or of-ness or aboutness of consciousness, i.e. with the fact that when one perceives or judges or feels or thinks, one's mental state is about or of something.” (The Phenomenological Mind)

If birds call out a warning sound related to the presence of a hawk, do we assume the aboutness if it shows that the birds are thinking? Or should we first establish that they can think, and then away there is aboutness?

https://youtu.be/0_aGbAojy-M

Joshs
If birds call out a warning sound related to the presence of a hawk, do we assume the aboutness if it shows that the birds are thinking? Or should we first establish that they can think, and then away there is aboutness? — frank

Good question. I subscribe to approaches to understanding living systems that impute a kind of aboutness even to creatures with no cognitive capacities to speak of.

I imagine your description of intentionality is accurate for certain approaches in philosophy. In phenomenology, however, intentionality and aboutness are quite different from a cause-effect structure. — Joshs

Then it should be simple enough for you to provide an example of aboutness and intentionality that does not include a causal relationship. In talking about intentionality or aboutness you are basically talking about causes and their effects.

Intentions always precede the action that is intended.

To say that something is about aomething else is to say that something was caused by something else, or else how would it be about it? How would it contain information about something else?

Intentionality has to do with the directedness or of-ness or aboutness of consciousness — Joshs

This is just another way of saying consciousness is composed of information.

"Aboutness" denotes 'to indicate a discursive subject' (e.g. this thread is about "aboutness").

"Intentionality" denotes 'to select an object of or direction for attention' (e.g. Boltzmann's S = k log W, looking at a tree, planning tomorrow's picnic).

It seems the latter can be a function or element of the former but is not always so.

Intentionality has to do with the directedness or of-ness or aboutness of consciousness
— Joshs
This is just another way of saying consciousness is composed of information — Harry Hindu

There are as many definitions of information as there are of intentionality , so in order for each of us to know what the other is talking about we would need to clarify these terms. I would just offer that u less you are willing to reduce information to ‘sense’ , the only place for information I see in Husserl’s model of consciousness is as a derived, second order construction.

Then it should be simple enough for you to provide an example of aboutness and intentionality that does not include a causal relationship. In talking about intentionality or aboutness you are basically talking about causes and their effects.

Intentions always precede the action that is intended.

To say that something is about aomething else is to say that something was caused by something else, or else how would it be about it? How would it contain information about something else? — Harry Hindu

Husserlian intentionality is very different from natural
causality. To intend an object is to anticipate forward into its occuring, so in this sense the intention brings ‘information’ with it that shapes what it is we experience as the object. That is to say , it borrows from the past to shape the future. So this protentional feature of intentionality is causative in it’s shaping function. But the object which is intended is also causative in that it shapes and corrects the expectation emanating from the subjective pole of the intentional act. In sum , the subjective and objective poles of an intentional act both cause and are affected by each other in the same moment.

“ First there is an empty expectation, and then there is the point of the primary perception, itself an intentional experience. But the primary presentation [or impression] comes to be in the flow only by occurring as the fulfillment of contents relative to the preceding empty intentions, thereby changing itself into primal presenting perception.” (Husserl 2001; translated in Gallagher & Zahavi 2014)

“The primal impression comes on the scene as the fulfilment of an empty protention; the now, as the present phase of consciousness, is constituted by way of a protentional fulfilment (Husserl 2001). “

Note that the intended object doesn’t merely fulfill the intentional expectation. If that were the case the world would be nothing but what we conjure. The object intersects with the forward expectation to produce something new which nonetheless is framed by the intentional anticipation.


This may not make much sense but maybe you can see how it deviates from the logic of natural cause-effect.

. I subscribe to approaches to understanding living systems that impute a kind of aboutness even to creatures with no cognitive capacities to speak of. — Joshs

Buy then intention wouldn't be involved, right?