That can't be correct, for that would mean that immaterialism - a view that is as far from naturalism as it is possible to be - would turn out to be a form of naturalism (which makes a mockery of the term). It would also mean that the debate over whether the non-natural can causally interact with the natural is misguided by definition (which it isn't).

Naturalism is best understood as the view that the ultimate constituents of reality are extra-mental entities.

That can't be correct, for that would mean that immaterialism - a view that is as far from naturalism as it is possible to be - would turn out to be a form of naturalism (which makes a mockery of the term). — Bartricks

Maybe it's just a kind of definitional game, but I would distinguish materialism, physicalism, and naturalism, with naturalism being the most general view. That is, immaterialism is only in opposition to materialism, but not in one to physicalism and naturalism.

Naturalism is best understood as the view that the ultimate constituents of reality are extra-mental entities. — Bartricks

Especially the mental entities could be the real ones. Here I am inspired by Galen Strawson:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htZR7ryJEqE

Galen Strawson says that all that is real is the physical. I modify that to mean that everything that is real is the natural. And something is real for me if it can do something, that is, exercise causality.

But now you're just using 'real' and 'natural' as synonyms.

That's not how they're used, not in philosophy anyway.

Two philosophers can agree that, say, morality exists - and thus is real - yet one might be a naturalist about morality and the other a non-naturalist.

So naturalism shouldn't be used as a synonym for 'real' as that makes such debates misguided by definition.

Okay, you may be right in that I am taking something for granted that is not so the case in philosophy.

Nevertheless, I find your definition of naturalism also unsatisfactory, since the ultimate constituents of reality might be mental entities. Keyword panpsychism.

To clarify things, here are several definitions of "naturalism."

• The philosophical belief that everything arises from natural properties and causes, and supernatural or spiritual explanations are excluded or discounted.
  
  
• The belief that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing “supernatural”, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality
  
  
• The belief that natural laws are the only rules that govern the structure and behavior of the natural world, and that the changing universe is at every stage a product of these laws
  
  
• A comprehensive, science-based worldview, premised on the idea that existence in all its dimensions and complexity is a single, natural realm, not split between the natural and the supernatural

No, it carves things up correctly, for if the ultimate constituents of reality are minds, then immaterialism is true - and that's not a form of naturalism.

Note too that even if there are some positions that operate to blur the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism, that doesn't mean that this is not what the terms mean.

No, it carves things up correctly, for if the ultimate constituents of reality are minds, then immaterialism is true - and that's not a form of naturalism. — Bartricks

I think the panpsychist would disagree with that. Because:

"Panpsychists believe that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. An increasing number of philosophers and even some neuroscientists are coming around to the idea that it may be our best hope for solving the problem of consciousness.
[...]
Firstly, panpsychists tend not to think that literally everything is conscious. They believe that the fundamental constituents of the physical world are conscious, but they need not believe that every random arrangement of conscious particles results in something that is conscious in its own right." (Philip Goff - Galileo’s Error)

This is a good starting point. Because you can see from these definitions that they do not give a criterion for how I can distinguish the natural from the supernatural or unnatural. But that is what matters. One needs a precise criterion.

An increasing number of philosophers and even some neuroscientists are coming around to the idea that it may be our best hope for solving the problem of consciousness. — spirit-salamander

It may solve the problem of consciousness theoretically but will it be true and how can that be demonstrated?

@Bartricks

No, it carves things up correctly, for if the ultimate constituents of reality are minds, then immaterialism is true - and that's not a form of naturalism. — Bartricks

Or do you mean that idealism is opposed to naturalism? Because the idealist sees himself as immaterialist, but the panpsychist sees himself as materialist and thus naturalist.

It may solve the problem of consciousness theoretically but will it be true and how can that be demonstrated? — Tom Storm

It would be as you say merely theoretical, that is non-empirical, philosophical from almost pure concepts. The question is whether or not you are persuaded by it argumentatively. But I was only concerned here with the understanding of naturalistic. And this understanding could indeed be purely theoretical.

Let's define a mind as an object that has mental states.

Let's define a material object as an object that has extension.

Let's also stipulate that my brain is an object that has extension.

And now let's stipulate that my brain has mental states.

My brain is now my mind, but it is also a material object.

I take it that we would both agree that my brain is a 'natural' object and thus that - under these circumstances - my mind turns out to be a natural object.

If we now imagine that everything in the universe apart from my brain disappears, then everything that exists is now natural - naturalism is true - and everything that exists is also my mind.

This kind of situation is one with which, I take it, my definition of naturalism would be unable to cope. For I have said that naturalism is best understood as the view that the fundamental constituents of reality are mind-external entities. I agree, but it is easy to fix by simply changing 'mind external' to 'not essentially mental entities'. It would remain the case that everything that exists was also my mind. But what exists - my brain - does not have its mental states as an essential property (for it could cease to have any mental states and yet still have extension). And so what exists could continue to do so without there being any mental entities in existence. This would then permit there to be naturalists who maintain that everything that exists are minds, and immaterialists who maintain that everything that exists is essentially a mind or mental states.

Here I think Chomsky's idea makes a lot of sense. Naturalism is, whatever is achieved by naturalistic inquiry.

By naturalistic inquiry, he has in mind theoretical explanations for certain phenomena of the world. Of course, theoretical inquiry only goes so far. So if we want to learn about things in which naturalistic inquiry makes little progress, or can't say much about, then we read literature or traditional philosophy or the arts.

This does not mean that these other forms of knowing are "artificial" or not natural, just that they don't give theoretical explanations about the world.

This is a good starting point. Because you can see from these definitions that they do not give a criterion for how I can distinguish the natural from the supernatural or unnatural. But that is what matters. One needs a precise criterion. — spirit-salamander

The definitions are pretty specific - the natural is what is allowable under natural laws established using the scientific method.

The definitions are pretty specific - the natural is what is allowable under natural laws established using the scientific method. — T Clark

That would imply that there was nothing natural until the scientific method came along. That doesn't seem right.

That would imply that there was nothing natural until the scientific method came along. That doesn't seem right. — Herg

Do you think the world didn't operate in accordance with scientific principles before there was science? Was there a different set of rules that operated before there were sentient beings?

That would imply that there was nothing natural until the scientific method came along. That doesn't seem right.
— Herg

Do you think the world didn't operate in accordance with scientific principles before there was science? Was there a different set of rules that operated before there were sentient beings? — T Clark

No, I'm suggesting that since the word 'natural' pre-dates the scientific method, it must then have had a meaning which did not depend on the scientific method, and may well still have the same meaning. For instance, in the days when science was called 'natural philosophy', what did people mean by 'natural' in that phrase? I would also point out that 'natural' is a word used in everyday talk, and I'm sure most people don't think about the scientific method when they use it; they may not even have heard of the scientific method.

I would also point out that your definition is circular:

the natural is what is allowable under natural laws — T Clark

How can this be a definition of 'natural' if the word 'natural' is in both the definiendum and the definition?

No, I'm suggesting that since the word 'natural' pre-dates the scientific method, it must then have had a meaning which did not depend on the scientific method, and may well still have the same meaning. — Herg

The word "natural" is not the subject of this thread. The subject is "naturalism." I gave several definitions of the word as it is currently used from various web sources. If you want to argue that those definitions are wrong, go ahead. You should provide some evidence for that claim.

The word "natural" is not the subject of this thread. The subject is "naturalism." — T Clark

Well, it wasn't me that introduced this red herring, was it?

Well, it wasn't me that introduced this red herring, was it? — Herg

Do you even know what the phrase "red herring" means?

Well, it wasn't me that introduced this red herring, was it?
— Herg

Do you even know what the phrase "red herring" means? — T Clark

Yes. Do you know what a circular definition is?

Yes. Do you know what a circular definition is? — Herg

Yes. Your criticism of my statement was accurate. Your turn.

Yes. Do you know what a circular definition is?
— Herg

Yes. Your criticism of my statement was accurate. Your turn. — T Clark

LOL. No, I don't engage in philosophical ping-pong just for the sake of it. I concede the field to you. Have a nice day.

@Herg @T Clark

I found something that everyone could be happy with:

"There is a widely accepted distinction between ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. Ontological naturalists maintain, roughly, that natural reality exhausts causal reality: there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural causal powers. Methodological naturalists maintain, roughly, that well-established science is our touchstone for identifying the denizens of causal reality: we have no reason to believe in causal entities and causal powers beyond those recognised by science." (Graham Oppy - Naturalism and Religion: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation)

As my Oppy quote above shows, the concept of naturalism definitely has to do with causality. And this seems to be mainstream, which is not to say that your explanation is wrong.

Take a look at the Stanford entry. It presents a history of the movement from materialism - the mechanical model of, say, Descartes - to action at a distance - Newton - to the impact of conservation laws and physicalism. And yes, causation is central to the discussion.

You've raised an interesting topic - thank you.

And something is real for me if it can do something, that is, exercise causality. — spirit-salamander

I had forgotten to say here that it is not only about the exercise of causality, but also about the undergoing of causality. So to act and to be acted upon.

No, you've misunderstood Oppy.

If that should be the case, I still believe that a definition of ontological naturalism, must necessarily include causality explicitly.

This was your definition:

[...] naturalism is best understood as the view that the fundamental constituents of reality are [...] 'not essentially mental entities'. — Bartricks

One could say in addition that naturalism starts from only one ontological genus and excludes all other genus. This one genus would be nature. So there would be only species of the one nature. Corporeality would be one kind and mentality another. But in order to know this, namely that both are species of the genus nature, they must be able to mutually interact causally. Otherwise one of the elements, like the mental, would be extra-worldly, hence extra-natural.

What's wrong with my definition?

Where causality is concerned, those - such as myself - who believe in non-natural entities, do not thereby disbelieve in causality or disbelieve in the causal powers of non-natural entities.

Your definition would have the absurd upshot than any and all who believe in entities with causal powers are thereby naturalists.