So you think all a priori judgments are reasonable and discursive, but there is no intuition at any level. — Antinatalist

No intuitions, at any level? Yes, there are, at the empirical level. The sensible level, of real things, represented in us as phenomena. There is no knowledge of real things of experience without representations by intuition, just as there is no knowledge of abstract things of thought without representations as concepts.

You might see the problem here. Nothing given from concepts alone can tell us about the world of objects and nothing from intuition alone can tell us about abstract things, like beauty, justice, moral obligation, even though experience is rife with examples of them.
———-

if you radically doubt everything, you doubt also science etc.
And I don´t think such a doubt is a rational way to view life. — Antinatalist

Agreed. Radical skepticism prohibits knowledge.

So you think all a priori judgments are reasonable and discursive, but there is no intuition at any level.
— Antinatalist

No intuitions, at any level? Yes, there are, at the empirical level. The sensible level, of real things, represented in us as phenomena. There is no knowledge of real things of experience without representations by intuition, just as there is no knowledge of abstract things of thought without representations as concepts. — Mww

I was thinking that perhaps reasoning about a priori judgments is itself intuitive. That reasoning, which evaluates is some a priori judgment true or false.

You might see the problem here. Nothing given from concepts alone can tell us about the world of objects and nothing from intuition alone can tell us about abstract things, like beauty, justice, moral obligation, even though experience is rife with examples of them.
———- — Mww

Yes.

This is not an absolute proof for the simple reason that we can't ever prove that we have understood our proofs correctly — Qmeri

If this is valid it applies to your “proof” too. A proof that disproves itself false is nonsensical.

What makes you think you haven’t made a mistake? If the possibility of making a mistake is justification to reject Descartes then it’s also justification to reject your proof that we should reject Descartes. And I’d rather reject the latter.

I was thinking that perhaps reasoning about a priori judgments is itself intuitive. — Antinatalist

In that case, all we’re doing is exchanging the general form of the judgement, with particular matter that can be used to verify or falsify it. We are still reasoning about an intuition and not reasoning about an a priori judgement, the validity of it being a consequence. The shortest distance between two points is a straight line, the judgement, requires us to reason to the physical construction of the representations contained in the concepts of point and straight and line, such that the judgement is shown to be true.

I was thinking that perhaps reasoning about a priori judgments is itself intuitive.
— Antinatalist

In that case, all we’re doing is exchanging the general form of the judgement, with particular matter that can be used to verify or falsify it. We are still reasoning about an intuition and not reasoning about an a priori judgement, the validity of it being a consequence. — Mww

When someone is making an reasonable a priori judgment, I understand it so, it has to be true by definition. It is another question that are a priori judgments true. But you prove/"prove" it intuitively, the question of is some a priori judgment true or false, is judged by intuition.

Do you see flaws in my logic?
And maybe I´m repeating myself.

But you prove/"prove" it intuitively, the question of is some a priori judgment true or false, is judged by intuition. — Antinatalist

Close enough. We’re saying about the same thing.

I made a mistake, nonetheless, in that judgements don’t have truth values, as such. They stand, a posteriori, as the correctness of the relation between an object we sense and the object as it becomes known. Or, in the case of mere thought a priori, they stand as the validity of the relation of conceptions to each other.

Best to bear in mind the perspectives involved. When there are two distinct and separate cognitive systems in play, they are required to conform to each other in order to facilitate the possibility of productive communication. When either system operates on its own, for its own purpose, to its own end, there is no communication, the system is confined to itself internally. The difference is language, necessary for the communication between multiple systems, not even present in each singular system in its internal operations. So when it is said a judgement is true, what it meant is that the proposition composed and presented externally to represent the internal judgement in one system, conforms to the internal judgement in the other, from which his composed proposition would have been congruent, had he been the speaker rather than the listener. In effect, it is the proposition that holds truth value, and then only because a judgement has been made on the validity of the relations in the proposition given by one system, to the relations in the internal judgement of the other system, with respect to it.

Are we having fun yet?

But you prove/"prove" it intuitively, the question of is some a priori judgment true or false, is judged by intuition.
— Antinatalist

Close enough. We’re saying about the same thing.

I made a mistake, nonetheless, in that judgements don’t have truth values, as such. They stand, a posteriori, as the correctness of the relation between an object we sense and the object as it becomes known. Or, in the case of mere thought a priori, they stand as the validity of the relation of conceptions to each other. — Mww

I agree.

Best to bear in mind the perspectives involved. When there are two distinct and separate cognitive systems in play, they are required to conform to each other in order to facilitate the possibility of productive communication. When either system operates on its own, for its own purpose, to its own end, there is no communication, the system is confined to itself internally. The difference is language, necessary for the communication between multiple systems, not even present in each singular system in its internal operations. So when it is said a judgement is true, what it meant is that the proposition composed and presented externally to represent the internal judgement in one system, conforms to the internal judgement in the other, from which his composed proposition would have been congruent, had he been the speaker rather than the listener. In effect, it is the proposition that holds truth value, and then only because a judgement has been made on the validity of the relations in the proposition given by one system, to the relations in the internal judgement of the other system, with respect to it.

Are we having fun yet? — Mww

I have to agree. And yes, I think we are having fun.

Thinking is not physical!
I think therefore I am not physical?

"I think, therefore I am" — Qmeri

I used to think that statement has been always wrong.
One cannot deduce "am" from "think".
It is a category mistake.

Existence cannot be logically proved by thoughts.
It can only be perceived.
Perception has possibility of error.
Reason has its limitation.

"I" is a perceived being.
It is not a logically deduced or proved by reason being.

I think therefore I am not physical? — Rxspence

That I am not physical, is true, but it isn’t true because I think.
————-

"I" is a perceived being.
It is not a logically deduced or proved by reason being. — Corvus

To be perceived implies the use of the senses. “I” am never available to any sensibility, even my own. “I” am a perceived being is therefore false. And impossible besides.

The only possible means for “I” at all, is by logical deduction. In humans, all logical deduction is only possible by reason. But “I” am not a being at all, so whether or not a being logically deduced or a being proved by reason, is moot.
————-

Beware reification.

The only possible means for “I” at all, is by logical deduction. In humans, all logical deduction is only possible by reason. But “I” am not a being at all, so whether or not a being logically deduced or a being proved by reason, is moot. — Mww

Can't agree. It sounds like if one had no logical deductive reasoning capability (such as children or non philosophical people - who don't know a thing about logic), then he or she has no concept of "I".

That I am not physical, is true, but it isn’t true because I think. — Mww

I dream therefore they are physical?

People know he or she is "I" by seeing their own hands, feet, their own face (in the mirror) etc in front of them, feeling hungry (and they say I am bloody hungry. I need to eat something. I feel thirsty must have something to drink...etc), feeling angry (I am angry now, they say), seeing the objects in front of them (they say, I see a mountain. I see a lake etc). They don't need logical deduction to have "I".

"I" is simply a being perceived by the being, even if they don't realise.