And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. — Phaedo 69c
But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites. — Fooloso4
The introduction by the editors, Pierre Destrée and Franco V. Trivigno, explains the organization of the book in three sections, on the psychology of laughter, the norms that govern humor, and the way philosophers make use of humor in their works. In fact, there is no sharp division among the chapters, and, as is to be expected, a good deal of overlap.
As the editors note (8), the primary type of humor turns out to be abrasive or polemical, and Plato's treatment of humor in relation to phthonos ("envy," "malice") is a theme that runs throughout.
It is also the focus of the opening chapter, by Trivigno, who observes that "Plato's explicit theorizing about laughter and comedy is . . . focused on particular sorts of laughter that are presented as morally harmful" (13). Laughter poses a double danger: it threatens to become uncontrollable and overwhelms one's judgement, appealing as it does to the lower part of the soul. Furthermore, the pleasure it provides is mixed, as Plato argues in the Philebus, since the envious feel pain at the success of others even as they delight in the anticipation of their failure.
In the Laws, however, Plato contemplates dividing "comedy into two kinds, according to whether it is playful [paizein] or not" (935D), the latter being free of animosity.
When Socrates makes fun of his interlocutors, Trivigno suggests, his humor is not hostile but aims at their moral improvement. Whether this counts as playful is perhaps questionable. — Book review by David Konstan
I guess a verbal flourish can be difficult to translate. — frank
As I have said before, with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done. — Fooloso4
So it probably helps to put ourselves in Plato's shoes in order to understand him. — frank
— Phaedo 69c
Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.
Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites — Fooloso4
:cool:As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories. — Fooloso4
There is here, once again, a play of opposites. — Fooloso4
Correct. And the crux of the matter is, are they the shoes (1) of a philosopher or (2) of an author of comedy? — Apollodorus
Playwrights were big celebrities back then. I don't know, probably best to just drop it, huh? There's more important stuff in the world — frank
I didn't know about the Bacchants. — Amity
Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, moderation and courage and justice are a purging away of all such things, and phronesis itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. (69c)
There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way.(69d)
practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice". — Fooloso4
... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d)
I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.
There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment. That is what I say.(95d-e)
Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought. (95e)
"This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction. I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in these matters. (96a)
Listen then, and I will, Cebes, he said. When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it is. (96a)
One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. (97b-d)
After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true. (99d-100a)
Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?—I do.
I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. (100c-e)
It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)
And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by discussing both the beginning and what emerges out of it, if you wish to discover any truth … but if you are a philosopher I think you will do as I say.”
What you say is very true, said Simmias and Cebes together. (101d-102a)
if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest. — Fooloso4
I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed! — Fooloso4
Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself. — Fooloso4
The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice". — Fooloso4
That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace. — Amity
So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round. — Amity
I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.(95d)/quote]
As I pointed out:
Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:
... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d) — Fooloso4
The problem may be that others are only too quick to proclaim what is all too obvious and not pace themselves slowly enough to attend to the details that can turn the obvious into something quite different. — Fooloso4
The OP says “The question arises as to whether this [Phaedo] is a comedy or a tragedy”. — Apollodorus
There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. There's no story arc. — frank
But it does contain elements of tragedy and comedy and has a spiritual message to convey. So, maybe something like the mystery plays of antiquity only more complex and sophisticated? — Apollodorus
I don't see a spiritual message. I see the expression of ideas that will course through philosophy for the next 2400 years. — frank
Platonism, by which I mean the philosophical and mystical tradition that regards itself as closely following Plato, does see a spiritual message in the dialogues, though. — Apollodorus
Plato was not willing to go as far as Socrates did. He preferred to address the public at large through his written dialogues rather than conducting dialogues in the agora.
He did not write abstruse philosophical treatises but engaging philosophical dialogues meant to appeal to a less philosophically inclined audience. The dialogues are, most of the time, prefaced by a sort of mise en scène in which the reader learns who the participants to the dialogue are, when, where and how they presently met, and what made them start their dialogue.
The participants are historical and fictional characters. Whether historical or fictional, they meet in historical or plausible settings, and the prefatory mises en scène contain only some incidental anachronisms.
Plato wanted his dialogues to look like genuine, spontaneous dialogues accurately preserved. How much of these stories and dialogues is fictional? It is hard to tell, but he surely invented a great deal of them. References to traditional myths and mythical characters occur throughout the dialogues.
However, starting with the Protagoras and Gorgias, which are usually regarded as the last of his early writings, Plato begins to season his dialogues with self-contained, fantastical narratives that we usually label his ‘myths’. His myths are meant, among other things, to make philosophy more accessible. — SEP article: Plato's Myths
For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do. But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. Myth inculcates beliefs. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children (cf. Republic 377a ff.), believe noble things....
Myth can embody in its narrative an abstract philosophical doctrine. In the Phaedo, Plato develops the so-called theory of recollection (72e–78b). The theory is there expounded in rather abstract terms. The eschatological myth of the Phaedo depicts the fate of souls in the other world, but it does not “dramatize” the theory of recollection. — As above
Plato criticized both the epic poetry of Homer and Hesiod, and the tragic and comic poets. Yet he invented myths of his own. So what was his attitude towards literature and myth? Peter tackles this question in a final episode on Plato.
ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses. https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm
The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.
For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third.
First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.
The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him. — Fooloso4
Of course. Have you read any books about Meister Eckhart? — frank
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.