I cannot doubt my existence. I exist. Undeniably so. — Querius
Bill Vallicella arguing in favor of consciousness. Excellent philosophy. — Querius
The unitary self is phenomenologically given, but not as a separate object. Herein, perhaps, resides the error of Hume and some Buddhists: they think that if there is a self, it must exist as a separate object of experience.
Modern romantic mythology requires that you be solipsistic being in this regard. — apokrisis
But the key point is, to reify the self as an object of perception, as something constant and changeless, is a perceptual error. — Wayfarer
Who sticks with the facts of social science?Heard it all before a million times. But I stick with the facts of social science. — apokrisis
A thought cannot exist without a thinker.Of course you can't doubt it ... given that you are in existence as a socially constructed self regulatory habit of thought. — apokrisis
If there is no "I" who perceives and understands the facts of social science, then how can you be aware of the facts of social science? — Querius
If there is no "I" who perceives and understands the facts of social science, then how can you be aware of the facts of social science? If there is no a consciousness of succession in one and the same conscious subject, how can you be aware of the fact that you continue to stick with the facts of science? Without the consciousness of succession, without the retention of the earlier states in the present state, no such conclusion could be arrived at.
A thought cannot exist without a thinker. — Querius
Still unresponsive.But my position deals with your "I" on three Pragmatic levels - genetic, neural and linguistic. All three are explained semiotically as habits of regulation that are produced by more general contexts. — apokrisis
If there is not an "I" who encompasses all three levels, how can you overview and be aware of those three levels? — Querius
I think the self arises from nature, yes. The self is a possible action/activity of nature. And I think laws of nature are merely models we use for purposes of modelling and predicting the world. I certainly don't understand the Kantian position of postulating necessary transcendental subject and transcendental object - I don't agree that either of them have been shown to be "necessary".So, what's your answer? Is the self irreducible, or reducible in the some naturalistic way? Or...? — John
Autonomous, responsible, free personhood is a prerequisite to rationality.There appears to be a trend in modern philosophy to deny the reality of the "I", the "self", reducing the "I" to simply a part of the community in some anti-reductionist manner. This I believe is a mistake. It is a mistake because it belittles the separation which exists between you and I. The separation between us is very real and needs to be respected. Without having complete respect for this separation we have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
My point was that you are talking a monadic substance approach to consciousness - the usual outcome of reductionist simplicity.
And all that was by way of dealing with the original point - what we would really mean by "top down acting consciousness". To remind you, I was explaining how constraints depend on semiosis and that in fact our human interaction with the world has at least three distinct levels (and so at least three distinct levels in which those constraints are evolving).
If we are talking about the neural level, for example, then that means the top-downness is to do with attentional and intentional brain processes.
This is not an explanation. You note that ‘striving to survive’ is necessary for life to succeed, and from there you go to (paraphrasing) 'and therefore organisms strive to survive’. This is not an explanation, since organisms don't necessarily exist. — Querius
Moreover, in order for ‘striving to survive’ to be one thing — contrary to a collection of unrelated behaviors — there must be a binding principle like ‘fear of death’, which logically requires a concept of death.
Explain what happens when one chooses to raise one’s arm. Explain the mechanism from intention to neural change. And explain how the “I” knows which neural parts to change and which not. — Querius
To pursue the analogy, how is an intention translated into instructions (‘software’) for neurons? And what power does emergent consciousness have over matter, such that ‘creating software instructions’ is an apt analogy? — Querius
But if we are talking about human "self-consciousness" - the self-regulatory awareness of the self as a self - then the source of those higher level constraints come from right outside of individual biology and development. That level of selfhood is socially constructed and linguistically encoded. — apokrisis
Autonomous, responsible, free personhood is a prerequisite to rationality.
If external forces beyond my control shape me with insurmountable arbitrary constraints and if there is nothing but blind ‘potentiality’ running into those imposed constraints, then I am not in control over my actions and thoughts. And if I am not in control over my actions and thoughts, then I am not rational. And if I am not rational then I ‘have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality.’ — Querius
The abstract mind, instantiated on the computationally universal brain, decides to move an arm.
It does not know the mechanism of how this is performed, because it does not need to.
The mechanism involves layers of sub-conscious neuronal control systems ...
Because we don't believe in magic, there cannot be any other explanation ….
The intention does not get translated into instructions for the neurons and needs not get so translated.
In my analogy, talk of intentions, beliefs, perceptions, actions, etc., already occurs at the functional "software" level.
Neurophysiology enables it rather in the way the hardware enables the software to run in the case of a computer.
So, likewise, the computer programmer can write instructions that directly govern the logical manipulation of significant symbols and not concern herself with the task of the compiler, interpreter, or hardware.
The programmer need not concern herself with the way in which the hardware enables her program to run.
The high level software causally directs and controls the steps in the computational task, while the hardware enables but doesn't direct the execution of the intended calculations or symbolic processes.
If the mind is the brain, and is produced by neuronal behavior, then the whole path from intentionality to neural change is a purely physical affair. There is no gap between the ‘mental’ and the physical, so no need for a mechanism to close any gap. I have no questions concerning this scenario, other than how matter can be intentional. — Querius
If instead the ‘emergent’ mind is independent from neuronal behavior, if it can reach down, by free will of its own, and cause neural change, I would like to know how this works.
If, as a third possibility, the mind is 'semi-independent' or something, please provide a clear picture. — Querius
In my book it makes no sense to term neuronal systems 'sub-conscious'. Anyway, how does the independent mind control those 'sub-conscious' neuronal control systems? — Querius
Is that not analogous to the claim that the chess program is the computer?
Software needs hardware to run on ...
would seem to be groundless.This is actually precisely Kant's contention.is a possible action/activity of nature. — Agustino
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.