I cannot doubt my existence. I exist. Undeniably so. — Querius

Of course you can't doubt it ... given that you are in existence as a socially constructed self regulatory habit of thought.

And indeed, you are reading right from the script in protesting your existential essence in these terms.

Modern romantic mythology requires that you be solipsistic being in this regard. You have been soaked in a Nietzschian ideal of selfhood from the earliest exposure to popular culture. So nothing could insult you more than the suggestion you might actually be a habitual product of some time and place in the developing story of human history.

Heard it all before a million times. But I stick with the facts of social science.

Topic number three.

Bill Vallicella arguing in favor of consciousness. Excellent philosophy. — Querius

I like Vallicella except for his reactionary politics and that he's a gun nut.

Note the final paragraph of Bill's article:

The unitary self is phenomenologically given, but not as a separate object. Herein, perhaps, resides the error of Hume and some Buddhists: they think that if there is a self, it must exist as a separate object of experience.

With respect to the Buddhist view - every single occurence of the term 'not-self' (anatta) in the early Buddhist texts is adjectival i.e. given as an attribute of phenomena. The objects of any phenomenal experience have three characteristics or 'marks' (laksana), namely, anatta, anicca, dukkha (not self, impermanent, and "unsatisfactory").

Nowhere in the early texts does the Buddha say 'the self does not exist' (although neither does he say that it does exist). When asked the question outright, he refrains from answering (here.)

This 'noble silence' is according to some scholars the origin of 'middle way' (Madhyamaka) philosophy which was to become the central philosophy of Buddhism.

But the key point is, to reify the self as an object of perception, as something constant and changeless, is a perceptual error. According to Husserl (in The Crisis of the European Sciences), Descartes made a similar error, i.e. after perceiving the centrality of (what Husserl would later call) the Transcendental Ego, he then made the grave mistake of objectifying it or treating it naturalistically as a 'substance' when in fact what it really is, is the condition for the possibility of knowing (here).

Modern romantic mythology requires that you be solipsistic being in this regard. — apokrisis

I think it's obviously a consequence of liberalism, which is founded on individual liberty, freedom of choice, freedom of expression and so on. Now that the religious rationale of self-abnegation has been removed, the individual ego, buttressed by economic theory and scientific method, is now the sole arbiter of reality, which gives rise to a deep and pervading Cartesian anxiety.

But the key point is, to reify the self as an object of perception, as something constant and changeless, is a perceptual error. — Wayfarer

Yep. Of course the feeling of being conscious always involves the feeling of intentionality or the feeling of there being a point of view in play. So by logical implication - if you are habituated to believe in a reductionist causality - the act of experiencing requires then a subject who "has" the experience. Which then sets things up nicely for the usual homuncular regress.

Reductionism has no choice but to fall into the trap because it has done away with the richer model of causality which could cash out the self as simply a generic dynamical context. Some accumulated weight of habit which thus gives mental events a probable direction.

Heard it all before a million times. But I stick with the facts of social science. — apokrisis

Who sticks with the facts of social science?
If there is no "I" who perceives and understands the facts of social science, then how can you be aware of the facts of social science? If there is no a consciousness of succession in one and the same conscious subject, how can you be aware of the fact that you continue to stick with the facts of science? Without the consciousness of succession, without the retention of the earlier states in the present state, no such conclusion could be arrived at.

Of course you can't doubt it ... given that you are in existence as a socially constructed self regulatory habit of thought. — apokrisis

A thought cannot exist without a thinker.

If there is no "I" who perceives and understands the facts of social science, then how can you be aware of the facts of social science? — Querius

Maybe "I" am a social scientist. That is "I" understand and perceive the world in a fashion that is a particular educated habit of some human community. Those in the know will point and say, see, there's a guy whose read his Mead, his Vygotsky, his Harre. He is one of us. And so that is how "I" in turn can recognise "myself".

So I'm not a social scientist in some romantic, intrinsic, ineffable fashion. I can instead see that is "what I am" by all the same objective criteria by which anyone would "be a social scientist". It is not any kind of problem that the source of "my identity" in this regard would be completely communal and so reliant on linguistic structure.

Of course, we humans are also all animals. We are genetically and neurally individual. So if you start to break "consciousness" down into its actual semiotic levels of organisation, there is also no problem in talking about awareness in the kind of "raw feels" way you are concerned with now. You can try to imagine the human mind without its cultural/linguistic habits - and find that science says there is now no introspection or "off-line thinking" going on, just what we might call "extrospection", or living "mindlessly" for the present.

So my objection is that you are just bundling all the complexity into some simplistic and dualistic notion of a mental stuff that is somehow the object of perception. The brain produces a display of data ... and a wee homuncular Querius sits perched in the pituitary gland, or somewhere, soaking up the ever-changing panorama being neurally represented.

You are arguing here as if there is some problem to do with the soul of the machine. And yet a living/mindful system is not a machine (in the literal sense) and so we don't need to worry about souls or other mental stuff that might animate the inanimate.

Okay, that was (again) absolutely unresponsive. Try again:

If there is no "I" who perceives and understands the facts of social science, then how can you be aware of the facts of social science? If there is no a consciousness of succession in one and the same conscious subject, how can you be aware of the fact that you continue to stick with the facts of science? Without the consciousness of succession, without the retention of the earlier states in the present state, no such conclusion could be arrived at.

hint: "I am a social scientist" is not an answer.

A thought cannot exist without a thinker. — Querius

In Buddhist philosophy (now that we seem to have arrived there) it is said that the thinker cannot exist without thoughts, that thought and thinker are mutually dependent or co-arising. The idea of 'self and other' is a deeply-embedded mental formation. What is generally taken as 'the self' is literally a thought-construction. That doesn't deny the reality of agency or even of subjectivity, but of an 'I' that is separate from and a possessor of experience.

What happens to your fist when you open your hand? What happens to your lap when you stand up?

But my position deals with your "I" on three Pragmatic levels - genetic, neural and linguistic. All three are explained semiotically as habits of regulation that are produced by more general contexts.

So you can continue to talk confusedly about some singular notion of the experiencing self, but I've already explained the complex nature of "being a human mind" in terms of the empirical facts.

There appears to be a trend in modern philosophy to deny the reality of the "I", the "self", reducing the "I" to simply a part of the community in some anti-reductionist manner. This I believe is a mistake. It is a mistake because it belittles the separation which exists between you and I. The separation between us is very real and needs to be respected. Without having complete respect for this separation we have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality.

Only after we recognize the reality of this separation, and adopt it as a firm principle, can we begin to understand the nature of the material existence which comprises that medium of separation. Then we can differentiate between natural, material objects, which are proper to the medium of separation, and artificial things, conventions and institutions, which are created by human beings to bridge that gap.

But I firmly believe it is a mistake to take for granted, all these artificial, institutions, which human beings have worked so hard to create, in an effort to close the gap between them, as if these things were naturally occurring. And this is what is the case when you start with the assumption that the separation between you and I is not a real and fundamental separation.

Declaring this thread derailed.

Does it matter? Isn't it better to allow discussion to develop relatively unconstrained (as long as it remains interesting)?

In any case I would have thought the question of the reality of the laws of nature is very much related to the question of the reality of the self. Both are either irreducible, or reducible in the usual naturalistic manner.

But my position deals with your "I" on three Pragmatic levels - genetic, neural and linguistic. All three are explained semiotically as habits of regulation that are produced by more general contexts. — apokrisis

Still unresponsive.

If there is not an "I" who encompasses all three levels, how can you overview and be aware of those three levels?

The returning irony is of course that your analysis of the "I" cannot exist if it was correct. Somehow the source of your cherished narrative must be exempt of the constraints and divisions you claim to exist.
The others are mistaken and necessarily so, because they are reading from the "script", produced by forces beyond their rational control, but surely that does not hold for "you".

---
p.s. Here you can find everything you ever need to know about 'homuncular regress'

If there is not an "I" who encompasses all three levels, how can you overview and be aware of those three levels? — Querius

So do you agree there are these three levels? Or do you dispute it?

My point was that you are talking a monadic substance approach to consciousness - the usual outcome of reductionist simplicity.

I said consciousness - as what it is like to be in the usual human modelling relation with the world - is a complex hierarchically-structured process.

And all that was by way of dealing with the original point - what we would really mean by "top down acting consciousness". To remind you, I was explaining how constraints depend on semiosis and that in fact our human interaction with the world has at least three distinct levels (and so at least three distinct levels in which those constraints are evolving).

If we are talking about the neural level, for example, then that means the top-downness is to do with attentional and intentional brain processes.

But if we are talking about human "self-consciousness" - the self-regulatory awareness of the self as a self - then the source of those higher level constraints come from right outside of individual biology and development. That level of selfhood is socially constructed and linguistically encoded.

Of course everything is then functionally integrated. We hang together pretty well despite these multiple levels of constraint.

So again, are you disputing that there are these three levels of organising constraint that make up the complex process that is being a "conscious human"? If not, present the evidence that contradicts my sketch of the scientific analysis.

All you have done so far is kept jumping to new questions and evading any detailed consideration of the technical arguments already put to you.

Both are either irreducible, or reducible in the usual naturalistic manner. — John

:-} again Kantianism of some sort... :P

I am unhappy with the question in my previous post. It does not make sense at all. My mistake. I retract that question.

What I am happy about is the remainder of that post and the questions before that, which are still unaddressed.

So do you agree there are these three levels as I've described? Or do you dispute it? If so, on what grounds?

So, what's your answer? Is the self irreducible, or reducible in the some naturalistic way? Or...?

So, what's your answer? Is the self irreducible, or reducible in the some naturalistic way? Or...? — John

I think the self arises from nature, yes. The self is a possible action/activity of nature. And I think laws of nature are merely models we use for purposes of modelling and predicting the world. I certainly don't understand the Kantian position of postulating necessary transcendental subject and transcendental object - I don't agree that either of them have been shown to be "necessary".

I think this is all backsliding from the superior Platonic/Aristotelian ontology which was developed with Spinoza, St. Aquinas, etc.

There appears to be a trend in modern philosophy to deny the reality of the "I", the "self", reducing the "I" to simply a part of the community in some anti-reductionist manner. This I believe is a mistake. It is a mistake because it belittles the separation which exists between you and I. The separation between us is very real and needs to be respected. Without having complete respect for this separation we have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Autonomous, responsible, free personhood is a prerequisite to rationality.
If external forces beyond my control shape me with insurmountable arbitrary constraints and if there is nothing but blind ‘potentiality’ running into those imposed constraints, then I am not in control over my actions and thoughts. And if I am not in control over my actions and thoughts, then I am not rational. And if I am not rational then I ‘have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality.’

My point was that you are talking a monadic substance approach to consciousness - the usual outcome of reductionist simplicity.

Indeed, I view consciousness as indivisible and I have provided several arguments. In response all you have offered is derogatory talk and avoidance.

And all that was by way of dealing with the original point - what we would really mean by "top down acting consciousness". To remind you, I was explaining how constraints depend on semiosis and that in fact our human interaction with the world has at least three distinct levels (and so at least three distinct levels in which those constraints are evolving).

If we are talking about the neural level, for example, then that means the top-downness is to do with attentional and intentional brain processes.

Please do continue. Explain voluntary agency. Explain how an emergent self-aware consciousness directs its neurons. Let’s start modestly. Explain what happens when one chooses to raise one’s arm. Explain the mechanism from intention to neural change. And explain how the “I” knows which neural parts to change and which not.
In this post you find an attempt by a kindred social construct named Jason Runyan. Consider my questions in this post as addressed to you.

p.s. you can skip the part about being social constructs and so forth. We know that already.

Indeed, I view consciousness as indivisible .... — Querius

So you say. But I've asked you to show how mind science could have got it so wrong then.

This is not an explanation. You note that ‘striving to survive’ is necessary for life to succeed, and from there you go to (paraphrasing) 'and therefore organisms strive to survive’. This is not an explanation, since organisms don't necessarily exist. — Querius

It's not an explanation of the event of abiogenesis and was not meant to be. It's rather a description of the observable teleological structure of all known living things as contrasted with the more primitive dissipative structures and the complex "organic" (proleptically so called) chemicals that existed before that event. I don't have an explanation for the event of abiogenesis itself; and it probably involved some large measure of contingency. It may have been a lucky accident.

The topic being the reducibility of the laws of nature, though, I am merely pointing out that the nested teleological structure of living things (also termed autopoiesis) whereby the parts (i.e. the organs) have as a function to promote the survival of the whole (the organism) and the molar activity of the organism reciprocally are directed at maintaining the function of the parts does not afford bottom-up reductive explanations. The reason for this is that the component processes (the physiological functions of the organs, cells, etc.) only make sense in relation to their functional embedding in the whole.

Moreover, in order for ‘striving to survive’ to be one thing — contrary to a collection of unrelated behaviors — there must be a binding principle like ‘fear of death’, which logically requires a concept of death.

It certainly does, though it is not required that the plants or non-rational animals that strive to survive and reproduce have any reflexive awareness that their physiology and behaviors be thus structured so as to favor such outcomes. In fact, rational animals don't need it either though it comprehensibly tends to becomes a genuine concern for them.

Explain what happens when one chooses to raise one’s arm. Explain the mechanism from intention to neural change. And explain how the “I” knows which neural parts to change and which not. — Querius

It would go something like this:

The abstract mind, instantiated on the computationally universal brain, decides to move an arm. It does not know the mechanism of how this is performed, because it does not need to. The mechanism involves layers of sub-conscious neuronal control systems, which eventually result in the appropriate nerve signals to the appropriate muscles.

An abstract computer program, instantiated on a computationally universal computer, decides to move its robot arm ...

Because we don't believe in magic, there cannot be any other explanation, though some of the details are a bit sketchy to say the least.

To pursue the analogy, how is an intention translated into instructions (‘software’) for neurons? And what power does emergent consciousness have over matter, such that ‘creating software instructions’ is an apt analogy? — Querius

The intention does not get translated into instructions for the neurons and needs not get so translated. The intention is directed outwards to the intended goal, in the world, not inwards to neurons or muscles. ("...I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel..." -- René Descartes) In my analogy, talk of intentions, beliefs, perceptions, actions, etc., concerns the functional/psychological "software" level. Neurophysiology enables it rather in the way the hardware enables the software to run in the case of a computer.

So, likewise, the computer programmer can write instructions that directly govern the logical manipulation of significant symbols and not concern herself with the task of the compiler, interpreter, or hardware. The programmer needs not concern herself with the precise way in which the hardware enables her program to run. The high level software causally directs and controls the steps in the computational task, while the hardware enables but doesn't direct the execution of the intended calculations or symbolic manipulations. (The proof of that is that if there is an unintended result -- a bug -- it often only is required to fix the software. The hardware need not be at fault, though it may sometimes be). Since the activity of the hardware gains its significance only through this merely enabling relationship, and doesn't stand in the way of the software control, this is a typical example of top-down causation.

One final note: as this example shows, there need not be a materially identifiable distinction between the software and the hardware levels. The software doesn't float over the hardware and control it from outside, as it were. Rather, when the software has been suitably loaded (and possibly, compiled, or hard-coded) then the functional structure of the computer has changed. The software level is thus a functional level rather than a mereological level (i.e. a simple part/whole relationship). It refers to the functional organization of the suitably programmed computer; while the correspondingly modified hardware it its newly informed material "body".

But if we are talking about human "self-consciousness" - the self-regulatory awareness of the self as a self - then the source of those higher level constraints come from right outside of individual biology and development. That level of selfhood is socially constructed and linguistically encoded. — apokrisis

Autonomous, responsible, free personhood is a prerequisite to rationality.
If external forces beyond my control shape me with insurmountable arbitrary constraints and if there is nothing but blind ‘potentiality’ running into those imposed constraints, then I am not in control over my actions and thoughts. And if I am not in control over my actions and thoughts, then I am not rational. And if I am not rational then I ‘have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality.’ — Querius

That social constructs exist outside of human consciousness, and act downward onto the consciousness of the individual is where the falsity lies. This assumes the illusion of Pythagorean idealism in which ideas (as social constructs) have some sort of independent existence. The moment we (falsely) assume that the existence of ideas is external to the consciousness of the individual, we surrender our moral responsibility. That is why Plato introduced "the good", to straighten out this perverted form of thinking. As apokrisis and Pierre-Normand have indicated, social constructs are based in habituation. The science of habituation is moral philosophy. All social constructs are based in morality.

The simple fact of the matter is, that morality comes about through the effort of the individual. Habituation is learning, and unless hard determinism is true (which it is not), learning is "caused" by individual effort, willful determination. Moral character, is what the individual must construct within oneself. Morality, hence all social constructs are caused by the efforts of the individuals.

The belief that morality is caused by external social constructs acting downward onto the individual consciousness is the grave mistake of the hard determinist. Consider the consequence, if every human being started to believe that it is true that morality is caused by social constructs acting on us. No individual human being would make any effort to learn or understand any moral principles, believing that morality is simply caused by external constructs acting on them. Consequently no one would be able to teach any moral principles, moral principles would be forgotten, and social constructs destroyed. We would all simply believe that morality is caused through some natural process of naturally occurring social constructs acting on us, until there were no more social constructs, then we'd have to wake up to reality, and rebuild.

That is the consequence if we receive as truth, the illusion that habituation occurs as some natural process of down-ward causation. Instead, we must face the hard cold facts, that morality is caused by the great strenuous efforts of each and every individual human being.

The abstract mind, instantiated on the computationally universal brain, decides to move an arm.

If the mind is the brain, and is produced by neuronal behavior, then the whole path from intentionality to neural change is a purely physical affair. There is no gap between the ‘mental’ and the physical, so no need for a mechanism to close any gap. I have no questions concerning this scenario, other than how matter can be intentional.
If instead the ‘emergent’ mind is independent from neuronal behavior, if it can reach down, by free will of its own, and cause neural change, I would like to know how this works.
If, as a third possibility, the mind is 'semi-independent' or something, please provide a clear picture.

It does not know the mechanism of how this is performed, because it does not need to.

If the mind is independent from neural behavior, then there is, by definition, a gap between the mind and neurons. Again, if there is no such gap, no such independency, I have no questions. Assuming the gap exists, I would like to know how the hoovering consciousness reaches down causally effective and on what basis it chooses between various options.

The mechanism involves layers of sub-conscious neuronal control systems ...

In my book it makes no sense to term neuronal systems 'sub-conscious'. Anyway, how does the independent mind control those 'sub-conscious' neuronal control systems?

EDIT:

Because we don't believe in magic, there cannot be any other explanation ….

Regarding an explanation of the existence of the universe, we are either stuck with the incoherent concept of infinite regress or a First Cause. IMHO there is some 'magic' involved in both explanations, so who are we to not believe in ‘magic’?

The intention does not get translated into instructions for the neurons and needs not get so translated.

That is rather surprising.

In my analogy, talk of intentions, beliefs, perceptions, actions, etc., already occurs at the functional "software" level.

So, our intentions, deliberations and thoughts are direct instructions for neurons. Neurons listen in and understand our mental stuff directly and know what to do? No problemo?

Neurophysiology enables it rather in the way the hardware enables the software to run in the case of a computer.

So, likewise, the computer programmer can write instructions that directly govern the logical manipulation of significant symbols and not concern herself with the task of the compiler, interpreter, or hardware.

Well, in order to function, hardware does require translation of high-level programming language, so this analogy seems inapt.

The programmer need not concern herself with the way in which the hardware enables her program to run.

Because a compiler — translator — bridges the gap. Right?

The high level software causally directs and controls the steps in the computational task, while the hardware enables but doesn't direct the execution of the intended calculations or symbolic processes.

Am I missing something? Where is the translator (compiler) in this narrative?

If the mind is the brain, and is produced by neuronal behavior, then the whole path from intentionality to neural change is a purely physical affair. There is no gap between the ‘mental’ and the physical, so no need for a mechanism to close any gap. I have no questions concerning this scenario, other than how matter can be intentional. — Querius

Is that not analogous to the claim that the chess program is the computer?

If instead the ‘emergent’ mind is independent from neuronal behavior, if it can reach down, by free will of its own, and cause neural change, I would like to know how this works.
If, as a third possibility, the mind is 'semi-independent' or something, please provide a clear picture. — Querius

Software needs hardware to run on, and if you disturb the hardware with anaesthetics or death, then the effect on the running of the software is going to be pretty drastic. But there is another type of independence: all computationally universal hardware is equivalent.

In my book it makes no sense to term neuronal systems 'sub-conscious'. Anyway, how does the independent mind control those 'sub-conscious' neuronal control systems? — Querius

You can remove an entire cerebellum, and the only difference the person notices is reduced motor control.

Is that not analogous to the claim that the chess program is the computer?

Do you say that the mind is analogous to software? If so, that would paint a rather inert picture of the mind. In this context I would rather say that software are the instructions for the brain. One problem is, how do we write those?
Notably, writing instructions doesn't get any easier by the fact that the brain is constantly reorganizing; synaptic connections are constantly being removed and others created — neuroplasticity. The brain is nothing like the rigid and fixed circuits of computer hardware.

Software needs hardware to run on ...

To pursue this unproductive analogy, software needs a programmer in order to exist.

If we are not knowing nature-as-it-is through the Laws and they are merely predictive models that tell only about how nature appears to us, then our understanding of nature through science tells us nothing about 'what really is', nothing of ontological or metaphysical significance. On that assumption the notion that the self

is a possible action/activity of nature. — Agustino

would seem to be groundless.This is actually precisely Kant's contention.

The transcendental subject is necessary as an expression of what we don't know about the self; about how it and the world are really produced. The self as we experience it to be cannot be understood by rational and empirical means. The Question of the self transcends the rational empirical domain. I don't think it is correct to claim that the Platonic or even the Aristotelian conception of the world is devoid of the idea of transcendence, and this also cannot be rightly claimed about Aquinas either. I think even Spinoza, if he was to be consistent, would allow for transcendence, as I have tried to convince you before.

I must say Agustino, I am beginning to find your professed Christianity to be quite inconsistent with what you espouse when it comes to philosophy. Spinoza's philosophy, for example, which you say you so admire is completely incompatible with any reasonable conception of Christianity, with any conception of it that does destroy its essence; its uniqueness as a religion, that is.
:s