We are saying that the one is existentially dependent upon and thus precedes the other. — creativesoul

Yes. He distinguishes clearly what he calls logical priority from temporal priority.

I buy the notion, not at all original with me, that no matter who we are, the correct stance to take with respect to a book and its author's ideas is as student to teacher. Once the ideas "on board," then one may revert to customary form. In any case, to judge before the case is a) completely made and b) understood as well as possible, aside from being impossible to do well, is simply an injustice to author and text - and self!

I've studied that part many times over. He's just plain mistaken here. His case is not as strong as he'd like it to be. It does not have the universal scope of applicability that he'd like it to have. Not all statements are made in answer to a question, at the time they are being made. That holds good regardless of the source of the purported question being answered. I've already offered a clear, readily understandable example to the contrary. "I'm ready for bed" is a statement that is not always made in answer to a question, regardless of whether one is engaged in thinking scientifically or not.

Collingwood wants to draw a distinction between thinking scientifically and not, where the former is untangling and reordering one's own thoughts with the aim of shedding light upon the presuppositions and/or questions underlying one's own statements(thought), and the latter is not. His justification for claiming that "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" is one of arguing by definitional fiat. He goes on to claim that...

The reader’s familiarity with the truth expressed in this proposition is proportional to his familiarity with the experience of thinking scientifically. In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and knows what that question is. In proportion as he is thinking unscientifically he does not know these things.

He goes further by re-introducing the clothesline example. I've no real issue with that example. He parses it well, and his method could be used with equal success regarding all sorts of statements where something or other is being identified. However, not all statements are ones in which the speaker is stating what something or other is or is called. Thus, "what is that?", or "what is that thing for?" are questions that quite simply do not arise regarding many other statements, regardless of whether or not one is thinking scientifically. "I'm ready for bed" being but one of many.

"I'm ready for bed" [let's call this P] — creativesoul

First, it seems to me, is whether P is meaningful in RGC's sense, or a nonsense statement. Assuming it is meaningful, what anterior statement(s) make it meaningful? We know it does not stand in isolation. For one thing it presupposes. Meaning, then, arises from context. RGC tells us that with every P, there is associated some context. What would be an immediate context to ground and make meaningful "I'm ready for bed"? The only one I can think of is, "Am I ready for bed?"

More generally, For very meaningful "P is Q," there is an attendant, "Is P (a) Q?" Now, it seems to me you may be confused in thinking that the question is or must be explicitly asked. RGC's point is that in scientific thinking, it had better be. But at the same time in unscientific thinking, it is usually not explicitly asked, but implied. And by that, that it stands as an adjacent link in the context of what makes P meaningful.

You can and may object, then, on your own terms, but yours not his, and thus yours not responsive to his argument. But all of this is easily accessible if you restrain your criticism until you've got the whole thing. Then criticize away! As I read RGC, he carves out his own territory making compelling and persuasive points. If you want to blow him up, you have to at least get close to him to do it.

Prop. 2. ’Every question involves a presupposition.

This is much better.

That is amenable to evolutionary progression. It also situates presuppositions prior to common language acquisition(prior to our learning naming and descriptive practices).

"What's that?" is a question that can exist in it's entirety; that can be formed by a language-less creature, and thus it's a question that can be formed prior to language creation, acquisition, and/or it's subsequent use, despite it's inability to be meaningfully articulated. It is one that has long since taken a linguistic form. We've all asked it at some point or other. It is perhaps the simplest of all questions; one that is perfectly capable of being completely articulated via language to the user's own satisfaction, but need not be in order to be formed by a language-less creature.

What's most notable is that it is a question that does not always require language use. It leads us to realize that we're in need of setting out what sorts of presuppositions such rudimentary questions can possibly involve. They certainly cannot involve presuppositions that are existentially dependent upon language and/or have linguistic content, because we're talking about language-less creatures.

At some of the earliest stages of human development, we can watch exactly and precisely what an undistracted, deep, and genuine curiosity looks like upon the face of another, and as a result we can also know beyond any and all reasonable doubt that curiosity itself does not require language. We all wonder about what we're looking at prior to, during the initial stages of, and long after our own language acquisition and/or the subsequent mastery thereof; all the while we're continuously learning the names of new things. Sometimes these things are directly perceptible, and sometimes not. That which is not warrants very careful attention. The point is that not all questions are existentially dependent upon language use(do not consist of language), whereas all statements are(do).

Long before using language to do stuff; long before ever adopting our first worldview; long before ever honing our initial worldview into what we may now call our 'very own' belief system/worldview; long before we ever became aware of the fact that we were already taking account of ourselves and the world before we came to realize that we were doing so; long before we ever even conceived of the idea of our having a place in this world; long before we ever even began talking about our own thought - like we are here; long before any of that, we began to wonder about what we were looking at. We can and do watch the face(s) of undistracted attention belonging to any creature after having just discovered something entirely new, something so interesting that it completely captured/captures their attention.

There are no statements about the world and/or ourselves possible unless and until there is a means for making them and a creature capable of doing so. If questions are asked prior to each and every statement that is made, as must be the case if every statement is made in answer to a question, then it only follows that questions give rise to statements. If questions give rise to statements, and all questions involve presuppositions, then all statements involve the same presuppositions as the questions giving rise to them(as the questions they were made in response to).




To labor the earlier point of refutation:There are any number of statements that can be, have been, and/or are currently being made about the world and/or ourselves that are not being made in answer to a question.

That's just the way it is.

Not all statements are made in answer to a question.<------That stands as an objection to Prop i, but it does not pose a lethal threat to the rest of Collingwood's project. I'm not looking to blow him up. To quite the contrary, the correction adds to the distinction between scientific thought and non scientific thought(in Collingwood's own sense of the terms). I'm not denying that all scientific thought involves statements that answer questions. I'm not denying that every scientific question involves at least one presupposition, and most involve a constellation thereof. I'm not denying that the role and/or operative function played by absolute presuppositions within scientific thinking are exactly as Collingwood describes. They act exactly like primary and secondary premisses, particularly those whose correspondence and/or meaningfulness is never questioned; those whose business it is to be believed. I'm not denying that it is not their business to be true/false. I'm not denying that the notion of verifiability/falsifiability does not apply to them, although they can sometimes be verified/falsified. I'm not denying that they are things left unspoken, unarticulated, and/or unpropounded by the candidate holding them.

I am most certainly denying the idea that absolute presuppositions are things that a subject can form, have, hold, and/or otherwise depend upon(infer from) when it is also the case that the subject themselves have never once even witnessed their being articulated. One can work from presuppositions that they've never witnessed being articulated without knowing that they are doing so. Such is the case whenever someone first learns that they've adopted some belief or another, or perhaps some set thereof, or to put it in Collingwood's terms, some constellation of absolute presuppositions, from someone else. For example, the absolute presuppositions that Collingwood concerns himself with through page 80 or so, are a group of three regarding causality. Some events were, are, and/or will be caused. All events were, are, and/or will be caused. No events have been, are, or will be caused.

All three of those are much too far along the timeline of evolutionary progression to be formed by anything less than a creature capable of taking account of it's thought, belief, emotions, feelings, and/or experience with a mastery that only metacognition can deliver. Such complex thought are the result of processes directly involving naming and descriptive practices(common language). None of the three are presupposed by any creature unless that creature has already found themselves at a loss to be able to take proper account of everything(all events).

It's well worth pointing out that Collingwood's notion of scientific thought aims to take proper account of that which already existed in it's entirety long before being untangled and re-arranged. It's a shame that he chose to dub the process itself as scientific, because in doing so he simultaneously devalued all other thought. It's akin to placing the utmost of importance upon lemon meringue pie, all the while devaluing the ingredients themselves along with the tools required for making/forming pies.

Scientific questions are asked long before any answers are ever offered. But we act as if we are very interested in all sorts of different stuff long before we ever being asking questions. Furthermore, there are some questions(most if I were to hazard a guess) about some stuff that quite simply cannot be asked until long after language use has begun in earnest. Questions about our own thought, for instance. Questions about one's own thought, belief, mind, feelings, emotions, experience, and/or all discussions about "what's it's like" to be another creature are just plain not capable of being articulated by language-less creatures.

The very capability of taking account of one's own thought requires something to take account of, something to take account of it, and a means for doing so. Collingwood is making a concerted attempt at taking proper account of metaphysics, and he begin doing so by virtue of cleaving the one common practice into two separate and distinct practices; ontology(the science of pure being), and the search for presuppositions(the science of thought). The former he relegates to the dustbin. The latter, he attempts to make good sense/use of.

Proposition 2 offers all of us a bit of knowledge regarding the evolutionary stages/development of human thought. It does not start out scientific. Just because something is true of scientific thought does not make it true of any preceding thought leading up to the scientific. Thought begins simply and grows in it's complexity. That is true with each and every individual thinking/believing human being that has ever existed. That is equally true of any and all thinking/believing creatures, regardless of the biological machinery. The complexity level of thought and belief is made possible, in part at least, by the biological machinery.

We are saying that the one is existentially dependent upon and thus precedes the other.
— creativesoul

Yes. — tim wood

Upon rereading, I deleted that bit. It's nonsensical as it is written, although I knew what I meant. Too bad I wrote the opposite. When something is existentially dependent upon something else, the something else exists in it's entirety either prior to or simultaneously alongside with,

Not all statements are made in answer to a question. — creativesoul

RGC troubles to distinguish nonsense statements from meaningful statements. The latter involve presuppositions to which to the statement, or proposition, stand as answer to a question about those presuppositions. And this you do not agree with. A test, then. Write out a proposition - a meaningful proposition - which entails no question at all.

RGC's qualification being that the the proposition must have some reasonable/logical ground. If no reason or logic, then the proposition is meaningless. He calls such nonsense. This all in Chap. 4.

:up:

The rules of logical entailment allow one to change the truth conditions of a statement, as Gettier so aptly demonstrated. That completely changes the meaning. I reject entailment as a logical tool(all of which are supposed to preserve truth) due to exactly that fatal flaw in understanding the meaning of a statement stemming from divorcing speaker from statement.

"I'm ready for bed" is something I say to myself often, or to my significant other. Sometimes, it is a statement made in answer to a question, and other times it is not. The point here is simple:It is a statement that is meaningful and it is not always made in answer to a question. So, it only follows that Collingwood's first proposition is false, as it is written.

The point here is simple: It is a statement that is meaningful and it is not always made in answer to a question. — creativesoul

The point is that in logical terms it is. It is that simple, although not quite as easy. Part of the insight is that the question does not have to be spoken or even articulated. If it is meaningful it implies the question. It is meaningful, hence the question.

And if not meaningful, still the question, but in that case not a meaningful question. It's useless to discuss this here when and while you're reading the source. Take on the source. And it won't do just to say no. Not least because if merely that were valid, then so would be no, no.

The point is that in logical terms it is — tim wood

Then that's about what counts as being "in logical terms"...

My statement is one made in everyday discourse. It is not always made in answer to a question.

A position can be completely coherent(lacking self-contradiction) and based upon false premisses. Collingwood's is one such position. We do not look to Colliingwood's position to see if it includes falsehood. We look to what he's describing, in the real world. We look at real world examples.

I've given one, and it's certainly not the only one.

Collingwood's claim(prop i.) is about each and every statement made. He's wrong. Not each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question.

When you say, "I am ready for bed," what do you mean? And to save a step, how do you know you mean it?

When I say "I am ready for bed", I mean that I am tired at the time I say it. Perhaps it had been a long physically or mentally exhausting day, and I am ready to lay down and fall asleep for the night. I know that that's what I mean because that's what I've learned to say during such circumstances.

Relevance?

:brow:

Sure and of course. But how do you know? The point is what RGC makes clear in his Prop. 1, pp. 23-25.

But what is your problem? It seems reasonable to me that if a person says something, and the something is meaningful, then there's a reason for his saying it. If he affirms that X is, the reason is the question arose, is X? At least that, even if not in so many words.

For you it's habituated. What does that mean? That you say X randomly? Or that you have learned to say it? Well, if you learned, then you learned the appropriate condition for saying it, and somehow you knew when that condition had itself arisen - the question implicit. You can deny it, but really you are only making clear you are not aware of it, and that you think that your nonawareness means it didn't happen.

But why strain at this gnat? Move on and keep reading.

When you say, "I am ready for bed," what do you mean? And to save a step, how do you know you mean it? — tim wood

When I say "I am ready for bed", I mean that I am tired at the time I say it. Perhaps it had been a long physically or mentally exhausting day, and I am ready to lay down and fall asleep for the night. I know that that's what I mean because that's what I've learned to say during such circumstances.

Relevance? — creativesoul

Sure and of course. But how do you know? — tim wood

It's very odd when one, such as yourself, readily accepts the answer given to a question by saying "Sure, of course", only to then ask the same question.

:confused:

And it's very odd to ask a question simple both in form and substance and have it ignored. You say you're tired at day's end. I do not doubt it. But how do you know that on that night you are in fact tired?

Is there a point, or counterargument somewhere here? I'm not interested in much else. The question you now ask, for the very first time, is irrelevant to the charge I levied here. In addition, it seems to be just plain obtuse, for obtusity's sake.

The point is that when I say that I am ready for bed, I do not always make the statement in answer to a question. Thus, prop. i.) is false, as it is written.

Now, are you going to put Collingwood's method to use here, or just keep on deflecting into irrelevancy?

The point is that when I say that I am ready for bed, I do not always make the statement in answer to a question. Thus, prop. i.) is false, as it is written. — creativesoul

And his point is that thinking scientifically, you must, and unscientifically you still do, but are just unaware of it. We all agree the question need not be articulated - but still it's there. Else, on his argument, and my understanding, how do you know? Btw by my count that's my fourth time asking.

It does not follow from the idea that statements can serve to answer some question relevant to them, that all statements are made in answer to a question.

I suggest you reread our exchange. The question you've asked has changed.

I'm saying that sometimes I make statements and they are not made in answer to a question. You're saying that that's false. Not much else to say here...

sometimes I make statements — creativesoul

Presumably true statements, so fa as you know. HOW, how-how-how-how-how, do you know they're true? If you cannot answer this question, or do not understand it, or comprehend it, then let's just stop right here.

And yet another question... different once again. How I know that I am ready for bed is different than how I know "I'm ready for bed" is true or how I know what I mean when I say it.

Do you have an argument? A valid counter? Something?

Do you have an argument? A valid counter? Something? — creativesoul

Sure, but you have provided proof that you have no interest in such things. I regret wasting my time with you. And it's too bad your understanding of RGC is so slight and thin that he does not even register on you.

Do you have an argument? A valid counter? Something?
— creativesoul
Sure... — tim wood

I'm all ears.

Collingwood makes the universal claim that each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question. In order for that to be true, each and every statement ever made must be made in answer to a queston. That is quite simply not always the case. So, proposition i.) is false as written.

I've given a perfectly adequate example which adequately serves as prima facie empirical evidence that refutes proposition i.) as written. Universal claims made about all statements that have ever been made that are later found lacking correspondence to what's happened and/or is happening are false. Proposition i.) is exactly such a claim. It is wanting, lacking, begging for truth. An inherent deficiency is shown by it's inherent inability to take proper account of things that happen on the daily.

Black swans and all...

Not all statements ever made are made in answer to a question. Each and every day some statements are made by speakers that find themselves in completely different sets of circumstances than those proposed by Mr. Collingwood(statements that are made in answer to a question). As it is written, the first proposition is falsified by our looking at actual events, as well as by our listening to accurate historical accounts.






From a slightly different angle; granting truth to see what follows...

If it is true, then there can be no statements ever made that are not made in answer to a question. The problem, of course, is that there are! Each and every statement that is made despite no question being asked at the time, serves as a clear cut prima facie example to the contrary. There are a plethora of actual events that are actual examples to the contrary. Universal claims have no exceptions. Proposition i.) does. Proposition i.) is therefore denied universal value. It's not worthy.

I do not make up the rules. I'm just using them. Some statements are made in answer to a question. Not all.





In the simplest terms...

Collingwood asserts with the utmost certainty that each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question. However, statements are made each and every day, across the globe and in different tongues, that are not made in answer to a question. There is no question involved in such cases. In each and evry one of these cases, the circumstances relevant to the utterance do not involve the speaker answering a question.

I mean think about it...

One can most certainly state the case at hand without being asked any questions whatsoever, whether those interrogations come from within oneself or directly from others at the time of utterance.






Reflecting back upon lines of thought in your earlier response to my counterexample...

Sure, we can all take statements completely out of their context, pretend that they are in some other context, and show that - when we take statements completely out of their context - the statement is, in fact, an acceptable answer to any number of relevant proxy questions. For example, you proposed a perfectly meaningful question that "I am ready for bed" could be answer for - if it were made in a completely different context; in completely different circumstances. The problem, of course, is that "I am ready for bed" is not always made in answer to a question. Whether or not a particular statement was or is actually made in answer to a question is not determined by Collingwood. Rather, in each and every case, whether or not a statement is made in answer to a question is completely determined by whether or not it was meant by the speaker to serve as an answer that particular question at the time of utterance. I say "I am ready for bed" as a means to inform my significant other that I am ready for bed. During all such times, the statement about my physical/mental state is not made as an answer to any question at the time of utterance.

Surely you're not going to insist on telling me otherwise, are you?

:kiss:

The latter involve presuppositions to which to the statement, or proposition, stand as answer to a question about those presuppositions. And this you do not agree with. — tim wood

Well no. As I explained in the last post...

We can take a statement out of the context in which it's uttered, and when placed into different sets of circumstances, it could stand as an answer to some question relevant to those different circumstances. So, I do not disagree that that can be done.


I'm saying that it does not follow from the fact that we can do that, that the statement extracted was originally made in answer to a question.

I've given a perfectly adequate example which adequately serves as prima facie empirical evidence that refutes proposition i.) — creativesoul

And five times you have refused answer to a question about that example. What is your problem? RGC makes a claim that he then supports and gives evidence for. You refute it thus with what you say is a counterexample, but you have not paid even "the cold respect of a passing glance" as to explaining how your counterexample is a counterexample. It just is, according to you.

There is a moment in your day when you announce a proposition. Presumably it represents your understanding of a state of affairs, and presumably that state of affairs was not the case somewhat before your pronouncement, but coming into being was the proximate cause of your announcement.

Your pronouncement, then, was meaningful and by that I mean not nonsense. The question is how did you come to make it? How did you know the state of affairs had come into being? And likely you just became aware of its having come into being. RGC's analysis puts a question into the heart of the nexus of that becoming aware. And that seems reasonable, right, and correct to me.

The test is the account of how you knew you were tired and ready for bed. Implicit is some form of the question - not necessarily spoken or in so many words - "am I tired and ready for bed?" Or even, "am I feeling tired and ready for bed?"

It is difficult to see how you could make your pronouncement without being aware of the condition that grounded it, and it is hard to see how you could come to that awareness without at some level querying it. That's your task. How did you know? That coming to know, on your account, having nothing whatsoever to do with any questioning at all.

But why labor at this? Go read the rest of the chapter and the rest of the book. On this you're like the monkey with its fist caught in the cookie jar. Until and unless you relax and let go of the cookie you think you have but do not have, you will get no cookies at all. Or like MU, who argues uselessly that arithmetic is wrong.

Lost interest in this discussion with you...

I'll continue my assessment, further reading and review in spite of your absence.

Be well.

"Are you ready for bed?" asks your significant other, presupposing that {censored}.

He is telling you that it is an absolute presupposition of the science he pursues: and I have made him a pathologist because this absolute proposition about all events having causes, which a hundred years ago was made in every branch of natural science, has now ceased to be made in some branches, but medicine is one of those in which it is still made. — Collingwood

I'm looking at this, and thinking that it looks a lot like what is more familiar to me as 'a hinge proposition'. Clearly, what is an absolute proposition in one {ahem} 'language game', ceases to be quite so absolute in another. A great undergraduate essay question, surely - "Compare and contrast Collingwood's 'absolute propositions' with Wittgenstein's 'hinge propositions".

There are some similarities it seems. The differences are there as well. Absolute presuppositions, according to Collingwood, are not propositions though. In fact, they are rather ill defined in this essay, which is another critique I've yet to have gotten into here but have noted it elsewhere.

Just finished it.

SPOILERS AHEAD :smile:

The two last sentences are a gem:

When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the Capitol. I am only a professorial goose, consecrated with a cap and gown and fed at a college table ; but cackling is my job, and cackle I will.