If order is not restricted to "temporal/spatial", then order is not restricted to unknowable noumena. — Luke

Of course, that's why we have to acknowledge the difference between the order we say that a group of things has, and the inherent order of that group of things. They are both called "order". That they are different accounts for the fact that we make mistakes in understanding the order of things..

That doesn’t work and you’ve misunderstood.

You are trying to draw an analogy between order/inherent order and phenomena/noumena. However, phenomena and noumena are both temporal-spatial, which makes order and inherent order also temporal-spatial by analogy.

You have already conceded that there are “many other types” of order besides temporal-spatial.

If there are “many other types” of order besides temporal-spatial, then order is not necessarily phenomenal or noumenal, so your argument fails.

If order is not limited to temporal-spatial order, then you can no longer hide behind your claim that true order is unknowable. So how do you account for any order which is not temporal-spatial?

I changed my mind on that days ago — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you mean this post?:



Whatever "change of mind you had" in that pile of confusions, you said inter alia:

(1)

Order is a spatial-temporal concept [bold added] — Metaphysician Undercover

and

(2)

They have no spatial-temporal separation, therefore no means for distinguishing one from the other, they are simply assumed to exist as a set. How do you think it is possible to order them when they have been conceived by denying all principles of order.? To introduce a principle of order would contradict the essential nature of these things. — Metaphysician Undercover

So there you are, still demanding that order must be temporal-spatial.

However, then, fifteen hours ago (not days ago), yes, you wrote:

Temporal/spatial was just one type of order, fishfry and Lluke gave examples of many other types. So we're not restricted to temporal/spatial order in our attempts at understanding the nature of inherent order. — Metaphysician Undercover

And that is the very remark that I just replied to. So I don't see you changing your mind since the post with (1) and (2) except the recent post of which I pointed out that it is inconsistent with your earlier stance.

/

And after so many days on end of you claiming that orderings are necessarily temporal-spatial, now you recognize that orderings do not have to be temporal-spatial, so what took you so long? It's piercingly clear that there are orderings that are not not temporal-spatial, but you could not see that because you are stubborn and obtuse.

I cannot say what the inherent order is, for the reasons explained. Do you have a problem with those reasons? Or do you just not understand what I've already repeated? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have rebutted great amounts of your confusions. You either skip the most crucial parts of those rebuttals or get them all mixed up in your mind.

Anyway, to say that there is "THE inherent ordering" of a set, but not be able to identify it for a set as simple as two members is, at the least, problematic. But more importantly, you cannot even define the "THE inherent ordering" as a general notion. That is, you cannot provide a definition like:

R is the inherent ordering of S if and only if P

where P is the definiens.

And your notion is so ridiculous that you say that if one did attempt to identify "The inherent ordering" of a set then one would not correctly choose "The inherent ordering". What? For a set with two members, I have a 50% chance of identifying "THE inherent ordering" (if there were such a thing) just by guessing.

You understand what "inherent" means don't you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your boorish condescension is stupid.

The question is whether or not it is possible for a set to be free from inherent order, i.e. having no inherent order, as fishfry claimed. You still don't seem to be grasping the issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said that the set of orderings of a set is not inherent to the set. I said over and over and over that sets have multiple orderings. The point I have been making to you is that you have not defined what it means for one of those orderings in particular to be "THE inherent ordering". You are the one who doesn't grasp the issue.

There are multiple orderings. Given a reasonable sense of 'inherent', the orderings of the set are all inherent to the set. In set theory and abstract mathematics. EVERY property of an object is inherent to the object. (Mathematical) objects don't change properties. They have the exact properties they have - always - and no other properties - always. There is no "time" operator that allows (mathematical) objects to have different properties at different times, so the properties are inherent. That is just a report on set theory, which doesn't have a "time" operator.

But the point you keep missing is that you have not defined what it means to say that one of the orderings in particular is "THE inherent ordering". They are all orderings of the set, and they are all inherent to the set. I have put 'THE' in all caps about a hundred times now. The reason I do that is obvious, but you still don't get it.

This started with discussion of the axiom of extensionality. With that axiom, sets are equal if they have the same members. In that regard, a set is determined by its members, whatever the set of orderings of the set might be. And, of course, for every set there is the set of all the orderings on that set. That set of all the orderings on the set is "inherent" in the sense that it doesn't change. But the point you don't get is that there is not one of those orderings that is in particular "THE inherent ordering" while the others are not. And it seems the reason you don't get that is because you started out needing to deny the sense of the axiom of extensionality itself, even though you are ignorant of what it does in set theory and you are ignorant of virtually the entire context of logic, set theory and mathematics.

My best guess is that the controversy regarding the existence/nonexistence of infinities, their categorization as potential and actual, the former being thought of as existing while the not, is an unfortunate relic of the past, specifically how infinity was first defined.

How infinity was defined (from ancient Greeks and Indians till just before Georg Cantor) operationally and thus its conceptualization as an endless process. As is obvious to me now, this idea of the infinite as a task that can't be completed immediately and violently conflicts with infinity as actual defined as ended/completed, leaving only potential infinity as a conceivable mathematical object.

Enter Georg Cantor and he discards, perhaps because he intuits the complication I refer to above, the traditional idea of infinity as an endless task in favor of, surprisingly, an even older understanding of numbers viz. 1-to-1 correspondence. Thus, he defines infinity as a set whose members can be put in a 1-to-1 correspondence with the set of natural numbers. As you can see, defining infinity as such sidesteps the vexing issue of endlessness; that infinity can't be completed is a non issue because all that matters is whether or not we can uniquely match one element of a given set with another element of the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3,...}.

It's exactly how the first mathematicians, by that I mean to refer to prehistoric times when tally marks were first invented/discovered, solved counting problems. Prehistoric people didn't know how to count, some say, beyond 2 and 3 and more were, for them uncountable which comes very, very close to what infinity is to the modern man. The way they got around this problem was by matching what they wanted to count, their population, livestock, etc. the relevant individuals with counters (tally marks). As you can see, we don't have to know the actual size of what's being counted, all that's required is a unique tally for each member of the set of objects that's being counted. Completing/ending/finishing the counting process of infinity is now a non issue.

To cut to the chase, infinity under this interpretation (1-to-1 correspondence between a set and the set of natural numbers), very ingeniously I must say, avoids the endless nature of infinity and the controversy over actual and potential infinities fails to gain the traction it needs to wreak havoc in set theory that was designed to deal with infinity.

Coming to the matter of an actual infinity in set theory, it becomes patently clear that there are sets whose elements can be put in a 1-to-1 correspondence with the elements of the set of natural numbers which includes itself and hence, in that sense, there are actual infinities.

he defines infinity as a set whose members can be put in a 1-to-1 correspondence with the set of natural numbers. — TheMadFool

I don't know how he reads in the original German, but the above is not how the set theory that came from Cantor works.

We don't define "infinity" as a noun. Rather, we define the predicate 'is infinite'. And the definition is NOT

x is infinite iff x is 1-1 with N.

Indeed not, since there are infinite sets that are not 1-1 with N.

Rather, the definition is:

x is finite iff x is 1-1 with some natural number.

x is infinite iff x is not finite.

An alternate definition is equivalent to the above with the axiom of choice:

x is infinite iff there is a proper subset s of x such that x is 1-1 with s.

I don't know how he reads in the original German, but the above is not how the set theory that came from Cantor works. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I admit it's possible that there's more of me in my post about infinity than Cantor. Nevertheless, I'm fairly confident that what I wrote would've brought a smile to his face. He was a deeply troubled man I believe, in no small measure due to Leopold Kroenecker's scathing criticisms of his life's work.

I'm fairly confident that what I wrote would've brought a smile to his face. — TheMadFool

Yes, it's possible he might get a chuckle at your hapless ignorance.

He was a deeply troubled man I believe, in no small measure due to Leopold Kroenecker's scathing criticisms of his life's work. — TheMadFool

It wasn't just that Kronecker criticized the work. But it does seems reasonable to think that his professional difficulties vis-a-vis Kronecker might have contributed to his poor mental condition, but I don't think we know for sure.

Yes, it's possible he might get a chuckle at your hapless ignorance. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Now, hold on a minute. The post I made is clear and to the point and captures the essence of Cantor's views on infinity.

It wasn't just that Kronecker criticized the work. But it does seems reasonable to think that his professional difficulties vis-a-vis Kronecker might have contributed to his poor mental condition, but I don't think we know for sure. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Indeed, any ideas why Kroenecker was so dead against Cantor? Was there anything more going on then just an academic disagreement on infinity? You know, like a personal grudge, anti-Russian sentiments? Your guess is as good as mine.

a

It is not mathematically possible for an all powerful and all good god to exist, the laws of thermodynamics, which are constraints and not some handwaved rule, apply to even god. Yin-yang and karma and whatnot is all related to thermodynamics and thus thermodynamics and energy predate any god, including the Christian god who might have been here since the big bang but for sure did not cause it. Infinite time means infinite energy increase, which is of course true. The big bang was one of infinite numbers of big bangs generated by some sort of perfect order system completely collapsing according to the laws of thermodynamics because you would need literal infinite rates of energy transfer to maintain a perfectly ordered state. Brian Greene is beyond any philosopher or most physicists — intpath32

The question of whether God is bound by the laws of physics is an old one. I found some references but these are not definitive, I just grabbed them off Google to illustrate that people have been thinking about the matter. I didn't read any of them, just wanted a random sample.

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskAChristian/comments/7br2fb/are_angels_bound_by_the_laws_of_physics_is_god/

https://faithfoundedonfact.com/is-god-bound-by-logic/

https://theconversation.com/can-the-laws-of-physics-disprove-god-146638

https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/47105/are-gods-also-bound-to-the-laws-of-physics

https://www.quora.com/Does-God-obey-the-laws-of-physics

https://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2011/08/can-god-violate-the-laws-of-physics.html

Now for my own contribution, consider a video game designer who creates an artificial but self-consistent world. The beings in that world are bound by the laws as defined by the designer; but the designer lives in what we call the real world and is not bound by the artificial rules of the game.

Why wouldn't God be exactly the same way? God has created the world, including the laws of physics. God's creatures, namely us, are bound by the laws of physics. But God isn't. Remember, God said, "Let there be light." I've always found it interesting that the ancients who wrote the Bible intuited that electromagnetic radiation was fundamental. And clearly the ancients saw God as existing outside of time and space, outside of the laws of physics.

Another point is that the laws of physics themselves are historically contingent ideas of human beings. It's a philosophical assumption that there are actually any laws that govern the universe, as opposed to science being a collection of theories that just seem to work to a good approximation, but that aren't actually true in any absolute sense. In fact there is a name for the belief that the world studied by science is real: scientific realism. There's no absolute proof that scientific realism is true. It could all be a dream, I could be a brain in a vat, or I could be a Boltzmann brain, a momentary coherence in an otherwise random and formless universe.

The same reasoning applies to simulation theory, which a lot of people take seriously these days. The advocates of simulation theory assume that the Great Programmer in the Sky operates according to the same laws of physics that we do and reason accordingly. But of course such an assumption is unwarranted. The Programmer, if such there be, lives in a completely different world with totally different physics. We can't use reason and logic to figure out what the next level up is like.

I haven't seen much of Brian Greene, but I'm a big fan of Sean Carroll.

captures the essence of Cantor's views on infinity. — TheMadFool

Sure, if "captures the essence" means grossly mischaracterizes with ignorant confusions.

Sure, if "captures the essence" means grossly mischaracterizes with ignorant confusions. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You seem to be contradicting yourself. First set your own house in order is advice that I've been given and have heeded. I suggest a similar course of action for your good self. Have a g'day.

You are trying to draw an analogy between order/inherent order and phenomena/noumena. However, phenomena and noumena are both temporal-spatial, which makes order and inherent order also temporal-spatial by analogy. — Luke

Right, inherent order, which I classed as noumenal, appears to be spatial-temporal. But the type of ordering which fishfry demonstrated to me, ordering by best, or better, cannot be inherent order because it is relative to intention, therefore phenomenal.

I don't see the problem.

So there you are, still demanding that order must be temporal-spatial. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, I agree that "order", when reduced in the extreme, seems to require necessarily, spatial-temporal conceptions. .I agree that some types of ordering such as those presented, which I called order by best, or better, appear to be free from spatial-temporal conceptions. But ultimately there must be something which is being ordered, individual objects, and this requires spatial separations. Perhaps however, we can order intentions themselves, as better or worse, as objects in the sense of goals, and we might give ends an ordering which is completely void of spatial-temporal conceptions. But this requires that we determine what type of existence an intention has.

And after so many days on end of you claiming that orderings are necessarily temporal-spatial, now you recognize that orderings do not have to be temporal-spatial, so what took you so long? It's piercingly clear that there are orderings that are not not temporal-spatial, but you could not see that because you are stubborn and obtuse. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Earlier in the thread, it was flatly denied as nonsensical, that the type of objects which existed in sets, are intentions. As explained above, that is the only way I can apprehend an "object" which has no inherent order, if it were an intention. So, if the things in sets are said to have no inherent order, the issue remains. How do you conceive of individual things with no spatial-temporal ordering, such that they can exist in a set without inherent ordering if these things are not intentions?

I have rebutted great amounts of your confusions. You either skip the most crucial parts of those rebuttals or get them all mixed up in your mind.

Anyway, to say that there is "THE inherent ordering" of a set, but not be able to identify it for a set as simple as two members is, at the least, problematic. But more importantly, you cannot even define the "THE inherent ordering" as a general notion. That is, you cannot provide a definition like: — TonesInDeepFreeze

I have defined "inherent order", in relation to the law of identity. It is you who is skipping the most crucial parts of what I write.

In set theory and abstract mathematics. EVERY property of an object is inherent to the object. (Mathematical) objects don't change properties. They have the exact properties they have - always - and no other properties - always. — TonesInDeepFreeze

OK then, two distinct ordering of the same elements constitutes two distinct sets. Do you agree? If order is inherent to the object, as you claim, then two distinct orderings of the same elements constitutes two distinct objects, therefore two distinct sets. Do you see this?

But the point you keep missing is that you have not defined what it means to say that one of the orderings in particular is "THE inherent ordering". They are all orderings of the set, and they are all inherent to the set. I have put 'THE' in all caps about a hundred times now. The reason I do that is obvious, but you still don't get it. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It's you who keeps missing the point. The "inherent order" is as "inherent" implies, the one which inheres within the object, as its identity, stipulated by the law of identity. It is categorically different from any order which we might assign to the object. Therefore it is not "one of the orderings" which we lay out, it is distinct from these. And the question you keep asking me, which of these orders is the inherent order is nonsensical because i keep telling you it's none of those orders.

This started with discussion of the axiom of extensionality. With that axiom, sets are equal if they have the same members. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Do you agree with me, that "equal" does not mean "the same"? Therefore equal sets are not the same set. Two sets with the same members in different orders can be said to be equal, but they cannot be said to be the same set. This is the part that fishfry doesn't get. Fishfry believes that if the sets are equal, they are necessarily the same set.

And it seems the reason you don't get that is because you started out needing to deny the sense of the axiom of extensionality itself, even though you are ignorant of what it does in set theory and you are ignorant of virtually the entire context of logic, set theory and mathematics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I am not denying the axiom of extensionality, I am denying a particular interpretation of it, which says that equal sets are the same set. I look at this as a misunderstanding.

Right, inherent order, which I classed as noumenal, appears to be spatial-temporal. But the type of ordering which fishfry demonstrated to me, ordering by best, or better, cannot be inherent order because it is relative to intention, therefore phenomenal.

I don't see the problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

How is intention phenomenal (in the relevant Kantian sense)? Or are you no longer talking about Kantian concepts, just like you are no longer talking about the "dots" diagram having the inherent spatial order that it has?

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

a

How is intention phenomenal (in the relevant Kantian sense)? — Luke

Intention is an integral part of the phenomenal system, the world as it appears to us, as the fulfillment of our wants and needs have shaped the way that we perceive the world evolutionarily, and have much influence over our perceptions on a day to day basis..

Intention is an integral part of the phenomenal system — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Kant say this?

Also, do you have any intention of accounting for your latest blatant contradiction:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

The inherent order is the true order, which inheres in the arrangement of objects. If I stated an order, this would be an order which I assign to those objects, from an external perspective, and therefore not the inherent order. — Metaphysician Undercover

Before your claim was that the inherent order is what's shown. Now you claim that the inherent order is what's hidden. It can't be both.

Where does Kant say this? — Luke

I don't know if Kant ever said, but it's pretty obvious how intention must fit in.

Also, do you have any intention of accounting for your latest blatant contradiction: — Luke

No, sorry I must have made a mistake, or perhaps you just misunderstood. More likely, you intentionally misinterpreted, as usual. I'm very well acquainted with your strawman interpretations designed at creating the appearance of contradiction.

Before your claim was that the inherent order is what's shown. Now you claim that the inherent order is what's hidden. It can't be both. — Luke

There is no contradiction in saying that I am showing you an order which I cannot describe. Try again. But I suggest you try to understand rather than trying to misunderstand.

I don't know if Kant ever said, but it's pretty obvious how intention must fit in. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you don't know whether intention has anything to do with Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction?
And yet you still use this distinction as the basis of your argument regarding inherent order?

You tried to draw an analogy between your supposed inherent order and Kant's noumena. When I pointed out that you had already conceded that "many other types" of order are not spatio-temporal and therefore not noumenal, you said that one other type (best to worst) "is relevant to intention, therefore phenomenal". If you don't know whether intention has anything to do with Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction, as you now admit, then you cannot claim that best-to-worst order is "relevant to intention, therefore phenomenal".

No, sorry I must have made a mistake, or perhaps you just misunderstood. — Metaphysician Undercover

There has been no misunderstanding. It's clear to everyone that you continually change your position and argue out of both sides of your mouth.

I'm very well acquainted with your strawman interpretations designed at creating the appearance of contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

What strawman interpretation? Instead of empty accusations, go ahead and explain how or what I have misinterpreted.

There is no contradiction in saying that I am showing you an order which I cannot describe. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's different to what you were saying earlier in the discussion. Earlier, you were saying that the inherent order can be seen and described. For example:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are points distributed on a plane, or 3d space, the positioning of those points relative to each other is describable, therefore there is an inherent order to them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Look, if the dots exist on a plane, they have positions on that plane, and therefore an exact order which is specific to that particular positioning. They do not have any other order, or else they would not be those same dots on that plane. Take a look at that posting of fishfry's and see the order which the dots have, on that plane, and tell me how they could have a different order, or no order at all, and still be those same dots on that same plane. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if you cannot see order in an arrangement on a two dimensional plane, I don't see any point in discussing "order" with you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I specified the order. It is a spatial order, the one demonstrated by the diagram. Why is this difficult for you to understand? When a diagram shows us an arrangement of dots, it shows us the spatial order of those dots, where the dots must be on a spatial plane to fulfill the order being demonstrated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only recently did you invoke Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction, changing your position entirely:

We are talking about "inherent order". This is the order which inheres within the group of things. It is not the perspective dependent order — Metaphysician Undercover

The "inherent order" is the order that the things have independently of the order that we assign to them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The inherent order is the true order, which inheres in the arrangement of objects. If I stated an order, this would be an order which I assign to those objects, from an external perspective, and therefore not the inherent order. — Metaphysician Undercover

if I stated an order, it would be a representation, imposed from my perspective, and therefore not the order which inheres within the object, the inherent order. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot tell you the order which inheres within the group of things, because iIwould just be giving you an order which I impose on that group from an external perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Contrary to the claims of your earlier posts, we can no longer simply look and see the inherent order which is demonstrated by the diagram. You now claim that what we see is a mere phenomena, and that the true, inherent order cannot be seen, described or known. Pure contradiction.

So you don't know whether intention has anything to do with Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction?
And yet you still use this distinction as the basis of your argument regarding inherent order? — Luke

I don't use that distinction as the basis for my argument, I gave that distinction as an example which i thought you might be able to understand.

You tried to draw an analogy between your supposed inherent order and Kant's noumena. When I pointed out that you had already conceded that "many other types" of order are not spatio-temporal and therefore not noumenal, you said that one other type (best to worst) "is relevant to intention, therefore phenomenal". If you don't know whether intention has anything to do with Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction, as you now admit, then you cannot claim that best-to-worst order is "relevant to intention, therefore phenomenal". — Luke

Come on Luke, use some intelligence. Kant did not have to name every instance of what contributes to phenomena for us to place things in that category. If you think I am wrong, and intention ought not be placed in that category, then just tell me. But please give reasons. Simply saying Kant didn't explicitly say it therefore, you're wrong in your analogy, is pointless.

What strawman interpretation? Instead of empty accusations, go ahead and explain how or what I have misinterpreted. — Luke

I told you how you misinterpreted., You claimed a contradiction when I said I couldn't describe something which was shown. That is just an indication of the limits to human intelligence, and word use, not a contradiction.

Pure contradiction. — Luke

Thanks for all the quotes removed from context. To be shown, or demonstrated does not mean to be stated, I went through that in the last post, and again above. And, "the positioning of those points relative to each other is describable" does not mean that I have the capacity to describe them. I do believe I mentioned that it would require an intelligence superior to a human intelligence, like a divine intellect. I was arguing the deficiencies of the human intellect, in being incapable of describing what is inherently describable.

This is exactly the problem which quantum physics actually has. The physicists are incapable of adequately describing the positioning, therefore "order" of the particles. We can either conclude that the particles have no inherent order, because the order cannot be determined by the human techniques, or we can conclude that they have an order, but other principles, and a higher intelligence, are required to figure out the order. As I explained to you already, (which you've left out of your inflammatory interpretation), is that the latter choice is the rational choice.

Therefore I reaffirm my accusation, that you are intentionally misinterpreting what I write for the sake of making it appear as contradictory, instead of putting any effort into trying to understand it. This is very consistent with my observations of your mode of operation at this forum.

I don't use that distinction as the basis for my argument, I gave that distinction as an example which i thought you might be able to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's odd. When I asked you what the "internal perspective" of an arrangement of objects was, you said:

Are you aware of Kant;s distinction between phenomena and noumena? As human beings, we do not know the thing itself, we only know how it appears to us. Kant seems to describe the noumena as fundamentally unknowable. — Metaphysician Undercover

And only a day ago you said:

Right, inherent order, which I classed as noumenal, appears to be spatial-temporal. — Metaphysician Undercover

But now you say that Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction is not the basis for your argument. How do you expect me to understand your argument about inherent order if one day you say that inherent order is noumenal, and the next day you say that Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction is not the basis for your argument?

Come on Luke, use some intelligence. Kant did not have to name every instance of what contributes to phenomena for us to place things in that category. If you think I am wrong, and intention ought not be placed in that category, then just tell me. But please give reasons. Simply saying Kant didn't explicitly say it therefore, you're wrong in your analogy, is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've now told me that you don't use Kant's distinction as the basis for your argument, so I don't know what analogy you're referring to. Either inherent order is noumenal or it isn't. Maybe you meant indirect realism instead of noumena? I don't know.

You claimed a contradiction when I said I couldn't describe something which was shown. — Metaphysician Undercover

False. I claimed a contradiction between your position and statements before you introduced Kant, and your position and statements after you introduced Kant.

Thanks for all the quotes removed from context. — Metaphysician Undercover

What context is lacking? Feel free to use the links provided to find the context.

To be shown, or demonstrated does not mean to be stated, I went through that in the last post, and again above. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but in the posts before you introduced Kant, you were clearly saying that the appearances were the reality (i.e. direct realism), as demonstrated by the quotes. Again:

Look, if the dots exist on a plane, they have positions on that plane, and therefore an exact order which is specific to that particular positioning. They do not have any other order, or else they would not be those same dots on that plane. Take a look at that posting of fishfry's and see the order which the dots have, on that plane, and tell me how they could have a different order — Metaphysician Undercover

You asked us here (prior to your introduction of Kant) to take a look at the diagram and see the order the dots have, and that they could not have any other order. Yet now (after your introduction of Kant) you are trying to convince us of the opposite: that there must be another order - the inherent order - which is different to the order we can see in the diagram. Moreover, you have claimed that the appearance of order and the inherent order could not be the same just by chance, despite your admission that you don't know whether or not they could be the same.

The contradiction is more stark here:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

To return to my recent point, you have conceded that there are "many other types" of order which are not "temporal-spatial", therefore your references to phenomena-noumena (or indirect realism or whatever) do not apply to these many other types of order. Therefore, you cannot claim that there is some hidden order to these other types. While that might be irrelevant to your claims, it is not irrelevant to the criticisms of your claims made by the other posters here. You are the only one arguing that order must involve spatio-temporal phenomena (and/or noumena).

But now you say that Kant's phenomena-noumena distinction is not the basis for your argument. — Luke

Right, this principle has a long tradition, it goes back at leas to Aristotle, with the law of identity, so it is definitely not based in Kant. Kant has simply presented the similar principle in his own way. I present it in my way. The principle is not "the same" it is a similar principle, needing to be refined and understood in the unique way of each particular individual mind who desires to understand..

In Aquinas, we see that independent Forms are fundamentally "intelligible" but not intelligible to the human intellect, because that intellect is united with a material body. This position, of being dependent on a body and the sense organs makes the intellect deficient. We find this same principle in Kant. The human intellect produces knowledge from phenomena which is dependent on sensation, and sense appearances. Notice that Kant refers to the noumenon as "intelligible", though it is not intelligible to us human beings, due to this predicament, which is not a contradiction.

Yes, but in the posts before you introduced Kant, you were clearly saying that the appearances were the reality (i.e. direct realism), as demonstrated by the quotes. — Luke

No, I don't believe I mentioned "appearances". And "inherent" clearly means within the object, as what inheres within. So if you interpreted me as saying the "inherent order" is part of the appearance of the object within a mind, rather than within the thing itself, I think this was a matter of misinterpretation. You did demonstrate some confusion as to what "inherent" means, as if you were somewhat unfamiliar with the word, so perhaps you thought I was talking about an order abstracted from an appearance, rather than an inherent order at that time.. But if you understood what "inherent" means, and what "appearance" means, you would not have interpreted in this contradictory way.

I think perhaps the issue was confused because we were talking about a diagram, which is intended to show something. Therefore there is a number of levels of representation which adds ambiguity. The diagram is an actual thing itself, with an inherent order. But it is also made to represent an order (an apparent order), which a human mind apprehends. This produced the problem with fishfry claiming it was "random", lacking order, because that is the intended (apparent order) which it was made to represent, However, I argued that there is necessarily an inherent order within the thing shown, and fishfry's claim that it did not show an order, that it was "random", is a false claim. If you had understood this argument from me, you would have recognized that I was making the same distinction at that time.

You asked us here (prior to your introduction of Kant) to take a look at the diagram and see the order the dots have, and that they could not have any other order. Yet now (after your introduction of Kant) you are trying to convince us of the opposite: that there must be another order - the inherent order - which is different to the order we can see in the diagram. Moreover, you have claimed that the appearance of order and the inherent order could not be the same just by chance, despite your admission that you don't know whether or not they could be the same. — Luke

That's a misinterpretation. I was asking the same thing both times, to look at the thing, and see that there is an order within the thing itself. What seems to be causing you confusion is the fact that we can look at a thing, and conclude that there is order inherent within (that's what makes a thing intelligible) without actually understanding the order., i.e. we see order without understanding it.

To return to my recent point, you have conceded that there are "many other types" of order which are not "temporal-spatial", therefore your references to phenomena-noumena (or indirect realism or whatever) do not apply to these many other types of order. Therefore, you cannot claim that there is some hidden order to these other types. While that might be irrelevant to your claims, it is not irrelevant to the criticisms of your claims made by the other posters here. You are the only one arguing that order must involve spatio-temporal phenomena (and/or noumena). — Luke

I don't understand your point. Your reference to "hidden order" doesn't make sense. I'm not talking about a hidden order, and this idea seems to be the source of your misunderstanding. The order is right there in plain view, as things are, but it is just not understood, because we do not have the capacity to understand it.

If you see now, that the entire time, I was talking about the order which inheres within the thing itself, as "inherent order", rather than some perceived, apprehended, or creatively imagined order, you can go back and reread the entire section and clear up your misunderstanding. I recommend that anytime you feel the inclination to interpret in the latter sense, and thereby apprehend contradiction, you suppress this inclination, and remain true to the intentions of the author. Afterwards you can ask me for clarification if any points appear to be unclear.

If you see now, that the entire time, I was talking about the order which inheres within the thing itself, as "inherent order", rather than some perceived, apprehended, or creatively imagined order, you can go back and reread the entire section and clear up your misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you were talking about the inherent order the entire time, and if the inherent order is not perceived or apprehended, then why did you say:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

Take a look at that posting of fishfry's and see the order which the dots have — Metaphysician Undercover

It can only be because you were not talking about the inherent order the entire time. You have contradicted yourself.

Furthermore this:

the entire time, I was talking about the order which inheres within the thing itself, as "inherent order", rather than some perceived, apprehended, or creatively imagined order — Metaphysician Undercover

contradicts this:

The order is right there in plain view — Metaphysician Undercover

If you were talking about the inherent order the entire time, and if the inherent order is not perceived or apprehended, then why did you say: — Luke

I don't see any problem with those quotes. As I said, the order is right there, in the object, as shown by the object, and seen by you, as you actually see the object, along with the order which inheres within the object, yet it's not apprehended by your mind.

Sorry L:uke, but I find it extremely ridiculous that you are trying to tell me what I was talking about. As I said, you need to go back and reread the entire section, with the understanding, and commitment, that it's all about the inherent order, therefore the order which inheres within the object. And quit trying to force your nonsense interpretation, insisting that you know better than I do, what I was trying to say, simply so that you can say that I was trying to contradict myself. It's foolish of you.

As I said, the order is right there, in the object, as shown by the object, and seen by you, as you actually see the object, along with the order which inheres within the object, yet it's not apprehended by your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are these both the inherent order (bolded)? If so, then why do you say "along with the order"?

@Metaphysician Undercover I just happened to run across an article in Philosophy Now called, A Justification of Empirical Thinking by Arnold Zuboff, whom Wiki describes as, "an American philosopher who has worked on topics such as personal identity, philosophy of mind, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of probability.[1] He is the original formulator of the Sleeping Beauty Problem[2] and a view analogous to open individualism—the position that there is one subject of experience, who is everyone—which he calls "universalism.""

So, a professional philosopher. At one point in the article he says: "We are indeed rationally justified in thinking 2 plus 3 will always be 5, because 2 plus 3 is not distinct from but rather identical with 5." My emphasis. So at least one professional philosopher would object to your claim that they are not identical.

Are these both the inherent order (bolded)? If so, then why do you say "along with the order"? — Luke

Yes, you see the object along with the order which inheres within, meaning you see the order, you just do not apprehend it. Consider the dots, we see them, we must see the order because it's there, yet fishfry claimed that the dots were randomly arranged, indicating the order was not apprehended

So, a professional philosopher. At one point in the article he says: "We are indeed rationally justified in thinking 2 plus 3 will always be 5, because 2 plus 3 is not distinct from but rather identical with 5." My emphasis. So at least one professional philosopher would object to your claim that they are not identical. — fishfry

There are numerous philosophers who argue against the law of identity as stated by Aristotle, Hegel opposed it, as is evident here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9078/hegel-versus-aristotle-and-the-law-of-identity/p1

What I see as an issue which arises from rejecting the idea that each particular object has its own unique identity (law of identity), is a failure of the other two interrelated laws, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. Some philosophers in the Hegelian tradition, like dialectical materialists, and dialetheists, openly reject the the law of non-contradiction. When the law of identity is dismissed, and a thing does not have an identity inherent to itself, the law of non-contradiction loses its applicability because things, or "objects" are imaginary, and physical reality has no bearing on how we conceive of objects.

There are specific issues with the nature of the physical world that we observe with our senses, which make aspects of it appear to be unintelligible. There must be a reason why aspects of it appear as unintelligible. We can assume that unintelligibility inheres within the object itself, it violates those fundamental laws of intelligibility, or we can assume that our approach to understanding it is making it appear.as unintelligible. I argue that the latter is the only rational choice, and I look for faults in mathematical axioms, and theories of physics, to account for the reason why aspects appear as unintelligible. I believe this is the only rational choice, because if we take the other option, and assume that there is nothing which distinguishes a thing as itself, making it distinct from everything else (aspects of reality violate the law of identity), or that the same thing has contradictory properties at the same time (aspects of reality violate the law of non-contradiction), we actually assume that it is impossible to understand these aspects of reality. So I say it is the irrational choice, because if we start from the assumption that it is impossible to understand certain aspects of reality, we will not attempt to understand them, even though it may be the case that the appearance of unintelligibility is actually caused by the application of faulty principles. Therefore it is our duty subject all fundamental principles to skeptical practices, to first rule out that possibility before we can conclude that unintelligibility inheres within the object.

Aristotle devised principles whereby the third fundamental law, excluded middle would be suspended under certain circumstances, to account for the appearance of unintelligibility. Ontologically, there is a very big difference between violating the law of excluded middle, and violating the law of non-contradiction. When we allow that excluded middle is violated we admit that the object has not been adequately identified by us. When we allow that non-contradiction is violated we assume that the object has been adequately identified, and it simply is unintelligible.