He was impious. — frank

This is true from the perspective of the city, but the gods of the city are not just. If the gods loved justice, however, then Socrates would be a paradigm of piety.

it is an extreme example of why piety must be tempered. In fact, it often has been, but not as the result of piety. — Fooloso4

However, that doesn't prove that piety per se is bad or that the Gods don't love piety as you claim.

So it is a strawman.

He was impious.
— frank

This is true from the perspective of the city, but the gods of the city are not just. If the gods loved justice, however, then Socrates would be a paradigm of piety. — Fooloso4

Per Aristophanes he publicly questioned the existence of the gods. It doesn't get more impious than that

I am in general agreement, but I don't think his motivation was to kill his father. That is in his mind an unavoidable consequence

I do think that part of his motivation was to make a demonstration of his piety and expert knowledge of the gods.

Per Aristophanes he publicly questioned the existence of the gods. It doesn't get more impious than that — frank

Right, but there is more to it. Neither Aristophanes nor anyone else at that time thought to bring charges against him. It was not regarded as a criminal matter until Meletus brought charges against him. Why he did so is a question better addressed in a discussion of Plato's and Xenophon's apologies.

Socrates does not deny his impiety. His concern is not for the gods but for the city. Again, his concern if for the human things.

Neither Aristophanes nor anyone else at that time thought to bring charges against him — Fooloso4

I explained this earlier. It was scapegoating that followed the defeat of Athens at the hands of the Spartans.

Socrates does not deny his impiety. His concern is not for the gods but for the city. Again, his concern if for the human things. — Fooloso4

And clouds. He apparently spent a lot of time trying to discover what clouds are.

It is the will of gods, not the will of God in the Euthyphro; and that's why the argument doesn't work in the monotheistic context. — Janus

The argument does work in a monotheist context:

If instead of gods we consider God then the question is whether something is beloved of God because it is just or just because it is beloved? In terms of piety the question would be: is it pious because it just or just because it is pious? If God loves the just and hates the unjust then what is pious, as what is loved by God, would be what is just. If someone like Euthyphro claims he is pious because he is doing what is beloved of God and what he does is unjust then either the unjust is beloved by God or he is not pious. In other words, the equation beloved of God = pious is insufficient without the possession of knowledge of God. — Fooloso4

The central question of the dialogue is about men not gods. What should guide Euthyphro’s actions, and how are we to judge Socrates’? Is piety simply a matter of doing what we are told a god or gods want from us, or is it part of the larger question of the just, noble, and good? Although it may seem that with monotheism there is no problem of conflict between gods; but the problem remains with the conflicting claims, laws, interpretations, and practices of the monotheistic religions. — Fooloso4

I explained this earlier. It was scapegoating that followed the defeat of Athens at the hands of the Spartans. — frank

This is part of it but not the whole story.

And clouds. He apparently spent a lot of time trying to discover what clouds are. — frank

That is the joke from Aristophanes Clouds.

This is part of it but not the whole story. — Fooloso4

Really? What's the other part?

The argument does work in a monotheist context: — Fooloso4

Right. It's monotheism again. So, what you are saying is that you are unwilling or unable to focus on Plato's text.

Anyway, here are the facts of the matter:

1. Socrates himself says, and Euthyphro agrees, that:

“The loved by the Gods is loved by the Gods because it is loved by the Gods, not loved (by the Gods) because it is loved by the Gods” (10e).

In other words, we cannot say that the Gods love it "because they love it". There must be another reason.

2. Nowhere does Socrates say that “pious” and “loved by the Gods” do not apply to the same things.

3. Socrates’ argument may or may not prove that we cannot define “pious” as “loved by the Gods” if and when the Gods’ reason for loving the pious is that it is pious.

But it does not prove that pious can’t be defined as “loved by the Gods”.

4. So the answer revolves on the reason or reasons for which the Gods love the pious.

You got it all wrong.

So the answer revolves on the reason or reasons for which the Gods’ love the pious. — Apollodorus

Exactly.

Exactly — frank

Yep. That's why he's been choosing his words carefully and constantly distracting people's attention with nonsensical pronouncements about Abrahamic religions. Apparently, it's the "Jews fault" that Fooloso4 is incapable of understanding a simple text.

Addressed in the Shoutbox.

Really? What's the other part? — frank

A discussion for another time and place. Perhaps you can do a summary of the Apology and we can discuss it.

The Apology doesn't contradict the historian's account.

Socrates was one of many victims of scapegoating following the defeat of Athens.

If I had one piece of advice for you, it would be this: by lifting texts out if the time and place they were written, you end up with wrong conclusions and in the process miss the genius of Plato. Take it however you like

I can't see that this answers my reply.

It seems to me that the reply to the god/gods is pretty straight forward, as set out by @Fooloso4. I agree that many will dismiss the argument forthwith, but that there is more to it. I don't agree that your argument - roughly that the will of god and the god are extensionally equivalent so the intensional distinction is irrelevant - works; of course I don't agree, since the terms have distinct uses; I think that line falls to the Naturalistic Fallacy.

I had thought @Olivier5 was making a joke with "Socrates himself didn't do such a great job at this task." - as if Socrates had as his task getting off the charge of impiety, when the opposite is the case.

All might be detailed more thoroughly, given time. Which line interests you the most?

The Apology doesn't contradict the historian's account. — frank

I did not say it does. I said there is more to the story. Start by looking at the other accuser behind Meletus and at Meletus himself.

If I had one piece of advice for you, it would be this: by lifting texts out if the time and place they were written, you end up with wrong conclusions and in the process miss the genius of Plato. Take it however you like — frank

Funny coming from the guy who could not grasp the problem of attempting to apply anachronistic terminology to Plato.

Funny coming from the guy who could not grasp the problem of attempting to apply anachronistic terminology to Plato. — Fooloso4

Funny that you keep doing it yourself all the time. I don't know why Banno thought it was a good idea to choose you for this thread, to be honest.

Although it may seem that with monotheism there is no problem of conflict between gods; but the problem remains with the conflicting claims, laws, interpretations, and practices of the monotheistic religions. — Fooloso4

I would like to interpose an observation from philosophy of religion if I may. In many discussions, there is equivocation between God and 'the gods'. As you say, the fact that the pantheist gods quarrel among themselves ought not to appear in monotheism, but this can be transposed into the form of the different monotheistic faiths quarreling amongst themselves about God, which amounts to a different version of the same problem.

But I think there is a certain artificiality about that transposition, which is that it still regards God as a god. As soon as you qualify God with the indefinite or definite article ('a' or 'the') you're 'objectifying' the concept, treating God as a 'that' - similar in kind to Zeus or Apollo, but 'the Christian God' as distinct from 'the gods of the Greek pantheon'; 'this god', not 'that god', the 'Christian' God as distinct from 'Allah'. And I think from the perspective of philosophical theology, that is mistaken. Monotheism is not the insistence that God is a superior member of the set of beings hitherto designated 'the gods', although, considering the historical origins of monotheism, that is an all-to-understandable attitude.

About the only modern philosophical theologian who makes this point is Paul Tillich. I won't pursue it here as it's tangential to the dialogue proper, although it is central to many of the interpretations being made here.

Monotheism is not the insistence that God is a superior member of the set of beings hitherto designated 'the gods', although, considering the historical origins of monotheism, that is an all-to-understandable attitude. — Wayfarer

Further digression. You may well be correct but my understanding of the Old Testament is the other gods referred to as false gods (Baal, Moloch, etc) are not denied as such, they are just not the true God of the Jews. Forgive the crassness of this comparison but I always took 'the one and only true god' to be analogous to the way film goers describe Connery 'as the one and only true Bond'.. Is there a reference that determines that these other 'false gods' do not exist? Additionally isn't Satan essentially a god too?

And you are wrong. You are confusing apples and oranges. — Bartricks

Sorry to break it to you but you saying it doesn't make it wrong. You began by telling me the Euthyphro dilemma is metaethics and virture ethics is normative ethics which I presume is what you mean by (comparing) apples with oranges.

I did admit that the above distinction is accurate but then I went on to show you that the metaethics of Euthyphro's dilemma has everything to do with the metaethics of virtue ethics. You're refusing to acknowledge this plain and simple fact. I confess I couldn't articulate my thoughts well, I was zoned out yesterday. With this clarification in place, you might be able to make sense of my previous posts. G'day.

Consider the cultural context. There was universal acceptance of deities in ancient culture, so God as revealed by the Bible could only be understood in those terms - as displacing those other deities and in that sense, being regarded as like but superior. (A book about this keeps popping up in my various feeds, ‘the origins of Biblical monotheism’). And as I’ve observed many times here, the name ‘Jupiter’ (Roman equivalent of Zeus) is derived from the Indo-European ‘sky-father’ (‘dyaus-pitar’). So it is natural to assume that the ‘one God’, especially as known by the epithet ‘heavenly Father’, is of a similar kind the pantheistic deities, but greater than them. (I know it’s a very delicate subject.)

But let’s get back to the Platonic dialogues. As I said in my earlier post on this thread, Socrates is quizzing Euthypro about ‘the gods’ but he also asks about the ‘real form of piety’ - not what makes this or that person a pious person, but what is its essence? I have the suspicion, as yet unfounded, that lurking in back of many such passages is the dim apprehension of the forms, specifically, the Form of the Good, or in this case, the form of piety, although it is not spelled out here. The implication being that, though Socrates might have been sceptical about piety as bestowed by or an attribute of the Gods, he doesn’t doubt that there really is such a thing. But the dialogue ends in uncertainty about its source and nature.

In subsequent history, many Platonic elements were to be incorporated in Christian theology - or taken over wholesale. (Might bear some comparison to what is now disparagingly known as cultural appropriation.) Through that prism, Socrates’ skepticism about the Greek gods is because, the argument would go, he has a nascent awareness of the God who has not yet been revealed in the life of Jesus; that he unconsciously recognises (in modern language), the one God. That, at any rate, would be a Christianised re-telling of it, but I do acknowledge my conjecture has many gaps at this point.

With this clarification in place, you might be able to make sense of my previous posts — TheMadFool

No, I do not understand you. Virtue ethics is a normative theory. It is not a metaethical theory. That is, it is not an analysis of what the goodness of a virtue is, in and of itself.

These are metaethical theories: divine command theory; naturalism; non-naturalism; non-cognitivism

These are normative theories: virtue ethics; consequentialism; deontology; pluralism.

The euthyphro attempts to refute divine command theory - a metaethical theory. It does this - or seems to -be drawing attention to the supposed arbitrariness that would infect morality if it were true.

So that's the issue: is morality rendered arbitrary by a divine command analysis?

About the only modern philosophical theologian who makes this point is Paul Tillich. — Wayfarer

I have read Tillich. I think the idea of the ground of being as opposed to a supreme being has its appeal. But I don't think it helps resolve the issue. If for no other reason than it is regarded as one of many different views.

Virtue ethics is a normative theory. — Bartricks

Agreed but it must have a metaethics of its own i.e. it should have some criteria for distinguishing good from bad. In short, that we have virtue ethics implies that there's a metaethical schema underpinning it. That metaethics of virtue ethics is, to my knowledge, all about the character of a virtuous person. The question that any and all virtue ethicists must ask themselves when faced with a moral question is, "what will a virtuous person do?"

Divine command theory is metaethics alright - is goodness whatever god commands or not? - but if one takes the position that goodness is what god commands, then such a position can be considered equivalent to putting one's faith in god's character, god being the perfect virtuous person. Did you get it now?

Agreed but it must have a metaethics of its own i — TheMadFool

No, that makes no sense. There is no such thing as a 'metaethics of virtue ethics'. You can be a divine command virtue ethicist; a naturalist virtue ethicist; a non-naturalist virtue ethicist, a non-cognitivist virtue ethicist.

I think you do not really know what a metaethical theory is. Here are two questions:

"What is moral?"

"What is morality?"

Normative theories attempt to answer the first. Metaethical the second.

Virtue ethics is an answer - a much disputed answer - to the first question, not the second. (And its answer is "that which a virtuous person would do" or some such.

Divine command theory is an answer - a much disputed answer - to the second question. And its answer is "God's commands and approvals" or some such.

I have the suspicion, as yet unfounded, that lurking in back of many such passages is the dim apprehension of the forms, specifically, the Form of the Good, or in this case, the form of piety, although it is not spelled out here. — Wayfarer

He does ask about the 'idea' and 'eidos' of piety, that is, the Form. If the Form or Kind can be identified then it can be determined whether what Euthyphro is doing is pious. But the Form is not discovered. As with the Form of the Good and the other Forms the best we can do is discuss what we think it looks like. 'Look' is another term for Form.

See my discussion of Socrates 'second sailing' in the Phaedo thread. Socrates says he is unable to see the things themselves and resorts to speech, to hypothesis, to images of things.

No, that makes no sense. — Bartricks

Normative ethics question: Is there good/bad in virtue ethics?

Answer: Of course there is, that's why it's an ethical theory i.e. it's supposed to guide our actions, ethically speaking.

Metaethics question: What is good/bad in virtue ethics? In other words, how do virtue ethicists distinguish good from bad?

Answer: All one has to do to get an idea of how one should behave is ask, "what would a virtuous person do in this situation?" To cut to the chase, in virtue ethics, good/bad are about a virtuous person's character/identity.

The Euthyphro dilemma: The metethical question, is what God commands good or not? If one believes that what God commands is good then, that goodness must be entirely part of God's character/identity. In other words, in the metaethical matter of Divine command theory, the question we should ask ourselves when faced with a moral issue is, "what would God do in this situation?"

Does it make sense now?

Metaethics of Virtue ethics: What will a virtuous person want us to do in a given situation? Focus on the character/identity of a virtuous person

Metaethics of Divine command theory: What will God want us to do in a given situation? Focus on the character/identity of God.



I can't make it clearer than that.

Metaethics question: What is good/bad in virtue ethics? In other words, how do virtue ethicists distinguish good from bad? — TheMadFool

No, that's not a question in metaethics. The metaethicist wants to know what goodness itself is - what's it made of. So, not what has it. But what it is made of.

No, that's not a question in metaethics. The metaethicist wants to know what goodness itself is - what's it made of. So, not what has it. But what it is made of. — Bartricks

That's exactly what I said, right? Every ethical theory brings with it its own brand of goodness.