What difference does/can it make to a person's life to hold an idealist position? — Tom Storm

I just got through talking about it:

Point is that by the materialist definition you get everything an idealist would want.
— khaled

Well, you don't, that's why they're not materialists. Principally, you don't get magical humans. Lots of people don't like being described as a the same sort of thing as rocks, rivers, or even trees, apes, and computers. They find that quite offensive. Bear in mind we're coming from a world that was taught that God made us bespoke, with His divine breath, and made the universe just for us: being ever so special is important to many. — Kenosha Kid

You made some hints but I was hoping for a more qualitative elaboration.

Are idealists necessarily more susceptible to a bunch of unverifiable tosh? How does one discern 'good' idealism from 'bad' and how does this play out in a quotidian life?

Question: what do you think belongs to epistemic idealism, that isn’t already included in transcendental idealism? — Mww

They’re pretty close. I would say epistemic idealism makes it more clear that in referring to the primacy of mind, we’re not talking about objective reality. If I say ‘the world is structures in consciousness’, I don’t mean that there are literal objective structures, like tectonic plates or fields. It’s that our understanding, our ‘meaning-world’, comprises layers of understanding, by which we orient ourselves and navigate the world. That includes scientific theories, language and the 'laws of thought'. As Einstein told Heisenberg, ‘the theory dictates what we will find’.

But this is the reverse of the common opinion, which is that minds

arise from states of complex systems. — Kenosha Kid

The problem with that is that there is nothing known to science which accounts for the first-person perspective, which has been debated many times under the heading of facing up to the hard problem, although many continue to deny that problem, and nothing can be done about that.

Secondly, as whateer we know about complex systems, or anything whatever, is already shaped and structured according to logical laws, then there's a circularity involved in saying that the things we're studying explain the subject which is studying them. That's the same circularity which, I believe, Kant noticed.

Yes minds are things. Not material things. Things. — khaled

Got any other examples of non-material things?

To a materialist, again, consciousness is a pattern, — khaled

I was reading an interesting article yesterday about a phenomenon called ‘representational drift’. Experimenters put electrodes on mouse brains and measure which neural systems respond to stimuli. The thing that they’re perplexed by is that the location of the responses keep changing. They would have expected that once a reaction to a familiar experience was habituated, that it would light up the same areas of the brain. But this doesn’t happen - the reactions 'drift' all over the brain. So, what is producing or co-ordinating the unified, holistic response which we call 'memory'? This is somewhat similar in a way to the problem of the subjective unity of perception.

We’ve talked about ‘implicit realism’ in earlier threads. I said that there’s a general tendency to believe that the brain pictures or represents the world - an idea which is anticipated in John Locke’s philosophy. The problem I see with such accounts is that the idea of ‘the world’ which these accounts invoke, is itself neural in origin. There’s no ‘outside’ of that. Both ‘inside the mind’ and ‘in the world’ are mental constructs, vorstellung (Schopenhauer) or Vijñāna (Buddhism). But that cuts against realism, so generally it is instinctively rejected.

See also The Neural Buddhists, David Brooks.

Lots of people don't like being described as a the same sort of thing as rocks, rivers, or even trees, apes, and computers. They find that quite offensive. — Kenosha Kid

It's not a matter of it being offensive - it's a matter of it being false, on account of the fact that the rational, linguistic and imaginative capacities of h. sapiens places us in a different category. 'Sapiens' purportedly means 'wise', in comparative religion, you will read references to 'the sapiential traditions', being the wisdom traditions of East and West. If that is a distinction which is lost to current culture, then, so much the worse for current culture.

How does one discern 'good' idealism from 'bad' and how does this play out in a quotidian life?

Some are property dualists. Some are mysterianists (materialists who think we'll never figure out consciousness). — RogueAI

I'm excluding those 2. When I say materialist or idealist I mean a purist, IE not a dualist in either case.

A materialist cannot say anything about consciousness with confidence because A), there's no way to prove that matter exists in the first place — RogueAI

"A materialist cannot say anything about consciousness because there is no way to prove matter exists". Come on now. Matter existing is a given. Or else you're not talking to a materialist.

B) even if matter does exist, if consciousness is patterns of matter, why does pattern A give rise to the feeling of stubbing a toe, while pattern B gives rise to the beauty of a sunset, while pattern C gives rise to no experience at all? — RogueAI

What answer here would satisfy you? These questions sound the same to me like "Why is pi equal to 3.14?" Or "Why does gravity exist?" It's just the case. If you want a materialist to answer those then you first answer why pi is equal to 3.14.

How does that work? — RogueAI

If you mean how to get from pattern A to pattern B (stubbing a toe to beauty of sunset) then we can figure that out pretty well.

Why are we conscious in the first place? — RogueAI

Because a certain pattern happened. Why did the certain pattern happen? Why is pi equal to 3.14?

If pattern of matter XYZ gives rise to (or is the same as) experience ABC, and that machine over there looks like it's an instance of pattern of matter XYZ, how do we verify it's having experience ABC? — RogueAI

No verification necessary. Pattern XYZ is experience ABC. All we need to verify to say something is having ABC is that it has pattern XYZ. Because those are the same thing.

This is like asking "How do we verify that the red cup is red?"

Agreed? — RogueAI

No as above. Most of your questions don't make sense in a matrialist context. They're like asking "Why is pi 3.14"

If you disagree, then explain how a scientist would go about detecting consciousness in a machine. — RogueAI

Well what do you mean by consciousness first?

Do you believe that mental states are identical to brain states? — RogueAI

Yes.

If so, how is it that I can have a song playing in my head, but there's no music in my skull? — RogueAI

Why would you think those two things imply each other? Having a certain song playing in your head is a certain brain state. One not necessarily produced by music.

If mental states are identical to brain states, then my mind weighs a couple pounds and is about the size of both of my fists. — RogueAI

A pattern doesn't weigh anything. A brain weighs something. A brain state weighs nothing.

This assumes there is a material thing called a brain that exists outside our minds — RogueAI

It's much simpler to prove than the alternative, that there is no brain and only a mind. Tack a good wack on the back of the head with a baseball bat. Your mind goes away, your brain doesn't. So the brain must exist outside the mind. Or at least, something independent of your mind that sustains it must exist (that's the brain).

I think that by today the issue is mostly - though not exclusively - terminological. Cartesian dualism, probably the most known type of dualism, assumed we knew matter better than we actually do.

Today if someone calls themselves a materialist, they usually deny the reality of experience as experienced, as in experiences are epiphenomenal or reaction to a stimulus, etc. There are exceptions too, like Galen Strawson or Susan Haack.

With idealism, it's a bit harder. You can go from woo-Chopra to common sense "reality is whatever is presented to mind'.

So the real distinction, I think, is the status of experience more so than the primacy of matter or mind.

:up:

Got any other examples of non-material things? — Wayfarer

God as most people define him. Ghosts, angels, devils, etc as most people define them. Etc.

There’s no ‘outside’ of that. Both ‘inside the mind’ and ‘in the world’ are mental constructs, vorstellung (Schopenhauer) or Vijñāna (Buddhism). But that cuts against realism, so generally it is instinctively rejected. — Wayfarer

I don't think it even brushes against it. That's what I tried to say last time too. You can maintain that we can't know anything outside of these "inside the mind" representations (by definition you can't), and at the same time that there is an "outside the mind" thing in itself. I'm talking about ontology not epistemology here.

I was reading an interesting articlep yesterday about a phenomenon called ‘representational drift’. Experimenters put electrodes on mouse brains and measure which neural systems respond to stimuli. The thing that they’re perplexed by is that the location of the responses keep changing. They would have expected that once a reaction to a familiar experience was habituated, that it would light up the same areas of the brain. But this doesn’t happen - the reactions 'drift' all over the brain. So, what is producing or co-ordinating the unified, holistic response which we call 'memory'? This is somewhat similar in a way to the problem of the subjective unity of perception. — Wayfarer

Why do you think any of this is an issue for me? I never said I could reach into your brain, pull out a piece of meat and proclaim "Here is memory". All I said was that memory is a pattern. None of this is inconsistent with memory being a pattern.

God as most people define him. Ghosts, angels, devils, etc as most people define them. Etc. — khaled

Oh well, glad you've sorted this all out. Talk some other time.

I'm excluding those 2. When I say materialist or idealist I mean a purist, IE not a dualist in either case. — khaled

You think mysterianism is the same thing as dualism?

No those were 2 unrelated sentences. I'm excluding mysterianists. Also when I say materialist or idealist I mean not a dualist. In other words when I say "materialist" I am only talking about reductionists or eliminitavists (who I think are ridiculous)

eliminitavists (who I think are ridiculous) — khaled

:up:

Yeah. That's a pretty irrational view. It's hard to think of a philosophical view which is more irrational than that. I mean even like strict solipsism makes more sense.

Come on now. Matter existing is a given. Or else you're not talking to a materialist. — khaled

Matter existing is not a "given" when I'm talking to a materialist any more than Christ rose from the dead is a "given" when I'm talking to a Christian. I didn't find your other answers compelling, either. Sorry.

Well in general when trying to understand the other view you at least try to entertain their starting premise. When I talk to idealists I don't say "You can't prove mind exists so you can't say anything".

I think the main reason you don't find the answers compelling is that you aren't actually entertaining the view. Half your questions wouldn't even make sense to a materialist.

if consciousness is patterns of matter, why does pattern A give rise to the feeling of stubbing a toe — RogueAI

"give rise to" assumes there is a "feelign of stubbing a toe" that is different from pattern A. Already not materialist. For example. The phrasing already assumes materialism is false somehow.

I didn't find your other answers compelling — RogueAI

I don't expect you to but were they at least self consistent? Because I don't care about convincing people, just testing out ideas.

Ok. Thanks. While I hold with an inherent dualism with respect to human cognition, and primacy of reason rather than mind, I think T.I already contains epistemic idealism. It is, after all, we that tell the world what it is, not the other way around. All the world ever does, is present itself.

I just never got the idealist materialist split. The idealists seem to be claiming the existence of something that's not needed for explaining anything. — khaled

I suspect that Descarte's duality was a philosophical compromise to allow Materialist Science to do its thing, without stepping on the toes of Spiritualist Theologians. So the "split" was not really between Materialism (atomic theory) and Idealism (Plato's Forms), but between pragmatic Science (bodies) and hypothetical Religion (souls). Yet that rupture also reflected different values. Most of us are Materialists in our daily lives, as we tend to the needs of our physical bodies. But some among us are Spiritualists, in that they are also concerned with the needs of their meta-physical minds or souls.

The mind/soul/consciousness is not a thing at all, as far as our senses are concerned. But to our sixth sense of Reason, it's a non-physical property (Qualia) that we value because it seems to be the essence of each person. However, that idealized or reified essence doesn't "explain anything" in a measurable scientific sense. It merely gives us an idea to hang-our-hat-on so to speak, to indicate that I am more than a lump of meat. That practically useless concept (of Me, or You) is what makes the difference between im-personal objective Science, and inter-personal subjective Social relationships.

Since Descartes, Scientists, freed from concern for Souls, have gone-on to change the physical world radically. Meanwhile, Philosophers are still arguing about the same old ideas & ideals that the Hebrews & Greeks wrote about 2.5 millennia ago. And they seem to value those things-that-are-not-things, not because they are pragmatically useful, but because they are personally meaningful. Ideas (words, metaphors, memes) are "not needed to explain anything" in a scientific sense, but they are absolutely necessary to convey explanations (ideas, opinions) from one immaterial Mind to Another ghost-in-the-machine. :cool:


“Who can find a virtuous woman? for her value is far above rubies” (Proverbs 31:10-31).

When I talk to idealists I don't say "You can't prove mind exists so you can't say anything". — khaled

"Mind exists" does not need to be proven. We know for a certainty that at least one mind exists. That is not the case with matter.

Sure, I agree we know mind exists. But it rests on matter - the brain. Without a brain we'd have no mind.

Unless someone would say something like "we don't know that mind depends on brain" or "the brain is mental stuff too". I think we can say that the first option here is too plausible.

On the other hand, if you say brains are a construction of mind, then yes this makes sense. What doesn't would be to say that brains aren't matter.

I know you have not been suggesting this at all, I'm just pointing our some options that would follow from the argument.

Without a brain we'd have no mind — Manuel

Apparently there are non-material things, though:

Got any other examples of non-material things?
— Wayfarer

God as most people define him. Ghosts, angels, devils, etc as most people define them. Etc. — khaled

And angels are categorised as incorporeal, intelligent beings, although admittedly it is difficult or impossible to imagine such a mind.

Sure, I agree we know mind exists. But it rests on matter - the brain. Without a brain we'd have no mind. — Manuel

There is correlation between brain states and mental states. Causation has not been established. I think the failure to come up with a causal explanation for how brain states lead to mental states, at this point in 2022, is catastrophic to materialism, which is evidenced by the recent popularity among materialists of panpsychism. You even have Mex Tagmark, out at MIT, claiming the universe is made of math.

My point is that the Explanatory Gap is evidence that we have a situation where brain states are correlated with mental states, but are not causing mental states- if brain states are causing mental states, we'd have at least some idea of how that happens, but it's still a complete mystery.

Unless someone would say something like "we don't know that mind depends on brain" or "the brain is mental stuff too". I think we can say that the first option here is too plausible. — Manuel

I think idealism is the most plausible (second option). It certainly is the most parsimonious. Positing the existence of mindless external stuff creates problems, solves nothing, and is unverifiable.

On the other hand, if you say brains are a construction of mind, then yes this makes sense. What doesn't would be to say that brains aren't matter. — Manuel

Under idealism, brains aren't matter, they're ideas, just like when we dream of physical objects- they only exist as ideas. Idealism simply posits that what happens in our dreams is also happening right now. I have no evidence of that, of course, but at least it's a case of going from the known to the known: dreaming. Materialism goes from the unknown (mindless stuff) to the known (mind) via an unknown (and possibly unknowable) mechanism. That's not parsimonious.

I know you have not been suggesting this at all, I'm just pointing our some options that would follow from the argument. — Manuel

I'm an idealist, although I don't know if I've suggested it in this particular thread.

I think the only way I can understand "non material" here would be to say "supernatural" entities. Whatever else anyone may say about mind being primary or matter, I think It would be difficult to argue against naturalism. By this, I don't mean science, I only mean things of nature.

So if we are going to speak about God and Angels, we'd speak of them as things of nature. Otherwise, I don't know what to say.

My point is that the Explanatory Gap is evidence that we have a situation where brain states are correlated with mental states, but are not causing mental states- if brain states are causing mental states, we'd have at least some idea of how that happens, but it's still a complete mystery. — RogueAI

Yes. There are serious problems with mind=brain identity theories. As in, clearly our experience of the color yellow is not reflected in what we understand of brains.

I'm a mysterian honestly. I think that in principle, if we knew enough, we could see how the brain creates mind via some process which we are clueless about because we lack the relevant intellectual capacities to detect them. But we are so far away from that, maybe permanently, that to argue brain=mind is almost not saying anything. Sure, my mind doesn't come from my finger, I'll grant that.

Materialism goes from the unknown (mindless stuff) to the known (mind) via an unknown (and possibly unknowable) mechanism. That's not parsimonious. — RogueAI

Sounds like Kastrup. Which is fine, he's an interesting guy. I'd quibble with the terminology in that I don't see a contradiction in saying that mind is physical stuff, which is very different from saying mind is physicSal stuff.

I mean one can be a non-material physicalist. Or a experiential materialist, meaning the stuff of matter is not inherently different from the stuff of mind. Or we have no good reasons to think so. Of course, granting that these properties called "mental" are the most secure source of knowledge we have.

Yeah, I agree with a lot of that. I love Kastrup! My personal "journey" away from materialism is similar to his. I don't think he really has anything knew, and I don't think he's thought through the theological implications of the existence of a cosmic mind. I think if you explore the idea of just one mind existing, you're going to wind up with a god eventually. Kastrup is great at explaining, though. I would love to listen to Harris interview him. I also thought Rupert Spira was great on Harris's show:
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=sam+harris+debate+consciousness

I saw parts of Hoffman's interview with Harris and Harris' wife, Anika. It was quite interesting.

I think Kaustrup's system is elegant, though his universal mind which you mention, is also not too convincing to me. Nonetheless, even if one doesn't frame the issue as Kastrup does, I think it is clear that many problems would dissolve if we just took for granted the mental as a given and everything else would be representation.

Thanks for sharing the link, I'll check it out. :up:

"Mind exists" does not need to be proven. We know for a certainty that at least one mind exists. That is not the case with matter. — RogueAI

We know for certainty that one mind exists. But you haven’t given a justification for why we should treat that mind as a separate kind of object from matter. A materialist has no problem with a mind existing. Because a mind is just a material thing. And has no problem with only being able to know for sure that the mind exists. For the same reason.

we have a situation where brain states are correlated with mental states — RogueAI

This is the problem. “Correlated with”. No, brain states ARE mental states. To assume that there is a mental state beyond the brain state by definition makes it something you can’t inquire about. You’ve defined a separate kind of object, that arises magically when the brain works a certain way and disappears magically when it doesn’t. The emotion of “Anger” for example, which in your model is like a ghost in the machine, completely undetectable, yet somehow capable of causing changes in the brain and furthermore changes in the brain in turn affect IT. But no, it’s not material for….some reason. Nor is it a pattern again for some reason. It affects and is affected by the physical world yet is ontologically different from it and can never be detected by measurement.

I just don’t see the point in defining things this way. You’ve defined something in a way that it cannot be touched by scientific method then you asked for a scientific explanation. I don’t see the point in defining emotions for instance this way. As “ghosts in the machine”. What does that explain or allow you to say that just defining them as patterns doesn’t?

My personal "journey" away from materialism is similar to his. — RogueAI

Interesting. I’ve taken the opposite journey. Why’d you ever leave?

Though the longer I think about this the more I start to think that idealists and materialists aren't very different except for which words they want to use. I've asked on this thread since the start of one thing that requires a materialist/idealist viewpoint and no one has presented anything. It seems both positions can say the same things, provided you use their respective definitions.

I've asked on this thread since the start of one thing that requires a materialist/idealist viewpoint and no one has presented anything. — khaled

You said, when asked for examples of non-material things:

God as most people define him. Ghosts, angels, devils, etc as most people define them. Etc. — khaled

So, do you believe that these non-material things (or rather, beings) are real? Because materialism would rule that out.

So, do you believe that these non-material things are real? — Wayfarer

No I didn't say they existed. I thought that was obvious.

Were you asking a materialist for examples of non material things that exist? None obviously!

RIght. But I started by saying:

Nope. The mind is definitely not a thing.
— Wayfarer

"Thing" is the most general word you can use. Yes minds are things. Not material things. Things. — khaled

So, if immaterial things don't exist, then they're not things. Which means, you didn't really answer the question.

So, if immaterial things don't exist, then they're not things. — Wayfarer

? A unicorn is a thing. Even if it doesn't exist.

I think we're getting stuck on technicalities here.

Which means, you didn't really answer the question. — Wayfarer

Which was?

The question of whether the mind is a thing. I said, 'mind is not a thing', which is making a polemical point. If it's not a thing, then how to conceive of it?

You said, well, it's an immaterial thing - to which I responded, what are some other examples? But the examples you provided turned out to be things you don't think exist, so they're not actually examples at all.