The question of whether the mind is a thing. — Wayfarer

Anything is a thing. It’s in the word.

The way you define it, mind is a thing in as much as unicorns are a thing as far as I’m concerned.

Way I define it mind is a pattern of physical things. Not a separate entity as you define it.

You said, well, it's an immaterial thing - to which I responded, what are some other examples? But the examples you provided turned out to be things you don't think exist, so they're not actually examples at all. — Wayfarer

Do you think the statement “Unicorns are things” is false on account of unicorns not existing? If not then minds as you define them, are things in the same way in my view.

I've asked on this thread since the start of one thing that requires a materialist/idealist viewpoint and no one has presented anything. It seems both positions can say the same things, provided you use their respective definitions. — khaled

Here is one difference I find pertinent: the reality or unreality of a goal-oriented processes, aka purpose, aka teleology.

Minds are purposeful. In an idealist’s cosmos - regardless of type - purpose will have an ontological presence because mind(s) have an ontological presence by default. Hence, teloi (i.e., goals or aims) will be real as determinants of what occurs, at the very least in some respect. As one simple example, my moving right rather than left was determined by my aim/telos of arriving at point B (had I traveled leftward I would not have arrived at point B, and so my goal of being at point B determined my traveling rightward). In an idealistic system, because everything is deemed mind-stuff of one sort or another (e.g., C.S. Peirce’s notion of physicality being effete mind), purpose will, or at least can, apply to many aspects of what is real, if not to everything.

Other than via thought experiments of what if we apply new senses to the semantics of well engraved terms, no materialist or physicalist system will accept matter or the physical to be to any degree determined by aims, teloi. Either under the construct that mind emerges from physical substrata via emergentism such that a property dualism unfolds or, else, that of brain = mind with no property dualism involved, because mind either is fully contingent upon matter or else is matter, and because matter is deemed to in no way be governed by any teleology, mind too then cannot be teleological in any real, or ontological, sense. There can be no ontological purpose in materialism/physicalism because matter / the physical cannot be teleological and because all that is real is matter / the physical.

The first alternative lacks much explanatory power in regard to many aspects of the physical (of effete mind in Peirce’s terminology). E.g., if idealism, then why the ubiquitously observed correlations between brain and mind in regard to brain damage? And so forth.

The second alternative results in a stark contradiction between experienced reality and theorized reality. For just as we know that minds occur, so too do we know that these minds, namely ourselves, function via goal-oriented processes. Even thought the theorized metaphysics of materialism, or physicalism, insists that no such thing takes place in actuality.

In short, a consequence of idealism is that purpose in the world is upheld. On the other hand, materialism/physicalism upholds an absence of purpose in everything, for here everything is material/physical.

Else expressed, the reality of purpose in any facet of the world requires a non-physicalist metaphysics, of which idealism is one form.

BTW, since I strongly lean toward there being such a thing as goal-oriented processes in the world, I’ll say that there being teleology in the world does not in any way necessitate that the world is thereby the creation of a deity. This being a notion that I find absurd, but this latter is a topic for different threads.

I would you can get purpose out of a materialist's viewpoint as well, though not directly. Look at unsupervised learning AI for example.

no materialist or physicalist system will accept matter or the physical to be to any degree determined by aims, teloi. — javra

Yes. There won't be any purpose above and beyond the material. But often the material moves purposefully. And I don't see a reason to propose a "ghost in the machine" that moves it. Again, unsupervised learning AI is a simple example of purposeful action born from purposeless components.

There is no "separate force" that forces things to move purposely over and beyond the physical forces, but the physical forces are enough as far as I can see.

Either under the construct that mind emerges from physical substrata via emergentism such that a property dualism unfolds or, else, that of brain = mind with no property dualism involved — javra

Ok so these are the two options. I subscribe to the second by the way.

The second alternative results in a stark contradiction between experienced reality and theorized reality. For just as we know that minds occur, — javra

? You lost me at "we know minds occur". I thought the second option was that brain = mind. Minds don't occur separately from brains. The way you use "mind occur" here makes no sense assuming the second alternative.

Else expressed, the reality of purpose in any facet of the world requires a non-physicalist metaphysics, of which idealism is one form. — javra

Not convinced. Do you think the self driving car that learned by trial and error moves purposelessly? It seems clear to me it doesn't. And equally clear to me that purpose for this car is NOT some "extra force" or "secret sauce" causing it to move this or that way. Nothing non-material is moving the car, yet it moves purposefully.

By the way, good job for actually answering the question and at least trying to give an example of something that requires an idealist metaphysics. I'm not convinced but at least you answered the question XD.

What can one say about the world that the other can't? — khaled

Idealists cannot rule out supernatural explanations, whereas materialists can.

So I take it that for you it makes perfect sense to deem material substance, or the physical, as purposeful. This conflicts with the history of materialism/physicalism, but I say, “hey, why not”. It does, however, require a metaphysical interpretation of determinants that – although hearkening back to Aristotle and his four causes – has nowadays been forsaken by most. Apropos, as a reminder, one of Aristotle conclusions given his premising of teleology what that of an ultimate final cause/telos as the unmoved mover of everything that changes/moves. Our of curiosity, would you say that this notion then conflicts with a purposeful materialism? Why or why not?

one of Aristotle conclusions given his premising of teleology what that of an ultimate final cause/telos as the unmoved mover of everything that changes/moves. Our of curiosity, would you say that this notion then conflicts with a purposeful materialism? Why or why not? — javra

If it's "unmoveable" then yes (conflicts). If it's "unmoved" then no. If it's fundamentally unmovable it's not physical. I don't like the idea of an "unmoved mover" in in any metaphysics though.

So I take it that for you it makes perfect sense to deem material substance, or the physical, as purposeful. — javra

I'd ask whether or not you think a self driving car has purpose. And if it does, when exactly did we add the immaterial "purpose sauce"? Seems to have risen naturally.

If it's "unmoveable" then yes (conflicts). If it's "unmoved" then no. If it's fundamentally unmovable it's not physical. — khaled

Well, for what its worth, I think Aristotle's intent was that of this ultimate telos/aim/goal being metaphysically fixed, or pre-determinate; not in a partial way (the way an effect can be partially determined by one cause among many) but in a complete or absolute manner. Its my best hunch of what he might have meant. At any rate, not "unmovable" as though it were some concrete thing that could otherwise be moved by something other. It is, after all, only a telos (aim or goal or completion/end).

I'd ask whether or not you think a self driving car has purpose. And if it does, when exactly did we add the immaterial "purpose sauce"? Seems to have risen naturally. — khaled

Wait a minute, I thought we were for the time being addressing the (now pejorative ?) purposefulness as as something material. And not as something immaterial.

As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved, because everything would be purposeful. BTW, this would apply just as well in Peirce's concept of physicality as effete mind.

As a heads up, I'm gonna sigh off for the time being.

I thought we were for the time being addressing the (now pejorative ?) purposefulness as as something material. And not as something immaterial. — javra

Yes. I said "When did we add the purpose sauce" sarcastically to imply that there is no "purpose sauce". That there is no "guiding force" over and above the things that are moving.

As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved — javra

Yes. That was the point of the sarcastic comment.

Are idealists necessarily more susceptible to a bunch of unverifiable tosh? — Tom Storm

Idealism _is_ unverifiable tosh.

How does one discern 'good' idealism from 'bad' and how does this play out in a quotidian life? — Tom Storm

I'm unaware of a good idealism. Could you provide an example?

It's not a matter of it being offensive - it's a matter of it being false, on account of the fact that the rational, linguistic and imaginative capacities of h. sapiens places us in a different category. — Wayfarer

I'm talking about people who find the idea offensive. Are you telling me they don't find the idea offensive? (Also, finding an idea offensive inevitably leads one to reject it as false, so the above isn't really saying anything.) There's nothing about reason, language and imagination that leads an unbiased person to infer a second fundamental kind of stuff, some of-the-gaps arguments notwithstanding.

There's nothing about reason, language and imagination that leads an unbiased person to infer a second fundamental kind of stuff, some of-the-gaps arguments notwithstanding. — Kenosha Kid

The point about reason, language and imagination is that it can 'see into the possible' - it can discover ideas and make them real. No animal can do anything remotely similar. As a consequence, the horizons of being are completely different for h. sapiens than for other creatures. Indeed, the differentiation between h. sapiens and other animals, let alone inanimate objects, ought not to be something that has to be defended. We have weighed and measured the cosmos, created technology that has changed the world. If you can't see how that is different to what non-rational animals do, then there's probably not a lot of point in trying to explain it.

Idealism _is_ unverifiable tosh. — Kenosha Kid

There's been a strong idealist strain in physics since the advent of quantum and the discovery of the 'observer problem'. Arthur Eddington's book The Nature of the Physical World, written between the wars, has a strong idealist bent, as exemplified by the oft-quoted passage from that text:

The universe is of the nature of a thought or sensation in a universal Mind … To put the conclusion crudely — the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by "mind" I do not exactly mean mind and by "stuff" I do not at all mean stuff. Still that is about as near as we can get to the idea in a simple phrase. The mind-stuff of the world is something more general than our individual conscious minds; but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to feelings in our consciousness … Having granted this, the mental activity of the part of world constituting ourselves occasions no great surprise; it is known to us by direct self-knowledge, and we do not explain it away as something other than we know it to be — or rather, it knows itself to be. — Arthur Eddington

As a physics lecturer, you must be aware of these and many other similar ideas expressed by modern physicists.

I'm unaware of a good idealism. Could you provide an example? — Kenosha Kid

Not remotely. But I'm not a philosopher. I'm just curious. My sympathies are with physicalism and empiricism and I find it interesting how confident people are in their views on things unseen or unknown. Nevertheless it may well be us that is wrong on this. :razz:

As a physics lecturer, you must be aware of these and many other similar ideas expressed by modern physicists. — Wayfarer

Is idealism primarily speculation based on the 'observer problem' - can anyone say it's a certain conclusion?

It’s an interpretation of the implications of physics, so by definition is beyond the scope of physics.

A lot of people think idealism claims the world is ‘made of’ mind and then can’t see how anyone could believe it.

Materialism

There's a fair bit of finesse needed here.

The root is matter, the first advocates being the Ancient Greek atomism and their friends. The world as particles of stuff bumping in to each other. That thinking ended with the success of Newtonian action at a distance; physics became reliant on forces that were not transmitted by stuff. The model of choice became mechanistic, perhaps best seen in the description given by Laplace, without need for that hypothesis. Then Positivism came along, attempting to restrict meaningful statements to those that are verifiable in various ways, resulting in Physicalism, roughly the notion that the best account of how things are , or of the actual world, is given by physics.

Now think on that; physics as it stands now is one hell of a long way from Newtonian mechanistic physics, and even further from atomism. It's changed a lot since the cited quote from Eddington, too.

If there is a thread common to these variations on materialism, it's a methodological aversion to a certain sort of explanation, that involving what might be loosely called spiritual explanations. That approach has been extraordinarily successful. Putting it facetiously, rejecting the explanation that "God did it" resulted in the world we live in now.

Idealism

Roughly, idealism is the view that the physical world is somehow derived from, or dependent on, mind; that the actual world is somehow a thing of the mind.

There's an interesting discrepancy that is well worth noting here. While there are a number of quite erudite and thoughtful supporters of idealism on this forum, the PhilPapers survey of philosophers found that amongst the philosophers surveyed support for Idealism sat at 4.3%.

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

Accept or lean toward: non-skeptical realism 760 / 931 (81.6%)
Other 86 / 931 (9.2%)
Accept or lean toward: skepticism 45 / 931 (4.8%)
Accept or lean toward: idealism 40 / 931 (4.3%)

Doubtless you will make of that what you will. But note, for our purposes here, the juxtaposition is not Idealism and Materialism, but Idealism and Realism.

Very interesting and I note that Dr Susan Haack asserts a cogent defence of 'innocent realism' her nod to naive realism, so disparaged by some QM speculators.

:up:

(Somehow I forgot to post this about 12 hours ago ...)

Are idealists necessarily more susceptible to a bunch of unverifiable tosh? — Tom Storm

Their "tosh" is psychologically verified (i.e. "believing is seeing") rather than publicly corroborated.

How does one discern 'good' idealism from 'bad' and how does this play out in a quotidian life?

"Good idealism" consists of noncognitive descriptions (e.g. phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism) and "bad idealism" posits noncognitive explanations (e.g. Buddhism, Platonism, Hegelianism). The latter derives life's meaning from 'a priori teleology' and the former from 'intersubjective (discursive) experience'.

What’s the actual difference between the two positions? What’s a significant position that cannot be put into materialist/idealist terms (whichever you want) without being contradictory. — khaled

A (philosophical) materialist, in order to be consistent, claims "immaterial g/G or persons (i.e. souls / spirits) do not exist". For her, material is synonymous with existent.

A (methodological) materialist eliminates "immaterial" data (e.g. qualia, final causes, souls/ghosts, miracles, spells, angels/demons) from her explanatory models.

And idealists posit that existence is experience-dependent (ideal) and deny unpurposeful (non-teleological) events, processes or objects.

update (re: idealism)

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/552902

….the actual world is somehow a thing of the mind. — Banno

(I wrote a long and well-thought-out piece in response, but I deleted it, because I realised it would simply be dismissed as 'Stove's gem'. )

My question then is what really is the difference between idealists and materialists other than the words they use to describe the stuff that exists. — khaled

I think the difference is psychological. They both ignore the problems with verifying their respective ontologies. This implies an emotional basis that blinds them to this problem.

Depending on what the prevailing view is, they could be rebels or defenders of the status quo.

Odd, isn’t it, that realism is complementary, but idealism is not? If a thing is thought to be real, it cannot at the same time be thought unreal; it is, or it isn’t. Idealism, on the other hand, has a multiplicity of conditionals, such that a variety of idealisms are all logically feasible depending on and consistent with their respective initial conditions. Absolute idealism (Hegel) does not immediately negate subjective idealism (Berkeley); transcendental idealism (Kant) does not immediately negate monistic idealism (Leibniz). A modified idealism is nonetheless an idealism.

Idealism is methodological human cognition writ large, and because it is absurd to suppose humans do not think, by whichever name under which it is manifest, it is equally absurd for the idealism which follows from it, to not be. As such, while it may be rational to object to idealism’s initial conditions, it is always irrational to object to idealism itself.

If proper idealism is an epistemological doctrine, not ontological, it follows that the more cognizant juxtaposition with respect to it, is internal/external, which reduces to thought/experience, and not ideal/real. It is not contradictory for thought to contain both the ideal and the real, but it is contradictory for experience to contain both the ideal and the real.

So....do humans in fact think, experience, know? Dunno, maybe not. No empirical proofs. But it doesn’t really matter, does it. Even if wrong, best to be the least possible wrong.

So....do humans in fact think, experience, know? Dunno, maybe not. No empirical proofs. But it doesn’t really matter, does it. Even if wrong, best to be the least possible wrong. — Mww

That was an awesome post. But isn't idealism about the part ideas play in the makeup of the world?

It needn't be the case that idealism is opposed to realism at all. One can hold that experience is the most immediate access we have to the world. All you need to do to establish realism is to say, whatever interacts with the mind is what is considered real.

From here, you'd need to distinguish between abstract thoughts about unicorns or hobbits and concrete experiences such as those objects in the world that interact with mind, which are not solely abstract thoughts.

Realism and materialism are ideas, aren't they?

The point about reason, language and imagination is that it can 'see into the possible' - it can discover ideas and make them real. No animal can do anything remotely similar. — Wayfarer

The problem with this is that the same people reject any evidence that there are some animals that would do something remotely similar, of which there are many. What would constitute "remotely similar" is always subject to revision by those that believe there can be no such thing.

Further, this is an explanation in need of a problem, not vice versa. People aren't scratching their heads about the sophistication of human language in the apparent absence of some fundamentally non-physical thing. It's an explanation that's only remotely compelling if you're really looking for a home for said fundamentally non-physical thing.

Accounting for the physical differences between humans and chimps largely accounts for the difference between how chimps communicate and how humans communicate, give or take some on-going research in the never-ending project that is science. The premature conclusion of non-physical stuff is not logical.

We have weighed and measured the cosmos, created technology that has changed the world. — Wayfarer

We? Exceptional people have done this. "We" throw plastic bottles in the ocean and watch the Kardashians ;)

As a physics lecturer, you must be aware of these and many other similar ideas expressed by modern physicists. — Wayfarer

Of course! (Although I was never a lecturer, just a researcher.) Referring back to myself:

Bear in mind we're coming from a world that was taught that God made us bespoke, with His divine breath, and made the universe just for us: being ever so special is important to many. — Kenosha Kid

Physics, science generally, has a long history of exceptionalism when it comes to the human mind. Creation myths are kind of prototypical scientific models.

The recent stuff on observer-dependence in QM is fascinating, I'm very excited about it, but it is just observer-dependence: no one* is saying that the cat, alive or dead, is created by minds, rather that the physical (!!!) states of brains can, in exotic circumstances, become entangled with quantum states, such that you might see dead cat and know that, for me, there's life in the thing yet.

How that entanglement occurs is very much because of the physicality of observers, cats, and whatnot.

Idealists cannot rule out supernatural explanations, whereas materialists can. — Pinprick

That's a good point, but simulation theory provides a foundation for modern day materialists to seriously consider some pretty improbable events. For example, thirty years ago, I don't think any materialists would have given much credence to the possibility of the stars in the night sky rearranging themselves to spell out a message, but if this is a simulation, and that's what the simulation creators want...

Although, even in that case, the explanation for the stars rearranging themselves would still not be supernatural. I agree that idealists should be much more receptive to supernaturalism.

Nevertheless it may well be us that is wrong on this. :razz: — Tom Storm

True, but if we discovered that, there'd have to be some compelling evidence... a paradox?

isn't idealism about the part ideas play in the makeup of the world? — frank

It was, generally, until Kant, and is still, from some more modern quarters, re: Royce via Hegel. For whatever all that’s worth.

I think the bottom line is....idealism is a doctrinal theory, but ideas are conceptions born of reason alone. And by attempting to quantify the empirical domain of the world, that is, to determine its makeup, with that which has no empirical content, there is immediate contradiction.

But it remains that all theories begin with either observation, or an idea that warrants a possible observation. If the latter, the theory may sustain itself pending empirical proof, or it may never obtain the certainty of experience, which is what an empirical proof actually is. SR, for instance, began with the idea of the simultaneity of relativity from a measly train station, of all things, but needed 35 years for observational justification. But even so, SR is not a condition of the makeup of the world, but only justifies a particular kind of intelligence’s particular kind of relation to it.

So, no, I don’t think ideas play a part in the makeup of the world. There’s a rather long segment in Kant that admonishes us to let established word/concept relations stand undiluted. From that, it may be best to let “makeup” of the world denote the substance of its constituency, and if so, and by the same token, if ideas have no substance, then it follows ideas cannot partake in the constituency of material things, such as worlds.

Subjective idealism: all is thought

Objective idealism: consciousness creates matter (even its own body)

Now I think one has to be careful with materialism. If we are not subtle, we will find that we are all homeless according to the material proposition. If the walls of my house are just infinite electrons appearing and disappearing as the space it is in changes constantly and ridiculously fast as earth circles the sun, then I do not have a physical home. Modern philosophy has many tools to try to see this, however, in the proper light

If we are not subtle, we will find that we are all homeless according to the material proposition. If the walls of my house are just infinite electrons appearing and disappearing as the space it is in changes constantly and ridiculously fast as earth circles the sun, then I do not have a physical home. — Gregory

That's wrong. You have a home, that is also electrons disappearing and appearing in space.