The fact that Socrates had apparently praised the Spartans in the midst of the war wasn't helpful, but we know Socrates was widely scorned and ridiculed earlier. — frank

It seems pretty clear from the Republic that Plato's Socrates is antidemocratic, and holds a sort of Sparta ruled by a philosopher class as the ideal system. It is quite possible that the real Socrates was doubtful of democracy.

Certainly the victory of Sparta in the Peloponnese war seemed to show their system superior, at least in chosing capable admirals and generals. The Athenians were known to trial their generals after a defeat and sentence them to death. That's an absurd military strategy.

In the decades that followed, some authors, including Plato in the Laws, compared the political systems of Athens and Sparta with a view to find a sweet spot somewhere in the middle. The freedom afforded by the Athenian system and the material affluence it brought Athens, down to its poorest citizens, are generally acknowledged in this literature but the downside was seen as widespread immorality. Here is what so-called Pseudo-Xenophon had to say:

Then there is a point which some find extraordinary, that they everywhere assign more to the worst persons, to the poor, and to the popular types than to the good men: in this very point they will be found manifestly preserving their democracy. For the poor, the popular, and the base, inasmuch as they are well off and the likes of them are numerous, will increase the democracy; but if the wealthy, good men are well off, the men of the people create a strong opposition to themselves. [5] And everywhere on earth the best element is opposed to democracy. For among the best people there is minimal wantonness and injustice but a maximum of scrupulous care for what is good, whereas among the people there is a maximum of ignorance, disorder, and wickedness; for poverty draws them rather to disgraceful actions, and because of a lack of money some men are uneducated and ignorant.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0158

It seems pretty clear from the Republic that Plato's Socrates is antidemocratic, and holds a sort of Sparta ruled by a philosopher class as the ideal system. — Olivier5

Yep.

The Athenians took Socrates to court for offending their Gods. So, it wasn't just Euthrypho, that's how people saw things in that particular time and place. There was nothing unusual about Euthyphro citing religion in support of his actions.

Plus, what were the chances of a conviction? Socrates himself would have been acquitted on condition that he did not re-offend.

There was nothing unusual about Euthyphro citing religion in support of his actions. — Apollodorus

I am not saying that the character is unusual, on the contrary he is used as an archetype, an apt example or better, a caricature of the common, up-and-coming Athenian.

Let's not forget that this is a dialogue by Plato, right? Plato's main concern was not to criticize religion but to convey a metaphysical message. Socrates himself suggests that piety is of service to the Gods in aiding them to perform a certain "work". So, I think Gerson and other scholars are right.

Plato's main concern was not to criticize religion but to convey a metaphysical message. — Apollodorus

Obviously, a new metaphysical message is always a critique of the old one.

Politics was an important purpose for all learned folks at the time. Plato devoted much of his attention to it. Which is why I think it is safe to see all of Plato's dialogue circling around the questions of not just what is right and just for the individual man, or for the gods, but also and most importantly what is just and right for the polis. And politics were tightly connected to religion back then (as it is still).

For a tight, professional historical analysis of the connections between politics and religion in Athens, 5th century BCE, I recommend:

https://www.academia.edu/33092520/RELIGIOUS_SCANDALS_AS_PART_OF_POLITICAL_STRUGGLES_OF_LATE_5_th_CENTURY_ATHENS_THE_CASE_OF_HERMOKOPIDAI_AND_PROFANATION_OF_THE_ELEUSINIAN_MYSTERIES

Maybe I can take that. The end of Euthyphro is best understood as ironical, a tone frequently associated to Socrates. — Olivier5

Socrates' irony is an important aspect of the question of how to read Plato. There are, of course, different opinions about how Plato is to be read. Certainly the Euthyphro would be read differently if one assumes he is what he claims to be. Socrates quickly shows that he is not. His irony, as well as Plato's, is on full display here. After telling Socrates that he is laughed at for saying things about the divine things he is laughed at and thought mad, (3c) Socrates says:

Heracles! Surely the many, Euthyphro, are ignorant of what way is correct. For I don't suppose that it is the part of just anyone to do this correctly, but of one who is no doubt already advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro: Far indeed, by Zeus, Socrates.(4b)

Euthyphro, being convinced of his advanced wisdom, that is to say, his divine wisdom since it is wisdom of divine things, is not at all concerned that he is doing something wrong. We are left to ask whether by the end Socrates succeeds in helping him gain enough self-knowledge to know that he is ignorant of such things.

Being ignorant of divine things Socrates shifts the focus from assumptions of what the gods love to considerations of justice.

... therefore that justice should not concern itself with piety. — Olivier5

I take it to be the other way round, piety should concern itself with justice. Claiming that doing this or that is doing what the gods love is insufficient.

the connections between politics and religion in Athens, 5th century BCE, — Olivier5

Greek religion, Athenian religion included, is closely related to social and political structures, i.e. to polis and its parts. Progress and welfare of the polis were identified with progress and wellbeing of its citizens and vice versa. To call somebody Fortunate/lucky/happy meant that the very person is favored by gods. In other words, religion was the frame of the structure and the functioning of the ancient Hellenic poleis.

Greek religion is connected to performing and fulfilling certain established rites and rituals that were believed to be in accordance with the will of gods and in avoiding those which were opposite to their will. Since the whole society could be punished due to the impiety of one person, polis controlled the religious rites and their fulfillment as well as their violation. Because of this potential threat provoked by a person, the punishments for impiety were very rigid, mostly death penalties. That is why, in political struggle and even in personal conflicts, people were often accused for religious violation, and if this violation was “proved to be true”, the accused was usually put to death, like in the case of Socrates. Proving religious violation and impiety was easier than proving state offence or offence in private lawsuits, because the jury in those cases had the same religious feelings, opposite to the political or personal favors towards the accused.
...
According to Martin Ostwald, in the years that Euripides’ Hiketides ​were put on stage (423 ​BCE), “oligarchic tendencies” entered the political stage of Athens and were especially favored amongst the young Athenian aristocrats. This coincides with the so called instable peace, i.e. the Peace of Nikias, during which, according to Thukydides, ​a new generation with new attitudes on life, religion and policy merged, a generation which grew up under the influence of the Sophists and Socrates as well.

To be continued...

More probably, Anytus thought that Socrates had corrupted his son. — Olivier5

We are in agreement. Turning his away from the vicious ways of his father would have been seen by Anytus as corrupting him. If he did not become a man of action, playing his role on the political stage and winning through ruthlessness he would have been corrupted.

Have you envisaged the possibility that Socrates' accusers could have had a point? Not saying that they were right to sentence him, but that they may have had legitimate points.

It seems pretty clear from the Republic that Plato's Socrates is antidemocratic, and holds a sort of Sparta ruled by a philosopher class as the ideal system. It is quite possible that the real Socrates was doubtful of democracy. — Olivier5

One thing that should be kept in mind is that the Republic is a "city in speech" intended to make it easier to show that justice is, for the city is the soul writ large. The soul, according to Socrates, should not be democrat, it should be ruled by reason. As to actual regimes, the best city is the city with the best laws and the best laws are not arrived at democratically.

Have you envisaged the possibility that Socrates' accusers could have had a point? Not saying that they were right to sentence him, but that they may have had legitimate points. — Olivier5

Good question. Aside from the political motivations, I do think they had a point. The tension between philosophy and the city is a major theme of Leo Strauss. In so far as philosophy questions traditions, ancestral ways, and questions of justice it is a threat to them. The larger question is whether the old and established is the same as the good. If the answer is no, and I think Socrates would say no, then in order to improve things things much change. Those who resist such change would see this as harming rather than helping the city.

Obviously, a new metaphysical message is always a critique of the old one. — Olivier5

Not at all. When we grow up we may see childhood in a new light. That doesn't mean that we criticize or want to abolish it. The same happens with religion. Common folk keep their religion whilst the more evolved souls move on to a more metaphysical or spiritual worldview.

Which is why I think it is safe to see all of Plato's dialogue circling around the questions of not just what is right and just for the individual man, or for the gods, but also and most importantly what is just and right for the polis. — Olivier5

It may be argued that Plato's political system was largely implemented by Alexander and his followers, with Hellenistic religion at its foundations and philosophy at its apex. There is no evidence that Plato intended to abolish religion and it never was. IMO, the Euthyphro has a metaphysical message that materialists are unable and unwilling to see.

When we grow up we may see childhood in a new light. That doesn't mean that we criticize or want to abolish it. The same happens with religion. — Apollodorus

When we are grown up, we have personally "abolished our own childhood" so your comparison doesn't work very well. I repeat: new metaphysics often compete with old metaphysics.

IMO, the Euthyphro has a metaphysical message that materialists are unable and unwilling to see. — Apollodorus

That may very well be the case. The metaphysical message could well be: justice is something quite different from piety, because what pleases one god displeases another and thus, the piety of one man is different from the piety of his neighbour. That the concept of justice in society must be built on something stronger and more reliable than old time religion: on wisdom rather than traditional beliefs.

new metaphysics often compete with old metaphysics. — Olivier5

With regard to this, banishing the poets from the Republic means banishing the myths of the gods.

This is what Prof Lloyd Gerson says on the subject: — Apollodorus

All well and good, but I don't want to jump the gun. I would like to see how the ideas develop in the course of the dialogues, rather than interpreting them in line with subsequent developments. (Although I will admit I haven't been devoting enough time to closely reading the actual dialogue and commentaries. )

I don't think we should read too much into that. — Apollodorus

I suppose one might take it as a mere pedagogic device, leaving the conclusion open so as to induce further conversation after a reading of the dialogue.

My vaguely recalled prejudices, formed as an undergraduate in the late middle part of the last century, incline me to differentiate the Socrates who ends his discussions in aporia from the Socrates who builds an account that just happens to be in line with Plato's political leanings. The picture is of a cynical Plato using Socrate's fame to spin his own political agenda. On this view the dialogues that end with aporia are those which more sincerely represent Socrates rather than Plato.

And of course this sits comfortably with my view of philosophy as consisting in critique rather than construction. Socrates pulling stuff down, Plato trying to put it back together again.

The principal purpose of Platonic dialogues is to encourage critical thought leading to rational conclusions instead of unexamined beliefs. — Apollodorus

Is it? As if the dialogues have only one purpose, and you can discern this. It's apparent that more than a few of the dialogues simply do not "lead to a rational conclusion", as you put it; so the evidence looks to be against you.

It's simply not the case that an examined life must lead to rational conclusions. One has the option of remaining agnostic. Of course, there are those who for reasons of personal disposition feel a need to grasp at an answer - almost any answer - in order to avoid the discomfort of uncertainty.

A side note; it would be a matter of common curtesy, when a member is mentioned on a post, to link using the mention tag - @ - so that one does not appear to be talking behind someone's back.

When we are grown up, we have personally "abolished our own childhood" so your comparison doesn't work very well. I repeat: new metaphysics often compete with old metaphysics. — Olivier5

You were talking about the "polis" and now you are shifting to the "personal". "We" is plural and stands for society or polis. Childhood in society is not abolished. As some grow up, others are born.

There are no new metaphysics. Metaphysical realities like soul and forms are eternal. They don't compete, they are complementary, just as childhood in the polis exists simultaneously with adulthood.

Plus Socrates doesn't say that he wants to replace one metaphysics with another.

In fact, by his own admission, Socrates is not any more knowledgeable than Euthyphro and thus not qualified to tell him what to do.

If Socrates is (a) not qualified to advise Euthyphro and (b) does not advise him, then (c) it is wrong to say that the dialogue is intended to advise him.

The only thing that the dialogue can possibly advise is for the reader to pursue the question or questions by appealing to their own reason.

For the materialists, one question may be whether Euthyphro should take his father to court. Unfortunately, the dialogue provides no indication or clue that would be relevant to the decision process.

As for the anti-materialists, they may have no interest in Euthyphro or his father. They may read Plato to gain spiritual knowledge. Therefore, they may take another lead offered by Socrates, viz., that "piety is doing service to the divine" that dwells within the soul, and accordingly turn their attention to the forms that take them to the divine above.

The conclusion needs to be consistent (a) with the text of the dialogue and (b) with what we know about Socrates and Plato from other dialogues.

it is simply false that Socrates in say, Euthyphro, is just a philosopher concerned only with the search for universal definitions and oblivious to metaphysics[52]. For example, Socrates in Euthyphro does not just want to know what the Form of Piety is; he also believes that there is such a thing as Piety that is the instrumental cause of the piety in pious things — Apollodorus

The form of piety seems indistinguishable from the definition of piety to me. The former is what the latter describes. What, for example, is the difference between the form of a triangle and the definition of a triangle?

It's simply not the case that an examined life must lead to rational conclusions. One has the option of remaining agnostic. — Banno

One also has the option of being irrational. It is still possible to arrive at that decision by applying reason or rational thought.

Of course, there are those who for reasons of personal disposition feel a need to grasp at an answer - almost any answer - in order to avoid the discomfort of uncertainty. — Banno

And there are also those who for reasons of personal disposition profess uncertainty whilst also claiming certainty that everyone else's suggestions are wrong.

The form of piety seems indistinguishable from the definition of piety to me. The former is what the latter describes. What, for example, is the difference between the form of a triangle and the definition of a triangle? — TheMadFool

Definition is the intellectual description or explanation of a thing. The Form is a supra-mental idea or pattern of which mental and physical objects are copies.

in descending order:

1. Supra-mental Form present in the Cosmic Mind.
2. Mental object and definition of it in the individual mind.
3. Physical object.

I suppose one might take it as a mere pedagogic device, leaving the conclusion open so as to induce further conversation after a reading of the dialogue. — Banno

This is consonant with what Socrates describes as his practice in the Apology - making people see that they do not know what they profess to know. Whether or not he has been successful with Euthyphro remains an open question.

What is said is only half of what is at issue. Of equal or greater importance is what one does. A key statement quoted above. Socrates says:

For I don't suppose that it is the part of just anyone to do this correctly, but of one who is no doubt already advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do. He has noted importance of avoiding evil and injustice to the city, beginning with the hearth (3a). The hearth was both the center of both the family and its religion. The name of the goddess Hestia means hearth. Euthyphro, acting without the necessary knowledge of what he is doing, is ignorant of his ignorance. Socrates, knowing he does not know, would not prosecute his own father. He is aware of how corrosive this might be to the city, the family, and the hearth.

And of course this sits comfortably with my view of philosophy as consisting in critique rather than construction. Socrates pulling stuff down, Plato trying to put it back together again. — Banno

Dialectic both separates and joins together. I will have more to say on this in the Socratic philosophy thread. This relates to the problem of aporia. Can the two opposing methods be brought together to create an account of the whole?

I would like to see how the ideas develop in the course of the dialogues, rather than interpreting them in line with subsequent developments. — Wayfarer

I think that this is the proper way to do it if your interest is in reading and understanding Plato rather than Platonism or the history of philosophy.

Definition is the intellectual description or explanation of a thing. The Form is a supra-mental idea or pattern of which mental and physical objects are copies.

in descending order:

1. Supra-mental Form present in the Cosmic Mind.
2. Mental object and definition of it in the individual mind.
3. Physical object. — Apollodorus

I thought as much but, in my defense, the gap between the physical and mental seems to be greater than that between the mental and the form. I feel that way, could be wrong though, but if my instincts are correct, mental and form maybe the same thing.

Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do. .... Euthyphro, acting without the necessary knowledge of what he is doing, is ignorant of his ignorance. Socrates, knowing he does not know, would not prosecute his own father. He is aware of how corrosive this might be to the city, the family, and the hearth. — Fooloso4

You are making a lot of statements there for which (a) you have no evidence and (b) that are either self-contradictory or are contradicted by other statements of yours.

For example:

"Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do"

But what applies to Euthyphro must apply to others, don't you think? So:

Most people are not advanced in wisdom, therefore they should all drop everything they are doing.

Socrates' relatives are presumably not any more advanced in wisdom, therefore they should drop their objections.

Socrates himself says that he knows nothing, therefore he should quit telling others what to do, etc. etc.

And you still haven't told us how you know all that when even Socrates neither knows nor attempts to tell Euthyphro what to do.

Odd. So after reading the dialogue, do you think Euthyphro wise?

if my instincts are correct, mental and form maybe the same thing. — TheMadFool

Plato doesn't go into exact details because his ultimate objective is to use the forms to direct the mind to the intelligence beyond the forms.

But one way of looking at it is to think of (1) the concept of "blueness" as the Form, (2) the mental image of a particular shade of blue and object of that color, and (3) the physical object of that color.

(1) and (2) are not quite the same thing. And then you have the definition which is the intellectual description of the mental object.

:ok: :up: Will get back to you if I think of anything worth spilling ink over.

So after reading the dialogue, do you think Euthyphro wise? — Banno

Not necessarily. Depends on what you mean by "wise" and when.

As Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others have pointed out, the dialogue appeals to the reader to follow the lead of Socratic statements like "piety is being of service to the divine (including the divine spark within the soul)" and turn their attention to the forms, patterns or models mentioned in this and other dialogues.

Of course, this is just one possible reading. What is yours?

But it is not so straight forward. In the Republic it is agreed that justice is "minding your own business" (433b). What is and is not your own business? Plato does not provide complete answers to the "what is X?" questions. Instead he guides our own inquiry. — Fooloso4

Some of the matter of what is "one's business" relates to family obligations in tension with others. There is piety as it relates to the gods but also the respect for the lives of parents and ancestors. The notion in the Republic that the City raise children instead of parents is drawn in sharp contrast to the fact that it is Socrates' brother who demands an argument that justice is not an arbitrary agenda of the strong. It seems that the family is not accepted as righteous without qualification but neither are the bonds of growing up together from a common source treated with contempt.

When reading Euthyphro with this tension in mind, it is striking that Socrates considers the betrayal of the the father as not warranted by the arguments presented as advancing the desires of particular gods.