All you can say is that consciousness was taken very seriously as a factor in QM by some if the founders of the science, so those who speak in terms of woo are out of their depth. — frank
As Marin notes, Schrödinger’s lectures mark the last of a generation that lived with the mysticism controversy. As Marin explains, quantum mechanics up to World War II existed in a predominantly German context, and this culture helped to form the mystical zeitgeist of the time. The controversy died in the second half of the century, when the physics culture switched to Anglo-American. Most contemporary physicists are, like Einstein, realists, and do not believe that consciousness has a role in quantum theory.
Quantum mechanics is a physical theory, but the nature of theory is never a matter for physics. It's the true nature of the wavefunction which is at issue - if it were cut-and-dried, there would be no competing interpretations. — Wayfarer
This is why, at least at present, the interpretation of the wavefunction is not a scientific problem, because all interpretations are currently indistinguishable. — Kenosha Kid
There's a huge difference between disagreement about what the single objective reality is, given the constraints of limited and imperfect phenomenology, and there not being a single objective reality. — Kenosha Kid
There's a huge difference between disagreement about what the single objective reality is, given the constraints of limited and imperfect phenomenology, and there not being a single objective reality.
— Kenosha Kid
A quantum experiment suggests there’s no such thing as objective reality, MIT Technology Review, March 2019. — Wayfarer
Ultimately, after I've made my measurement, you and I have to agree. — Kenosha Kid
Why assume that matter and mind are distinct?
Until someone can tell me where matter "stops" and mind "begins", this distinction doesn't make sense.
Another thing altogether is to say that mind (consciousness specifically) doesn't really exist, in a manner like Dennett argues, that everything is an illusion.
In that scenario we can only contrast a version of the world in which experience exists and one in which it does not. But this distinction between mind and matter can't be coherently formulated, I don't think. — Manuel
No, I think in essence you are correct. It's just that sometimes when I see "mind" as opposed to "matter", I just type automatically. It's not a critique.
Just emphasizing that back in 17th and 18th century, you could make such a distinction. But by now it's not very substantive.
The only thing to stress in these metaphysical disputes would be how much consciousness matters, no pun intended. — Manuel
If Dennett is right in his "materialism", the view that the phenomena of the mind are illusion or bad theoretical postulates — Manuel
I mean, if it's all mere reaction to stimuli and the like, then the loved one is merely a bag of chemicals, so we should be rational and think to ourselves that, I thought this person was unique, funny, smart, perceptive and so on, but I'm wrong, all it was was cleaver reactions to external stimuli. — Manuel
Why assume that matter and mind are distinct?
Until someone can tell me where matter "stops" and mind "begins", this distinction doesn't make sense. — Manuel
If mind was an illusion — Manuel
Eliminative materialism isn't the only materialism. — khaled
A person can be funny and also be merely a bag of chemicals. IE reductionist materialism. — khaled
Or more importantly, why that distinction would be needed. — khaled
it's just that these are different levels of description. The level at which we interact with people in a day to day basis, is not the level at which we usually think of them as chemicals. It is much more complex and rich than that, or so it seems to me. — Manuel
we can speak of the experiential aspects of life (consciousness, mental going ons, thoughts, dreams, qualia) and the non-experiential aspects of life, those aspects of life which lack experience such as a rock or or particles or anything else we think has no experience — Manuel
And which part of this is not supported by a reductive materialism? — khaled
Right again, which part of this contradicts a reductive materialism? As long as consciousness, mental goingons, etc are not identified as a "different type of thing" then you can still be a materialist and talk about them. — khaled
You'll need something like the concept of emergence to cover the diverse physical basis. — frank
I never claimed it's possible to cover the "diverse physical basis" neurologically. I claimed that every instance of a mental event can be reduced to a physical event. Not that we can reduce every instance of a mental event to a single neurological event. — khaled
So instead of trying to reduce something like pain to a single neurological state, you can define it in terms of behavior. So being in pain due to X is acting to avoid X for example. That's an example of a definition that would cover the diverse physical basis. — khaled
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