it is striking that Socrates considers the betrayal of the the father as not warranted by the arguments presented as advancing the desires of particular gods. — Valentinus

It was particular Gods in the beginning but later they both agreed on "all Gods" or "the divine" in general.

And Socrates himself had the habit on turning to dreams, daimons, and Gods when deciding what course of action to take. That's how he started his philosophical career.

So after reading the dialogue, do you think Euthyphro wise?
— Banno

Not necessarily. Depends on what you mean by "wise" and when. — Apollodorus

I'm asking what you think - not Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others. Do you think him wise?

For my part, he is a buffoon, a clown, a puppet made to dance to Socrates' tune, and running off when things don't go as planned.

So

Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do. — Fooloso4

...looks quite right to my eye; yet you questioned it.

So, do you think Euthyphro wise?

My comment was not meant to argue against that aspect of Socrates' approach. I was hoping to bring up the views of generation and respect for family into the picture.

looks quite right to my eye; yet you questioned it. — Banno

1. Where does "should" come from?

2. Should all people who are "not advanced in wisdom" drop everything they are doing? Or is it just Euthyphro?

I'm asking what you think - not Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others. Do you think him wise? — Banno

I thought I had answered that already:

As for the anti-materialists, they may have no interest in Euthyphro or his father. They may read Plato to gain spiritual knowledge. Therefore, they may take another lead offered by Socrates, viz., that "piety is doing service to the divine" that dwells within the soul, and accordingly turn their attention to the forms that take them to the divine above. — Apollodorus

Why are you avoiding answering the question? Was Euthyphro wise?

You implied that he might be. I'd like to understand how.

I thought I had answered that already: — Apollodorus

Well, no.

You implied that he might be. I'd like to understand how. — Banno

I said it depends on what you mean by "wise" and when. Like at the beginning of the dialogue or the end, or in general, etc., etc.

I can't answer a question if I don't know what the question is.

I said it depends on what you mean by "wise" — Apollodorus

Yeah, you seem to be playing games. No, if I ask you if you think Euthyphro wise, it depends on what you mean by "wise"; which you are free to explain.

Here:

You are making a lot of statements there for which (a) you have no evidence and (b) that are either self-contradictory or are contradicted by other statements of yours.

For example:

"Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do" — Apollodorus

You implied that there may be an account in which Euthyphro is wise, and ought do as he intends. What is that account?

But it seems you will not share it.

You implied that there may be an account in which Euthyphro is wise, and ought do as he intends. What is that account? — Banno

Anything is possible. You seem unwilling to share what you mean by "wise".

Anyway, if we were to take Socrates' alleged description of "wise" as "knowing that one does not know anything", then Socrates was possibly "wise" in that sense.

But we can't say much about Euthyphro because he never said anything that would enable one to make an accurate judgement. As a general impression, I would say he was neither wise nor unwise, just a regular guy.

Having said that, I don't read Plato to worry about this or that character. I read him to see if he, Plato, has got any metaphysical thoughts to share. And I also read Gerson and other scholars to verify if I understood him right.

A pretty ordinary response.

just a regular guy. — Apollodorus

Do many "regular guys" in your vicinity put their father on trial for murder? No, @Fooloso4 has the point; your criticism does not stand.

Euthyphro claims to have divine wisdom, that is, wisdom regarding divine things.

...and when put to the test, fails to give a satisfactory account.

Some of the matter of what is "one's business" relates to family obligations in tension with others. — Valentinus

Yes. There is a tension that exists between the city and the family. The city demands that sons go to war. was brought sharply into focus during the Vietnam war. The communist idea of raising children in the just city was intended to avoid such conflicts of interest, but in an actual city would be a source of endless conflict, I think it was also intended to be anti-ideological. What seems best in speech is not what is best in practice.

When reading Euthyphro with this tension in mind, it is striking that Socrates considers the betrayal of the the father as not warranted by the arguments presented as advancing the desires of particular gods. — Valentinus

Euthyphro, by claiming he is purifying the city and piously doing what the gods love, unwittingly sets the gods against the city and family.

...and when put to the test, fails to give a satisfactory account. — Banno

Perhaps those who cannot see that his actions are wrong cannot because they are too much like Euthyphro. As I said in my first post:

He represents a character type. A type that seems incapable of knowing his ignorance. — Fooloso4

Yeah, that was the shared joke at the root of the creation of this thread from the other.

You seem to be pretty happy with your understanding of this dialogue.

In some areas Apollodorus understands it better than you do, and he's also happy.

So all is well.

Euthyphro claims to have divine wisdom, that is, wisdom regarding divine things. — Fooloso4

Yet I think he’s actually rather like the Pharisees in the NT. Thinks he knows, but doesn’t possess real wisdom. I think he’s a stand-in for what we would call ‘organised religion’. Socrates, the questioning gadfly, is nearer the mark, because he possesses one crucial attribute that Euthypro does not, which is knowing that he doesn’t know, as opposed to thinking he knows something he doesn’t.

One thing that should be kept in mind is that the Republic is a "city in speech" intended to make it easier to show that justice is, for the city is the soul writ large. — Fooloso4

I think the political dimension of Plato cannot be denied. It is NOT metaphorical but literal. He went all the way to Syracuse to try his hands at politics, with rather poor results. Besides, he quite correctly argues that justice means nothing for an individual living alone like an hermit. It is by definition a social, intersubjective thing.

In the Republic, to the degree the soul of the city REFLECTS the sould of its citizens, it also SHAPES it through education. So there is mutual influence between the souls of the citizens and the soul of the city.

banishing the poets from the Republic means banishing the myths of the gods. — Fooloso4

That was not the smartest idea in there, mind you. People cannot live without art. Good art is emotionally and socially intelligent. It can also be politically or philosophically subversive, hence perhaps the temptation to banish it from the Republic.

Re. religion, is there ANY role for priests in the Republic?

This is the true intent of the dialogue, to uphold the principle of piety whilst endowing it with a deeper, Platonic meaning. — Apollodorus

Sure, but since it is unknowable what it is that is truly pleasing to gods (because the gods themselves do not speak to us directly), the subject of piety becomes moot, and at best, becomes a matter of having high regard for what a particular human says.

Socrates is the example of law-abiding citizen par excellence. — Apollodorus

Clearly, he was not such, when he denied the gods.

I think Socrates is taking issue with wrong interpretations of piety, not piety itself. — Apollodorus

The way I see it, he was sentenced to death for failing to respect social taboos. Of course, when people are punished for failing to respect social taboos, their punishers don't use terms like "failing to respect social taboos", but something more socially tangible, like "murder" or "treason".

In philosophical (Platonic) life, piety is practicing philosophy whose aim is to "become as godlike as possible" = "serving one's own God", i.e., one's own self. — Apollodorus

On a personal level, piety is being good to one's own self, the inner divine intelligence, by recognizing its divine identity and acting according to what is good for the self (nous) in Platonic terms. — Apollodorus

Can you provide some reference for this? Because it seems to be an awfully modern, self-helpy idea.

Childhood in society is not abolished. As some grow up, others are born. — Apollodorus

And you never heard about conflicts between parents and children about what to do and not do?

There are no new metaphysics.

You don't strike me as the innovative type, that's for sure.

it is wrong to say that the dialogue is intended to advise him. — Apollodorus

The dialogue is obviously intended to advise its reader, somehow. Euthyphro is just a character, playing the role of the fool.

The question of whether Plato (and Socrates) were actually monotheistic is a vexed one. I think the most straight-forward reading is that they were not - at least, monotheism is not an explicit theme in this dialogue. But as I noted previously in this thread, because of the subsequent adoption (or appropriation) of Plato by the Greek-speaking theologians, then it's common to read monotheism into the dialogues even if it's not explicitly present. — Wayfarer

Sure. And as I've been saying, scenarios that are typical for demigods (who are not omnimax, such as the Greek goods) get transposed as if they apply for God (Jehovah fits the description of a demigod much better than he does that of God, a point apparently lost on so many Abrahamists).

One more footnote, on the dialectic of belief and un-belief. Because of the constitution of the Christian faith, religion is to all intents equated with belief as distinct from knowledge, in Western culture. Christianity is a doxastic religion as distinct from a form of philosophical rationalism or gnosticism. The latter seeks to 'ascend' to a higher perspective, as it were, through the disciplined analysis of ideas traced to their origin. Christianity rejects that [in favour of 'simple faith' which is open to all].

Of course, the characteristic difference between a top-down approach (divine revelation) and a bottom-up approach (man tries to learn the truth about God on his own).

Christianity rejects that in favour of 'simple faith' which is open to all.

Which, of course, it is not.

The distinctive problem of post-Christian culture is that the platonic kind of philosophical spirituality is automatically characterised along with belief and rejected on that account. That is the dialectic of belief and un-belief that underlies many of the debates. See Metaphysical Mistake, Karen Armstrong.

It's the killing, raping, and pillaging done in the name of religion that I can't get past.

From the article linked above:
Christians bought into the scientific theology, and some embarked on the doomed venture of turning their faith's mythos into logos.

The impetus for this was surely the Christian emphasis on Divine Judgment and eternal damnation. Christian religions stand and fall with eternal damnation; without it, Christianity has no reason for existing. I don't agree with what Armstrong is saying above. I don't think Christians bought into the scientific theology, but rather, resorted to it in order to support their judgmentalism and weak identity.

Do many "regular guys" in your vicinity put their father on trial for murder? No, @Fooloso4 has the point; your criticism does not stand. — Banno

1. There aren't many murders in my vicinity. And even if there were, I can see no logical connection with a work by Plato.

2. Are you saying that if someone's father committed murder then he should be acquitted on the grounds that he is someone's father? That doesn't really make sense, does it?

3. I asked @Fooloso4 what he would do if his father killed someone, would he call the police or would he bury the body in the garden? He didn't reply because he knows that the answer would demolish his case.

4. His statement was "Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do".

My point was, how does (B) "and so should not do what he intends to do" follow from (A) "Euthyphro is not advanced in wisdom"?

If we insist that is does follow, does it follow (a) in all cases or (b) only in Euthyphro's case?

If (b) then we need to explain why Euthyphro is an exception.

If (a) then everyone who is "not advanced in wisdom" should drop what they are doing and never do anything.

5. Plus, are Euthyphro's relatives any more "advanced in wisdom" than Euthyphro? Are people who are "more advanced in wisdom" always right? What is the definition of "more advanced in wisdom"? How do we arrive at that definition and who decides? Etc., etc. ....

And you never heard about conflicts between parents and children about what to do and not do? — Olivier5

I have heard of personal conflicts between parents and children. I have not heard of class struggle between parents and children as two opposed classes aiming to abolish one another.

The dialogue is obviously intended to advise its reader, somehow. — Olivier5

That is exactly what I have been saying. Plato's dialogues are addressed to the reader, not to the characters in the dialogues. The materialists focus on Euthyphro's character in order to deflect attention from the fact that the dialogue may have a metaphysical message for the reader.

Euthyphro is just a character, playing the role of the fool. — Olivier5

He seems like a constructed, composite character, a literary device.

I'm reminded of Polonius: "To thine own self be true" is what people often quote, in an ironic twist as the only thing they've remembered from "Hamlet".

Are such characters wise? They defend social norms, the status quo, the taboos, and as such, they ensure for themselves a measure of safety and wellbeing. So in that sense, they are wise. But on the other hand, social norms do not form a consistent, non-contradictory system, so anybody defending those norms is bound to run into a problem eventually, a problem that cannot be navigated without incurring damage to oneself or others. I think wisdom would be to be able to behave in line with social norms, but in a way that never results in damage to oneself (and ideally, others), but I don't see how this is possible.

I think wisdom would be to be able to behave in line with social norms, but in a way that never results in damage to oneself (and ideally, others), but I don't see how this is possible. — baker

Exactly. That's why the dialogue does not solve the problem of what Euthyphro should do. But people are reading all sorts of things into it in order to promote their own personal opinion that is far from objective.

Clearly, he was not such, when he denied the gods. — baker

He didn't deny them. That was the charge against him, which he denied. See Apology:

"Let the event be as God wills: in obedience to the law I make my defence ... I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits or demigods; - is not that true? Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either Gods or the sons of Gods?"

"Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the Sun or Moon, which is the common creed of all men? You are a liar, Meletus"

"If, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the Gods, if I disobeyed the oracle [i.e. Apollo]"

Can you provide some reference for this? Because it seems to be an awfully modern, self-helpy idea. — baker

You are kidding, right?

Socrates says:
“Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise”, etc. (Thaetetus 176a – b).

See also Timaeus, Plotinus, etc. Read Rabinowitz, Gerson, etc.

N Sedley, Becoming godlike

The communist idea of raising children in the just city was intended to avoid such conflicts of interest, but in an actual city would be a source of endless conflict, I think it was also intended to be anti-ideological. What seems best in speech is not what is best in practice. — Fooloso4

I agree that the distinction between speech and practice is critical and is the woof and warp of the Republic. But it doesn't seem to me to be a matter of either/or. As you note, the competing and converging influences of city and family create the environment we live in.

From that perspective, I would call the ideas for raising and educating children in "the city of words" communitarian rather than communist. The practice of philosophy by Socrates is, in that way, a form of education by the "city" in contrast to families reproducing their culture. Socrates acceptance of the judgment against him is a declaration that while he belongs to the city, the city also belongs to him.

Another element that makes the distinction complicated is how various "schools of thought" interact on the scene. They are like families themselves in some ways. They reproduce over generations and compete with other "families" in the public square. The legitimacy of the City as itself has to stand above these in practice somehow.

You are kidding, right?

Socrates says:
“Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise”, etc. (Thaetetus 176a – b). — Apollodorus

But you said earlier:

In philosophical (Platonic) life, piety is practicing philosophy whose aim is to "become as godlike as possible" = "serving one's own God", i.e., one's own self.
— Apollodorus
On a personal level, piety is beinggood to one's own self, the inner divine intelligence, by recognizing its divine identity and acting according to what is good for the self (nous) in Platonic terms.
— Apollodorus — baker

This emphasis on oneself I don't see in the passage you quote above.

You are kidding, right?

Socrates says:
“Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise”, etc. (Thaetetus 176a – b). — Apollodorus

Did they believe such things about women as well?

This emphasis on oneself I don't see in the passage you quote above. — baker

You said it seems "awfully modern, self-helpy"

Can you provide some reference for this? Because it seems to be an awfully modern, self-helpy idea. — baker

I'm saying you can find it in Plato, Plotinus and many others. Nothing "modern, self-helpy" about it at all.

The emphasis in the Euthyphro is on being of service to the divine.

According to Plato, the inner self is divine.

The goal of philosophy is to make the soul godlike.

Who or what "ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as it can and become like God, so far as this is possible?"

Obviously, the soul or self.

Some other time, then, Socrates. For now I am in a hurry to go somewhere, and it is time for me to go away.

Where is he going in such a hurry? — Fooloso4

Because he saw what was coming viz. nobody really knows anything at all! Even if he'd stayed long enough for Socrates to finish what was essentially Socrates talking to himself using hapless randoms from the Athenian citizenry as foils he would've learned absolutely nothing, nada, zip, zero!

Consider now the transformation Socrates undergoes - from, "I think I know" to "I know that I don't know" every time he engages in dialectics with an Atheniam. What makes this transition epistemically, by extension philosophically, mind-blowing? Well, it's a dilemma actually: either you live in a delusion (you know nothing but you think you know) or realize you're an ignoramus (you know that you know nothing). Tough choice, don't you think? Reminds me of my handsome 8 year old nephew who's fond of putting me in a spot with would you rather this or that? questions. So, lemme try this on you all, would you rather be a mad person or would you rather be a foolish person? We're to make a selection between Scylla and Charybdis. What luck!

All is not lost though because the real choices are a mad person who doesn't know fae is mad or a foolish person who knows fae's foolish. The crucial difference between the two - insight (see below for clarification)

In psychology and psychiatry, insight can mean the ability to recognize one's own mental illness — Wikipedia

It all makes sense now: Temet Nosce

In another case, when he was informed that the prestigious Oracle of Delphi declare that there is no-one wiser than Socrates, he concluded "So I withdrew and thought to myself: ‘I am wiser ( sophoteron ) than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows ( eidenai ) anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know." — Wikipedia

What about Euthyphro? Was I right about him? Did he see what was coming? I'm not sure but assume he didn't know Socrates' point, that being we have to gain insight into our condition as a first step towards wisdom, something Athenians probably had great respect for. In other words, Euthyphro was a madman who never realized he was cuckoo! Tragic? I hardly think so...

There is a fine line between genius and insanity. I have erased this line. — Oscar Levant

I, on the other hand, have chosen to impale myself on both horns of Socrates' dilemma, I'm mad and I'm a fool, I'm TheMadFool. :rofl: