One kind of property that minds have, that matter does not, is the subject of logic. Such principles as ‘the law of the excluded middle’, and by extension, many of the mental operations common to thought, abstraction and language, such as ‘like’, ‘not like’, ‘equal to’ and so on, are internal to the nature of thought - they are purely the relation of ideas. They’re also able to be realised in a variety of different ways - for example in different languages or encoded in different systems using different media. But a simple logical proposition, like if A>C and B>A then B>C, can be represented in diverse ways, without loosing its meaning. So what is it that stays the same, if the material form of the expression is different in each case? A rational mind can perceive those equivalences even if their material form is changed. That is something materialism can’t explain.

Then you're using 'reduction' in an unusual way. What you're describing is nonreductive physicalism. — frank

"Non-reductive physicalism is the view that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties"

They're not ontologically different. I erased my example but this was what I was about to type:

Jeff's pain is a neurological event that is different from Jane's pain, which is again different from a cow's pain. But they are all neurological events.

Few would accept that definition at this point. — frank

Really? Few would accept a behavioral definition of pain?

How do you know when someone's in pain? Do you directly assess what qualia they're experiencing or do you look at their behavior?

They're not ontologically different. — khaled

Look a little further into the use of "reductive" ok?

Really? Few would accept a behavioral definition of pain? — khaled

That's correct. Pain is thought of as an experience, not a behavior.

Reply when you're actually interested in having a conversation. Don't waste people's time.

If I’m misunderstanding what they’ve said please explain it better. — Wayfarer

Sure thing. These recent experiments are laser interferometer experiments aimed at simulating Wigner's friend experiment* in which Wigner's friend makes a quantum measurement inside the laboratory but Wigner is outside.

In the original formulation of the Schroedinger cat experiment, Schroedinger assumed that when the experimenter opened the box, the wave of the cat would collapse from a superposition of |alive cat> + |dead cat> to one pure state (|alive> or |dead>) absolutely. For instance, if the experimenter closed the box, left the room, and another one came in to check, not knowing the first's result, the cat would still be in a pure state of one or the other. This is universal collapse.

Wigner argued that if he were to observe the laboratory his friend was in, it would remain in a superposition of live+dead cat even after his friend had made a measurement, so long as Wigner didn't know what the actual measurement outcome was, i.e. Wigner had made no measurement that should resolve the state of the cat.

This is to do with how things entangle. If the cat is in state |alive> + |dead> and Wigner's friend interacts with it (performs a measurement that should yield a single measurement outcome), Wigner's friend will be in superposition (until collapse):

|friend> X ( |alive cat> + |dead cat> ) = |friend>|alive cat> + |friend>|dead cat> = |friend measured alive cat> + |friend measured dead cat>

In MWI, things would even evolve from there without collapse, the two terms being parallel worlds that would never interact again. If collapse occurs, it is assumed to be at measurement, so as soon as the friend is consciously aware of the contents of the box, one of the two terms vanishes.

When Wigner's friend sends him a message to say that measurement is complete, there's nothing about that message that can resolve Wigner's view of the lab as still being in superposition. He is also an observer and, in his observations, his friend is another physical component of the experimental setup.

If his friend told him which measurement outcome was achieved, this wouldn't make much difference. Either collapse has occurred universally and the state of the message would be |friend measured alive cat> or |friend measured dead cat>, or collapse did not occur until Wigner received the message |friend measured alive cat> + |friend measured dead cat>, at which point collapse occurs and Wigner arrives at a single measurement outcome.

By only telling Wigner _that_ measurement has occurred, i.e. by sending exactly the same signal irrespective of measurement outcome, any superposition of the lab* remains unresolved. Wigner cannot collapse the signal because it's not in superposition. Wigner's paradox was that Wigner could be sure that he had not collapsed the lab while also being sure that his friend had collapsed the cat.

These recent experiments show that a measurement can be made by part of the experimental apparatus but still demonstrate superposition to a separate part of the experimental apparatus.

* Oh yeah...
4. You can simulate humans and labs with a laser.
5. Laboratories can be in quantum superposition.

I skimmed this discussion but didn't spot anything relevant to my question. Could you point me to a specific post? — EricH

The OP. "How should I live my life" is a question about ethics. The OP argues a) why such questions occur now, b) that they would have been rare for most of our history, c) that we evolved biological apparatus to bypass asking these questions in our natural state, d) this social apparatus is part of what makes us uniquely human, e) that we still inherit apparatus from more distant, pre-social ancestors that does not make us uniquely human, f) that meeting the impossibility of acting on our social instincts in the modern world with antisocial behaviour is therefore subhuman, g) that moral existentialism is the state of humans in the modern world, and h) to be human, that existentialism must be constrained by that which makes us human: in this context, social behaviour.

Pain is thought of as an experience, not a behavior. — frank

Plus side:
Agreed. From somebody else’s observation of my behavior if I’m in pain......it is possible I can project a behavior directly inconsistent with the pain I feel. When I go to the doctor, it is possible to inform him of effects having nothing to do with the cause. Senseless to do, but proves someone’s observation of my behavior does not necessarily correspond to the pain I feel.

From my own point to view, it is entirely possible that the behavior I exhibit is an intentional disguise for the pain I feel. If it’s, say, the most important game of the year, and the coach knows I’ve pulled a muscle in my leg, I may falsify my behavior to an extent sufficient for his observation to allow me to play, even if it hurts like hell. ‘Course....if I screw up....well, that’s on me, but.....the point stands.

Everyone probably has the diversity of experience, when, e.g., a twist of the ankle, once in public, once in private. I’m here to tell ya, even with the exact same degree and occasion of pain, I’ll cuss like a sailor, throw things and kick the dog in private, but exhibit an entirely different behavior in a crowd. But I can’t distinguish the pain in the one scenario, from the pain in the other.

Another may/may not know that I feel pain, in direct accordance to my display/disguise of it, but only I may know of it, regardless of any display at all.

Still, these days, people do associate pain with behavior, first because of the rise of psychology, in which case the rest of us are merely being told some arbitrary truth of Nature’s Way, and second because humans have become a tribe of whining crybabies, looking for sympathy they may not deserve.

Minus side:
Pain is not an experience, in the truest sense. Experience is always of a known cause, pain is not. One will have a direct corresponding pain or pleasure given an experience which is its cause, but one will not necessarily have a direct corresponding experience caused by pain or pleasure itself, re: a simple headache.

but I could still in principle verify that collapse has not occurred for me. — Kenosha Kid

Sure, because it wasn’t you that measured. This is the quantum elaboration derived from the metaphysical truism....only experience is empirical knowledge.

Pain is not an experience, in the truest sense. Experience is always of a known cause, pain is not. One will have a direct corresponding pain or pleasure given an experience which is its cause, but one will not necessarily have a direct corresponding experience caused by pain or pleasure itself, re: a simple headache. — Mww

This is an intriguing paragraph because I don't know how you're using "experience."

The way I meant it, pain would usually be a component of experience. Pleasure could be a component of the very same experience.

I was thinking of experience as just awareness if things. How are you using it?

Superposition is an epistemological situation, right?

I got that part - what I'm not seeing is how this ties into the materialism vs. idealism debate in this discussion. Sorry if I wasn't clear on that.

My guess is that you're on the materialism side of this debate, yes?

One kind of property that minds have, that matter does not, is the subject of logic — Wayfarer

In another thread we were exploring a notion that phenomena like logic is just a symptom of a deeper property shared by all things. We were struggling with how to name such a deeper universal property. Intelligence? Information?

My best guess at the moment is that should such a deeper property exist, it would be so universal and pervasive as to not qualify as a separate thing, and thus any attempt to assign a noun may be misguided.

I was think of experience as just awareness if things. — frank

Which is fine, in the General Grand Scheme of Things. But then....what would consciousness be?

In the Reduced Critical Scheme of Things, where only one conception can relate exactly to an idea, experience and awareness cannot both represent things.

SO...............there’s Frank, walking down the street, only hears a BOOM!! Frank can indeed tell himself he is aware of a sound, but he cannot tell himself of the thing that made the sound, because he only heard it. So he cannot say, even when aware of the one, that he is aware of the certainty of the other. So Frank has no experience of a particular thing relating to the sound. So Frank’s notion of experience as awareness doesn’t hold, in the Reduced Critical Scheme of Things.

Now, Frank is certainly authorized to tell himself he has never ever heard a sound that didn’t have a thing immediately connected to it, he’d be correct, he could just walk on, and his notion of experience as awareness, in the General Grand Scheme of Things, holds.

The question becomes, for those bothering to ask it.....under what conditions is it possible for the General and the Critical Schemes to be completely irrelevant. And that can only occur if experience of things and awareness of things, are at all times and under any conditions, exactly the same, without exception. Which is, of course, quite unfounded, for it is completely logical to be aware of some things for which there never has been a corresponding experience.

How are you using it? — frank

Experience: a posteriori cognition by a subject as mediate ends, by means of sensation;
Awareness: immediate affect on the subject by means of sensation, such that a posteriori cognitions become possible. Experience absolutely requires awareness, but awareness does not absolutely promise experience. Which reduces to the validity of pain awareness absent experience for its immediate cause.

It is permissible for pain to be a component of experience, which is different than to say pain is an experience. Which is what all the above jaw-flappin’ was about.

Hmm. What I can say is that you aren't using "experience" the way Chalmers does. Since he's a solar figure in philosophy of mind at this point, I'll have to let your spaceship cruise on unmolested.

We may meet again at the Tannhäuser Gate.

(Chuckles to self)

Yeah, I get that a lot, as you can tell from the fact my comments far outnumber my mentions.

I think you have a really interesting perspective.

the self/mind is unknowable (although not in the way the 'new mysterians' mean it.) That's why I referred to the Bitbol paper, 'It is not known but it is the knower', — Wayfarer

But however unknowable to us the self/mind is , can we assume that it is constant in itself , unlike intentional objects which are contingent , relative and fleeting? Or is this self constantly change alongside objects of experience?

One kind of property that minds have, that matter does not, is the subject of logic. Such principles as ‘the law of the excluded middle’, and by extension, many of the mental operations common to thought, abstraction and language, such as ‘like’, ‘not like’, ‘equal to’ and so on, are internal to the nature of thought - they are purely the relation of ideas — Wayfarer

They are idealized constructions derived from perceptual interaction with a world. They would. it be possible without our first having constructed the concept of a self-identical object. The construction of the object is dependent on our embodied interactions with our perceptual environment. Thus logic originates in embodied interactions between organism
and environment.

Interesting question I thought of related to this:

Suppose we were introduced to strong evidence that the universe was a simulation, such as say, some aliens coming down and pausing some of the laws of physics and telling us as much.

So the universe that our species evolved in is an advanced simulation running on some sort of "computer" in a "higher" reality.

What would you call that?

It sure doesn't seem like idealism to me, although idealist epistemological claims could still be relevant. However, it also doesn't seem like materialism. I mean, you could suppose that the universe that contains the computer running our simulation truly does exist materially, but your evidence for that would necissarily be limited since you're stuck in the simulation. You'd also have to posit the likelihood that you are in a simulation of a simulation, which could itself be simulation, and so on.

What exactly holds there, some sort of souless neo-gnostic monism?

I suppose an advantage of the thought of Boehme and his descendants is that it paints a logical, beautiful world that can encompass all these contingencies. However, Boehme tilts towards the mystic and away from the more concrete world of philosophy, although I think his major impact in philosophy is underrated. And the system breaks down in its coherence as you continue from the logic of negation and make the leap to Christ.

So the universe that our species evolved in is an advanced simulation running on some sort of "computer" in a "higher" reality.

What would you call that? — Count Timothy von Icarus

a) an episode of the Twilight Zone
b) Classic Cartesian thinking

If you believe that the wavefunction is epistemic, sure.

what I'm not seeing is how this ties into the materialism vs. idealism debate in this discussion — EricH

The debate isn't of interest, but your belief does make a difference. Knowing about ourselves, rather than simply adopting attractive beliefs about ourselves, can teach us how to better live our lives and how to understand the actions of others.

:smile: I'll take a look when I get more time Joshs...

the self/mind is unknowable (although not in the way the 'new mysterians' mean it.) That's why I referred to the Bitbol paper, 'It is not known but it is the knower',
— Wayfarer

But however unknowable to us the self/mind is , can we assume that it is constant in itself, unlike intentional objects which are contingent , relative and fleeting? Or is this self constantly change alongside objects of experience? — Joshs

You notice how you've subtly made the mind or self an object by asking this question - an 'it'. The mind, the self are not an object. There is no 'it' but then neither is it correct to say there is no mind or self. That's a very subtle point but crucial to get.

Thus logic originates in embodied interactions between organism and environment. — Joshs

Logic inheres in the relation of ideas, not on the ‘exchange of ions across membranes’ or other such physical processes. It is assumed that the sophistication of the brain allows for the origination of logic, but the principles of logic are discovered, not invented; however the brain evolves, it has to conform to them, it doesn't produce them out of itself.

You notice how you've subtly made the mind or self an object by asking this question - an 'it'. The mind, the self are not an object. There is no 'it' but then neither is it correct to say there is no mind or self. That's a very subtle point but crucial to get. — Wayfarer

Yes, hopefully you will continue to expand on this. It seems a translation challenge.

the principles of logic are discovered, not invented; however the brain evolves, it has to conform to them, it doesn't produce them out of itself. — Wayfarer

I may have misunderstood you. I thought you were arguing that logic is grounded in a transcendent platonic category of mind. If you are saying instead that logic is an empirical endeavor( discovered rather than invented) then I agree. But then this is consistent with Lakoff and Johnson’s account of the basis of mathematical logic in embodied interactions( not physical
causation but higher order intentionality).

If you are saying instead that logic is an empirical endeavor( discovered rather than invented) then I agree. — Joshs

I don't see logic as empirical in the sense of being 'dependent on experience'. It can be tested or validated against experience - if you use logic to make a claim, and then discover that the claim is wrong, then there's something faulty with your logic. But I see logic as innate to the structure of the mind, an innate capacity. In that sense, I'm sympathetic to the generally platonist view.

I've read about Lakoff and Johnson, but they seem to me to be part of the 'naturalised epistemology' approach. Whereas I accept the facts of evolution I question the sense in which such faculties can be understood solely through the lense of evolutionary biology. That of course is a controversy in evolutionary theory itself.

But at the same time, I'm trying to make a fairly simple point: that logic or reason, the capacity to understand terms such as 'the same as', 'greater than', 'because', and so on - are based on the mind's ability to grasp the relations of ideas. Those abilities can't be explained in materialist terms.

This argument finds some support from biosemiotics:

The concept of biosemiotics requires making a distinction between two categories, the material or physical world and the symbolic or semantic world. — Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis

I'm saying, this distinction exists within the structure of reason itself. It goes on:

The problem is that there is no obvious way to connect the two categories. This is a classical philosophical problem on which there is no consensus even today. Biosemiotics recognizes that the philosophical matter-mind problem extends downward to the pattern recognition and control processes of the simplest living organisms where it can more easily be addressed as a scientific problem. In fact, how material structures serve as signals, instructions, and controls is inseparable from the problem of the origin and evolution of life. Biosemiotics was established as a necessary complement to the physical-chemical reductionist approach to life that cannot make this crucial categorical distinction necessary for describing semantic information. Matter as described by physics and chemistry has no intrinsic function or semantics. By contrast, biosemiotics recognizes that life begins with function and semantics. ...

Even in the most detailed physical description of matter there is no hint of any function or meaning. The problem also poses an apparent paradox: All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws.

That's a pretty killer argument, from science, against physical-chemical reductionism. There are many more coming out of that science.

But I see logic as innate to the structure of the mind, an innate capacity. In that sense, I'm sympathetic to the generally platonist view. — Wayfarer

It is assumed that the sophistication of the brain allows for the origination of logic, but the principles of logic are discovered, not invented; however the brain evolves, it has to conform to them, it doesn't produce them out of itself. — Wayfarer

This is a good idea for a new thread. This particular issue has preoccupied me for years. It relates also to some Christian/Islamic apologists (via Kant's transcendental argument) and their proposition that atheism/physicalism/evolution is self-refuting - no meaning can come from no meaning.

I have no substantive view on this as I am not a philosopher, but I would be interested to hear a strong physicalist rebuttal of this. The argument to develop, I assume, is is how do the structures of logic and language humans appear to have as innate occur in a physicalist universe? Did Chomksy plead mysterianism to this one too?

Is this not analogous to the argument that math is discovered, not invented? Morality? I think the basic principle can be applied to many things.

Is the Platonic interpretation of this however more of a 'magical warehouse' we point to where things we can't explain are 'stored'? It seems to me that with a putative realm of Platonic forms we explain a mystery with another mystery. And I appreciate the venerable tradition in Western culture of such idealist positions before science started to cut away ideas that were not directly empirical. I guess the next step in this thesis is that all ideas are held in the mind of God and we partake of this higher consciousness in our own small ways.

You notice how you've subtly made the mind or self an object by asking this question - an 'it'. The mind, the self are not an object. There is no 'it' — Wayfarer

Your use of the term idealism is weird then. So idealism for you does not include that minds are a different sort of "it" from matter? The mind is not an object, yet you're an idealist?

It is assumed that the sophistication of the brain allows for the origination of logic, but the principles of logic are discovered, not invented; however the brain evolves, it has to conform to them, it doesn't produce them out of itself. — Wayfarer

Where do you get this? I wouldn't place logic above an evolutionarily advantageous adaptation. I wouldn't place it "out there" in the world. Laws of logic are about how we think, they're not inherent in the world itself. Otherwise we wouldn't have different logics.

It's weird to me because you seem to think that having any concept of "pattern" or "structure" automatically counts as a form of idealism. Whereas I would assume idealism is a position that proposes the existence of ideas as a separate sort of object from matter, like how the panpsychists or dualists do it.

This is a good idea for a new thread. — Tom Storm

Actually I had a recent thread on this, Platonic Realism and Scientific Method.

how do the structures of logic and language humans appear to have as innate occur in a physicalist universe? Did Chomksy plead mysterianism to this one too? — Tom Storm

I think the obvious answer is, they evolved, and I think that's true. What I'm trying to get at, however, is that the furniture of reason, let's say, ought not to be considered as products of natural selection, on account of the fact that they don't come into existence when we discover them. I think that's in keeping with the passage I quoted. I think there's simply an assumption that everything about the mind can be understood as a result of evolutionary biology, because that has become the de facto explanation for human faculties.

My philosophical view is not at all Biblical intelligent design oriented. It's that when h. sapiens evolved to the point of being language-using, rational beings, then they discover horizons of being that aren't available to other creatures, and that at this point they (or we) transcend biological determinism. Controversial point, I know. There's a lot of debate over these kinds of ideas.

As for Chomksy, have a look at this review.

The mind is not an object, yet you're an idealist? — khaled

I'm an idealist because I don't think of the mind as an object. I keep trying to communicate this idea, and obviously keep failing. Idealism is not about 'what things are made from' but about 'the nature of knowing'. What we know, including what we understand the world to be, is a cognitive act, a constructive effort on the part of the embodied mind.

Laws of logic are about how we think, they're not inherent in the world itself. Otherwise we wouldn't have different logics. — khaled

There's a saying, God created the integers, all else is the work of man. It's like that. There are fundamental, general and simple logical principles, such as the law of identity and the law of the excluded middle, which must be true in all possible worlds. They are not 'the product' of anything, insofar as any species that develops will need to be able to recognize them. Certainly above those basics all kinds of systems and abstractions and inventions can be created, but the fundamental laws are not invented. 'God created the integers....'

you seem to think that having any concept of "pattern" or "structure" automatically counts as a form of idealism — khaled

Not any form. The notion of 'the ideas' in Platonist philosophy is one of the underlying principles of Western philosophy, but it's very difficult to understand. (Not saying I'm an expert, either.) Suffice to say in current philosophy, where I see it best represented is in neo-thomism e.g.

the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in reality as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge. — Jacques Maritain

Universal ideas, in that sense, are inextricably bound with the capacity for abstraction, language, reasoning, and so on. Where this is impossible for modern thought to understand, is that those universals don't exist anywhere, they're not 'out there somewhere'. They're more like the constituents of thought or reason, than the constituents of objects. (See Russell 'World of Universals'). That is why I think with the ascendance of nominalism, and then empiricism, the Western tradition lost its connection to real metaphysics, the last vestiges of which, as a living philosophy, are found in neo-thomism. (Oh, and in Pierre Hadot.)

I would assume idealism is a position that proposes the existence of ideas as a separate sort of object from matter, — khaled

Not a separate sort of object from matter. A different orientation with respect to the nature of things. A different philosophical stance.

:up: