The term "pattern" (paradeigma) refers to Platonic Forms which, as you yourself admitted, were known to Plato and his immediate disciples at the time he wrote the Euthyphro. — Apollodorus

No one disputes that the Forms are often talked about in the dialogues. We went through this already. What is at issue is what they are.

Of course pattern refers to the Forms, that is the point. The dialogue refers to the Form as a pattern, not as an instrumental cause. Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo. An hypothesis is not an instrumental cause. If you cannot provide textual evidence that a Form is an instrumental cause and not, as Socrates says, a hypothesis, then, despite what you may believe, your interpretation is without grounds.

Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

He doesn't call them that in the Euthyphro though. The fact is that the Platonic Forms were simply a way of expressing abstract nouns in the same way Goddess Dike represented Justice before Plato.

Plato merely translates the older, more intuitive concept into philosophical language.

A pattern is not an instrumental cause, it does not cause anything to be like it. It is, rather, that by which we can identify something as being of that kind. — Fooloso4

Our friends are saying that Plato believed in forms and used that concept in Euthyphro, and therefore that this MUST be the message of Euthyphro.

That's like saying: Plato used the letters of the alphabet to write the Republic, therefore the message proclaimed by the Republic is simply: I BELIEVE IN ALPHABETIC WRITING SYSTEMS !

Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo.
— Fooloso4

He doesn't call them that in the Euthyphro though. — Apollodorus

No he doesn't. He doesn't talk about Forms at all. He talks about one Form and calls it a pattern. He says nothing about instrumental causality, a concept of central importance to Gerson. I suspect you do not understand what you copied and pasted and used as an argument from authority.

The fact is that the Platonic Forms were simply a way of expressing abstract nouns in the same way Goddess Dike represented Justice before Plato. — Apollodorus

You're getting closer. Plato replaces the mythology of the gods with the mythology of Forms.

You're getting closer. Plato replaces the mythology of the gods with the mythology of Forms. — Fooloso4

Socrates certainly describes the Forms as causes in the Phaedo. And he doesn't mean that they are mere hypotheses, what he does is to discuss them hypothetically.

And of course, as has been noted by many scholars, he mentions Forms at 6e in the Euthyphro. For Plato and his immediate disciples, terms like "idea", "form", and "pattern", meant Forms. They could mean other things in the everyday sense of the word, but on one level they indisputably meant Platonic Forms as you have already admitted. IMO it would be irrational to dispute this.

What is of particular interest is that Socrates (at 6e) says:

"Tell me then what this aspect [form] is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy."

"ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ᾽ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ."

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DEuthyph.%3Asection%3D6e

As may be clearly seen, Socrates uses the terms ἰδέα idea or "form" and παραδείγμα paradeigma or "pattern" and, significantly, says that he wishes to fix his eye upon it and use it as a standard of reference in deciding what is pious or impious.

The Form is "seen" by the inner eye of spirit (nous) in intuitive, supramental perception (noesis).

So, this is something a bit more than empty "hypothesis".

He's talking of what we nowadays call concepts, and their definition. He is asking "define piety". Your "interpretation" of Plato is still extremely basic. Plato 101.

He used alphabetic letters too, mind you. Hence his message must be about the use of alphabetic letters, right?

He's talking of what we nowadays call concepts, and their definition — Olivier5

Please re-read my earlier posts. Terms like "idea" and "paradeigma" would evoke the concept of "Forms" in the mind of those familiar with Platonic thought. @Fooloso4 has already admitted this.

Plato had a fetish for Forms? What else is new?

A pattern is not an instrumental cause, it does not cause anything to be like it. It is, rather, that by which we can identify something as being of that kind. — Fooloso4

A concept, in other words. Plato tried to eek out the meaning of concepts by interrogating them. That's a style of enquiry more that a metaphysical message. In fact I find a rather facile way of discarding concepts, to ask for their precise definition. Concepts are not easy to define, so yeah, Euthyphro could not really define piety to Socrates' satisfaction, but if if he had asked Socrates "define justice", I bet Socrates would have struggled too.

That's a style of enquiry more that a metaphysical message. — Olivier5

"Style of inquiry" that in association with the concept of "Forms" that it evokes in those familiar with Platonic thought, produces a metaphysical message.

Very simple. Though, possibly, too complex for the intellectually or metaphysically challenged to grasp.

IMO it would be irrational to dispute this. — Apollodorus

The only thing that is irrational is your repetition of what I have said more than once as if it is in dispute. I even quoted myself saying as much some pages back showing I had already said it pages before that.

Socrates certainly describes the Forms as causes in the Phaedo. — Apollodorus

This is what he says about causes in the Phaedo:

If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best.” (97b-d)

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)

“I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they
exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal.

I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.” (100c-e)

Later he reintroduces physical causes:

“Tell me again from the beginning and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things.” (105b-c)

He does not discuss them hypothetically. They are hypothetic.

...the pious is that which is loved by the Gods because it is good, just and divine. — Apollodorus

Clearly then...

The attributes/properties of being just, good, and divine are independent of being loved by the gods, which is an insurmountable problem for any position that believes in creator god(s) repsonsible for creating everything as well as the problems faced by divine command theory.

What is of particular interest is that Socrates (at 6e) says: — Apollodorus

You just quoted the same passage I did using a different translation!

As may be clearly seen, Socrates uses the terms ἰδέα idea and παραδείγμα paradeigma and, significantly, says that he wishes to fix his eye upon it and use it as a standard of reference in deciding what is pious or impious. — Apollodorus

Do you think by repeating the same thing you can avoid having to deal with the problem of instrumental causality?

... he wishes to fix his eye upon it and use it as a standard of reference in deciding what is pious or impious. — Apollodorus

What he wishes to do and what he able to do are two different things. He has no knowledge of the Forms and has never seen them. He says as much in the Republic.

If you want to discuss it further I will do so here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11210/socratic-philosophy/p1

If the attributes/properties of just, good, and divine are divine, then they are part of the divine.

They have no separate existence from the divine, especially in the human soul which is essentially divine.

Terms like "idea" and "paradeigma" would evoke the concept of "Forms" in the mind of those familiar with Platonic thought. Fooloso4 has already admitted this. — Apollodorus

They do not "evoke the concept 'Forms'. They are terms we translate as Forms. You have a concept of Forms based on the myth of transcendence from the Republic. It is philosophical poetry, images of what Socrates thinks true knowledge must be.

If the attributes/properties of just, good, and divine are divine, then they are part of the divine. — Apollodorus

That doesn't fix the problem...

If those attributes are independent of the gods, but those attributes are part of the divine or are the divine, then the divine is independent of the gods...

What he wishes to do and what he able to do are two different things. He has no knowledge of the Forms and has never seen them. He says as much in the Republic. — Fooloso4

Again, you fail to see the fallacy of confusing Socrates with Plato. The theory of Forms was proposed by Plato.

Socrates is a character in Plato's dialogues, remember?

but if if he had asked Socrates "define justice", I bet Socrates would have struggled too. — Olivier5

This is part of his knowledge of his ignorance. As long as we cannot say what justice itself is we can only have opinions about whether something just or unjust and no standard by which to measure.

It is philosophical poetry, images of what Socrates thinks true knowledge must be. — Fooloso4

That is your opinion.

Of course philosophical poetry is used to convey metaphysical concepts and experience.

You keep confusing Socrates with Plato and vice versa.

If those attributes are independent of the gods — creativesoul

They are not independent, just as sunlight is not independent of the Sun.

Again, you fail to see the fallacy of confusing Socrates with Plato. The theory of Forms was proposed by Plato. — Apollodorus

Whether or not the historical Socrates talked about Forms is irrelevant. I am talking about the Socrates of the dialogues. It is never "Plato said this" always "Socrates said this". You never find Plato saying anything.

Argument by defnitional fiat. Fantastic. Gods love themselves. You win.

Gods love themselves. — creativesoul

Why would the Gods hate themselves?

That is your opinion. — Apollodorus

Yes, my opinion. But my opinion backed up by what is said in the text.

Of course philosophical poetry is used to convey metaphysical concepts and experience. — Apollodorus

The metaphysical concepts are created by the poetry, just as the gods were created by the poets.

Again, if you want to pursue this further: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11210/socratic-philosophy/p1

Not interested. Revisit the argument/objection given. It's still an insurmountable problem. Believe what you like.

You never find Plato saying anything. — Fooloso4

Plato speaks through his characters. And he clearly spoke to his pupils like Aristotle. Unless you believe he was using sign language and even that is a form of speech.

It's still an insurmountable problem. Believe what you like. — creativesoul

It isn't a problem that I created. And of course I believe what I like just as you do.

The metaphysical concepts are created by the poetry, just as the gods were created by the poets. — Fooloso4

1. That is your opinion, that, incidentally, is unsupported by the text.

2. I don't believe there is anything to pursue further as you are not contributing anything new. I have stated many times that this "discussion" is going around in circles and is a total waste of time and space.

The problem with your particular line of thinking is that it results in the following...

The gods love themselves.

The question/problem is - of course - do the gods love something because it has the attributes of goodness, justness, and divinity or iare such things just, good, and divine because the gods love them.

Your answer was that gods loved things that are just, good, and divine.

So, either those properties exist in and of themselves independently of the gods, or the gods love themselves.

Not an acceptable answer to me. Results may vary.