So with the Copenhagen Int., we can talk about superposition, but we aren't talking about reality. That's so weird. — frank

Yep. A famous quote attributed to Bohr says:

There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature. — Niels Bohr (as quoted by Aage Petersen)

That is, what we can say about nature is that you will find, with some well-defined probability, either a dead cat or a live cat in the box when you open it.

Some Neo-Copenhagen interpretations do add more interpretive meat to the formalist bones (and in interesting ways), but that's the gist.

the shut-up-and-calculate philosophy or the Copenhagen interpretation (which I think of as shut-up-and-calculate minus the shutting-up part)
— Get real - Scott Aaronson, Nature Physics, June 2012

Haha that's excellent! — Kenosha Kid

:smile:

That is, what we can say about nature is that you will find, with some well-defined probability, either a dead cat or a live cat in the box when you open it. — Andrew M

Yes, quite. Although there's a danger here of giving the sense that QM is a bottom-up theory of ignorance: it isn't. The version of QM that encodes such ignorance (density matrix theories) is mathematically distinct from QM, and will yield different experimental predictions.

Quantum superposition is experimentally verifiable, so the wavefunction captures something ontological. On the other hand, we cannot say anything about a system's state until we measure it, which is problematic because of the huge initial-state dependence of the mechanics. With good old-fashioned non-relativistic unidirectional time, that's a problem: we must capture every possibility in the wavefunction, not just to ensure that a possible outcome is represented, but to capture all possible interference effects that manifest over many measurements.

In principle, relativistic quantum mechanics does away with this. Instead of capturing all possible paths from a given initial state, we capture all possible paths between a given initial state and a given final state. There is no need to represent an outcome that will not happen, nor to represent interference between trajectories toward outcomes that are orthogonal.

But how is it that we are able to experience an object as a singular unit , separated out from a
multiplicity of which we deem it to belong , such that we can proceed to perform these feats of logic? Husserl’s fist published work , the philosophy of arithmetic, offers a fascinating genesis of such seemingly irreducible concepts as that of the discrete , self-persisting object from mix more basic acts , wherein there is as yet no concept of formal object.

For instance, according to Husserl, the basis of any sort of whole of independently apprehended parts(a whole in the pregnant sense) is the collective combination, which is an abstracting act of consciousness uniting parts. — Joshs

This perspective seemingly differs from mine and it intrigues me. First, to be clear, I acknowledge that I have not read Husserl and so cannot offer a firsthand judgment of his philosophy, that I don’t know the extent to which you uphold Husserl’s ideas, and maybe most importantly, that I’m not fully certain as to this quote’s intended meaning.

That acknowledged, I find that wholes, forms (rather than shapes), or eidoi (I so far find no meaningful difference between the three terms), though cognizable to be the summation of parts, are primary to our awareness of what is, rather than being second-order abstractions from some more rudimentary awareness wherein wholes don’t occur. (This without denying that in adults many are indeed abstracted from immediately experienced wholes previously encountered.)

If this doesn’t conflict with what the quote is intended to imply, then I’ve misunderstood. My bad in advance. But to try to make myself clearer:

When we conceptualize the parts which constitute particular wholes, any cognized part, when focused upon, will itself be cognized as a whole, an eidos, onto itself. This though each part may itself be deemed to be constituted of yet smaller parts. Given current physics, this until we arrive at zero-point energy, wherein we again address wholes, eidoi, these either being specific fields or specific quanta, or, alternatively, the quantum vacuum field as itself being a whole, i.e. an eidos.

For me this ties in with the principle/law of identity: any identity we can be aware of is itself an eidos and, as such, is cognized by us to be a whole give that, most always if not always, can be abstracted as being constituted of parts, with each identifiable part then itself, again, being an eidos.

As one concrete example, we infer a whole rock to be constituted of rock fragments (themselves constituted of sand particles, and so on) but we hold no inkling of what these particular rock fragments might actually be until we take a hammer to the rock to break it apart. At which point the particular whole rock ceases to be, now being replaced by a multiplicity of whole rock fragments.

Else, if the development of object permanence is being addressed, I'd likewise argue that infant awareness innately consists of eidoi as primary. The relations which these wholes, eidoi, hold is what is learned via a conflux of experience and innate reasoning as the infant matures.

Alternatively argued, one cannot intentionally act if nothing is identifiable, if there is no identity of which one is in any way aware. Intention (aboutness) presupposes cognizance of identities; again, with each identity being a whole onto itself.

At any rate, if there in fact are disagreements, I’d like to learn more about where these disagreements take place.

In this particular case, there is no direction towards the answer. Rather, every direction is as good as any other. — khaled

I see no reason to agree with you. And I did read your statements. You stated a personal opinion; "there is no use in talking about 'the reason that orders the world'". And you made a further statement about your personal resignation; "I don't have access to 'the reason that orders the world' so I don't care about it."

Nowhere have I seen the claim that a human being has no direct access to the independent ordering of the world justified. Plato argued that the philosopher does have access to it through the means of apprehending "the good". This is the point of the cave allegory. And, it is the described responsibility of the philosopher to turn around, and go back to the others to assist them in their enlightenment.

So the statement, "no human being can have access to the reason that orders the world" is absolutely unsupported, as far as I can tell, yet the statement "it is possible for a human being to access the reason that orders the world" is flimsily supported. Flimsy support out weighs no support by an infinitely large magnitude, so I choose the flimsy support for my opinion; while your opinion ought to be banished from the philosophical mind as that held by those who are satisfied to be trapped in the cave of illusion for all eternity.

And this is true of everyone. It's not about the limitations of the individual but the limitations of being human. — khaled

It appears like you do not believe in evolution then. If these limitations are truly the limitations of being human, as you believe, they are still not the limitations of being alive.

If these limitations are truly the limitations of being human, as you believe, they are still not the limitations of being alive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. Sorry for assuming that we're talking about humans. Once we meet aliens or once we evolve to the point where we classify as a different species then yes, we may see more.

Nowhere have I seen the claim that a human being has no direct access to the independent ordering of the world justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is justified by definition. You have access to the reason in your mind. You don't have access to "the reason that orders the world". This is not to say that the reason in your mind is wrong, but that it could be incomplete. Any theory about "the reason that orders the world" is just that, a theory. As long as it accounts for own reasoning and perceptions the only thing separating it from any other theory is Occam's razor.

I remember Donald Hoffman claiming that whenever he tried to simulate evolution on a machine using some sort of "game system", the organisms that ended up surviving were ones that did not understand "the reason that orders the world" but who instead just managed to find a "reason internal to the mind" that specifically suits their survival needs and nothing more. — khaled

If you do believe in evolution then you ought to believe that it is more likely than not that our reasoning and perceptions are incomplete. Not only is this supported by experimental evidence (Hoffman) but also we can easily find scenarios where there are things we cannot detect that affect us, such as UV light.

Some Neo-Copenhagen interpretations do add more interpretive meat to the formalist bones (and in interesting ways), but that's the gist. — Andrew M

So what's the alternative to Copenhagen?

The world isn’t mathematical; we are.
— Mww

I think that's an artificial distinction. The point is that we can predict, ascertain, control, discover, all through the application of mathematics. — Wayfarer

Ok, fine. Artificial distinction because I was speaking euphemistically. We aren’t mathematical, exactly. Instead, because we do all those things you listed, and we do them through application of a logical system, then it follows we must be imbued with that very logical system. How can we apply that which we haven’t already authorized, and how can we authorize that which we haven’t already determined as sufficient?

I’m going to maintain......via cognitive prejudice, I readily admit......that the mathematical nature of the domain of phenomena is not given to us in the observations of it. Relations between members of the domain, or between its members and its investigators, are given, and that by which relations are comprehensible to the investigators, cannot be in the relations themselves, but derived solely from the method for understanding them.
————-

Put another way, it's not just how 'the mind' works, but that there's a corresponding order in nature. — Wayfarer

Yeah....that’s the ubiquitous on-the-other-hand, and the bane of metaphysics in general. Is it right because we think it, or is it and we think it rightly. The only possible solution to the epistemological dichotomy must arise from a critique of the commonality, which is “we think”, but when the prime of metaphysical reductionism is found regarding it alone, it turns out not to apodeitically solve anything at all.

As Michael Schenker, UFO, “Rock Bottom”, 1974, so fondly laments.....where do we go from here?

Right. Sorry for assuming that we're talking about humans. Once we meet aliens or once we evolve to the point where we classify as a different species then yes, we may see more. — khaled

As I said, knowledge is a cumulative thing. Do you not agree that human beings have knowledge within themselves, instinctual knowledge, which was acquired by earlier life forms? If so, then you ought not define "what can and cannot be known" by the limitations of the human life form.

It is justified by definition. You have access to the reason in your mind. You don't have access to "the reason that orders the world". — khaled

This is completely untrue. Human beings communicate. Through communication we have access to what is in the minds of others. And we only have access to the minds of others through the medium which is the physical world. Therefore we must have access to the physical world. You can deny that this is "access", but what's the point to restricting the use of "access" in this way? You might as well say that we don't have access to anything and we know nothing. What good is such a claim?

Any theory about "the reason that orders the world" is just that, a theory. As long as it accounts for own reasoning and perceptions the only thing separating it from any other theory is Occam's razor. — khaled

So, what's wrong with having theories? Remember, you claimed that talking about "the reason that orders the world" is pointless. Are you now claiming that theories, in general, are useless? That's not true, theories are very useful.

If you do believe in evolution then you ought to believe that it is more likely than not that our reasoning and perceptions are incomplete. Not only is this supported by experimental evidence (Hoffman) but also we can easily find scenarios where there are things we cannot detect that affect us, such as UV light. — khaled

I'm sorry Khaled, but I cannot see your reasoning. You are claiming that because our reasoning and perceptions are incomplete, we ought not make any effort toward completion. How is such a defeatism ('because I don't have it I ought not try to get it') the approach of a rational being?

So, what's wrong with having theories? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nothing. And they’re very useful.

Remember, you claimed that talking about "the reason that orders the world" is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I claimed we will never know we if have access to it.

You are claiming that because our reasoning and perceptions are incomplete, we ought not make any effort toward completion. — Metaphysician Undercover

False. Maybe I just suck at communicating. I’m saying that despite all our efforts we have no evidence by which to tell that we’re “done”. That we “got it”. Therefore it’s useless to aim at “getting it”. We can and should get as close as we can, where it’s useful to do so, but again:

the only thing separating one theory from any other theory is Occam's razor. — khaled

And we only have access to the minds of others through the medium which is the physical world. Therefore we must have access to the physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn’t say we don’t have access. I said we have no reason to believe we have full access, nor any way to tell that we do. That there could always be something we’re missing (heck, as far as we know there most likely is something missing). It’s a very modest claim.

For me this ties in with the principle/law of identity: any identity we can be aware of is itself an eidos and, as such, is cognized by us to be a whole give that, most always if not always, can be abstracted as being constituted of parts, with each identifiable part then itself, again, being an eidos. — javra

This is indeed a different understanding of whole, part and their relation in comparison with Husserl’s phenomenological approach. Your method, which is consistent with much empirical thinking going back to Aristotle, assembles larger wholes out of parts which maintain their own identity as they are joined together to form larger totalitites. Thus, your notion of form, eidos, whole is linked to identity as persisting presence to self, substance and res extentia. Husserl and Heidegger unravel the concept of self-present identity.

As Michael Schenker, UFO, “Rock Bottom”, 1974, so fondly laments.....where do we go from here? — Mww

Continuing to study, read, reflect and to discern.

That's always on option.

Or we can simply get ever more confused. Which is a problem. :meh:

I feel as though my understanding is continuing to improve. The way I study is thematic, the following of themes and ideas across history, and I think there are some very cogent themes to study in this area.

I suppose if you have in mind a project along the broad lines of idealism in opposition to narrow empiricism of the scientistic sort, you'd have a good deal to go over.

I'm stuck with two main themes, which are maybe impossible to study and hard to think about. They are about things in themselves and innate knowledge. I suspect something from the 1870's to the 1940's would be best. It seems to me to be the a last gasp of brilliance, between the pragmatists, Mainländer Whitehead and some obscure author.

So I'm only getting more perplexed. Oh well...

I feel if I could really settle down to a life of reading and contemplation a lot of things would fall into place. I have a work-from-home job, so I guess I'm lucky in that regard, but it's a very dry job in very utilitarian field. So I'm on a kind of treadmill, technically retirement age but not quite ready. Philosophy forum is really a kind of diversion from my situation. I'm seriously contemplating applying to do a master's in philosophy at my alma mater in 22-23.

I had the good fortune to dedicate some years of my life to study. It was satisfying in many ways.

Yeah you should do it, you know more than me and I submitted my dissertation almost a year ago but finished essentially a year prior to that, postponed due to the pandemic. Although it brought some (little) clarity, it opens more questions that didn't bother you so much before.

But certainly, you should go for it if you can. :up:

I submitted my dissertation almost a year ago — Manuel

well, congratulations on that, I know how much work it is to finish one of those, and takes a lot of dedication.

Husserl and Heidegger unravel the concept of self-present identity. — Joshs

Heidegger and Husserl are underappreciated these days. This tradition though started with Kant. I think that Kant's first two antimonies were more a question for math and physics than philosophy. His last two though are the core of the Kantian paradox: we feel like we are free but that we impose freedom on ourselves by something determining us to. Do we create ourselves, and even the world, or is there someone else besides us pulling the strings? Descartes had a greater influence on Kant than people realize I think. Wasn't it Descartes's ontological argument that Kant was referring to in his criticism? Anyway most German philosophy after Kant has been trying to figure out our relationship with the world and with ourselves. These questions are true puzzles

Kierkegaard wrote "so it is the supreme passion of reason to seek a collision, though this collision must in one way or another prove its undoing." And Kant said "Human reason has this particular fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer"

Thanks. :)

Thus, your notion of form, eidos, whole is linked to identity as persisting presence to self, substance and res extentia. — Joshs

Well, fyi, this is not an accurate representation of my view. And I have quite an aversion to the Cartesian notion of res extensa and related themes. Is an individual paradigm, which we know to be constituted from a great plurality of interrelated ideas, not comparable in its magnitude to that of an individual idea? Only a Cartesian would so assume. For the rest of us, paradigms are of course larger than ideas and, in so being, hold a greater extension within cognitive spaces, and both are aspects of cognition rather than being corporeal. A potential idiosyncrasy of mine that I couldn't resist expressing.

All the same, I was mainly claiming that awareness of wholes is primary to both our cognizance and cognition, and that awareness of parts, or of constituency, is secondary. As one generalized consequence, we infer parts from wholes, rather than vice versa. But I wasn't aiming at a metaphysics for the principle of identity, if there were to be one.

Husserl and Heidegger unravel the concept of self-present identity. — Joshs

Guesstimating here, but the notion of identity being fully relative to relations as opposed to "self-present" (if this indeed touches upon their content) doesn't of itself refute the primacy of wholes over parts in respect to awareness, to not address in respect to aboutness.

Doesn't seem you're interested in a discussion on this subject, and that's fine. Just wanted to clarify my stance.

(Actually I'm reading a very interesting philosophy of physics book, Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin, which attempts to situate quantum physics in the broader context of Western classical philosophy. Pity you're not nearby, I'd lend it to you.) — Wayfarer

:up: Apropos my earlier post, I see that that book title comes from Heraclitus! :-)

Yes, quite. Although there's a danger here of giving the sense that QM is a bottom-up theory of ignorance: it isn't. The version of QM that encodes such ignorance (density matrix theories) is mathematically distinct from QM, and will yield different experimental predictions. — Kenosha Kid

Indeed.

Quantum superposition is experimentally verifiable, so the wavefunction captures something ontological. — Kenosha Kid

Yes. On the other hand, QM can be considered as a generalization of probability theory over complex numbers (see Scott Aaronson's FAQ at the link below). In which case, it's not just Wigner that has no information about the friend's measurement, his entire local environment doesn't either (hence interference)!

In principle, relativistic quantum mechanics does away with this. Instead of capturing all possible paths from a given initial state, we capture all possible paths between a given initial state and a given final state. There is no need to represent an outcome that will not happen, nor to represent interference between trajectories toward outcomes that are orthogonal. — Kenosha Kid

I'm not quite clear on this point. Consider a MZI with equal arm lengths where the emitted photon always goes to the same detector. We would still need to add the amplitudes of the paths that go to the untriggered detector in order to make the correct predictions. Or do you mean we just don't have to represent path interference around Pluto (since we already know the photon couldn't tunnel out and make it there in time.)

So what's the alternative to Copenhagen? — frank

Maybe the Zen Anti-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? :-)

I hold that all interpretations of QM are just crutches that are better or worse at helping you along to the Zen realization that QM is what it is and doesn’t need an interpretation. As Sidney Coleman famously argued, what needs reinterpretation is not QM itself, but all our pre-quantum philosophical baggage—the baggage that leads us to demand, for example, that a wavefunction |ψ⟩ either be “real” like a stubbed toe or else “unreal” like a dream.

...

You shouldn’t confuse the Zen Anti-Interpretation with “Shut Up And Calculate.” The latter phrase, mistakenly attributed to Feynman but really due to David Mermin, is something one might say at the beginning of the path, when one is as a baby. I’m talking here only about the endpoint of the path, which one can approach but never reach—the endpoint where you intuitively understand exactly what a Many-Worlder, Copenhagenist, or Bohmian would say about any given issue, and also how they’d respond to each other, and how they’d respond to the responses, etc. but after years of study and effort you’ve returned to the situation of the baby, who just sees the thing for what it is. — The Zen Anti-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics - Scott Aaronson

I'm not quite clear on this point. Consider a MZI with equal arm lengths where the emitted photon always goes to the same detector. We would still need to add the amplitudes of the paths that go to the untriggered detector in order to make the correct predictions. — Andrew M

Not at all. Counterfactual final states contribute nothing to the amplitude at the factual final state. The amplitude at a given final state is the sum over histories between the initial state and that state, nothing more. Problem is not knowing what the factual state is.