There is no essential difference, what we are doing here IS a philosophical dialogue. — Olivier5

If you say so, it must be true.

It could be that Plato never went that far. Or it could be that he did, but that he thought against publishing this rather revolutionary metaphysical view during his life time because it would have been too risky. — Olivier5

He didn't have to. It was a logical conclusion of his ideas as expressed in his works. This is precisely why it was taught by Plotinus and other Platonists who saw themselves as followers of Plato's philosophical position.

It was often the case in classical times that a school would have exoteric and esoteric doctrines — Olivier5

This is true. I have discussed this on several threads. Strauss, mentioned above, is actually responsible for the renewed interest in this, although he was pointed in this direction by Nietzsche.

One problem is that esoteric has connotations such as hermeticism (see the quotes from Eco above and, of course, our resident hermeticist), the occult, and mythicism.

The modern philosophers practiced it as well: "Reading Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing", Arthur Melzer. Here is a link to the appendix: "A Chronological Compilation of Testimonial Evidence for Esotericism": https://press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/index.html

But there is an oral tradition on Plato (neoplatonism) that attributes to him a form of monotheism where the One is the ultimate general principle, transcending all the eons. — Olivier5

I don't know if the oral tradition or traditions were ever written down, but we do not have evidence of them. So they can say pretty much whatever one wants to claim they say. In addition, and more importantly, history shows us that a teaching over time takes on a life of its own and veers away from the original.

Whatever problems there are with what is written is also a problem with what is said unless the author can be questioned, that is, dialogue.

Pfff! It's a truism, true by virtue of what a dialogue is: a debate between two people.

What I meant was that a debate between two people is not necessarily a philosophical dialogue. And even less a dialogue like one written by Plato, IMHO.

Anyway, have a nice day.

I don't know if the oral tradition or traditions were ever written down — Fooloso4

Aristotle alludes to them. But you are right that these unwritten doctrines are impossible to reconstruct. Plotinus claims to record these oral platonic traditions but wrote 500 years after Plato. The school founded by Plato, the Academia, had several twists and turns in terms of doctrine over the centuries, as one would expect; it's all muddled.

It is dubious whether Socrates himself had any positive doctrine whatsoever, hence 'he doesn't know'. His singularity was in his approach to questions. A method, but not a doctrine; which is I think what you are saying.

Still, he was accused on doctrinal matters too: his so-called religious innovations. Doesn't mean the accusers were correct of course, but in my mind there must have been some context here, some irksome ideas at play, some kind of metaphysical ideas circulating around Socrates that tended to piss off the average Athenian.

Hypothesis 1: it was his radical doctrinal doubt itself that was irksome; i.e. his absence of doctrine may have been seen as a rejection of all doctrines, and hence as a doctrine itself (like the empty set is a set).

Hypothesis 2: he may have indeed expressed doubt or joked about certain naïve beliefs of his time. He might even have seen some of them as pretty ridiculous.

The two are not mutually exclusive and in my mind, H1 is almost certainly true.

H2 rests on scant evidence but I think Euthyphro does contain a critique of naïve transactional piety, and points to holiness as something higher than the gods.

There are also contextual historical elements, e g. the story of the desecration of the herms In 415, or the natural philosophy of Anaxagoras, which I think can bring some light on this issue.

One morning in the spring of 415 B.C., a short time before the Sicilian expedition was to set sail, it was discovered that all the herms -- busts of Hermes graced with an erect phallus -- dotting the city of Athens had been vandalized. Apparently the phalluses were broken as well as the faces. This created a furor and a period of religious McCartyism, so to speak, to identify the hermokopidai (“herm-choppers”). Bribes were offered for information. Other acts came to be denounced such as an alledged profanation of the Eleusian mysteries during some symposium (perhaps little more than a prank, or a themed orgy) in which Alcibiades—a student and friend of Socrates and one of the three Athenian generals appointed to command the Sicilian expedition—was implicated.

One theory is that the new generation, trained by Socrates and other philosophers, had little respect for these symbols of old time religion, seen as crude, and was prone to poke fun at them.

The other historical fact that I would like to bring up for context, relates to the nature of the sun and moon, whether they are deities or natural objects. You quoted one apology (don't remember which of Plato or Xenophon, where Socrates says in essences: "don't we all agree that the sun and the moon are gods?"

And yet Anaxagoras, a Ionian who brought philosophy and the spirit of scientific inquiry to Athens, had written about the heavenly bodies, which he asserted were masses of stone torn from the Earth. He said the moon had mountains and believed that it was inhabited, that the sun was a very large and very hot stone ("larger than the Peloponnese")... He predicted that sooner or later a piece of the sun would break off and fall to earth.

According to Pliny the Elder and Aristotle, in 467 BC a large meteorite landed near Aegospotami, an Athenian colony in the Hellespont. When the fiery fragment cooled, it was found to be some large brown stone. This gave credence to Anaxagoras' theories.

Diogenes Laertius reports that Anaxagoras was charge with impiety circa 450 BC and forced to flee the city.

Anaxagoras is said to have remained in Athens for thirty years. He was a well-known intellectual. And in the Phaedo, Plato portrays Socrates saying that as a young man: 'I eagerly acquired his [Anaxagoras'] books and read them as quickly as I could'. Therefore Socrates could not have ignored Anaxagoras' cosmology. He was about 20 when Anaxagoras was trialed.

So what is he really saying when he pretends 50 years later, at his own trial, to agree that the moon and the sun are deities? Isn't he saying, under the guise of irony, that it's highly debatable that they are deities?

So what is he really saying when he pretends to agree that the moon and the sun are deities? Isn't he saying, under the guise of irony, that it's highly debatable that they are deities? — Olivier5

The fact that Socrates used irony does not mean that everything he said was just irony.

Plato definitely describes visible and invisible Gods, including the Sun, Moon, and other planets that were living deities created by the Demiourgos or Maker of the Universe.

The Universe (Cosmos) itself has a soul and is a living being.

desecration of the herms in 415 — Olivier5

Herms

Herms were marble or bronze four-cornered pillars surmounted by a bust. Male herms were given genitals. Herms originated in piles of stones (ἕρματα) used as road- and boundary-markers, but early on developed into the god *Hermes (but see that entry). As representations of Hermes they were viewed also as protectors of houses and cities. The Athenians claimed credit for the developed sculptural form (Paus. 1. 24. 3), and herms were particularly common in Athens, at crossroads, in the countryside, in the Agora, at the entrance of the Acropolis, in sanctuaries, and at private doorways. The sacrilegious mutilation of the herms in 415 BCE led to the exile of *Alcibiades (Thuc. 6. 27 ff.). Other deities, e.g. *Aphrodite (Paus. 1. 19. 2), were also occasionally represented as herms, and the Romans in copying Greek portrait statues converted some into herm form.

https://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-9780199381135-e-3054

A method, but not a doctrine; which is I think what you are saying. — Olivier5

Yes, zetetic skepticism. Knowing that neither he nor anyone else knows he inquires. He sets out to understand things as best he can, according to what seems best, knowing he does not know what is best.

... the desecration of the herms In 415 ... — Olivier5

Leo Strauss in his commentary on the Symposium discusses this at length. https://the-eye.eu/public/concen.org/UChicagoPress.Ebook.Pack-2016-PHC/9780226776866.UChicago%20Press.Leo%20Strauss%20on%20Plato%27s%20Symposium.Leo%20Strauss%20%26%20Seth%20Benardete.May%2C2003.pdf

So what is he really saying when he pretends to agree that the moon and the sun are deities? — Olivier5

From the Euthyphro thread:

it was his radical doctrinal doubt itself that was irksome — Olivier5

To question beliefs is seen by some to be a denial of what is believed.

As an aside: in Judaism to ask why, or more strongly to interrogate, is an essential part of Talmudic understanding. Christians, however, often regard questioning as an attack on their beliefs. The discussion that follows is like Socratic dialectic. Contrary to this, Christianity establishes official doctrines of the faith.

Once again Socrates' irony is lost on some. Socrates does not say he believes the sun and moon are gods, he asks whether Meletus is accusing him of not believing that they are gods as other men do. He then says that Meletus is confusing him with Anaxagoras. (26d) Anaxagoras had also been indicted on charges of impiety, but fled. His books, Socrates points out, were still for sale for a small sum.

In the Republic Socrates says that the sun is the offspring of the Good. (506e) Nowhere does he refer to the Good as a god.

4

Socrates Argument For Why the Good Cannot Be Known

The argument is not easily seen because it stretches over three books of the Republic, as if Plato wanted only those who are sufficiently attentive to see it.

I begin by collecting the releverent statements. Bloom translation. Bold added.

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a)

"Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is?"
"Yes."
"While opinion, we say, opines." (478a)

"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c)

“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

"You," I said, "are responsible for compelling me to tell my opinions about it." (509c)

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)

He makes a threefold distinction -

Being or what is
Something other than that which is
What is not


And corresponding to them

Knowledge
Opinion
Ignorance



The middle term is somewhat ambiguous. What is not is something other than that which is, but to what is not he assigns ignorance. Opinion opines neither what is nor what is not. Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not.

What is entirely is entirely knowable. The good, being beyond being, is not something that is entirely. The good is then not entirely knowable. As if to confirm this Socrates says that he is giving his opinions about the good, but that what is knowable and unknowable is a matter of fact. As to the soul’s journey to the intelligible and the sight of the idea of the good, he says that a god knows if it happens to be true, but this is how it looks to him. He plays on the meaning of the cognate terms idea and look, which can be translated as Form. A god knows if it “happens to be true” but we are not gods, and what may happen to be true might also happen to be false.

The quote at 517 continues:

… but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything—in the visible it gave birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence —and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it. (517c)

But it is not seen, for it is not something that is and thus not something knowable, and so no conclusion must follow. In order to act prudently, he says, one must see the good itself. Whether one is acting prudently then, remains an open question. The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher. A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers.

Whether one is acting prudently then, remains an open question. The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher. — Fooloso4

Unfortunately, that sounds very much like indulging in facile sophistry. The fact is that everything remains an open question until you have a final answer. And you can't have a final answer until you arrive at ultimate reality.

The same applies to scientific facts and theories. They are what we think we know until we know better.

That doesn't mean that we know nothing or that Socrates was an atheist or nihilist. This is an unwarranted modern belief influenced by neo-Marxist interpretations that probably emerged in the early 1900's and was resuscitated in the 1940's and 50's before it was buried again due to lack of evidence and interest.

In any case, it is totally anachronistic to try to impose outdated liberal ideas of the 1900's on texts written centuries before the current era.

This is just your standard response to whatever goes against your hermetic Christian Neoplatonist beliefs.

It must have escaped your notice that everything I said is directly from the text.

You know absolutely nothing about my beliefs which actually illustrates your methodology.

You invited me to join your discussion and I am presenting my own arguments. If I agreed with everything you say, there would be no discussion and you would be talking to yourself.

I have no problem with you quoting the texts, provided you are using the correct translation. The problem is the anachronistic assumptions and erroneous interpretations you bring to the dialogues.

Of course you can do whatever you like, but if you think about it, it would be more realistic to look at the dialogues like a contemporary of Plato and Socrates, not like a hard-line liberal of the 1940's.

As much as you would like it to be the case, the fact remains that Plato and Socrates were not 20th-century liberals with atheistic or nihilistic tendencies. It just seems absurd to claim otherwise.

... provided you are using the correct translation. — Apollodorus

There is no translation that is considered the "correct translation". The Bloom translation is widely used and regarded as one of the best. It was published in 1968.

All this stuff about the 1940's and "hard-line liberals is nonsense. It is not an accurate description of me or Bloom. It is nothing more than your typical smokescreen.

Once again, everything I said is taken directly from the text.

You attack me, the translation, liberals, neo-Marxists, all without evidence or relevance.

Well, why don't you look at your own attacks?

.. your hermetic Christian Neoplatonist beliefs .... — Fooloso4

You have used translations where relevant words or passages were missing.

And you generally quote anti-Platonist authors with 20th-century liberal ideas and agendas.

Why can't you just look at the dialogues as a contemporary of Plato and Socrates for whom the dialogues were intended? Don't you see the anachronism, or are you just pretending?

And on and on and on endlessly and evasively arguing.

Why can't you just look at the dialogues as a contemporary of Plato and Socrates ... — Apollodorus

From anyone else I would consider this a joke, but it is not. It is a sad demonstration of your ignorance of the problem of interpretation.

How is it "ignorance of the problem of interpretation"?

Interpretation has never been such a problem until the 1900's. There is a very long and well-attested Platonist tradition from Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus and Proclus all the way into modern times, which for some strange reason you choose to ignore.

See From Plato to Platonism by Gerson and other scholars if you don't believe me.

That's why I'm asking you a simple question. Why don't you try to look into how Plato's and Socrates' contemporaries would have read the dialogues if you really want to know?

But it seems that you are not interested.

Interpretation has never been such a problem until the 1900's. — Apollodorus

More evidence of your ignorance of the problem.

More evidence of your ignoring the evidence and scholarly opinion. Have you got anything else to say on the subject or have you run out of ideas?

Anyway, my constructive suggestion is to first see how Plato's contemporaries read the dialogues, after which we can look into how that compares with neoliberal interpretations. How about that?

The premise is that although Aristotle's work is not stylistically in the form of a dialogue it is diological. — Fooloso4

That makes sense when looking at the way Aristotle described what other people thought before he giving his response. He is engaged with past and future partners in conversation.

He certainly provides more background of some of the people and ideas that are assumed as common knowledge in Plato's Dialogues.

I think that Aristotle, like Socrates and Plato, was a zetetic skeptic. The matters under discussion, despite appearances, are not resolved. The reader is not a passive observer, but an active participant in trying to determine what seems best and most likely to be true without having the measure by which to know what is right and true and good.

Sounds interesting start a thread.

The matters are not resolved.
I think Aristotle was trying to establish a basis for being an organic being in De Anima that is quite different from being a skeptic. But the activity of the "intellect" there brings up all the questions Plato asked.

I think Aristotle was trying to establish a basis for being an organic being in De Anima that is quite different from being a skeptic. — Valentinus

Socratic or zetetic skepticism differs from other forms of skepticism. Aristotle's morphology was something considered known. That the soul is the form of the body, lacks the same type and degree of evidence.

In De Anima, the means for perceiving the other are the work of the senses. Touch notices touch. Hearing hears. Sight sees. The mind "minds". It is an instrumental point of view. What we experience is bounded by our ability to perceive.

So, the question what is being experienced seems central to the discussion.

I am not sure if this is a general observation about De Anima or if it is in response to something specific I said.

Do you have in mind the dual aspect of the intellect, Book lll, chapter 5?

The one sort is intellect by becoming all things, the other sort by forming all things.

It was a recognition of the general reluctance to affirm statements as you noted but also exactly what is expressed in Book III, chapter 5.
Whatever is causing things to happen is directly related to my ability to notice them.

Whatever is causing things to happen is directly related to my ability to notice them. — Valentinus

I agree. And inquiry is in part allowing oneself to notice. If we think we have the answers or we have expectations about things we can miss whatever does not conform to our answers and expectations. Which is exactly what is happening in this thread. The inability to see or perhaps unwillingness to see what is being said.

Which is exactly what is happening in this thread. The inability to see or perhaps unwillingness to see what is being said — Fooloso4

Yes. And if you don't mind me saying so, you seem to be a prime example of that.

And this brings us back to where we started. You are accusing others of regarding Plato as a Platonist without realizing that your own insistence on seeing Plato as an atheist and nihilist isn't any more tenable, in fact, quite the opposite.

You seem convinced that even the slightest critique of traditional religion automatically and necessarily equals atheism. But, if you think about it, how many atheists and nihilists among Plato's direct disciples can you name? Is Aristotle one of them?