↪RogueAI
When you observe this website you observe philosophical discussions.
— RogueAI
Which are no more than a pattern of of letters. Which are no more than than a pattern of lights on your screen lighting up. Etc. — khaled
Because she's never seen red before. No new knowledge was gained in the usual sense. Because again, in this case "know" has 2 meanings. There is the know in "know pythagorean's theorem" and the know in "know red". The latter simply means seeing something red. By the latter meaning, mary doesn't know red. Even if she knows everything about seeing red in the former meaning. No new knowledge in the former meaning is gained. The surprise comes from seeing red for the first time — khaled
OK, so the only difference between Plato's Republic and Lady Chatterly's Lover is the way the matter is arranged? Really? — RogueAI
I bet you wouldn't talk about computer code. You would say it's a website where people discuss philosophy. Because that's what it is! — RogueAI
The position you take is extremely counterintuitive and certainly does not map on to the way people talk. — RogueAI
It also entails that a physicalist account of pain is a necessary AND sufficient definition for pain. I think that's preposterous. Any definition of pain has to include that it hurts. It feels bad. — RogueAI
The physicalist account of pain doesn't mention the mental component of pain — RogueAI
I mean, if an alien asked you "what's pain?", you wouldn't talk about it hurting and feeling bad? — RogueAI
Are you sure you want to argue in favor of the existence of experiential knowledge? I certainly think it's a thing, but you're going to have trouble reconciling the existence of experiential knowledge in a purely physical world. — RogueAI
After reading ahead, I see we're too far apart on basic principles. You're willing to sacrifice meaning. I'm not. — RogueAI
I think it's a pattern. — khaled
what's the pattern of prime numbers? — Wayfarer
the laws of motion? — Wayfarer
English syntax? — Wayfarer
German syntax? — Wayfarer
Reason, abstraction and language are all intimately linked and specific to h.sapiens — Wayfarer
It is the ability to perceive meaning for which there isn’t a satisfactory physicalist account, other than in the vague sense that it evolved. — Wayfarer
Wayfarer
what's the pattern of prime numbers?
— Wayfarer
Numbers that are only divisible by themselves and one. — khaled
And what about "it evolved" is vague? What more do you want? What's missing? — khaled
DNA does not form a pattern - it’s too complex to be reduced to a pattern. English syntax likewise does not form a pattern, as it’s irregular, even if there are some ‘patterns of use’ such as conjugation — Wayfarer
Strictly speaking, evolutionary theory accounts for the biological origin of species - there’s nothing in it specifically to account for the nature of reason as such. — Wayfarer
Reason, abstraction and language are all intimately linked and specific to h.sapiens — Wayfarer
Your problem is you’re too busy arguing to really think about what you’re saying — Wayfarer
but at least it shows proper respect for the very faculty which makes humans human. — Wayfarer
reason is the source of explanation, not something like a beak or a tooth or a claw which enables us to catch more prey. — Wayfarer
We can’t ‘explain reason’ - reason is the source of explanation — Wayfarer
It’s not a pattern, or a structure, or some other facile explanation. — Wayfarer
I don’t want an answer to that, or a counter-argument, but for you to think about what it is I’m trying to share with you. — Wayfarer
And you should reexamine your own "bias against matter" that litters your reply. The idea that matter is this dumb crude thing that can never rise to the exalted status of things like reason and thought, so reason and thought must be their own separate entities! — khaled
Conclusion: Thoughts are neither matter nor energy.
In other words, thoughts are nonphysical. — TheMadFool
PBS's Closer to Truth just released a new video that covers a lot of what's talked about in this thread:
"What is the Mind-Body Problem? | Episode 205 | Closer To Truth" — RogueAI
The idea is simply that the laws of physics can't account for the laws of logic — Wayfarer
And why is that? — khaled
Because they belong to different orders of explanation. — Wayfarer
It will agree that even though you can't directly explain logic in terms of physics, physical laws give rise to the kinds of beings that can, namely, humans. Looked at from the other end, logic, and everything else humans do, can be traced back to physics. That is what physicalism means - that 'everything is physical', that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. (wiki). — Wayfarer
What I'm arguing is that you can't perform this reduction, that there is no plausible means to reduce logic to physics because they belong to different ontological levels. So that probably means that I'm obliged to defend substance dualism. — Wayfarer
I find that really weird for multiple reasons. Firstly, on my thread, you kept insisting how mind is not a "new sort of thing" at all, and now you're saying you're a substance dualist, which means precisely that mind is a new sort of thing different from the physical. — khaled
To them, consciousness =/= neurological state, but moreso a spirit, a ghost in the machine. I'm talking here about Descartes, don't know if that's "ancient enough". And you see the remnants of that today. — khaled
There is "mind stuff" and "physical stuff", the laws of physics merely describe the physical stuff, with nothing to say about the mind stuff. — khaled
So, when you're thirsty, and go get a glass of water, how did your thirst, a "mental object" cause a physical movement? Or did it not? — khaled
The idea is simply that the laws of physics can't account for the laws of logic, as they belong to completely different levels — Wayfarer
The whole is more than the sum of its parts — Aristotle
There is no 'mind stuff' in any literal or objective sense. — Wayfarer
It needs to said that the philosophical term 'substance' does not mean 'a material with uniform properties', — Wayfarer
But in the original context, 'ouisia' was a 'type of being' or 'bearer of attributes'. — Wayfarer
it lead to idea of the separateness of mind and matter as literal substances, which I think is a radical conceptual problem. That is what is behind your question: — Wayfarer
There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves.
But that doesn’t say that the mind doesn’t exist - it’s just that the manner of its existence is not something which can be conceived objectively. — Wayfarer
There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years! — Wayfarer
I ask you how this bearer can actually cause a physical change, given it's not physical. — khaled
What other mode of existence is there? "Subjective existence"? I have no clue what you're saying here. — khaled
one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. — SEP
There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. — SEP
Through intentional action. We all intentionally do things, we carry out conscious acts. If you were unconscious then you couldn't do that. — Wayfarer
But consider concepts - like natural numbers. They are real, in that they are the same for anyone who is able to count. But they're not things, at any rate, not material objects. — Wayfarer
But, structures of what? — Wayfarer
It is not 'a thing'. — Wayfarer
I think the expression 'immaterial thing' is an oxymoron. — Wayfarer
I can see how to make sense of that, provided that you understand that the immaterial mind is never an object of perception, it's not a thing among other things. — Wayfarer
I'm asking you what this [a conscious act] would look like under a microscope. — khaled
But, structures of what?
— Wayfarer
Matter. That is the point. Structures of matter. And not a separate substance. — khaled
Actually, let me ask a slighly different question this time. When you get hit really hard at the back of the head, the mental substance seems to disappear doesn't it? You go unconscious. How did the physical impact affect the mental substance? — khaled
Whatever it is, we can agree that you commit to the existence of a mental substance correct? This mental substance would be undetectable by any physical means correct (since it's non-physical and all that)? — khaled
Through intentional action. We all intentionally do things, we carry out conscious acts. If you were unconscious then you couldn't do that. — Wayfarer
I recall you talking about the 4 F's (food, fight, feed, f**k) - primal drives that, to some degree, define life. Such are missing in nonliving things e.g. a stone - it just sits there and probably has been sitting there and will sit there for all of eternity. — TheMadFool
And I'm telling you why that couldn't happen. You can't infer the nature of intentionality from looking at neurological data. — Wayfarer
A physical blow can obviously affect the physical capacity to be conscious. — Wayfarer
I've already showed why this is implausible. An idea can be represented in all different kinds of neural configurations, not to mention many different languages or types of media. — Wayfarer
But on the other hand, what if I tell you something, convey something to you, that makes you sick or fills you with dread? Then nothing physical has passed between us — Wayfarer
So there's no way to even deal with a 'non-physical' object in that framework. There are, as I understand it, spookily not-quite-physical things in quantum physics, like virtual particles that go in and out existence. But that's not what I'm getting at. In that formulaic picture of how science works, the mind is excluded as a matter of principle. It attempts to derive a view of what is objectively there, same for all observers, measurable and quantifiable. Physicalism is the view that whatever is measurable and observable in that sense, is the basis of all-there-is. Whenever you tallk about 'objects' or whether 'mind is a substance', then you're adopting that framework. And I suggest you're adopting it unconsciously, i.e. without thinking about it. That is why when I say that the mind is not an object, then you can't understand that, you think that I'm talking 'word salad'. What I'm actually doing, is analysing the question from a different perspective - I'm looking at it philosophically, in terms of the relationship of subject and object, not viewing it through the perspective of science. — Wayfarer
What will it look like when the mental substance affects matter? — khaled
And yet, the algorithm is no more than the structure of physical stuff in every case. — khaled
Like you having a drink of water. — Wayfarer
Programmed by humans. Without humans, no algorithms. Humans interface between the domain of ideas and those of matter. — Wayfarer
Dualism again. — Wayfarer
You’re a great sport, Khaled. It’s helped me a lot having this conversation, and I thank you for it. — Wayfarer
A fourth version of the Problem of Interaction is related to the third, but, because it is more prominent in the contemporary literature, especially in some of the “property-based” problems we examine below, we will develop this last version at greater length. The first premise is:
The Completeness of the Physical: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.
When you trace the causal history of any physical effect—that is, of anything physical that has a cause—you will never need to appeal to anything non-physical. The physical universe contains within itself the resources for a full causal explanation of any of its (caused) elements, and in this sense is “complete”. The point applies, then, to whatever might occur to or within our bodies. Any instance of bodily behavior has a sufficient physical cause, which itself has a sufficient physical cause, and so on. In tracing the causal history of what we do, we need never appeal to anything non-physical.
Can’t you see that playing out on this forum? — Wayfarer
This, incidentally, is why Franz Brentano’s idea of ‘intentionality’ became one of the hallmarks of phenomenology. Intentionality, or about-ness, is said to be one of the fundamental attributes of consciousness, which marks it off from the physical; thoughts are ‘about’ objects, in a way that has no correspondence in the domain of the physical. — Wayfarer
Right. But to those four, h.sapiens adds another ingredient - rationality, which opens horizons of possibility inconceivable to other species — Wayfarer
Do you think that some physical effects are not caused sufficiently by physical causes? Because it's that or epiphenomenalism. And I think both are wrong. Or is there some alternative I'm not thinking of here? — khaled
Sorry to interject, but you guys should really consider quantum consciousness theory. — Enrique
You mean, science knows all there is to know about the brain. — Wayfarer
Do you think that some physical effects are not caused sufficiently by physical causes? — khaled
Since they've been proposed the laws of conservation have worked flawlessly. — khaled
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