PBS's Closer to Truth just released a new video that covers a lot of what's talked about in this thread:
"What is the Mind-Body Problem? | Episode 205 | Closer To Truth"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3TnBjLmQawQ

↪RogueAI
When you observe this website you observe philosophical discussions.
— RogueAI

Which are no more than a pattern of of letters. Which are no more than than a pattern of lights on your screen lighting up. Etc. — khaled

Well, this gets to the heart of my problem with materialist reductionism: it strips the world of meaning. You are claiming that this website is nothing more than computer code. OK, so the only difference between Plato's Republic and Lady Chatterly's Lover is the way the matter is arranged? Really? The only difference between this place and Breitbart is the amount/pattern of little switches turning off and on? Maybe you believe that, but if someone asked you to describe this website, I bet you wouldn't talk about computer code. You would say it's a website where people discuss philosophy. Because that's what it is!

The position you take is extremely counterintuitive and certainly does not map on to the way people talk. It also entails that a physicalist account of pain is a necessary AND sufficient definition for pain. I think that's preposterous. Any definition of pain has to include that it hurts. It feels bad. The physicalist account of pain doesn't mention the mental component of pain, and I think it becomes an absurdity by leaving subjective experience out of the definition and claiming it's a complete definition. I mean, if an alien asked you "what's pain?", you wouldn't talk about it hurting and feeling bad? Of course you would. That would be the first thing you would talk about.

Because she's never seen red before. No new knowledge was gained in the usual sense. Because again, in this case "know" has 2 meanings. There is the know in "know pythagorean's theorem" and the know in "know red". The latter simply means seeing something red. By the latter meaning, mary doesn't know red. Even if she knows everything about seeing red in the former meaning. No new knowledge in the former meaning is gained. The surprise comes from seeing red for the first time — khaled

You're arguing my case. There are indeed two kinds of knowledge going on in Mary's room: book knowledge and experiential knowledge. Are you sure you want to argue in favor of the existence of experiential knowledge? I certainly think it's a thing, but you're going to have trouble reconciling the existence of experiential knowledge in a purely physical world.

After reading ahead, I see we're too far apart on basic principles. You're willing to sacrifice meaning. I'm not. Sorry for how late the reply was! And the video I linked is really good.

OK, so the only difference between Plato's Republic and Lady Chatterly's Lover is the way the matter is arranged? Really? — RogueAI

Yes. If you think there is another difference please point me to it. It seems clear to me that if you change the way the letters are arranged, and the number of each letter used, that you can turn Plato's republic to Lady Chatterly's Lover. You don't need to "add anything" else to do so. So that tells me it's the only variable.

If I did change the arrangement and number of letters turning a copy of Plato's republic into Lady Chatterly's Lover by physically using glue and scissors, did I miss anything? Is it "really" still plato's republic. I mean... I didn't add or remove any non physical meaning in the process, but it seems in the end that I got Lady Chatterly's lover. Or, again, do you maintain that if I maim a copy of Plato's republic in this manner that after the operation the book is still "really" plato's republic and not Lady Chatterly's love letter? That's the conclusion you'd have to reach if you want to separate the meaning from the pattern. And I think that's a clearly absurd conclusion.

I bet you wouldn't talk about computer code. You would say it's a website where people discuss philosophy. Because that's what it is! — RogueAI

Those two things aren't mutually exclusive......

So, if I made a website with identical code to this one, with all the same post history and everything, and then switched the link between the new website and the original website, such that anyone going to the link is actually going to the new, cloned website, would I have missed anything? I don't remember adding "meaning" at any point in this operation. Yet it seems like I haven't missed anything.

This isn't to say that meaning doesn't exist, but that it is no more than the pattern. If you think "meaning" has its own existence, then tell me, if I did the procedure above, at what step do I add the "meaning" and the "philosphy" to the new philosophy forum clone site?

Answer: You don't "add meaning". Meaning is the pattern, not an object or substance to be added.

The position you take is extremely counterintuitive and certainly does not map on to the way people talk. — RogueAI

Example to back up this statement? The prevailing paradigm today is materialism. So this can't be true. Give me an example so I know what you mean.

It also entails that a physicalist account of pain is a necessary AND sufficient definition for pain. I think that's preposterous. Any definition of pain has to include that it hurts. It feels bad. — RogueAI

It does. A physicalist account of pain includes that it hurts. Because "it hurts" is a description of a physical pattern.

The physicalist account of pain doesn't mention the mental component of pain — RogueAI

Again, let's examine this idea. Now, first off, I'll disagree with the statement. The physicalist account of pain does mention the mental component of pain. Because the mental component is the pattern.

But going by your definition, you think the mental component is another sort of object. You first take the neurological state, and then add to it the mental component. You think that something like a philosophical zombie is conceivable, as in, a physically identical clone that has no "mental component"

Let me then ask you, when you're in pain and so yell "Ouch", how did pain, a non material thing, cause the movement of you mouth, a material thing? That is telepathy. And if our minds can cause physical changes inside our bodies somehow, then why are they limited to inside our bodies? Why can't I lift a water bottle with my mind the same way I can lift my arm with my mind?

Now if pain, and mind, are patterns of a physical state, it is very straightforward to explain how they bring about the effects. But if you want to divorce mind from matter like that, you're either stuck with violating the conservation laws, or admitting that mind is useless. You didn't yell "Ouch" beacuse you're in pain, how could you! Pain is just a non material thing, it can't move your mouth!

I mean, if an alien asked you "what's pain?", you wouldn't talk about it hurting and feeling bad? — RogueAI

No of course not. What the heck does saying "Pain is what hurts" accomplish. Doesn't seem helpful at all.

This is a good exercise actually. Supposedly a materialist would fail at describing pain to an alien and this is a problem exclusive to materialism. Ok. Imagine I'm an alien. Describe pain to me. Supposedly idealists/dualists have no problem doing this.

Except y'all also hold that it's private and ineffable. So......

Are you sure you want to argue in favor of the existence of experiential knowledge? I certainly think it's a thing, but you're going to have trouble reconciling the existence of experiential knowledge in a purely physical world. — RogueAI

I won't. You think it's a thing, as in an actual object. Some "mental stuff" that you add. THAT I can't reconcile sure.

I think it's a neurological pattern. If you concede that I don't have trouble reconciling the existence of knowledge in general why would I have trouble with "experiental knowledge"?

To have experiental knowledge of X (the color red in this case) would mean to have a certain memory. To have a memory is to have a certain neurological pattern.

After reading ahead, I see we're too far apart on basic principles. You're willing to sacrifice meaning. I'm not. — RogueAI

No, we just have different definitions of what meaning is. You think meaning is its own kind of "mental object". I think it's a pattern. And I've highlighted how useless and problematic posing such a "mental object" is, especially since it literally cannot do anything. You'd be stuck with meaning, philosophy, Qualia, and all this other mental stuff you want to exalt, ironically being useless. I mean, there IS a way out that I mentioned on my first post in the thread that would allow you to have a non material mind that can actually make physical changes without violating the laws of conservation, but it's not without its problems and quirks either.

I think it's a pattern. — khaled

what's the pattern of prime numbers? the laws of motion? English syntax? German syntax?

Reason, abstraction and language are all intimately linked and specific to h.sapiens . It is the ability to perceive meaning for which there isn’t a satisfactory physicalist account, other than in the vague sense that it evolved.

what's the pattern of prime numbers? — Wayfarer

Numbers that are only divisible by themselves and one.

the laws of motion? — Wayfarer

You can easily look them up. They're simply differential equations.

English syntax? — Wayfarer

https://www.ego4u.com/

German syntax? — Wayfarer

https://www.learngermanonline.org/free-grammar-exercises/

The fact that any of these concepts were even deemed worthy to distinguish (so for example, prime numbers as opposed to the rest of the numbers) means they have a pattern.

Reason, abstraction and language are all intimately linked and specific to h.sapiens — Wayfarer

Weren't you the one talking about "the reason of the world" in other threads, and I was the one saying that reasoning is a developed capacity specific to h.sapiens?

It is the ability to perceive meaning for which there isn’t a satisfactory physicalist account, other than in the vague sense that it evolved. — Wayfarer

So there is a physicalist account for it....

And what about "it evolved" is vague? What more do you want? What's missing?

Wayfarer
what's the pattern of prime numbers?
— Wayfarer

Numbers that are only divisible by themselves and one. — khaled

But that does not make it a pattern. The key characteristic of patterns are repetition. Crystals form patterns. Waves form patterns, and there are patterns in nature. But the sequence of primes are not a pattern (although some argue that a pattern can be discerned it’s a vexed point.) DNA does not form a pattern - it’s too complex to be reduced to a pattern. English syntax likewise does not form a pattern, as it’s irregular, even if there are some ‘patterns of use’ such as conjugation. So what you keep saying is incorrect - the ability to recognise meaning, perform mathematical operations and the like can’t be reduced to or explained in terms of patterns. It’s too simplistic.

And what about "it evolved" is vague? What more do you want? What's missing? — khaled

Strictly speaking, evolutionary theory accounts for the biological origin of species - there’s nothing in it specifically to account for the nature of reason as such. Again, surely, h. Sapiens evolved to the point of being able to speak and reason, but that doesn’t mean that speech and reason can be understood solely through the lens of biological determinism, which I regard as reductionist. (Trying to find an affordable or library edition of this book.)

In the first place I fail to understand how not being able to find a pattern for prime numbers is a challenge for materialism.

DNA does not form a pattern - it’s too complex to be reduced to a pattern. English syntax likewise does not form a pattern, as it’s irregular, even if there are some ‘patterns of use’ such as conjugation — Wayfarer

Right so there is no hard pattern for everything.

Still, there is something that sets primary numbers apart from regular numbers. And something that sets DNA apart from other polynucleutides. Maybe not a hard and fast pattern, but something. And the only point I'm trying to make is that this "something" is not a new kind of object called "mind stuff". It is no more than the structure of the thing itself.

There is a structure to prime numbers: They are numbers that are divisible by only themselves and one.
There is similarly a structure to DNA and RNA. And English. And German. Even if it gets hazy at the corners.

And this Structure is not a new type of object, all that exists is structures of the physical. Meaning is not a new type of object added to physical stuff. It is simply the structure of physical stuff.

Maybe structure is a better word. I'll use that from now.

Strictly speaking, evolutionary theory accounts for the biological origin of species - there’s nothing in it specifically to account for the nature of reason as such. — Wayfarer

But you just said:

Reason, abstraction and language are all intimately linked and specific to h.sapiens — Wayfarer

So if we can account for other features of h.sapiens like sight and hearing by accounting for the biological origin, why not reason?

Your problem is you’re too busy arguing to really think about what you’re saying. Look at it like I’m trying to convey something remarkable to you, something that you really should be impressed by, which is, your own capacity to reason - not that ‘you’re right and I’m wrong’. You know in the ancient world the rational capacity was thought to be ‘God given’. OK, maybe that’s an anachronism, but at least it shows proper respect for the very faculty which makes humans human. We can’t ‘explain reason’ - reason is the source of explanation, not something like a beak or a tooth or a claw which enables us to catch more prey. I’m trying to talk philosophically about this faculty, the crowning glory of philosophy proper. It’s not a pattern, or a structure, or some other facile explanation. I don’t want an answer to that, or a counter-argument, but for you to think about what it is I’m trying to share with you.

Your problem is you’re too busy arguing to really think about what you’re saying — Wayfarer

Doubtful. I'm just tyring to understand idealists. But to me you just seem to be failing to commit to anything.

but at least it shows proper respect for the very faculty which makes humans human. — Wayfarer

And your problem is that you think any materialistic explanation is "reducing" or "demeaning" reason. You want to exalt it so badly you end up making it a new separate sort of thing, which in turn makes it useless. It's ironic.

reason is the source of explanation, not something like a beak or a tooth or a claw which enables us to catch more prey. — Wayfarer

The two views are not mutually contradictory. And both are true.

We can’t ‘explain reason’ - reason is the source of explanation — Wayfarer

Even so, all I'm saying is that reason isn't a separate entity. You haven't agreed or disagreed so idk what you're trying to do here exactly.

It’s not a pattern, or a structure, or some other facile explanation. — Wayfarer

Calling it a pattern or structure is not being too simple. You underestimate how complicated and beautiful those can get.

I don’t want an answer to that, or a counter-argument, but for you to think about what it is I’m trying to share with you. — Wayfarer

And you should reexamine your own "bias against matter" that litters your reply. The idea that matter is this dumb crude thing that can never rise to the exalted status of things like reason and thought, so reason and thought must be their own separate entities! Maybe it's because I have a background in computer science that I don't have that urge to exalt. Patterns of matter are exalted enough as they are.

And you should reexamine your own "bias against matter" that litters your reply. The idea that matter is this dumb crude thing that can never rise to the exalted status of things like reason and thought, so reason and thought must be their own separate entities! — khaled

The idea is simply that the laws of physics can't account for the laws of logic, as they belong to completely different levels. So

Conclusion: Thoughts are neither matter nor energy.

In other words, thoughts are nonphysical. — TheMadFool

PBS's Closer to Truth just released a new video that covers a lot of what's talked about in this thread:
"What is the Mind-Body Problem? | Episode 205 | Closer To Truth" — RogueAI

Watched it. The only philosopher I really agreed with was Moreland, which vexes me, because he's an evangelical, and I'm not..

The idea is simply that the laws of physics can't account for the laws of logic — Wayfarer

And why is that? What exactly woud it mean for the laws of physics to "account for" something. If you mean that by looking at the laws of physics we can deduce the laws of logic, obviously not. I don't think anyone would disagree there. Then again, you can't deduce much of anything by just looking at the laws of physics.

Can the laws of physics account for the capacity of sight?

And why is that? — khaled

Because they belong to different orders of explanation.

Physicalism, the belief that everything is physical, will say that logic supervenes on physics. It will agree that even though you can't directly explain logic in terms of physics, physical laws give rise to the kinds of beings that can, namely, humans. Looked at from the other end, logic, and everything else humans do, can be traced back to physics. That is what physicalism means - that 'everything is physical', that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. (wiki).

What I'm arguing is that you can't perform this reduction, that there is no plausible means to reduce logic to physics because they belong to different ontological levels. So that probably means that I'm obliged to defend substance dualism.

Because they belong to different orders of explanation. — Wayfarer

That does not answer why one can't be reduced to the other. Physics and chemistry belong to different orders of explanation, yet one can be reduced to the other.

It will agree that even though you can't directly explain logic in terms of physics, physical laws give rise to the kinds of beings that can, namely, humans. Looked at from the other end, logic, and everything else humans do, can be traced back to physics. That is what physicalism means - that 'everything is physical', that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. (wiki). — Wayfarer

Great. Seems exactly like what I think.

Curious to me that you don't count accounting for the evolutionary history of humans as "explaining logic". What exactly do you expect "explaining logic" to look like then? If someone were to explain how we evolved eyes, have they not explained sight? Anyways.

What I'm arguing is that you can't perform this reduction, that there is no plausible means to reduce logic to physics because they belong to different ontological levels. So that probably means that I'm obliged to defend substance dualism. — Wayfarer

Finally you commit to something.

So then, to you, logic is different ontologically from physics? There is "mind stuff" and "physical stuff", the laws of physics merely describe the physical stuff, with nothing to say about the mind stuff.

I find that really weird for multiple reasons. Firstly, on my thread, you kept insisting how mind is not a "new sort of thing" at all, and now you're saying you're a substance dualist, which means precisely that mind is a new sort of thing different from the physical. But I'll just take what you say now, that is substance dualism.

So, when you're thirsty, and go get a glass of water, how did your thirst, a "mental object" cause a physical movement? Or did it not?

If it did, how do you square that with the conservation laws? Here we would have a case where the "physical stuff", your body, moved in a particular manner, and supposedly this movement was not started by something physical but by "mind stuff", in this case your thirst. In other words, your mind caused a particular physical movement, it added momentum to some particle or other, and that resulted in you getting the drink. But that clearly violates the conservation laws, although it is a testable hypothesis (fundamentally, probably not practically). We can trace the causal chain that ended in you drinking the water, and your hypothesis is that within this chain, we'd find a seemingly uncaused movement. That there will be some unexplained movement we can point to and say: "Aha, that's where the mind came in". Do you expect that we'll find such a movement?

I find that really weird for multiple reasons. Firstly, on my thread, you kept insisting how mind is not a "new sort of thing" at all, and now you're saying you're a substance dualist, which means precisely that mind is a new sort of thing different from the physical. — khaled

I know that's what it sounds like. It is related to your earlier comment:

To them, consciousness =/= neurological state, but moreso a spirit, a ghost in the machine. I'm talking here about Descartes, don't know if that's "ancient enough". And you see the remnants of that today. — khaled

Part of this confusion is because of the word 'substance'. It needs to said that the philosophical term 'substance' does not mean 'a material with uniform properties', which is the normal meaning of 'substance'. The philosophical term came from the Latin translation of Aristotle's term 'ouisia', which is a form of the word 'to be' or 'being'. But in the original context, 'ouisia' was a 'type of being' or 'bearer of attributes'. That's why you encounter the strange expression of what kind of 'substance' Socrates is. 'Substance' was derived from 'substantia', what 'stands under' or 'bears' the attributes (e.g. blue eyes). But in the transition to modernity, this original sense of the word became lost, and 'substance' became conceptualised as a literal kind of stuff or objective substance, which it isn't.

All of this was amplified by Descartes, who used the terms 'res extensia' and 'res cogitans' - extended material, and ‘thinking substance’, is how it's usually translated. Descartes' model is very much an abstraction, like an economic model - not a literal hypothesis. But because of the confusion over the meaning of 'substance', and the way that the supposed division of mind and matter was conceived, it lead to idea of the separateness of mind and matter as literal substances, which I think is a radical conceptual problem. That is what is behind your question:

There is "mind stuff" and "physical stuff", the laws of physics merely describe the physical stuff, with nothing to say about the mind stuff. — khaled

There is no 'mind stuff' in any literal or objective sense. But that doesn’t say that the mind doesn’t exist - it’s just that the manner of its existence is not something which can be conceived objectively. Notice that ‘ontology’ doesn’t necessarily refer to ‘different kinds of things’; the distinction between ‘beings’ and ‘objects’ is an ontological distinction (although one that is not recognised by physicalism.)

So, when you're thirsty, and go get a glass of water, how did your thirst, a "mental object" cause a physical movement? Or did it not? — khaled

Let's not take basic physiology to exemplify the rational power of thought. Thirst and hunger are characteristic of any living organism. And even that simple capacity may not be reducible to physics - non-reductionist biologists say that biology can’t be reduced to physics, because living organisms have attributes that are different in kind from physical objects. ‘The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ ~ Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought.

The idea is simply that the laws of physics can't account for the laws of logic, as they belong to completely different levels — Wayfarer

I share your sentiments on that score.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts — Aristotle

I'm actually surprised that physicalists/reductionists find this a hard pill to swallow. They have a very good instance of what Aristotle's is saying right in front of their noses viz. the inanimate-animate gap [there's no physical explanation how the nonliving (chemicals) come together to produce life].

If we view universe as a massive (self) organizing system then we have warrant to believe that each level organizes in such a way that out of it emerges a different level that has properties/qualities and governing laws that are unique to it and is more than just the sum of the parts at the level below it. Since each level has its own distinct set of properties/qualities and laws, each level deserves its own corresponding explanatory theoretical framework.

Life even if physicalists/reductionists claim it's only physical is a case in point - failure of reductionism!

There is no 'mind stuff' in any literal or objective sense. — Wayfarer

So then where is the idealism in your idealism?

It needs to said that the philosophical term 'substance' does not mean 'a material with uniform properties', — Wayfarer

I didn't say that. A substance is a bearer of properties.

But in the original context, 'ouisia' was a 'type of being' or 'bearer of attributes'. — Wayfarer

That's all that's needed for my question to make sense.

You think there is a bearer of mental properties. I ask you how this bearer can actually cause a physical change, given it's not physical. Or is it incapable of causing physical changes? It's a simple question.

it lead to idea of the separateness of mind and matter as literal substances, which I think is a radical conceptual problem. That is what is behind your question: — Wayfarer

That is.... precisely what substance dualism is. From SEP:

There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves.

The SEP sticks to your definition of substance, that is, a bearer of properties (which is not something I disputed in the first place). And substance dualism is a belief that there is a bearer of mental properties over and above the physical stuff itself. So again I ask you, can this bearer of mental properties cause a physical change? If so how?

But that doesn’t say that the mind doesn’t exist - it’s just that the manner of its existence is not something which can be conceived objectively. — Wayfarer

What is this supposed to mean? It literally just reads like word salad to me. It exists, but not objectively? What other mode of existence is there? "Subjective existence"? I have no clue what you're saying here.

There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years! — Wayfarer

Fossils store information with a history of three thousand million years.....

I ask you how this bearer can actually cause a physical change, given it's not physical. — khaled

Through intentional action. We all intentionally do things, we carry out conscious acts. If you were unconscious then you couldn't do that.

What other mode of existence is there? "Subjective existence"? I have no clue what you're saying here. — khaled

From the passage you quoted:

one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. — SEP

That is close to what I'm saying, except that I think the expression 'immaterial thing' is an oxymoron. 'Things' are by their very nature material. But consider concepts - like natural numbers. They are real, in that they are the same for anyone who is able to count. But they're not things, at any rate, not material objects. There is a vast range of such concepts which are amongst the constituents of thought. They're not material objects, either. You have said, they're structures (after I pointed out that 'patterns' were too simplistic.) But, structures of what? In what? You can't say 'the brain', because of multiple realizability - the brain can be configured in an infinite variety of ways, but the structure of elementary logic is invariant. So, they're structures in thought, the relationships of ideas. They're not physical.

That said, I would take issue with this statement:

There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. — SEP

It is not 'a thing'. Take away all the activities of consciousness, what remains? I don't think there is any residuum or core of 'pure consciousness', at any rate, anything which can be meaningfully discussed as an object. Saying that there is 'a thing that thinks', is just the kind of confusion that I referred to my previous post. There is no thing that thinks. Humans think, but humans are not things.

This is behind the traditional conception of dualism - the physical body animated by an immaterial mind (or soul). I can see how to make sense of that, provided that you understand that the immaterial mind is never an object of perception, it's not a thing among other things.

Through intentional action. We all intentionally do things, we carry out conscious acts. If you were unconscious then you couldn't do that. — Wayfarer

I'm asking you what this would look like under a microscope.

Let's again think about the example where you drink water because you're thirsty. There is a substance, called "you" or "your mind" that you think causes some physical change resulting in you drinking water. If we were to trace the causal chain that led to you drinking water (so we would record what every single atom and particle was doing and what caused that movement, and what caused that movement.....etc) what do you expect to find? Do you expect that we would find some neuron activation or other that seemingly has no physical cause? Since it was caused by the mind? Note that would directly violate the laws of conservation, and there hasn't been a case that those were violated since they were conceived of. Are you suggesting that all we have to do is do a very accurate brain scan, and we would find that we violate the laws all the time by impacting physical systems with our minds?

But consider concepts - like natural numbers. They are real, in that they are the same for anyone who is able to count. But they're not things, at any rate, not material objects. — Wayfarer

Agreed. But they are structures of material objects. No more than that.

There is no need to pose two different substances, physical and material. All that is needed is the material, and its structure. The structure is not a substance, it's not a bearer of properties. I struggle to even call it a property.

But, structures of what? — Wayfarer

Matter. That is the point. Structures of matter. And not a separate substance.

It is not 'a thing'. — Wayfarer

I think the expression 'immaterial thing' is an oxymoron. — Wayfarer

You seem to not use the word "thing" properly. "Thing" can stand in for any noun.

But ok, you at least commit to a mental substance right? Since you don't like "thing".

Within the causal chain that led to you drinking the glass of water, where does that substance interfere?

I can see how to make sense of that, provided that you understand that the immaterial mind is never an object of perception, it's not a thing among other things. — Wayfarer

"Thing" does not mean an object of perception. Again, "thing" is even more general than "substance" so if something is a substance, it's gotta be a thing (note the use of "something" in that sentence). But let's not debate the meaning of the word "thing". Whatever it is, we can agree that you commit to the existence of a mental substance correct? This mental substance would be undetectable by any physical means correct (since it's non-physical and all that)?

Actually, let me ask a slighly different question this time. When you get hit really hard at the back of the head, the mental substance seems to disappear doesn't it? You go unconscious. Or at any rate, you have to concede that material changes affect the mental substance. How did the physical impact affect the mental substance?

I'm asking you what this [a conscious act] would look like under a microscope. — khaled

And I'm telling you why that couldn't happen. You can't infer the nature of intentionality from looking at neurological data. I told you about that Atlantic article about 'representational drift' in mice before. You didn't get the point at the time. This is the point. If you can't detect a correlation between stimulus and response in a mouse's brain, then how would you go about detecting the correlation betwen an intentional act and electrical signals in a human brain?

But, structures of what?
— Wayfarer

Matter. That is the point. Structures of matter. And not a separate substance. — khaled

I've already showed why this is implausible. An idea can be represented in all different kinds of neural configurations, not to mention many different languages or types of media. Logic is the relationship between ideas, and ideas are not structures of matter.. They're structures of meaning.

Actually, let me ask a slighly different question this time. When you get hit really hard at the back of the head, the mental substance seems to disappear doesn't it? You go unconscious. How did the physical impact affect the mental substance? — khaled

Dualism says that humans are a combination of mental and physical. A physical blow can obviously affect the physical capacity to be conscious. But on the other hand, what if I tell you something, convey something to you, that makes you sick or fills you with dread? Then nothing physical has passed between us, but it has physical effects, like raising your blood pressure or making you throw up. And that's because the meaning has affected you, not anything physical. You know what it means, because you're a human, with an imagination, and the ability to interpret. The placebo affect is like that, in medicine - a subject's belief that they will be cured has physical affects, even though they've been given no physical medicine.

Whatever it is, we can agree that you commit to the existence of a mental substance correct? This mental substance would be undetectable by any physical means correct (since it's non-physical and all that)? — khaled

I want to break this down a bit. Since the beginning of modern scientific method, with Galileo, science places a fundamental but unstated emphasis on what can be objectively measured. As it happens, physical objects are the paradigmatic example of such things. Newton's laws of motion are amazingly accurate across vast ranges of such behaviour. That is why physics became paradigmatic for philosophy - it's why 'physicalism' is the mainstream view. It is, or was, paradigmatic for all science and so is deeply embedded in our way of thinking.

So there's no way to even deal with a 'non-physical' object in that framework. There are, as I understand it, spookily not-quite-physical things in quantum physics, like virtual particles that go in and out existence. But that's not what I'm getting at. In that formulaic picture of how science works, the mind is excluded as a matter of principle. It attempts to derive a view of what is objectively there, same for all observers, measurable and quantifiable. Physicalism is the view that whatever is measurable and observable in that sense, is the basis of all-there-is. Whenever you tallk about 'objects' or whether 'mind is a substance', then you're adopting that framework. And I suggest you're adopting it unconsciously, i.e. without thinking about it. That is why when I say that the mind is not an object, then you can't understand that, you think that I'm talking 'word salad'. What I'm actually doing, is analysing the question from a different perspective - I'm looking at it philosophically, in terms of the relationship of subject and object, not viewing it through the perspective of science.

Through intentional action. We all intentionally do things, we carry out conscious acts. If you were unconscious then you couldn't do that. — Wayfarer

Bingo! We talked about this on another thread. I know this is going to make Albert Camus turn in his grave but I have this feeling that he's been cremated. Anyway, life seems to possess...wait for it...purpose - it, as a whole and individually, seems to be on some kind of mission so to speak. Life wants to do something as opposed to a nonliving thing. Take the simplest of living organisms, a bacterium - it seems bent on foraging, feeding, and conjugating (sex). I recall you talking about the 4 F's (food, fight, feed, f**k) - primal drives that, to some degree, define life. Such are missing in nonliving things e.g. a stone - it just sits there and probably has been sitting there and will sit there for all of eternity. If memory serves, you used the word "intentionality".

Right! No argument from me on that score, but mainstream science (and therefore a lot of philosophy) is radically non-teleological in its outlook. Meaning that the whole idea of purpose is set aside, or reduced to the personal - persons can have purposes, but these are of their own devising, there’s no purpose in nature. Can’t you see that playing out on this forum?

This, incidentally, is why Franz Brentano’s idea of ‘intentionality’ became one of the hallmarks of phenomenology. Intentionality, or about-ness, is said to be one of the fundamental attributes of consciousness, which marks it off from the physical; thoughts are ‘about’ objects, in a way that has no correspondence in the domain of the physical.

I recall you talking about the 4 F's (food, fight, feed, f**k) - primal drives that, to some degree, define life. Such are missing in nonliving things e.g. a stone - it just sits there and probably has been sitting there and will sit there for all of eternity. — TheMadFool

Right. But to those four, h.sapiens adds another ingredient - rationality, which opens horizons of possibility inconceivable to other species. Which is why I often argue that Darwinian theory is incomplete in this respect - which, incidentally, was also the view of Alfred Russel Wallace.

And I'm telling you why that couldn't happen. You can't infer the nature of intentionality from looking at neurological data. — Wayfarer

That's not what I'm asking you for though. I'm not asking you to reduce intentionality to a single physical process. I get you can't do that. What I'm asking is: What will it look like when the mental substance affects matter?

Say we call you drinking the cup of water Neurological State 1 (NS1). We can find out what caused NS1, let's call that NS2. And NS3 is what caused NS2. And so on.

Do you expect that at some point we'll find a NSX that was NOT caused by a previous NSY? A neurological state that was brought about by the mental substance doing something?

A physical blow can obviously affect the physical capacity to be conscious. — Wayfarer

So consciousness is a physical capacity now? Come on.....

How can the physical affect the mental substance and vice versa? Explain in terms of what the physical would look like as it is being affected. What do you expect we will see, when intentionality causes a movement? Or is intentionality incapable of moving anything (epiphenomenology)?

I've already showed why this is implausible. An idea can be represented in all different kinds of neural configurations, not to mention many different languages or types of media. — Wayfarer

This does not make it so that the idea is not a structure that is shared accross them. Exactly like the same algorithm can be implemented on any number of computers, and non computers. And yet, the algorithm is no more than the structure of physical stuff in every case.

But on the other hand, what if I tell you something, convey something to you, that makes you sick or fills you with dread? Then nothing physical has passed between us — Wayfarer

Really? Nothing physical? Not even sounds? Or lights on a screen?

Doubtful. I'll immediately become an idealist if you manage to convey something to me telepathically without any physical means, as you claim you can do...

So there's no way to even deal with a 'non-physical' object in that framework. There are, as I understand it, spookily not-quite-physical things in quantum physics, like virtual particles that go in and out existence. But that's not what I'm getting at. In that formulaic picture of how science works, the mind is excluded as a matter of principle. It attempts to derive a view of what is objectively there, same for all observers, measurable and quantifiable. Physicalism is the view that whatever is measurable and observable in that sense, is the basis of all-there-is. Whenever you tallk about 'objects' or whether 'mind is a substance', then you're adopting that framework. And I suggest you're adopting it unconsciously, i.e. without thinking about it. That is why when I say that the mind is not an object, then you can't understand that, you think that I'm talking 'word salad'. What I'm actually doing, is analysing the question from a different perspective - I'm looking at it philosophically, in terms of the relationship of subject and object, not viewing it through the perspective of science. — Wayfarer

None of this has answered my question.

Incidently I don't disagree with any of the above. I disagree with your use of words such as "thing" and "object" but at least I know that you think mental substances exist. And that's all I need to formulate my question. Which you keep not answering.

You admit there exists mental substances yes? And you claim those mental substances can affect, and are affected by the physical world. We can observe the physical world. When a mental substance affects the physical world, what do you expect we will see?

What will it look like when the mental substance affects matter? — khaled

Like you having a drink of water.

And yet, the algorithm is no more than the structure of physical stuff in every case. — khaled

Programmed by humans. Without humans, no algorithms. Humans interface between the domain of ideas and those of matter. Dualism again.

You’re a great sport, Khaled. It’s helped me a lot having this conversation, and I thank you for it.

Like you having a drink of water. — Wayfarer

Well as far as I can tell, we have never found cases of a neurological event that wasn't entirely explained by the previous neurological event. So it seems to me like the mental substance isn't doing anything.

Programmed by humans. Without humans, no algorithms. Humans interface between the domain of ideas and those of matter. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

Dualism again. — Wayfarer

Non sequitor.

Again, you don't need to pose a new kind of substance. There is nothing so far that you've given that you can't explain with just the matter and its structures. And structures are not a substance.

You’re a great sport, Khaled. It’s helped me a lot having this conversation, and I thank you for it. — Wayfarer

I don't wanna sound like a dick but I wish I could say the same. You just keep dodging the problem. Maybe the SEP will get through:

A fourth version of the Problem of Interaction is related to the third, but, because it is more prominent in the contemporary literature, especially in some of the “property-based” problems we examine below, we will develop this last version at greater length. The first premise is:

The Completeness of the Physical: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.

When you trace the causal history of any physical effect—that is, of anything physical that has a cause—you will never need to appeal to anything non-physical. The physical universe contains within itself the resources for a full causal explanation of any of its (caused) elements, and in this sense is “complete”. The point applies, then, to whatever might occur to or within our bodies. Any instance of bodily behavior has a sufficient physical cause, which itself has a sufficient physical cause, and so on. In tracing the causal history of what we do, we need never appeal to anything non-physical.

Do you think that some physical effects are not caused sufficiently by physical causes? Because it's that or epiphenomenalism. And I think both are wrong. Or is there some alternative I'm not thinking of here?

Can’t you see that playing out on this forum? — Wayfarer

I need to work on my observational skills. Either it's talent or practice and I lack the former and I'm just too scatter-brained for the latter. Woe is me!

This, incidentally, is why Franz Brentano’s idea of ‘intentionality’ became one of the hallmarks of phenomenology. Intentionality, or about-ness, is said to be one of the fundamental attributes of consciousness, which marks it off from the physical; thoughts are ‘about’ objects, in a way that has no correspondence in the domain of the physical. — Wayfarer

Saving this file for future reference. I hope I can access it when I need to.

You've been kind enough to remind me of this about-ness. How many times now? This is probably the 5th time. Patience is a virtue they say. :up:

I suppose this has something to do with subject-object distinction. Inanimate matter, a stone for example, can be an object but never a subject while the animate is capable of assuming a subject's role. That should be close enough to the truth for the likes of me.

Right. But to those four, h.sapiens adds another ingredient - rationality, which opens horizons of possibility inconceivable to other species — Wayfarer

A gold star for Wayfarer for this gem!

The 5th F = Figure

Definition of figure: think, consider, or expect to be the case (intentionality/planning) and let's not forget the word also refers to numbers, something you seem interested in in an ontological sense.

Thanks! G'day.

Do you think that some physical effects are not caused sufficiently by physical causes? Because it's that or epiphenomenalism. And I think both are wrong. Or is there some alternative I'm not thinking of here? — khaled

Sorry to interject, but you guys should really consider quantum consciousness theory. Superposition explains subjective qualia, and entanglement explains the structural properties of matter as distributed in space (even a stationary column essentially consists in remote entanglement effects). Chemistry is basically entanglement with some tunneling thrown in, while sustained superposition emerges from quantum coherence within some systems of entangled wavicles, a blending into complex patterns of resonance that are the substance of sensation and feeling. Its explanatorily significant but not eliminative, for the phenomenology of intention and identify are still certainly a piece of the puzzle. Ignore me if I'm irritating lol but I speak the truth!

We have never found cases of a neurological event that wasn't entirely explained by the previous neurological even — khaled

You mean, science knows all there is to know about the brain.

Ignore me if I'm irritating lol but I speak the truth! — Enrique

You put one view among others.

Sorry to interject, but you guys should really consider quantum consciousness theory. — Enrique

I mentioned it in my first comment on this thread (though not by name). But it's weird. It doesn't seem to be what idealist (or anyone) wants. It's not clear at all how much quantum mechanics plays a role in the neurology so you'll likely end up with a useless mind anyways, because the brain is too big to be treated as a quantum system. And it's panpsychist to a weird degree. You'll end up with electrons being more free than us (since they're much more affected by quantum mechanics than a macro body like us would be).

You mean, science knows all there is to know about the brain. — Wayfarer

No. But are you suggesting that we will find such a case? Since they've been proposed the laws of conservation have worked flawlessly. Nowhere have they broken down. Are you suggesting they break down within our brains every minute of the day this whole time?

And I'll just repeat the question again for the 100th time knowing you won't answer:

Do you think that some physical effects are not caused sufficiently by physical causes? — khaled

Since they've been proposed the laws of conservation have worked flawlessly. — khaled

Not in respect of everyday life. Science has had to invent fancy concepts like 'negenrtopy' to allow for the fact that you can tidy your room up. You know the meaning of the philosophical term, 'procrustean bed'?