There are clearly lots of physical things produced by minds, all those things would obviously cease to exist of minds ceased to exist. — Isaac

Did you mean to say the bolded? Aren't you talking labels here? Is your position then that the sun's existence is dependent on whether minds exist??? And what "physical things" do you think minds produce???

That is not true for me. I can feel the difference quite well. — Olivier5

I'm sure you will grant me the existence of people who cannot tell their hallucinations from reality, and this causes them tremendous trouble in life. You are not one of these people, OK.

Did you mean to say the bolded? Aren't you talking labels here? Is your position then that the sun's existence is dependent on whether minds exist??? — RogueAI

Not the sun, no. You seem to have this odd default position that either all things are caused by minds or no things are, I can't understand why you want to take such a position. Ideas are made by minds, they wouldn't exist if minds didn't exist. The sun (or the external states which we interpret as 'the sun') are not caused by minds and would continue to exist if minds didn't. I'm really not clear on why this is such an issue, it seems obvious to me. Feet would also cease to exist if there were no animals to have feet, this doesn't make feet oddly non-physical.

delete

If all minds disappeared, would the sun still exist? yes, no. — RogueAI

The state which we interpret as 'the sun', yes.

The sun (or the external states which we interpret as 'the sun') are not caused by minds and would continue to exist if minds didn't. — Isaac

So, the sun is mind-independent? You didn't agree with this before, and here you are literally saying the sun is not dependent on any mind. So, the sun is mind-independent, yes?

So, the sun is mind-independent? You didn't agree with this before — RogueAI

Where did I not agree with this before?

Right, there wouldn't be labels for anything, but the stuff would still be there. I think we're agreed. So the physical is mind-independent. Agreed?
— RogueAI

No, I don't think that follows. — Isaac

One question asks if the sun is mind-independent, the other asks if the physical is mind independent. The sun is not all that is physical.

you will grant me the existence of people who cannot tell their hallucinations from reality, and this causes them tremendous trouble in life. — RogueAI

There are many problems in this world. Thankfully most of us can intuitively feel a difference between dreams, or even hallucinations, and reality. There's a sense of matter being there, being hard and heavy.

One question asks if the sun is mind-independent, the other asks if the physical is mind independent. The sun is not all that is physical. — Isaac

So your claim then is that there is some physical stuff that is mind-independent (e.g., the sun) and some physical stuff that isn't mind-independent. Can you give me an example of physical stuff that isn't mind-independent?

Can you give me an example of physical stuff that isn't mind-independent? — RogueAI

Yes...ideas.

There are many problems in this world. Thankfully most of us can intuitively feel a difference between dreams, or even hallucinations, and reality. There's a sense of matter being there, being hard and heavy. — Olivier5

I agree. Idealism is counter-intuitive, but it doesn't suffer from a similar problem as the mind-body problem because it supposes that something we already know exists (hallucinations that people can't tell from reality) exists on a massive scale. There needs to be evidence for that, of course, but the claim itself is not susceptible to a category error. I think the mind-body problem is evidence that there's a category error going on, and you can't get the mental from the physical.

Yes...ideas. — Isaac

OK, so we have some attributes for the physical:
It is sometimes mind-independent (e.g., the sun) and sometimes not (e.g., ideas). Would you agree that the physical is sometimes conscious and sometimes not? For example, your brain is conscious and your kidneys aren't, agreed?

Would you agree that the physical is sometimes conscious and sometimes not? For example, your brain is conscious and your kidneys aren't agree? — RogueAI

Yes.

(though I should add that I actually think a body is conscious, not a brain - but I don't think that was your point)

Yes. — Isaac

I think we got pretty far defining the physical. Any further posts would be along the lines of "why is it that brains are conscious and kidneys aren't?" and I'm sure you've heard all that and have an explanation you like.

I'm sure you've heard all that and have an explanation you like. — RogueAI

Indeed.

Though as ever, I'm intrigued by what you think an answer to "why is it that brains are conscious and kidneys aren't?" would be like. For me the answer is "that's just the way things played out". I don't expect anything to have a reason to have turned out some way and not another. Why is it that you want a reason?

Indeed.

Though as ever, I'm intrigued by what you think an answer to "why is it that brains are conscious and kidneys aren't?" would be like. For me the answer is "that's just the way things played out". I don't expect anything to have a reason to have turned out some way and not another. Why is it that you want a reason? — Isaac

We're a curious species. We're usually not content with "that's just how things are". We always want to know why. In my case, I think the idea that mental states = physical states is contradicted by the simple fact that I can have a song playing in my head while there's no music in my skull; I can see green, without part of my brain turning green. I think the idea that mental states are caused by physical states is more appealing, but there's no consensus explanation for how that can happen, and for that to still be a mystery makes me think there's a category error going on there.

I think where the materialist case really bogs down is with computers. Most materialists believe that machines can be conscious. That entails that the pain of stubbing a toe is (or can be reduced to) a bunch of tiny switches turning off and on. That's extremely implausible.

Having a mind and a body is not necessarily a problem. The duality of form and matter is useful, conceptually and practically. So is the particle-wave duality.

Ah, I see. Useful for explaining something previously unexplained. — Kenosha Kid

I mentioned it doesn’t matter what the entailment is, that determines why one system would be thrown away before the other. From that, it can be deduced that explanation isn’t the reason. Besides, explanation implies understanding, which is quite obviously not the case in math generally, and quite apparently not the case in metaphysics generally.

It’s something else, underpinning both systems.

We're a curious species. We're usually not content with "that's just how things are". We always want to know why. — RogueAI

True, but not always thereby a sensible question.

I think the idea that mental states = physical states is contradicted by the simple fact that I can have a song playing in my head while there's no music in my skull — RogueAI

It seems highly implausible that you actually have a song playing in your head. There doesn't seem to be be any source of vibration in there sufficient to make the necessary sounds. Far more likely is that you sometimes have an experience similar to that you have when listening to a song. Since both experiences are mental processes it doesn't seem at all a contradiction.

Most materialists believe that machines can be conscious. That entails that the pain of stubbing a toe is (or can be reduced to) a bunch of tiny switches turning off and on. That's extremely implausible. — RogueAI

How are you judging the plausibility of some aspect of this reality? Have you experienced several other realities and found none of them to be thus arranged? What criteria would a state of affairs have to meet to qualify as 'plausible'?

Having a mind and a body is not necessarily a problem. The duality of form and matter is useful, conceptually and practically. So is the particle-wave duality. — Olivier5

I know. My position is out there. I think 5% of professional philosophers are idealists (that's from a survey done awhile back). I think idealism is becoming more popular, though. You have people like Max Tegmark saying the universe is made of math, and Christof Koch is a panpsychist. Panpsychism isn't idealism, but it's certainly a step in that direction.

All these ideas are too fancy for me.

which would give you a useful picture of what going on between the ears — Isaac

Admittedly, yours gives a much more useful picture than the mathematics which grounds the elementary physical mechanisms. Between speculative cognitive metaphysics and empirical cognitive psychology, however, I will put my gambling profits on the former, for the simple reason that it tells me specifically about myself from within, whereas the latter is being told to me from without.

Most of all, my metaphysical paradigm doesn’t need to juxtaposition disabilities or physical damage in justifications for my normative mental goings-on. I mean.....the very last thing I want to know, is how something that’s broke in my head, explains something that isn’t. I understand clinical diagnosticians find that useful, but if I have a serious enough disability, my metaphysics is useless automatically, whatever the reason for it, which is ok because I won’t have a use for it anyway.

Interesting look inside, nonetheless.

It seems highly implausible that you actually have a song playing in your head. — Isaac

No it doesn't. You've never had a song stuck in your head? Sure you have. People talk about songs playing in their heads all the time. That's one of the problems with the materialist position: it doesn't map on to the way we talk to each other. The materialist has to say, "Yes, we might say "we have a song in our heads", but what we really mean, is neurons xyz are doing abc.". That's a problem for materialism, because when I'm talking about a song being stuck in my head, everyone knows exactly what I mean, and that I'm not talking about my brain.

Dualism has a distinct advantage in that it maps on to our everyday language the best: we talk about our minds and we talk about our bodies and we don't think they're the same thing. I think if you drill down, you run into problems with it, but dualism certainly seems to be the way things are.

it tells me specifically about myself from within — Mww

It claims to. By what measure do you assess that it actually does.

Most of all, my metaphysical paradigm doesn’t need to juxtaposition disabilities or physical damage in justifications for my normative mental goings-on — Mww

Again, that it doesn't is not evidence that it doesn't need to.

It depends, I suppose, on what it is you want to achieve. If you're just looking for a story that answers "why do I think like that?" then metaphysics is certainly an easier route to find one. It's pretty much off-the-shelf (armchair not provided, pipe optional), but in this case I can't quite see why communication of those ideas would be of any use. You're giving a good account of why Kant would write CPR, why would anyone read CPR? Having no predictive values (which is what all those experiments with the 'broken' minds do for us) it doesn't seem to have any measure of quality to make it worth the time, in the context of the objective we're talking about here.

Either one of two things is the case - the human mind is a set of functions in matter which are therefore constrained by the properties of that matter (in which case proper study of that matter is indispensable to an understanding of those constraints), or it is not thus constrained (in which case no assessment of it;s function carries any more weight than any other, we might as well make it up one minute to the next).

The task, it seems, is to model the causes of our thoughts. Why does it seem more compelling to believe 2+2=4 than it does to believe 2+2=5? Why can't I believe both X and ~X at the same time? Why do I like this film and not that one? etc. What attracts us to one model over another is, I suppose, just another one of those questions.

It seems highly implausible that you actually have a song playing in your head. — Isaac


No it doesn't. — RogueAI

Well, this conversation has taken an uncomfortable turn for the pathological. Are you saying that you can't tell the difference (even colloquially) between the expressions "there's a song playing in that room over there" and "I've got this song playing in my head"? I can quite reliably assure you it's not a matter of materialists imposing an unwarranted distinction between the two, literally every sane person is quite well aware that "I've a song playing in my head" doesn't actually refer to the same set of happenings as "there's a song playing in that room".

I suspect you're just building an interesting 'air castle' (as above), so this is only a light concern, but one of the key symptoms of schizophrenia is the inability to distinguish between internal and external sources of sensory perceptions. If you really can't tell the difference between a song playing in the next room and a song playing in your head (in qualitative terms, not just spatial) then I strongly suggest you see a psychiatric specialist. Most people can distinguish the mental qualities of two events with some clarity.

I think the idea that mental states = physical states is contradicted by the simple fact that I can have a song playing in my head while there's no music in my skull
— RogueAI

It seems highly implausible that you actually have a song playing in your head. There doesn't seem to be be any source of vibration in there sufficient to make the necessary sounds. Far more likely is that you sometimes have an experience similar to that you have when listening to a song. Since both experiences are mental processes it doesn't seem at all a contradiction. — Isaac

This is a much clearer explanation than what I gave. :up:

I think the mind-body problem is evidence that there's a category error going on, and you can't get the mental from the physical. — RogueAI

The "mind-body problem" is a misnomer. Call it an enigma instead, or a mystery, or simply a question. There are many unresolved questions, like the origin of the universe, what existed before the big bang, how did life happen? These are accurately called questions, not problems. Nobody calls abiogenesis a "problem", for good reasons.

Questions are good things. They can be contemplated and marvelled at forever. Problems are problematic, there's something wrong with them; they need to be solved, the sooner the better.

Or they should be avoided, which is what you seem to be saying: "let's avoid a philosophy where this problem would arise". Should we also avoid any philosophy where the "abiogenesis problem" would arise?

Defining the mind-body relationship as a "problem" tends to get people anxiously banging their head on the wall about it, or avoiding it, when they could instead enjoy the beauty of the question.

You can see it happen here 24/7. The same old tired arguments are being made over and over again on this subject, day after day, month after month, year after year. They think they are arguing but all they do is bang heads.

I agree. Idealism is counter-intuitive, but it doesn't suffer from a similar problem as the mind-body problem because it supposes that something we already know exists (hallucinations that people can't tell from reality) exists on a massive scale. There needs to be evidence for that, of course, but the claim itself is not susceptible to a category error. I think the mind-body problem is evidence that there's a category error going on, and you can't get the mental from the physical. — RogueAI

True. But there's also a kind of category error with idealism. Let's go with the idea that there is no physical world, and take the example of subjective idealism, although there's a variant of the below for other kinds.

How I will explain my experience of the sun coming up every morning, how the clouds gather and move, how I experience having the same body every day (more or less), how the floor holds that body up, how I experience the taste of kimchi, etc., is unknown, but I can describe it to myself or other humans (be they minds or p-zombie hallucinations). Noting my experiences, mentally acting to reproduce those experiences, discussing those experiences with said phantoms, certain rules as about my experiences must become clear. For instance, I can never see the sun rise in the direction my compass calls north (irrespective of whether the sun rises in the same direction every morning or whether my compass consistently points north), nor do I experience others saying they have seen such a thing. My subjective experience is consistent with regularity and consensus.

I might conclude that these mysterious rules about what my mind experiences are the most interesting thing about my existence, perhaps dedicate my existence to their study. The rules seem to be mathematical, but there's relationships between kinds of experience that are not: how fast a bowling hits the ground in my experience 'bowling ball hits ground' depends on its initial height and its mass, and there's no obvious reason to say the initial height is 2 and not 1 or 1000, or that the mass is 1 and not 2 or 200. To use the maths to describe the regularity of the content of my experience, I must have an additional set of rules about how I measure distance between things in my experience, masses of things, velocities of things, etc.

Let's call that Xism: the idea that my ideal experiences play out according to rules (irrespective of how those experiences are generated, e.g. I might be unwittingly imposing those rules) and those rules rely on measures of contents of experience. Note, I've not said anything that contradicts the notion of idealism: I am only talking about the contents of experience that must be true, not the causes of them.

Thing is, this science of idealism we've just described --Xism -- is physicalism. Experience has forced us to ensure that everything we can say about this ideal world is constrained to match what physicalists say about the physical world, since physics is an empirical method, i.e. it's concerned with explaining experience, and the experience of an ideal world must be the same experience, otherwise it's counter-factual.

So idealism commits a worse category error: it holds that coming up with a different name for something is the same as coming up with a new thing. But a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.