it tells me specifically about myself from within
— Mww

It claims to. By what measure do you assess that it actually does. — Isaac

Cognitive prejudice. Given a set of theoretical conditions, assessing the degree of satisfaction with them. Now, one might be inclined to say, yeah right, in that case you’re no more than being led by the nose, which usually is the case, considering the lack of empirical warrant, unless the theoretical conditions are so rigid, so complete, encompassing all readily apparent circumstances......and never once contradicting Mother Nature Herself......granting to it due authority causes no harm. In short, it’s a comfortable rendering of something for which no certain knowledge yet repeals.
—————

Most of all, my metaphysical paradigm doesn’t need to juxtaposition disabilities or physical damage in justifications for my normative mental goings-on
— Mww

Again, that it doesn't is not evidence that it doesn't need to. — Isaac

My metaphysics is an exposition on the possibility of a priori knowledge on one hand, and an exposition on the grounds for moral determinations on the other. That being given, I have no wish to know what doesn’t work, but only that which does, and why such should be the case. Thus it is, that whatever juxtaposition does arise, merely exemplifies the consequences under which these expositions themselves are somehow defective, and not what happens when the internal physicality responsible for their manifestation, somehow are.
—————

It depends, I suppose, on what it is you want to achieve. If you're just looking for a story that answers "why do I think like that?" then metaphysics is certainly an easier route to find one. — Isaac

Exactly right. I am Everydayman. Makes no difference whether true or not, there seems to be a little tiny world contained in my head, and wherever it directs, I go. As do you, and even while looking to arrive at the same answer by a different story, you arrive in the exact same way as I, in whichever way that actually is.
————

The task, it seems, is to model the causes of our thoughts. — Isaac

My metaphysics doesn’t do that. My thoughts are given, it makes no difference what causes them. That I think is a condition of my biology, and to seek its causes, is to necessarily use the very thing already caused. I can never ever think to a cause of thinking. Better to examine what a thought is, what a thought contains, where it fits in some overall system, rather than its causality.

Modeling the cause of thought implies making better humans.
Modeling the content of thought implies making a human better.

That I think is a condition of my biology, and to seek its causes, is to necessarily use the very thing already caused. — Mww

So? What’s the issue with this?

I can never ever think to a cause of thinking. — Mww

Why not? You just implied in the above quote that you can.

Better to examine what a thought is, what a thought contains, where it fits in some overall system, rather than its causality. — Mww

Agreed that’s more practical. But you can do both no?

Well, this conversation has taken an uncomfortable turn for the pathological. Are you saying that you can't tell the difference (even colloquially) between the expressions "there's a song playing in that room over there" and "I've got this song playing in my head"? — Isaac

No, I'm saying you're wrong: it's not implausible to have a song in your head. It happens all the time.

You can see it happen here 24/7. The same old tired arguments are being made over and over again on this subject, day after day, month after month, year after year. They think they are arguing but all they do is bang heads. — Olivier5

Pretty much. But things change. The paradigm is shifting. Consciousness has become a big problem in academia. It's not OK to just sweep it under the rug anymore.

to seek its causes, is to necessarily use the very thing already caused.
— Mww

So? What’s the issue with this? — khaled

Infinite regress.

Thing is, this science of idealism we've just described --Xism -- is physicalism. — Kenosha Kid

No, because the idealist says that the cause of your experiences is a mind(s). Everything you experience is a projection of either a coordinated set of minds or a god-head mind, like in Berkeley's idealism. Modern idealists like Bernardo Kastrup talk about a "cosmic mind". In any case, no physicalist would agree that reality is the product of a cosmic mind's thinking.

But you do bring up a point: science works equally well under idealism as it does under physicalism. Positing the existence of some mind-independent non-conscious stuff doesn't solve any problems.

The "mind-body problem" is a misnomer. Call it an enigma instead, or a mystery, or simply a question. There are many unresolved questions, like the origin of the universe, what existed before the big bang, how did life happen, and who came first: the chicken or the egg? These are accurately called questions, not problems. Nobody calls abiogenesis a "problem", for good reasons. — Olivier5

Because, with abiogenesis, we already have a framework for an explanation: life started when chemicals xyz, did abc in environment efg. We're just trying to figure out exactly the environment, steps and chemicals. What's the framework for the explanation "how does consciousness arise from matter?" What does the answer to that even look like? Consciousness is an illusion? Consciousness IS brain activity? Consciousness is information integration? Unlike with abiogenesis, the explanation for consciousness at this point is pure guess work. I think it's a unique problem. You think "give it time". Maybe. But we should at least have the broad outlines of an explanation by now. The fact we don't is good evidence there's something deeper to the mystery.

it's not implausible to have a song in your head. It happens all the time. — RogueAI

Right and he’s saying that to “have a song in your head” has a different meaning to “hearing a song from the other room”. In the one case there are are air vibrations hitting your eardrums causing the certain brain state. In the other case there are no air vibrations, yet there is a similar brain state (similar in the sense that you still feel like you hear a song). So there is no contradiction here.

Having a song in your head and actually hearing a song from the other room are different yet similar experiences corresponding to different yet similar brain states. What’s the issue with this?

Positing the existence of some mind-independent non-conscious stuff doesn't solve any problems. — RogueAI

It solves countless problems. Such as:

1- Not being able to dismiss solipsism, or a world where it’s just you and the mind of God.

2- Not being able to tell if anyone else has a mind (kind of same as above but applies individually)

3- Not being able to tell if someone is suffering or not (since their behavior is divorced from what their mind is thinking)

And the list goes on but those are all problems with dualism not idealism per se. I’m trying to understand idealism so I’ll ask you the same question I asked wayfarer.

No, because the idealist says that the cause of your experiences is a mind(s). Everything you experience is a projection of either a coordinated set of minds or a god-head mind — RogueAI

What are minds themselves in an idealist system? Are they also projections of a mind? Or are they somehow independent and fundamental? If they are the former, whose mind? God’s? Then in whose mind is God a projection? If he’s not a projection in another’s mind, what is he? If the latter, how do they seem to increase whenever a kid is born?

Sorry for all the questions I just don’t get y’all. And I’ve been trying to.

Infinite regress. — Mww

How, do you mind explaining? I don’t see how you end up with infinite regress.

Consciousness has become a big problem in academia. It's not OK to just sweep it under the rug anymore. — RogueAI

It always has been, I think. Freud and Lacan were all the craze when I was a teen.

Unlike with abiogenesis, the explanation for consciousness at this point is pure guess work. I think it's a unique problem. You think "give it time". Maybe. But we should at least have the broad outlines of an explanation by now. The fact we don't is good evidence there's something deeper to the mystery. — RogueAI

We are just guessing about abiogenesis too. Some guys think they have the begining of a usable framework. Maybe they do, maybe they don't.

My point is that the mind-body relationship is not a problem to be avoided, it's an interesting area of research. So just because this question comes up in a dualist framework is no reason to abandon a dualist framework. It's just one of the interesting questions that crop up when one accepts the existence of bodies and minds. It's not a problem.

I don’t see how you end up with infinite regress. — khaled

That I must use thinking, in order to think to that which causes my thinking, is the epitome of infinite regress. The cause of my thought can only be a thought, which is caused by an antecedent thought....never to arrive at the unconditioned cause of any thought.

Pretty straightforward, I should think.

Having a song in your head and actually hearing a song from the other room are different yet similar experiences corresponding to different yet similar brain states. What’s the issue with this? — khaled

There is no issue with what you're talking about. This is what I was responding to:

It seems highly implausible that you actually have a song playing in your head. — Isaac

No, it's not implausible to actually have a song playing in your head. I have a song playing in my head right now. Do you think it's implausible? Do you think I'm lying or mistaken?

What are minds themselves in an idealist system? Are they also projections of a mind? Or are they somehow independent and fundamental? If they are the former, whose mind? God’s? Then in whose mind is God a projection? If he’s not a projection in another’s mind, what is he? If the latter, how do they seem to increase whenever a kid is born?

Sorry for all the questions I just don’t get y’all. And I’ve been trying to. — khaled

These are questions that need answers, but they're not indicative of a category error, which is what you were claiming before. In idealism, there's only one ontological category: mental stuff. In dualism, there are two categories: mental stuff and physical stuff, and the dualist claims that one comes from the other. That would be fine if there was an explanation for it all, but in the absence of any explanation (and the problem has been around a long time), I think there's a prima facie case for a category error.

The cause of my thought can only be a thought — Mww

Not true. Idk where you get this. You must have had a first thought no? You haven’t been thinking forever. What caused your first thought after being born? It wasn’t another thought. By definition. Or even simpler, what causes your first thought after waking up? Do you continue your line of thinking from before you went to sleep? I would be impressed if that’s the case! This also applies to your thoughts about what causes thoughts. Those also started somewhere, and weren’t caused by a thought.

never to arrive at the unconditioned cause of any thought. — Mww

So, if I think of a cause of something, what I just thought of is not an “unconditioned cause” because I thought about it?

How do you ever get to the “unconditioned cause” of anything then, if even thinking makes it “conditioned”?

I’m not sure I’m following.

That I must use thinking, in order to think to that which causes my thinking, is the epitome of infinite regress. — Mww

No it isn’t as I just explained above. I know some programming and it’s pretty common practice to have an object take itself as a member. So the “human” class would declare something like “friend” variable which is of type human. You would have to have a human in order to have a human friend. But no weird infinite regresses occur. Usually you end up with cycles or complicated networks. Or some people just not having friends.

No, because the idealist says that the cause of your experiences is a mind(s). — RogueAI

The cause is irrelevant. We've simply moved from using the word 'physical' to describe the rules that appear to govern our experiences -- irrespective of their causes -- to using the word 'ideal'. It's just exchanging dummy tokens, nothing of physicalist is really lost except terminology.

No, it's not implausible to actually have a song playing in your head. I have a song playing in my head right now. Do you think it's implausible? Do you think I'm lying or mistaken? — RogueAI

Question not to me but, yes, mistaken. Very mistaken. In the same way there's no red in your head when you think of the colour red. You have representations of a song, but no actual music is playing.

No, it's not implausible to actually have a song playing in your head. I have a song playing in my head right now. Do you think it's implausible? Do you think I'm lying or mistaken? — RogueAI

Yes, if by “song playing in your head” you mean that there are air vibrations that produce a certain sound literally emanating or passing through your head. But this is what you must mean in order to make your point. Otherwise your points about “seeing green without a green brain” or “hearing a song in your head without a source” wouldn’t actually be a challenge for materialism in any way as explained above.

but they're not indicative of a category error, which is what you were claiming before. — RogueAI

I have not once used the phrase “category error”. You’ll need to remind me if I did because last time we talked was around a week ago wasn’t it?

In dualism, there are two categories: mental stuff and physical stuff, and the dualist claims that one comes from the other. — RogueAI

Uhhhh no? Dualism is dual precisely because neither can be reduced to the other. If you propose 2 kinds of stuff but really one kind just comes from the other kind, you’re a monist who believes the other kind is all that exists. No materialist denies the existence of minds and consciousness. What they deny is that they’re different stuff. Yet we don’t call materialists dualists do we?

That would be fine if there was an explanation for it all, but in the absence of any explanation (and the problem has been around a long time), I think there's a prima facie case for a category error. — RogueAI

I’m not sure I understand this but it doesn’t seem to answer the question.

So can you answer the question?

What are minds themselves in an idealist system? Are they also projections of a mind? — khaled

You win.

Question not to me but, yes, mistaken. Very mistaken. In the same way there's no red in your head when you think of the colour red. You have representations of a song, but no actual music is playing. — Kenosha Kid

Have you ever had a song stuck in your head?

Yes, if by “song playing in your head” you mean that there are air vibrations that produce a certain sound literally emanating or passing through your head. But this is what you must mean in order to make your point. — khaled

I'm talking about a song playing in my head. It has nothing to do with air vibrations, and of course you know that because in your life I'm sure people have told you they have songs stuck in their heads and you never said to them "but how can that be??? There are no air vibrations in your skull!", so I give up. If you are incapable of acknowledging the trivial fact that people have songs in their heads, what more can I say? The absurdity of your position has been laid bare.

Have you ever had a song stuck in your head? — RogueAI

I can go one better: I have even written an entire song, lyrics, chords, bassline and all, in the space of a cigarette break without making a peep. But there was still no music playing in my head, no sounds, just mental representations of sounds.

I can go one better: I have even written an entire song, lyrics, chords, bassline and all, in the space of a cigarette break without making a peep. But there was still no music playing in my head, no sounds, just mental representations of sounds. — Kenosha Kid

But you didn't answer my question: have you ever had a song stuck in your head?

But you didn't answer my question: have you ever had a song stuck in your head? — RogueAI

You genuinely couldn't get the answer from the above? Seriously?

Fine. Define 'song'.

Define 'song'. — Kenosha Kid

Lame.

Lame. — RogueAI

Isaac above tried to be more specific on this earlier to make sure you're not conflating two different things. You seemed to be stubbornly refusing to be specific then and you're clearly not improving on this point. My conclusion is that you're actively trying to conflate things and avoiding anything that will resolve your intented ambiguity, this time with stupid insults. Yeah, very lame.

Come back if you fancy a grown-up chat on this topic, it is an interesting one.

I'm talking about a song playing in my head. It has nothing to do with air vibrations — RogueAI

Then the triviality of your counter argument is laid bare.

I think the idea that mental states = physical states is contradicted by the simple fact that I can have a song playing in my head while there's no music in my skull — RogueAI

If it has nothing to do with air vibrations then why did you expect a song playing in your head to imply music in your skill? So then the idea that mental states = physical states is not contradicted by this simple fact is it?

If you are incapable of acknowledging the trivial fact that people have songs in their heads, what more can I say? — RogueAI

Oh no it’s very easy to acknowledge when people are using colloquial expressions. It’s your “counter argument” that relies on taking the literal meaning to make sense as I just explained above. It’s not that people are being obtuse or that materialism can’t account for songs playing in your head, it’s that your counter argument only begins to make sense when the literal meaning is taken, that’s why people take the literal meaning in response to you.

Again, if songs playing in your head has nothing to do with air vibrations (which we can agree it doesn’t) then there is no reason that having a song playing in your head should require music in your skull. So your “simple fact” presents no difficulty to materialism. There is no contradiction in it.

Or you can take the literal meaning in which case: no you don’t have songs playing in your head unless someone installed a boom box there. Now the argument is wrong on empirical grounds.

Whichever meaning you take the counter argument is bad.

Now, regardless of the absurdity or non absurdity of my position, can you please answer the question?

What are minds themselves in an idealist system? Are they also projections of a mind? — khaled

I’m trying to understand your position (which I assume is idealism though you haven’t explicitly committed to anything far as I can see)

In short, it’s a comfortable rendering of something for which no certain knowledge yet repeals. — Mww

Good call. I used to tell my students that far from being the detached, dispassionate scientists we might expect of our biologist or physicist cousins, if you don't come to psychology with a very strong preference for one particular model/approach then there's probably something wrong with you.

The trick is to be resolute enough to discard it when it's clearly overwhelmed by a weight of opposing evidence, but where not - fill your boots. Psychology simply cannot progress like the hard sciences can and it's pissing into the wind to try and pretend it can.

Trouble is, much of Kant's thinking on human thought processes falls into this key category of theory, but I've no doubt it's possible to salvage it with a few 're-interpretations', it usually is. there's not many theories that are beyond the human capacity for creative elbowing into the space left by empirical observation.

Exactly right. I am Everydayman. Makes no difference whether true or not, there seems to be a little tiny world contained in my head, and wherever it directs, I go. — Mww

I don't buy this. Kant is, by all accounts, a difficult text to understand, and you seem to be something of a scholar. there's nothing 'everyman' about it, it's a passion for a particular viewpoint and (if judged by the amount of effort put into pursuing it) quite a strong one. Nowt wrong with that (as my wife would say), but it can't also be passed off as a kind of path of least resistance. I've read CPR. It's a path of massive resistance, we're talking boulder, river-crossings and pits (probably bottomless ones).

I can never ever think to a cause of thinking — Mww

As @khaled has raised above, we're not talking about thinking to a cause of thinking, we're talking about thinking to a cause of some given thought. One can use a torch to find another torch.

Modeling the cause of thought implies making better humans.
Modeling the content of thought implies making a human better. — Mww

Woah - left-field, where did this spring from?

Well, this conversation has taken an uncomfortable turn for the pathological. Are you saying that you can't tell the difference (even colloquially) between the expressions "there's a song playing in that room over there" and "I've got this song playing in my head"? — Isaac


No, — RogueAI

Right. Then as @khaled and @Kenosha Kid have already laid out, there's no contradiction to be examined. You (in common with the vast majority of the population) can tell the difference between the experience of having 'a song stuck in your head' and that of having a song playing through earphones. Thus empirically, to our senses, they appear to be two different experiences, so we presume have two different causes.

Here we have our first piece of empirical evidence for an external world. Some experiences seem to have this 'internal' label attached to them and I can stop them (or at least interfere with them) to a degree. Other experiences have this 'external' label an no matter what I do, I can't seem to make them something other than they are at first blush. I can imagine the song in my head going up an octave, and experience that, I can't make the one coming in through my earphones go up an octave no matter how hard I try, it stays resolutely at the pitch it always has been.

Of course the line between these two states is not a clear cut as that - we construct all of our perceptions and expectation can bring about all sorts of changes to what we see and hear. But that's something psychologists, and neuroscientists have found out recently, not the default position we're born with. In fact, telling people the extent to which we construct our reality is usually a challenge met with strong resistance.

So we have excellent cause to believe there's an external cause for our perceptions and an internal cause for our imagination and memory. Our perceptions are difficult to alter, seem to be highly homogenous among other humans, are consistent through time and are generally confirmed by machines and predictive algorithms. Our imagination and memory, on the other hand, seem very easily altered (I seem to be able to choose what appears in my 'mind's eye'), vary wildly between humans, change through time and are currently inaccessible to machines let alone predictable.

Nothing conclusive, but given it's the default position anyway (certainly since toddlerhood, which is as far back as we can really test these things), there seems no good reason not to assume a theory that these two radically different types of experience have two equally radically different causes.

The cause of my thought can only be a thought — Mww

What makes you think this?

Edit - Catching up, I somehow missed the section where @khaled already dealt with this. Feel free to ignore this.