The diagram is not in the system, it's an outside view. — Kenosha Kid
A system with an input and output can't have as its output a report on the system. If there's a bit of the system that measures the system, what is measuring it, etc. — Kenosha Kid
nothing wrong with a system examining the inner workings of a sample of almost identical systems. — Kenosha Kid
Have the system report the map input :|--> output for all possible inputs. The resultant map is functionally identical to the system, but differently composed — Kenosha Kid
examining the system, reporting on it, post hoc, is not the use of the system for its intended purpose. When thinking about something, in the common course of cognitive events, to ask myself how it is I’m thinking it, isn’t in that common course. I may inquire afterwards, in which case I would retrospect using the very same system by which the original thought occurred. Check out how a car drives, whether it drives properly or there’s something wrong with it, by driving it, right? Check out the fit of a shoe......ehhhh, you get the picture. — Mww
In addition, part of the system is not in our awareness. Just as in the physical nature of brain mechanics, there is a gap between the sensing of a thing and the apprehension of it, that part in which the perception is transformed into material for the system. Much like we are not conscious of the transfer along nerves of the output of sensation and the input to the brain. — Mww
The first box is the instantiation of it, the last is the culmination. — Mww
Indeed, but this seems to apply only to the totality of the system, which I didn't think was ever in question. If a system is made of subsystem A and subsystem A* (responsible for examining the workings of subsystem A) then 'the system' is examining itself. The fact that it's not examining the totality of itself doesn't remove from the fact that it is examining itself. — Isaac
A separate point here, but perhaps one to get into when I've fully understood your objections — Isaac
We're aware that something more is going on with us but it's very difficult to put a finger on, hence the evasive vagaries of the language used ("what it is like" etc.). — Kenosha Kid
Another possibility: you could have say a ring of subsystems each examining the system on the left. Every subsystem will be examined, but none has a picture of the whole, nor can you get any information out of it without introducing another subsystem which isn't being examined. — Kenosha Kid
Not sure how this relates to the difference between cognitive science and metaphysics. Both are post hoc. — Isaac
In fact cognitive science has the slight edge here in that third parties can contribute some data here without their examination forming a part of the process — Isaac
But we are conscious of the transfer along nerves of the output of sensation and the input to the brain, at least I am. I've seen it with my own eyes in both fMRI and EEG. — Isaac
I'm not conscious of it at the time, but I've no reason at all to believe that all the times I'm not in a machine capable of detecting such things my body works differently to the times when is is, that would be unreasonable skepticism. — Isaac
The first box is the instantiation of it, the last is the culmination.
— Mww
This seems to be making an arbitrary distinction. — Isaac
The System' in the context of our discussion is the mind and it's contents. — Isaac
If you are aware of the instantiation and you are aware of the culmination, then by definition both must be part of 'The System' because you have no other means by which you can be aware of either than your mind. — Isaac
Information is the only thing that fits in mind, so it is the only thing that can cause a thought ( The deeper question though is what causes the information to integrate?). — Pop
This information must be interpreted. — Pop
The mind is working with "raw information" — Pop
The diagram is not in the system, it's an outside view.
— Kenosha Kid
An outside view viewed by whom? — Isaac
The philosophical 'puzzle' only arises when we expect that lay story to relate in some intrinsic way to what we actually find out in neuroscience and cognitive science. I mean, why would it, it's just a story. — Isaac
Which could be considered as just another iteration of what I’m talking about. If it is information responsible for causation and we still need to query the cause of the cause....we remain contending with that damnable infinite regress. — Mww
This energetic and vibratory information of the outside world is constantly acting upon us. We are constantly swamped by it ( information ) . We must interpret it, in order to navigate it , and self organize. — Pop
It doesn’t, insofar as they are both post hoc. Yours is post hoc from an external perspective, mine is post hoc from my own internal perspective. — Mww
Which is exactly the problem. I don’t want data contributed exactly because it isn’t part of the process. — Mww
Metaphysics is not and never was a science, hence cannot be examined scientifically. — Mww
Then you are only conscious of the the representation of the transfer, and infer the correspondence between them. — Mww
It is indubitable that whatever is in our heads is not the same as whatever is in the world outside our heads. Doesn’t matter what is, only that what is here is distinct from what is there. — Mww
If you look back, you will find I don’t use the term “mind”. As far as I’m concerned, in the context of this discussion, all I need to talk about is the human cognitive system and its constituency, which cannot include mind. Even if we say the system is metaphysical, and “mind” is metaphysical, doesn’t mean they are the same thing. — Mww
I am aware of the external world simply from being affected by it. — Mww
I don’t need mind to tell me there is something in my visual field. — Mww
Honey-Do time, doncha know. — Mww
Not that hard to imagine, that given sufficient methodological reduction from some undeniable reality, we can actually arrive at some example or other, that represents our cognitive system, such that all the above is explained. Explained but not proven. — Mww
Yes, I completely agree with this but it also makes me think we're speaking at cross purposes. — Kenosha Kid
I was talking more about what precedes that: System A*'s lack of knowledge about itself or the causes of System A's outputs. Yes, it's undoubtedly a cause of rationalisations, of narrative-building, but the absence of information (expressed by those you disapprove of as the immediacy of qualia) are examinable. What we don't know about our phenomenology invites either curiosity or rationalisation. — Kenosha Kid
We were supposed to be going to see Derren Brown tonight. My girlfriend bought me the tickets for my birthday last year but it was cancelled due to Covid. — Kenosha Kid
Turned out, it's this date next year. — Kenosha Kid
I was going to say use a mirror, but the point is the same. — Isaac
Not at all. A metaphor is simply an illustration, a comparison. It is not to be taken literally.
Do I really need to explain such ultra basic literary notions? What's wrong with you brains? — Olivier5
You asked a question: why is the mind so hard to understand, and I answered you. Now you say that you are in agreement with my answer. But that makes you angry somehow.Hence all you've said it that you think the mind cannot examine itself. We knew that. — Isaac
You asked a question: why is the mind so hard to understand, and I answered you. Now you say that you are in agreement with my answer. — Olivier5
A prerequisite, I would think, is for the mind to acknowledge itself... — Olivier5
I asked why we find it so hard to accept that our subjective feeling of it might be different from the reality of it. — Isaac
I don't think anyone denies this. — Isaac
You'd be surprised. — Olivier5
Are you denying the reality of your subjective feelings? See point A above. — Olivier5
How could the reality of the subjective feeling be anything other than the reality of the subjective feeling? — Wayfarer
All the things you mention are objects. You have an I-it relationship to them. — Wayfarer
I'm not seeing that as a compelling reason why they can turn out to be other than they seem but my mind can't. All you've done thus far is point to a difference, you haven't explained how that difference causes the effect I'm asking about. — Isaac
You are quite good at avoiding questions. I repeat: Are you denying the reality of your subjective feelings? — Olivier5
Consider that, if you cannot trust the reality of your feelings, you cannot trust the reality of your thinking either since thinking is in part feeling, sensing, etc. — Olivier5
If you cannot trust the reality of your thinking, you cannot trust science. — Olivier5
How come do you trust science so much if you don't trust thinking? — Olivier5
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