Fair warning - I can't quite make sense of what either of you are saying here so this post is in part a fishing exercise to clarify and may well end up more clearing up things you don't mean than responding to the thing you do mean.

The diagram is not in the system, it's an outside view. — Kenosha Kid

An outside view viewed by whom? Mww seemed to be talking about his own thought processes in both cases, so taking an 'outside' view of them would seem to be impossible - unless one relied on the view of third parties, but this seems no less available to cognitive science so that wouldn't amount to a distinction.

A system with an input and output can't have as its output a report on the system. If there's a bit of the system that measures the system, what is measuring it, etc. — Kenosha Kid

Indeed, but this seems to apply only to the totality of the system, which I didn't think was ever in question. If a system is made of subsystem A and subsystem A* (responsible for examining the workings of subsystem A) then 'the system' is examining itself. The fact that it's not examining the totality of itself doesn't remove from the fact that it is examining itself.

So, insofar as the discussion was about the advantages of a metaphysical vs a cognitive science approach, neither seem to be making the claim to have examined the totality of the system and so inability to do so doesn't seem relevant to the matter of each one's utility.

nothing wrong with a system examining the inner workings of a sample of almost identical systems. — Kenosha Kid

A separate point here, but perhaps one to get into when I've fully understood your objections - here's a really important feature of neurology called redundancy - you may have come across it - but it undermines the idea that there's specifically a neural circuit for this or that job, rather there are usually several. If what we're talking about is a simple inability of one subsystem to examine itself, then we've surmounted that objection already as there would almost certainly not be one subsystem doing the job of system-wide examination. There are already carbon copies of such systems available to their clones for examination.

Have the system report the map input :|--> output for all possible inputs. The resultant map is functionally identical to the system, but differently composed — Kenosha Kid

Again, in the context of an examination of the two approaches (metaphysics/cognitive science) this seems to be simply a de facto constraint on both. Any description we give will constitute a description not the thing it's describing.

examining the system, reporting on it, post hoc, is not the use of the system for its intended purpose. When thinking about something, in the common course of cognitive events, to ask myself how it is I’m thinking it, isn’t in that common course. I may inquire afterwards, in which case I would retrospect using the very same system by which the original thought occurred. Check out how a car drives, whether it drives properly or there’s something wrong with it, by driving it, right? Check out the fit of a shoe......ehhhh, you get the picture. — Mww

Not sure how this relates to the difference between cognitive science and metaphysics. Both are post hoc. In fact cognitive science has the slight edge here in that third parties can contribute some data here without their examination forming a part of the process (and so changing it). I'm not seeing how a metaphysical approach solves this problem.

In addition, part of the system is not in our awareness. Just as in the physical nature of brain mechanics, there is a gap between the sensing of a thing and the apprehension of it, that part in which the perception is transformed into material for the system. Much like we are not conscious of the transfer along nerves of the output of sensation and the input to the brain. — Mww

But we are conscious of the transfer along nerves of the output of sensation and the input to the brain, at least I am. I've seen it with my own eyes in both fMRI and EEG. I'm not conscious of it at the time, but I've no reason at all to believe that all the times I'm not in a machine capable of detecting such things my body works differently to the times when is is, that would be unreasonable skepticism.

The first box is the instantiation of it, the last is the culmination. — Mww

This seems to be making an arbitrary distinction. 'The System' in the context of our discussion is the mind and it's contents. If you are aware of the instantiation and you are aware of the culmination, then by definition both must be part of 'The System' because you have no other means by which you can be aware of either than your mind. You could rely on third party reports of either, but then with cognitive science we can rely on third party reports of the intervening activity too.

___

As I said, I'm not yet convinced I've understood the objection, so take the above as tentative.

Indeed, but this seems to apply only to the totality of the system, which I didn't think was ever in question. If a system is made of subsystem A and subsystem A* (responsible for examining the workings of subsystem A) then 'the system' is examining itself. The fact that it's not examining the totality of itself doesn't remove from the fact that it is examining itself. — Isaac

Yes, this is fine and, I think, more or less what the brain is doing anyway, right? I was just saying I got what Mww was talking about. And it is pertinent. For instance, System A* can report on at least some of System A but not itself, which seems to describe the mystery of the mind quite nicely. Pretty much everything we can point at is present and correct for animals with much smaller forebrains and likely not what we'd think of as conscious. We're aware that something more is going on with us but it's very difficult to put a finger on, hence the evasive vagaries of the language used ("what it is like" etc.).

Another possibility: you could have say a ring of subsystems each examining the system on the left. Every subsystem will be examined, but none has a picture of the whole, nor can you get any information out of it without introducing another subsystem which isn't being examined.

Anyway, I think what Mww is saying is that the brain can't report on its entire state, which is true. Bits of the brain can examine other bits, but the whole is made up of blind spots as much as insight.

A separate point here, but perhaps one to get into when I've fully understood your objections — Isaac

No objections dude, just weighing in. Didn't mean to confuse matters more.

We're aware that something more is going on with us but it's very difficult to put a finger on, hence the evasive vagaries of the language used ("what it is like" etc.). — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, I certainly see the issue. I don't subscribe to the difficulty myself though. I think something as simple as time passing is actually a far more complicated notion to get one's head round, yet the story we tell ourselves to manage it is simply accepted.

For me consciousness is simply an internal collation mechanism, all the justifications (reasoning, logic...), intentions, desires are just the stories we tell to bring a modicum of unity to what is otherwise a disconnected set of stimuli-response mechanisms. I don't doubt for a minute that most organisms complex enough to benefit from some collation have it.

What I don't wholy understand is why we have so much trouble reflecting on it.

Going back to time. As I understand it, my everyday concept of time passing would fall to pieces under any serious scrutiny, but we don't have so many interminable debates about how that is. I have a story about time which helps me muddle through, it's not terribly much like time really is, but then I wouldn't expect it to be, time's really super complicated and it'd be a nightmare to go about life with that in mind all the time.

Consciousness seems the same to me. It's extremely complex and nebulous, but there's nothing at all mysterious about it's being that way, it's exactly how I'd expect it to be. We have a lay understanding of it instead which suffices most of the time.

The philosophical 'puzzle' only arises when we expect that lay story to relate in some intrinsic way to what we actually find out in neuroscience and cognitive science. I mean, why would it, it's just a story.

Anyways... I realise now I've rambled way off topic with all that, but I'm not deleting it all now, you can have it.

Another possibility: you could have say a ring of subsystems each examining the system on the left. Every subsystem will be examined, but none has a picture of the whole, nor can you get any information out of it without introducing another subsystem which isn't being examined. — Kenosha Kid

More on topic this time.

What would be the case if part of the information each step received was the fact that it's neighbour had been studied by the step to it's left and will be studied by the step to it's right. That doesn't defy any self-study because this still all counts as information about the previous step. If also it were to learn that the previous step learnt this about the step before that... Then let's say one of the algorithms in a step was to make a Bayesian inference about where its data came from and went to... Would it not derive the exact system you described despite being a part of that system?

Me: The cause of my thought can only be a thought.
You: What makes you think this?
Me: Simple: I don’t know the cause of my thought. I know I start with this (something), I know I end up with that (“basketball”), but whatever happens in between, is part of the system itself, and can never be examined except by the very system of which it is a part.
You: You're saying that you know you start at 1 and end up at 9, but you can't examine the boxes inbetween using the system itself. But how can you know that without having at least taken a glance at the diagram - you must have 'examined' the system to some extent to even be able to report as much as you have.
Me: EXCEPT by using the system itself. Examining the system, reporting on it, post hoc, is not the use of the system for its intended purpose.
——————

Not sure how this relates to the difference between cognitive science and metaphysics. Both are post hoc. — Isaac

It doesn’t, insofar as they are both post hoc. Yours is post hoc from an external perspective, mine is post hoc from my own internal perspective.

In fact cognitive science has the slight edge here in that third parties can contribute some data here without their examination forming a part of the process — Isaac

Which is exactly the problem. I don’t want data contributed exactly because it isn’t part of the process. Metaphysics is not and never was a science, hence cannot be examined scientifically. The system can only examine itself, with itself.
—————

But we are conscious of the transfer along nerves of the output of sensation and the input to the brain, at least I am. I've seen it with my own eyes in both fMRI and EEG. — Isaac

Then you are only conscious of the the representation of the transfer, and infer the correspondence between them.
—————

I'm not conscious of it at the time, but I've no reason at all to believe that all the times I'm not in a machine capable of detecting such things my body works differently to the times when is is, that would be unreasonable skepticism. — Isaac

Correct, you’re not conscious of it at the time of it, but you are also not conscious of it merely because of its visual representation. Also correct, in that there is no reason to think the body works differently pursuant to different representations of it. The body works as it works, however that is.
—————-

The first box is the instantiation of it, the last is the culmination.
— Mww

This seems to be making an arbitrary distinction. — Isaac

It would be, if not for its logical necessity. It is indubitable that whatever is in our heads is not the same as whatever is in the world outside our heads. Doesn’t matter what is, only that what is here is distinct from what is there.
—————

The System' in the context of our discussion is the mind and it's contents. — Isaac

If you look back, you will find I don’t use the term “mind”. As far as I’m concerned, in the context of this discussion, all I need to talk about is the human cognitive system and its constituency, which cannot include mind. Even if we say the system is metaphysical, and “mind” is metaphysical, doesn’t mean they are the same thing.
(In the 700 pages of the CPR, mind is mentioned exactly four times, and then only as a general transcendental idea)

If you are aware of the instantiation and you are aware of the culmination, then by definition both must be part of 'The System' because you have no other means by which you can be aware of either than your mind. — Isaac

I disagree. I am aware of the external world simply from being affected by it. I don’t need mind to tell me there is something in my visual field. It is certain the reason makes mistakes, so it is irrational to suppose Mother Nature would require us to reason about whether or not we see something.

It is not the business of reason to tell me that there is something, but always and only to tell what the something is. Which also suffices for the distinction from another point of view, for that I am affected by a thing from its perception, is of a different time that being told what it is from the process of the cognitive system.

To be continued......Honey-Do time, doncha know.

Information is the only thing that fits in mind, so it is the only thing that can cause a thought ( The deeper question though is what causes the information to integrate?). — Pop

Which could be considered as just another iteration of what I’m talking about. If it is information responsible for causation and we still need to query the cause of the cause....we remain contending with that damnable infinite regress.
————-

This information must be interpreted. — Pop

Absolutely.

The mind is working with "raw information" — Pop

Common consensus, yes. Pretty much given something is working with the information. One camp says brain works with it, the other camp says mind works with it.

As it ever was......

The diagram is not in the system, it's an outside view.
— Kenosha Kid

An outside view viewed by whom? — Isaac

Not an outside view, but an inside view at a different time. Guy goes about his business. Guy makes a mistake; guy does a good thing; guy does this; guy does that, all day, every day for his whole conscious life, all under the direct supervision of the system.

Something a guy might do, is ask about the mistake; ask about the good thing; ask about this; ask about that. It’s called reflection. Who’s he gonna ask, for certain answers that is, but himself? What’s he gonna ask, but the system. How’s he gonna ask, but with the system. Only the system can ask and answer, because the system did, what the system’s asking about.

Silly as that seems, it is in fact what we do all the time. Happens so fast we don’t notice, and is so common as to be unnoticeable most of the time, but once in awhile, we are forced by some relative severity, to actually think about something we did. Didn’t do. Said or didn’t say. Thought or didn’t think.

Not that hard to imagine, that given sufficient methodological reduction from some undeniable reality, we can actually arrive at some example or other, that represents our cognitive system, such that all the above is explained. Explained but not proven.

And the rest, as they say....is history.

The philosophical 'puzzle' only arises when we expect that lay story to relate in some intrinsic way to what we actually find out in neuroscience and cognitive science. I mean, why would it, it's just a story. — Isaac

Yes, I completely agree with this but it also makes me think we're speaking at cross purposes. You're talking about some rationalisation of our experiences, I think, either some innate compulsion to narrate (which I believe in, perhaps not as a compulsion but a function) or some conscious rationalisation along those lines.

I was talking more about what precedes that: System A*'s lack of knowledge about itself or the causes of System A's outputs. Yes, it's undoubtedly a cause of rationalisations, of narrative-building, but the absence of information (expressed by those you disapprove of as the immediacy of qualia) are examinable. What we don't know about our phenomenology invites either curiosity or rationalisation.

I am drunk again. We were supposed to be going to see Derren Brown tonight. My girlfriend bought me the tickets for my birthday last year but it was cancelled due to Covid. She got etickets a few months back for a replacement, tonight she said. So I booked a table for food and cocktails before the show. Turned out, it's this date next year.

Well played, Derren. Well played.

Anyway, my response will have to wait til tomorrow as we had nothing to do but drink more cocktails.

Which could be considered as just another iteration of what I’m talking about. If it is information responsible for causation and we still need to query the cause of the cause....we remain contending with that damnable infinite regress. — Mww

No. Information does not just simply reside in your mind. There is an information flow between things - connecting and relating them. We are an evolving process of self organization - evolving in relation to the information ( people, society, things , everything ) surrounding us.

This energetic and vibratory information of the outside world is constantly acting upon us. We are constantly swamped by it ( information ) . We must interpret it, in order to navigate it , and self organize. — Pop

Wikipedia: "The English word "Information" apparently derives from the Latin stem (information-) of the nominative (informatio): this noun derives from the verb īnfōrmāre (to inform) in the sense of "to give form to the mind", "to discipline", "instruct", "teach". Inform itself comes (via French informer) from the Latin verb īnfōrmāre, which means to give form, or to form an idea of. "

What I don't wholy understand is why we have so much trouble reflecting on it. — Isaac

Science happens in the mind. This may be why science finds it difficult to look at the mind, or even to conceive of it. The eye cannot see itself.

It doesn’t, insofar as they are both post hoc. Yours is post hoc from an external perspective, mine is post hoc from my own internal perspective. — Mww

Understood.

Which is exactly the problem. I don’t want data contributed exactly because it isn’t part of the process. — Mww

Why would it matter? We've just established the investigation is post hoc, so externally derived data about it isn't going to disrupt the process we're investigating, that's already happened and we're simply gathering data about it. Memory is one source, fMRI scan might be another.

Metaphysics is not and never was a science, hence cannot be examined scientifically. — Mww

Not seeing the link. Something's not being a science doesn't seem to me to have any bearing on whether science can investigate it. Sports aren't themselves a science either, but science investigates them.

Then you are only conscious of the the representation of the transfer, and infer the correspondence between them. — Mww

True, good spot. True also of your thoughts though. As we've established, your investigation of them is post hoc. So you're being delivered a representation of what went on, not what actually went on.

It is indubitable that whatever is in our heads is not the same as whatever is in the world outside our heads. Doesn’t matter what is, only that what is here is distinct from what is there. — Mww

True, but that gives you the existence of box 1. It does not give you that it is connected to a chain of boxes which ultimately lead to box 9. It's logically, equally possible that there is merely box 1 and box 9 and no connecting boxes at all. To conceive a connection you must, in some way, have examined 'the system' because it is only via the system that they are connected at all.

If you look back, you will find I don’t use the term “mind”. As far as I’m concerned, in the context of this discussion, all I need to talk about is the human cognitive system and its constituency, which cannot include mind. Even if we say the system is metaphysical, and “mind” is metaphysical, doesn’t mean they are the same thing. — Mww

I read this the requisite three times...still nothing I'm afraid. Any chance of a re-phrasing?

I am aware of the external world simply from being affected by it. — Mww

If I knocked you unconscious and then shaved your eyebrows off you would have been affected by the outside world but not aware of it. It doesn't follow that you are aware of all that you are affected by. So it isn't 'simply'. Some intervening factor must be involved to distinguish the eyebrow removal whilst conscious from the same even whilst unconscious.

I don’t need mind to tell me there is something in my visual field. — Mww

You absolutely do. Absent of a mind all you have is a chaos of staccato signals, which tell you nothing, not even if there's something. The mind even has to contend with 'noise' (random neurotransmitter release, axon channel leakage...). We can't even tell the difference between external sources and internal sources of signalling without a mind to do some speculation and hypothesis testing.

Honey-Do time, doncha know. — Mww

I'm not sure I want to know, but curiosity won...What is "Honey-Do time"?

Not that hard to imagine, that given sufficient methodological reduction from some undeniable reality, we can actually arrive at some example or other, that represents our cognitive system, such that all the above is explained. Explained but not proven. — Mww

Yep. The only difference then between this metaphysics and cognitive science seems to be that that we make the assumption all this happens in a brain (a good assumption, I think). Once that assumption is made then "my V4 region fired when I looked at that chair" becomes no less a piece of the puzzle to reflect on than "I thought of my old schoolmaster when I looked at that chair". Having established the link between the mind and the brain, all activity in that system (thoughts and signals) becomes a piece of the puzzle. There's no reason I can think of to rule out one source of data.

Science happens in the mind. This may be why science finds it difficult to look at the mind, or even to conceive of it. The eye cannot see itself. — Olivier5

But my eye can see your eye and vice versa. Then we come to the astonishing discovery that we can see and study eyes.

Yes, I completely agree with this but it also makes me think we're speaking at cross purposes. — Kenosha Kid

Probably.

I was talking more about what precedes that: System A*'s lack of knowledge about itself or the causes of System A's outputs. Yes, it's undoubtedly a cause of rationalisations, of narrative-building, but the absence of information (expressed by those you disapprove of as the immediacy of qualia) are examinable. What we don't know about our phenomenology invites either curiosity or rationalisation. — Kenosha Kid

OK, I can see that, but see my next post, I think there's stuff system A* can infer about system A, including it's own role.

We were supposed to be going to see Derren Brown tonight. My girlfriend bought me the tickets for my birthday last year but it was cancelled due to Covid. — Kenosha Kid

Or was it...?

Turned out, it's this date next year. — Kenosha Kid

Or, will you get home and find it's already this time next year...?

I'm still waiting for Derren to come on the radio and demonstrate that the whole of the last few years has been a massive trick. "Did you all really believe that Donald Trump could become president of the US and then preside over a viral pandemic that's straight out the plot of at least six post apocalypse films?... Even I thought I'd gone too far on this one..."

It was a metaphor... :groan:

The eye cannot see itself. — Olivier5

But my eye can see your eye and vice versa. Then we come to the astonishing discovery that we can study eyes. — khaled

Exactly. I was going to say use a mirror, but the point is the same.

It was a metaphor... :groan: — Olivier5

Then you begged the question.

Not at all. A metaphor is simply an illustration, a comparison. It is not to be taken literally.

Do I really need to explain such ultra basic literary notions? What's wrong with you brains?

I was going to say use a mirror, but the point is the same. — Isaac

I didn't mean to say that it is absolutely impossible for the mind to see the mind, just that it was difficult for some minds to see themselves. (You are a case in point.) And this poor reflexivity in my view accounts for the difficulty of science to study and understand the mind.

Not at all. A metaphor is simply an illustration, a comparison. It is not to be taken literally.

Do I really need to explain such ultra basic literary notions? What's wrong with you brains? — Olivier5

Nothing in that prevents it from begging the question. The likening of the mind to the eye in your metaphor, without @khaled's objection, only works if you already assume that the mind is something that cannot examine itself. Hence all you've said it that you think the mind cannot examine itself. We knew that. We're trying here to present arguments either way, not just remind everyone what our current beliefs are.

Hence all you've said it that you think the mind cannot examine itself. We knew that. — Isaac

You asked a question: why is the mind so hard to understand, and I answered you. Now you say that you are in agreement with my answer. But that makes you angry somehow.

See my caveat in the post above: it is not totally impossible for the mind to understand itself in my view, just hard to do. A prerequisite, I would think, is for the mind to acknowledge itself...

You asked a question: why is the mind so hard to understand, and I answered you. Now you say that you are in agreement with my answer. — Olivier5

No, mistaken on both counts I'm afraid, my fault. I did not ask "why is the mind so difficult to understand?" I asked why we find it so hard to accept that our subjective feeling of it might be different from the reality of it.

And I did not agree with you that the mind cannot examine itself, I said we all already knew that you thought that.

Sorry for not having been clearer on both fronts.

A prerequisite, I would think, is for the mind to acknowledge itself... — Olivier5

I don't think anyone denies this.

A.

I don't think anyone denies this. — Isaac

You'd be surprised.

B.

I asked why we find it so hard to accept that our subjective feeling of it might be different from the reality of it. — Isaac

Are you denying the reality of your subjective feelings? See point A above.

I asked why we find it so hard to accept that our subjective feeling of it might be different from the reality of it. — Isaac

How could the reality of the subjective feeling be anything other than the reality of the subjective feeling?

'I feel sick, Doctor!'

'Oh no you don't, you're just being tricked by your stomach!'

I don't think anyone denies this. — Isaac


You'd be surprised. — Olivier5

Examples?

Are you denying the reality of your subjective feelings? See point A above. — Olivier5

Why would I be?

I have a subjective feeling the earth is a flat plane which goes on forever. Scientists tell me it's round. Great, now we can navigate.

I have a subjective feeling the table is made of solid matter. Scientists tell me it's actually all quantum goings on and wot not (I believe I've got I got the technical terms correct there @Kenosha Kid?). Great, now we can quantum compute.

I have a subjective feeling my consciousness is really special, consistent and impenetrable to investigation. Scientists tell me it's actually just neurons firing. All hell breaks loose.

That's the matter I find interesting.

How could the reality of the subjective feeling be anything other than the reality of the subjective feeling? — Wayfarer

See above. That things are sometimes not as they seem to be is taken as a matter of course these days in all fields of science... Why would your mind be any different? Why is it immune from turning out to be other than it first seems?

Why would your mind be any different? Why is it immune from turning out to be other than it first seems? — Isaac

All the things you mention are objects. You have an I-it relationship to them.

You are quite good at avoiding questions. I repeat: Are you denying the reality of your subjective feelings? Yes or no?

Consider that, if you cannot trust the reality of your feelings, you cannot trust the reality of your thinking either since thinking is in part feeling, sensing, etc. If you cannot trust the reality of your thinking, you cannot trust science.

So I have a new question for you: Is science more than just neurons firing?

All the things you mention are objects. You have an I-it relationship to them. — Wayfarer

Yes... and? I'm not seeing that as a compelling reason why they can turn out to be other than they seem but my mind can't. All you've done thus far is point to a difference, you haven't explained how that difference causes the effect I'm asking about.

I'm not seeing that as a compelling reason why they can turn out to be other than they seem but my mind can't. All you've done thus far is point to a difference, you haven't explained how that difference causes the effect I'm asking about. — Isaac

In what sense does one know one's own experience, your innate sense of being conscious and paying attention. You can't say 'oh, there it is, what is that, I will go and look at it.' It's not an object of cognition, but is part of the subject of experience.

When you have a thought, an experience, a sensation, this doesn't occur to you as an object, obviously. If a rock hits you, then the rock is an object, but the pain it causes you is not an object. Isn't that obvious? Is that something that has to be explained? And you can't say 'well, that pain I feel is actually not pain, it's really the firing of c-fibres.' Let someone fasten a paperclip to your earlobe and have you say that. Pain is irredemiably first-person. You can't see pain, or weigh it or measure it, only feel it, and only you know how bad that pain is. It's not an objectively real but it's nonetheless real.

You are quite good at avoiding questions. I repeat: Are you denying the reality of your subjective feelings? — Olivier5

That they exist? No. That they give me an accurate model of reality? Yes. I see no reason at all to believe that prima facie.

Consider that, if you cannot trust the reality of your feelings, you cannot trust the reality of your thinking either since thinking is in part feeling, sensing, etc. — Olivier5

Yes, that's right.

If you cannot trust the reality of your thinking, you cannot trust science. — Olivier5

Indeed.

How come do you trust science so much if you don't trust thinking? — Olivier5

Because it's got a methodology that produces some reliably useful models. I'm not getting the point you're trying to make. There's a difference between trusting a feeling prima facie and continuing to trust it in the light of other feelings to the contrary. You seem to assume it's either all or nothing.

T1 - I have some feeling about how my mind works.

T2 - I do some science (or read some). I now have some new feelings about how my mind works which seem to tie in better to other feelings I have about the world.

T3 - I now have a new feeling about how my mind works.

I trust science because it generally delivers better 'tie ins' at T2 than other methods. The process seems painfully simple to me, I'm baffled as to why it causes such consternation.