Motive questioning again...

So when people do not respond to your post, they are at fault — Olivier5

Never mentioned 'fault', nor did I say anything about failure to respond to posts either. I don't know what this wierd line of enquiry of yours is headed toward, but it's becoming increasingly detached from anything actually being said.

no one has said that the concept of pain is painful. — Isaac

When you have a thought, an experience, a sensation, this doesn't occur to you as an object, obviously. If a rock hits you, then the rock is an object, but the pain it causes you is not an object. Isn't that obvious?
— Wayfarer

Not at all. I can model the pain as an activity in neural circuits. It's seems quite clearly like an object to me. — Isaac

No one has said anything like "cameras are beings" — Isaac

the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects.
— Wayfarer

This is also true of a camera taking film. — Isaac

If you don't understand the counter-arguments you're presented with, you can just seek clarity, you don't have to just throw in the towel. — Isaac

Never mentioned 'fault', — Isaac

You implied that other people's criteria for not responding to your post may not be as rational as your criteria to not respond to their post. I am just amused at your lack of self-awareness.

You implied that other people's criteria for not responding to your post may not be as rational as your criteria to not respond to their post. — Olivier5

I didn't once make an assertion about what was actually the case regarding rationality of people's criteria. I said quite clearly and deliberately that it seemed that way to me. In fact I made a point of saying that I assumed it would all make sense to Wayfarer, and when you directly asked me if mine was an assumption I answered "of course". I really can't fathom how you've gleaned from all that the idea the I've condemned Wayfarer's approach as irrational and that's an end to it. Were that the case I would have nothing to ask would I?

You're obfuscating a very real, and very fundamental, distinction in philosophy, in fact even in ordinary discourse, between objects, objectivism, objective view, and subjects, subjects of experience, beings. But then, this is a consequence of your philosophical view, which has conditioned you to ignore this distinction. — Wayfarer

I completely recognize the object-subject distinction, I just don't think it's a distinction between kinds of stuff but rather roles in an interaction. But more to the point, I just find your use of the words "existence" vs "being" to mean about the same as "object" vs "subject" to be idiosyncratic and not in keeping with the usual way those words are used in philosophy.

If Elon Musk does succeed in going to Mars, would he expect to find anything there answering to the description of 'a being'? — Wayfarer

Yes; though I do recognize that in colloquial (non-philosophical) usage in that context it might be taken to mean "creature", a living thing, probably an animal, even an intelligent human-like one perhaps, in which case no. But we're talking philosophy here, not colloquialisms.

The other point you haven't addressed is the dualism of symbols on the one hand, and physical matter, on the other. — Wayfarer

That was the main thing I was addressing in the post that mentioned your odd use of "being", which I guess distracted you from the rest:

That's the distinction between form and substance. The question at hand is whether there are irreconcilably different kinds of substances (i.e. stuff that's not just a different form of some other stuff), or at least irreconcilably different kinds of properties of those substances; not a question of whether there's a difference between something having a form (or function, as above) and being made of a certain kind of stuff. — Pfhorrest

I really can't fathom how you've gleaned from all that the idea the I've condemned Wayfarer's approach as irrational and that's an end to it. — Isaac

Well, don't fathom it then. You can't understand everything, and this is a tangent anyway.

Then it's not about dualism in the usual philosophical sense under discussion here. — Pfhorrest

There are many different uses of the term.

What is the difference between the map and the territory, in your opinion?

you can't repair a human being — Wayfarer

No one was prepared for a denial of the advent of medicine. Curveball!

I just find your use of the words "existence" vs "being" to mean about the same as "object" vs "subject" to be idiosyncratic and not in keeping with the usual way those words are used in philosophy. — Pfhorrest

If philosophy uses words differently than the every-day use of the words, is philosophy talking about a different world than everyone else when they use those words? If philosphy is an attempt to explain the world and our relationship in it, you would think that we would all be using the same words in the same way - philosophically or not.

Devices and beings are ontologically distinct. — Wayfarer

Rather, that is the point in question.

You don't murder a camera, and you can't repair a human being. — Wayfarer

You don't throw a magnetic field. And you don't measure the intensity and direction of a rock. Does that make rocks and magnetic fields ontologically distinct?

What I'm saying that we don't see is the way in which the mind, the subject, constructs or creates what we understand as the real world. We constantly interpret what we see to make our worldview. Heck even neuroscientists see that, although they don't always grasp the philosophical implications. — Wayfarer

And everyone agrees.

What they don't agree with is going from that to saying that the mind is ontologically distinct. It doesn't logically follow.

The other point you haven't addressed is the dualism of symbols on the one hand, and physical matter, on the other. — Wayfarer

Even if one admits such a dualism it wouldn't make one a substance dualist. Because symbols are not a substance, or they don't need to be.

A triangle doesn't exist in the same way a rock does. The triangle, is the expression of a certain structure. It is not a new substance. One could propose a "mental substance" that the triangle is made of but again I ask: Why would one need to do that? It doesn't seem to bring any advantages, and brings plenty of problems.

There's a pattern here, isn't there? — Wayfarer

The pattern is willful, petulant misunderstanding.

The pattern is willful, petulant misunderstanding. — Olivier5

That sounds like you're assigning a motive...

The motive remains a mystery but the behavior is consistant.

You see how this "debate" is once again descending into a farce.

180 at the moment is incapable of debating anything.

Leaving aside his overemotional anxiety and his ad hom,the man doesn't want to address points without strawmanning nor clarify what he's saying.

Which is much needed because his writing "style" and manner of explaining is terrible.

Same thing he did with 3017amen. The man is too gun shy to fully engage.

Put hanover in with someone decent please!

I think it's getting a bit better. It's a shame Hanover picked substance dualism to defend as it's an awfully easy target. Not that 180's done a very good job of tackling it. The simple question "What's your solution to the interaction problem?" could have saved a few pages.

I was actually just thinking how much I'd like to see 180 debating something serious with someone serious. Two magic-stuff-is-real debates with people unable or unwilling to defend the proposition they've volunteered to defend until they've seen 180's attack of the same, descending into "well, define it and then I know what I'm defending" pointlessness. *shrug*

@bert1
It was,until the last couple of posts.

Yep,I agree with the rest of your post.

I completely recognize the object-subject distinction, I just don't think it's a distinction between kinds of stuff but rather roles in an interaction. — Pfhorrest

:up:

@Kenosha Kid

See,if you debate and you think the other sides point is magic or woo,then what's the point of a real discussion?

Its then a polemic and with bad debaters it gets all hair splitting and crappy,and goes nowhere.

Hanover at least has some emotional stability and tries to be charitable.

180 is just awful.

See,if you debate and you think the other sides point is magic or woo,then what's the point of a real discussion? — Protagoras

For the other side to try and convince you otherwise. That's a debate.

@Kenosha Kid

How many debates have you seen where someone's mind was changed?

And to be a decent debate there should be a bit of charity and understanding.

This ain't a mgregor porier press conference!

How many debates have you seen where someone's mind was changed? — Protagoras

That's not the point. The point is to try, and let the observers make their conclusions.

And to be a decent debate there should be a bit of charity and understanding. — Protagoras

Bullshit!

Hanover uses a semantic distinction in place of an ontological one: physical means natural and therefore non-physical means supernatural. In place of supernatural we could substitute unnatural and therefore mind and thought are unnatural.

It is not an abstract 'subject' that sees things, but some particular thing that sees things. While it is true that it does not see itself seeing, it does not follow that it stands outside of the world of things as the early Wittgenstein had it, or that seeing is not a physical process that some physical things are capable of.

There is a fundamental distinction between a house that is the object of thought and a house I can live in, but both are things made, both the result of human activity. The "thinking thing" is not some part of me, the thinking thing is me.

@Kenosha Kid

It is the point. The fact you can't name debates where one side changed is instructive on the mindset of the debates.

All this supposed follow the data,claiming open mindedness and being "logical" is mainly disingenuous posturing.

And bullshit to you as Well punchy!

What is the difference between the map and the territory, in your opinion? — Olivier5

A map is a compressed copy of the territory: a map stores information about the territory in a smaller amount of space. This can be literally smaller physical space, as in a paper map of a geographic territory, or it can be informational space, as in compressing a file on a computer. In either case the compression can be either lossy, saving space by leaving out irrelevant details, or lossless, saving space by identifying patterns in the underlying territory and representing instances of those patterns symbolically rather than actually repeating the same information over and over again.

If philosophy uses words differently than the every-day use of the words, is philosophy talking about a different world than everyone else when they use those words? — Harry Hindu

No, just using a slightly different language, a different dialect if you will.

If philosphy is an attempt to explain the world and our relationship in it, you would think that we would all be using the same words in the same way - philosophically or not. — Harry Hindu

It's not at all unusual for different subsets of a linguistic community to develop slight differences in their use of language. While I can easily think of some exceptions to this, I would suspect that philosophical language usage is typically more conservative, sticking to the older uses of words, while colloquial usage changes more over time due to the accumulation of errors and misunderstandings by less-educated laypeople.

I completely recognize the object-subject distinction, I just don't think it's a distinction between kinds of stuff but rather roles in an interaction — Pfhorrest

Roles are performed by actors. You wouldn’t describe the interaction between minerals in those terms. You use the word ‘stuff’ as in ‘all the same stuff’ so indiscriminately as to be meaningless. The point about the dualism implied by signs and symbols, is that it comprises the relationship between signs, not the relationship between objects or any kind of 'stuff'.

You wouldn’t describe the interaction between minerals in those terms. — Wayfarer

In chemistry we do that all the time: whether something is an acid or base, for instance, is defined by its role in an interaction with another substance.

The point about the dualism implied by signs and symbols, is that it comprises the relationship between signs, not the relationship between objects or any kind of 'stuff'. — Wayfarer

Then it's not dualism in the sense under discussion here, and conflating it with that sense only causes unnecessary confusion.

How do you define "physical substance" and "non-physical substance"?
— Hanover

Nature and imagined, respectively.
— 180 Proof

Phenomena, nature, is 'what appears' - but what appears is always subject to judgement and interpretation. That is what 'apperception' is. And those acts do not inhere in nature, but in the observing mind.

In chemistry we do that all the time: whether something is an acid or base, for instance, is defined by its role in an interaction with another substance. — Pfhorrest

And none of that requires, or involves, the 'roles' of 'subject and object'. Roles require actors, and chemical substances are not actors - well, not unless you want to argue for panpsychism.

The point about the dualism implied by signs and symbols, is that it comprises the relationship between signs, not the relationship between objects or any kind of 'stuff'.
— Wayfarer

Then it's not dualism in the sense under discussion here, and conflating it with that sense only causes unnecessary confusion. — Pfhorrest

I'm not the one who is confused. Reifying 'substance' as 'stuff', as 'something that exists', as 'mind stuff', or whatever is the problem. There is no 'mind-stuff' as an objective fact - 'mind' is 'what interprets'. But you can't stand outside that, as whatever you think is always the product of it. So not being able to do that, we then externalise it, look for it as something objective, and then ask 'well, where is it?' But it's nowhere to be found. You have to 'turn the eye around' and look at what is looking.

So that quotation from Howard Pattee about the relationship of the symbolic and the physical is much nearer to actual dualism than what is being discussed, which is predicated on the self-contradictory notion of 'mental stuff'. That's where the confusion lies.

How anthropomorphic of you. Quarks, for instance, do not "appear". More than 99% of nature is very much not "what appears". Stop confusing yourself.