And none of that requires, or involves, the 'roles' of 'subject and object'. Roles require actors, and chemical substances are not actors - well, not unless you want to argue for panpsychism. — Wayfarer

I didn't say that those were the roles of subject and object specifically, but they are nevertheless roles in an interaction, in the usual way that chemists talk about that.

I do argue for panpsychism in any case, but that's not the point here.

Time, please.

FInal arguments, folks

Mine, already given.

a map stores information about the territory in a smaller amount of space. — Pfhorrest

Yes, a map is a symbolic and simplified representation of a territory, made for a certain purpose e.g. facilitating the analysis of, or navigation within the territory.

So the map is made for a specific objective, a certain type of use, a teleology. It implies a goal, or several goals.

These goals drive the kind of simplification applied when building the map. The features of the territory that have no import for the goal are not represented. For instance, roads maps -- designed to facilitate road travel and transportation -- typically do not represent vegetation cover or elevation.

Without such simplification the map would be useless, or more precisely, it would have no advantage compared to the territory. It would also be impossible to build.

Finally, the map is static while the territory is dynamic. The map represents a state of the territory at time t. There are exceptions to this, eg chronograms that map space-time. But the chronogram itself is drawn at time t.

In the case of man-made maps or the regular kind, the map is given some stable material support e.g. written down on paper. What is written down is a symbolic, mind-derived map, a mental map. All man-made maps are mental maps, originally.

Therefore the relationship between map and territory is not symetrical. The "roles" cannot be reversed. There is an fundamental epistemic cut between them. If we were to explore a new planet, and found a map carved on some stone of the nearby terrain, we would conclude that a conscious being carved it.

Now, where does that lead us re. Dualism vs. Monism?

The mind itself can be seen as a geographer, drawing upon a collection of mental maps, constantly updated. Since there is no form without matter, even mental maps (mental symbolic representations of the world) must be coded onto some physical support.

It stands to reason that they are written down on neurons.

This is a dualist perspective in the sense that mental events are recorded onto neurons (and from neurons onto paper or other material support) for later recalling into the mental world. It's mind over matter.

Now my challenge to you is to make sense of the map-territory relationship in monist language.

Now my challenge to you is to make sense of the map-territory relationship in monist language. — Olivier5

You've seen an actual map, right? Is it a different kind of stuff than paper and ink combined?

The mind itself can be seen as a geographer, drawing upon a collection of mental maps, constantly updated. — Olivier5

Or a cartographer rather, yes. Good analogy. We make actual mental maps to navigate. These are models of geography, one of many kinds of models of the world made by the brain which we can think of as maps of a kind (a map of how to behave, for instance).

As you say:

It stands to reason that they are written down on neurons. — Olivier5

so the map itself isn't a different kind of stuff.

One map can be written down on many sheets of paper though. There can be several printed copies of the same book, or map

But each page is made of the same kind of stuff. There's no ontological distinction between maps of Italy and maps of France. Every mental map, however many different ones there are, are made of the same kind of neurons.

This is just form and substance again. Nobody is denying that there is a difference between those. The disagreement is about whether there’s more than one kind of substance. (Or property thereof).

Property
"In logic and philosophy (especially metaphysics), a property is a characteristic of an object; a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties."

Let us take a few classic properties of geographic maps such as scale; projection type; purpose of the map, which drives the simplification process as explained; date of issue and author; place or thing represented.

What's the scale of a rabbit?

What's the purpose of a comet?

What's the projection type of a tomato?

What's the date of issue and the author of a stone?

What does a star represent?

What is the gender of a table?

Physical things have different properties than other physical things, but they’re still all physical properties, so pointing out properties that some things have and others don’t doesn’t establish the need for ontologically different kinds of properties.

:up:

FInal arguments, folks — Banno

They're still debating?

It stands to reason that they are written down on neurons. — Olivier5

You should have a glance at this.

So brains are works in constant progress.

What is the gender of a table? — Pfhorrest

Neutral in English, feminine in French.

Physical things have different properties than other physical things, but they’re still all physical properties, so pointing out properties that some things have and others don’t doesn’t establish the need for ontologically different kinds of properties. — Pfhorrest

To me, things that are representations of other things (such as maps) have certain properties that relate to their representation aspect, such as scale, which is the ratio (relation) between two things: the size of objects on the map divided by their size in the territory (supposed constant in geographic maps). Things that are NOT representations of other things do not have these properties. What is the materiality of such a thing as the scale of a map?

Beside, a map can be printed on many copies, each of which is a different material thing, but the map itself is one. It's the same map on all copies. A map can be translated into another language, and it will look differently on paper but essentially it remains the same map. So the map is more abstract a form than just the paper form on which it is printed. This abstraction of maps vis-à-vis both the territory and the map's physical support is very difficult to think in a monist logic.

Physical things have different properties than other physical things, but they’re still all physical properties — Pfhorrest

Then what use is the term, "physical" if it doesn't distinguish from something else?

so pointing out properties that some things have and others don’t doesn’t establish the need for ontologically different kinds of properties. — Pfhorrest

Well, that all depends on how we define, "property".

It stands to reason that they are written down on neurons. — Olivier5


You should have a glance at this. — Wayfarer

In what way do you think representational drift makes any difference to the robustness of the conclusion that representations are written down on neurons?

Beside, a map can be printed on many copies, each of which is a different material thing, but the map itself is one. It's the same map on all copies. — Olivier5

Only if you beg the question already. The map of my local area in my car is not the same map as the map of my local area on my bookcase. There are differences at the microscopic level even to the arrangement of the symbols. It's only 'the same' because we take the expression 'the same' in common language to mean similar enough for our purposes. Here the purpose is to navigate my local area. It's no different to saying two people have the same hairstyle. We're not saying they literally have every single hair in the same place, just similar enough for our purposes.

So all you have in identifying some unifying theme which is constant between two maps of the same area is a linguistic convention, not an ontological distinction. If it were an ontological distinction it would not be possible for me to claim they were not the same, by pointing out microscopic differences. If I do so, you'd have to say "those differences are not enough", which is a subjective judgement about purposes, not an objective one about what kinds of thing exist and of what substance.

Isn’t ‘writing’ itself a form of representation? It has to be metaphor, right? Secondly, that article shows that even for simple stimulus and response, there’s no 1:1 correlation between particular regions of the mouse brain and the response to the stimulus.

The neurons that represented the smell of an apple in May and those that represented the same smell in June were as different from each other as those that represent the smells of apples and grass at any one time.

So I am questioning the idea that neurons ‘represent’ ideas or that ‘ideas’ are ‘written’ on them. There’s something like a mixed metaphor at work here. ‘Writing’ is of course a form of symbolic communication, whereas whatever is conducted between brain cells comprises the exchange of ions and so on. Those don’t directly represent anything, rather, the brain seems to be able to respond with great flexibility while still maintaining the same content.

that article shows that even for simple stimulus and response, there’s no 1:1 correlation between particular regions of the mouse brain and the response to the stimulus. — Wayfarer

How does this conclusion lead you to...

questioning the idea that neurons ‘represent’ ideas or that ‘ideas’ are ‘written’ on them. — Wayfarer

Ideas may be written on paper too, no? If I copy the idea from one page and then destroy the original, have I not preserved the idea? If such a process were carried out a thousand time by robots, the human reading it after the thousandth iteration would be reading the same idea. If the idea were not represented on paper and preserved through the process described, then how could the human reading it gain the idea?

It's no different to saying two people have the same hairstyle. We're not saying they literally have every single hair in the same place, just similar enough for our purposes. — Isaac

Not really. It's the same map IFF it represents the same thing the same way, e.g. at the same scale, projection, and was authored by the same person at the same time.

It's the same map IFF it represents the same thing the same way, e.g. at the same scale, projection, and was authored by the same person at the same time. — Olivier5

So no two maps are the same then?

Huh? Not at all. It's like a poem. Poems exist. They can be copied on many different support, but they are still the same poem. Two copies of the same map are two copies OF THE SAME MAP.

Ideas may be written on paper too, no? If I copy the idea from one page and then destroy the original, have I not preserved the idea? — Isaac

Right, but what is preserved is an idea, information, a story. It can be represented in a variety of media and many different languages or systems, including binary code. But the idea stays the same, while the material form is different - which I think is an argument in favour of dualism.

but what is preserved is an idea, information, a story. It can be represented in a variety of media and many different languages or systems, including binary code. But the idea stays the same — Wayfarer

See my comment to Oliver above. The idea does not stay the same, only similar enough for our purposes, so there's no unity requiring a separate existence, only a façon de parler.

I am questioning the idea that neurons ‘represent’ ideas or that ‘ideas’ are ‘written’ on them. There’s something like a mixed metaphor at work here. ‘ — Wayfarer

Ideas must be written down on something to exist, and to have any effect on things. An idea written nowhere, not even in some dude's memory, is not presently in existence or in any way active in this present world.

If your article is correct, which it probably is (and brain plasticity in general is well established), it follows that ideas exist in some 'mental space', and that they are written down on neurons but not written forever, only they are written and rewritten and rewritten, always slightly differently, and (maybe) our ideas evolve as a result of this constant rewriting.

I can assure you that if you present me with the same smell every day for a month, at first I may think :yum: and at the end :vomit:

An image of our brain:

If your article is correct, which it probably is (and brain plasticity in general is well established), it follows that ideas exist in some 'mental space', and that they are written down on neurons but not written forever, only they are written and rewritten and rewritten, always slightly differently, and (maybe) our ideas evolve as a result of this constant rewriting. — Olivier5

It's not just the act of "writing", but also recalling. From where do we recall our ideas/memories? Our memories are not composed of neurons, but colors, shapes, sounds and feelings. When you recall the visual of a neuron, is not the neuron composed of shapes and colors? So which is more fundamental - neurons or shapes and colors? And are not shapes and colors a type of information?

In what way is that a reply to the argument raised? I still see 7 names similar enough for me to pronounce them the same and bring the same city to mind on reading them. Similar enough for our purposes, but not the same entity.

@Hanover said:

I cannot unravel a true logical contradiction as it’s been phrased and it’s why the interaction problem remains unsolved for many hundred years. The way out of a definitional contradiction necessarily involves clarification of definitions.

If the distinction is made between physical and mental substances then the interaction problem must be confronted. Has Hanover solved the problem by clarifying definitions?