Here's the thing: continuing on in this belligerent irrational way will only render your posts here irrelevant. Folk will increasingly ignore you. As it stands, very few of the top posters bother to reply to you. Your posts are taken up by new members, who entertain you only until they realise your foibles. It's not a winning strategy. — Banno
...the necessary God cannot be dependent on being made true by existence. — TheWillowOfDarkness
So there are no possible worlds in which god does not exist. True by definition of necessary being.. There is no counterfactual or other possiblity to the necessary God. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Seems something like that if god existed his being would be dependent on the existence of other things. I gather this would be in contradiction of what was said above, that "A necessary being exists regardless of whatever else exists".For the the necessary God to exist would deny God's very necessary, as it would mean God's presence would have to be made true by existing (as opposed to not). — TheWillowOfDarkness
Like I say, you haven't got an argument. — Bartricks
I have demonstrated that the view that for some proposition A, A is both true and false, is a consequence of your view that the law of noncontradiction does not apply in some possible worlds. Reject noncontradiction in any possible world, and you reject it for every possible world. — Banno
God is so powerful it can do a contradiction. — Gregory
You don’t think logic describes anything about the way you things work? — DingoJones
Once again, if something is 'contingently' true then there us a possible world in which it is false. — Bartricks
That contradiction implies that anything can be true, not just in that possible world but in any possible world. The Principle of Explosion is not restricted to just that one possible world.
Hence if contradictions can occur in any possible world, they can occur in every possible world. — Banno
Allowing for the sake of argument that the law of non-contradiction is only, contingently, not necessarily, true in this world, the fact that it is possible that contradictions might be true in other worlds does not entail that they must be capable of being be true in this world. — Janus
Putting it more formally, (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. Indeed, it is the very definition of what it is to be an impossible world. — Banno
Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be true in any possible world.
But that might be, Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be truein that world. — Banno
But that argument assumes what it seeks to prove; the universality and necessity of the law of non-contradiction. — Janus
Well, I can't see why it wouldn't, since there seems to be noting that limits the q in (p & ~p)⊃q to any particular word; But I will take you word for it.but this would have no bearing on worlds where the law of non-contradiction does obtain, as far as I can tell. — Janus
Even if the argument form explosion did not work, it remains that (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. — Banno
think Freddy was referring to gods of ancient peoples as "metaphors". — 180 Proof
We "explain" ourselves today through commodity fetishes (placebos) and Prozac, etc. — 180 Proof
I agree that the idea of a contradiction being true is impossible to parse. So, yes, a contradiction could not be a coherent (and much less a self-consistent) thesis, which I guess means it could not be a thesis at all, and could be nothing more than nonsense. — Janus
You are demanding an argument that doesn't presuppose logical contradiction. Which is clever as an impossible demand for evidence, but also incoherent, because there isn't criteria left to determine what is or isn't an argument. Ergo, an assertion is just as valid or not.You won't be able to. — Bartricks
As some have already hinted, classical theism maintains that God is necessary being, not that God is a necessary being. In other words, God is not conceived as an individual being who "exists" in the sense of reacting with other individual things.God is supposed to be a necessary being. — Banno
We can reformulate this as a conditional proposition that should be utterly uncontroversial: If there is a possible world in which there is no God, then God is not necessary being. On the other hand, we can also formulate another conditional proposition that should likewise be utterly uncontroversial: If God is necessary being, then there is no possible world in which there is no God. Taken together, what we have here is just a definition of "necessary being" in terms of possible world semantics: God is a necessary being if and only if there is no possible world in which there is no God.Something is necessary if it is true in every possible world.
There is a possible world in which god does not exist.
Hence, god is not a necessary being. — Banno
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