"even if you arranged some non-living matter into the exact form and function of a real human being, such that it walked around and talked and lived life like a real human, and even reported on mental states it supposedly had, might there still be something missing that's not accounted for just by the functionality?" is "basically no". — Pfhorrest

This is done all the time. It's called reproduction, and I have no problem with it. Note the importance of EXACT FORM in the sentence. Form is what life is about. Whether you use these or those molecules of water makes no actual difference, but the form is what 'matters'.

My issue was rather with your definition of experience:

But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be. — Pfhorrest

In other words, you define experience as conscious experience... not sure that's more than a tautology, or that it makes much of a difference with "thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation".

My point is that conscious experience is fundamentally different from just matter or energy, not that it cannot be 'produced' or made to happen in this world.

So this discussion now circles around the ontological status of abstract forms, such as the letter N, conceived as an element of a set called alphabet.

As we all know, the invention of the alphabet or rather its derivation from earlier ideograms (the letter A for instance would derive from a stylized cow head, turned upside down) was a significant achievement in the history of writing, allowing a massive reduction in the number of distinct signs to learn.

If the alphabet does not really really exist, we have a problem.

So what is the ontological status of the alphabet? I would respond as follows: IFF the alphabet is said to exist as an abstract set, it becomes teachable to people and thus, it becomes a reality in their head. This allows them to do all sorts of amazing things like writing on TPF. If on the contrary the alphabet does not really exist as one abstract thing, it cannot be taught and used. I prefer the first hypothesis, personally.

"Your 'A' is not similar enough to the ideal mental form for 'A', try again."

"Your 'A' is not similar enough to all the other 'As', try again."

What's wrong with the second teaching method? What does it fail to achieve by way of learning how to write?

"Your 'A' is not similar enough to the ideal mental form for 'A', try again."

"Your 'A' is not similar enough to all the other 'As', try again."

What's wrong with the second teaching method? What does it fail to achieve by way of learning how to write? — Isaac

It is less elegant, heavier conceptually, and more complex to teach. Qualitatively, it implies that all recognisable As are equivalent, which is not the case. They are variations on a theme, derivated from the ideal A by adding little bars at the bottom (sheriffs) or thickened strokes (bold) or what not. These variations themselves become easily teachable when seen as variations from some basic shape.

Just teach them the alphabet; it's easier. Whether the alphabet "exists" or not is a not-too-meaningful question. Whether it is a useful concept is the right question. And the answer is yes.

It is less elegant..., — Olivier5

Subjective.

...heavier conceptually.... — Olivier5

Absolute nonsense. Your approach creates an entirely unnecessary category of existence and then populates it with entities we can neither measure nor see which would require an entirely new branch of physics to govern their interaction with the material world. Mine just says if there's seven words on a page, there's seven words on a page. No hidden stuff, no new physics, no magic.

...more complex to teach. — Olivier5

What's easier to show, some other 'As' or the nebulous mental concept of an 'A'?

They are variations on a theme, derivated from the ideal A by adding little bars at the bottom (sheriffs) or thickened strokes (bold) or what not. — Olivier5

They absolutely are not. This is just historically false.

Just teach them the alphabet; it's easier. — Olivier5

Both approaches teach the alphabet.

Your approach creates an entirely unnecessary category of existence — Isaac

It's about concepts and their usefulness, not about their existence. Once the concepts of letters and numbers have been invented, we'd be fools not to use them.

Sound waves are physical for sure. But what about the probability wave? Are those waves physical? — Wayfarer

Definitely, or we wouldn’t study them under “physics”

I think a better example for you would be algorithms. We don’t consider those physical (mostly though we don’t bother to ask the question), even though they’re a set of instructions for a physical computer (or anything) to follow. We’re not entirely consistent it seems to me when it comes to what we call physical.

No, I’m arguing for substance dualism — Wayfarer

Except you think there is one substance not two. Different forms of one substance.

Physicalism believes that mind is a result of matter, the product of the material brain, whereas dualism believes that mind is the cause as much as the result. — Wayfarer

That’s not what either physicalism or dualism means. Physicalism is the belief that all that exists is physical substances. Dualism is the belief that there are 2 separate substances, one mental and one physical. You keep insisting that the mental, is not a substance, so you’re not a substance dualist.

We’re not entirely consistent it seems to me when it comes to what we call physical. — khaled

Not 'entirely'? It's a moving target, it changes all the time. All it comes down to is a pledge of allegiance to science.

You keep insisting that the mental, is not a substance, so you’re not a substance dualist. — khaled

OK, let me put it this way - mind is a substance in the philosophical sense, that is, it has properties (such as knowing) - but it is not something objective. It doesn't exist as an object of experience, but as the subject of experience. Can you see the distinction?

You may be interested in skimming this thread Is Information Physical? which was about this question.

Not 'entirely'? It's a moving target, it changes all the time. — Wayfarer

What I meant was that sometimes we call forms of physical things “physical” (waves) and sometimes we don’t (algorithms).

mind is a substance in the philosophical sense, that is, it has properties (such as knowing) — Wayfarer

I think I get what you’re saying now. I’d still struggle to call it dualism.

Algorithms are specific forms that the hardware follows. Algorithms are thus not material (don’t have mass). Algorithms also have properties (time complexity, space complexity, etc). Does that make algorithms a new substance? Is there an “algorithm-hardware dualism”?

Algorithms are close to what I’m getting at. But what about scientific principles? f=ma? e=mc²? Are they physical? I’d say, of course they’re not, they’re principles or observed regularities, discovered by the application of mathematical reason to phenomena.

There are a whole range of other realities whose reality we can…affirm: interest rates, mortgages, contracts, vows, national constitutions, penal codes and so on. Where do interest rates "exist"? Not in banks, or financial institutions. Are they real when we cannot touch them or see them? We all spend so much time worrying about them - are we worrying about nothing? In fact, I'm sure we all worry much more about interest rates than about the existence or non-existence of the Higgs boson! Similarly, a contract is not just the piece of paper, but the meaning the paper embodies; likewise a national constitution or a penal code. — Neil Ormerod

Are they physical? I’d say, of course they’re not, they’re principles or observed regularities, discovered by the application of mathematical reason to phenomena. — Wayfarer

In other words, they are the forms that physical stuff seems to follow. In the end what exists is: The physical stuff, in different forms.

You take forms to be a substance, so you’re a dualist. I don’t so I’m a physicalist. In the end, I don’t think we disagree on much other than what counts as a substance.

Good conversation. I feel like we’ve reached some agreement?

Well, it has been a good conversation, and I thank you for it, although I still feel as though I haven't made myself clear.

You take forms to be a substance, so you’re a dualist. I don’t so I’m a physicalist. In the end, I don’t think we disagree on much other than what counts as a substance. — khaled

Substance dualists might consider the disagreement to be more substantial. :grin:

It's about concepts and their usefulness, not about their existence. — Olivier5

Well no, the thread is about dualism. It's literally about their existence. If all you're saying is that it's useful to imagine a single ideal 'A' then...meh. Some people do, some don't. It's horses for courses.

What's absolutely a given is that it's neither necessary, nor foundational and so there's no cause at all to assume some second substance for it to be constituted of.

If all you're saying is that it's useful to imagine a single ideal 'A' then...meh. Some people do, some don't. — Isaac

Everybody does, in actual fact, even those unaware that they do. The human mind thinks in universals.

What's absolutely a given is that it's neither necessary, nor foundational and so there's no cause at all to assume some second substance for it to be constituted of. — Isaac

Concepts that have been invented do exist, if only in our heads. Their "substance" is not an immediate concern of mine; I'm not even sure the word has a meaning in the context of abstract ideas.

As to whether concepts are foundational, I think they are historically so, not naturally so. The invention of the zero and base 10 counting for instance was purely conceptual, but it greatly facilitated computation.

Everybody does, in actual fact, even those unaware that they do. — Olivier5

Bullshit (in the technical sense). What possible evidence could you bring to bear that everybody uses the concept of an ideal 'A' even if they claim to use alternative methods? You're just flailing. I've given a perfectly reasonable account of how one might learn to read and write the letter 'A' without a mental ideal, you've not given any counter argument, yet here you're simply declaring that everyone does it your way even if they think they don't.

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

What possible evidence could you bring to bear that everybody uses the concept of an ideal 'A' even if they claim to use alternative methods? — Isaac

Because they speak of it, thus they know the concept of the letter A. You are lying to yourself.

Because they speak of it, thus they know the concept of the letter A. — Olivier5

I've never heard anyone in day-to-day language talk about the ideal mental concept of the letter 'A'. Give me an example of the sort of conversation you've had which includes the subject.

They say things like: "is this an A or not?"

They say things like: "is this an A or not?" — Olivier5

Right. Which, as I've just explained, does not require an ideal mental construct. It's just a façon de parler for "is this sufficiently like all the other 'A's". This can be easily demonstrated by asking people to draw the ideal 'A' and finding each will do so slightly differently, thus no universal ideal 'A' could possibly exist. Or you could ask people how they arrived at what all letter 'A's have in common and find they give a range of answers, none of which will cover the full range of letters they're prepared to accept as an A. Or you could look at the history of the letter and find it to be completely at odds with the idea of variations on a pure theme, but rather a series of random gradual changes.

Which, as I've just explained, does not require an ideal mental construct. It's just a façon de parler for "is this sufficiently like all the other 'A's". — Isaac

"All the other As" means the same thing as "the set of all As" which means the same thing as "the concept of the (singular) letter A". You are just playing conceptual hide and seek with yourself because you are afraid to think in universals.

"All the other As" means the same thing as "the set of all As" which means the same thing as "the concept of the (singular) letter A". — Olivier5

How on earth do you square "the set of all 'A's" meaning the same thing as "the concept of the singular letter A"? For a start one is a set of existent things, the other a concept. One has many members, the other only one. One can be described, the other cannot. One is consistent between individuals, the other is not. One has entirely physical objects, the other none.

They're about as different as it's possible to be.

And why on earth would I be 'afraid' to think in universals? What an odd thing to accuse someone of. What harm might I be predicting could come to me if I were to think in universals?

For a start one is a set of existent things, the other a concept. — Isaac

A set is a concept, by definition.

What harm might I be predicting could come to me if I were to think in universals? — Isaac

Losing face on a message board.

A set is a concept, by definition. — Olivier5

I'm talking about the contents, not the set itself.

Everybody does, in actual fact, even those unaware that they do. The human mind thinks in universals. — Olivier5

Butting in, A in this context isn't a universal. It's a category we learn, in this case are taught. We all likely make the mistake of thinking it a universal as a child, but we all learn that it is not.

Categories generally are idiosyncratic. My blue might be slightly different to your blue by virtue of the fact that the range of frequencies I call blue differs to the range you call blue. We might find a boundary colour and disagree as to whether it is blue or green despite the fact that we are staring at the same colour so have that in common. And it isn't just the question of the label to use that we're arguing over: how our brains categorise things affects how we see them. The borderline colour that I call blue will look more blue to me than to you.

My ex-girlfriend wrote lowercase a without it joining at the top such that I read it as a u. Others could clearly see it as an a. Finding a bunch of A in different fonts we're all familiar with isn't going to interrogate much. Finding a bunch of corrupted A might be more telling.

Nope. You were talking of ALL the As, which a concept.

You were talking of ALL the As, which a concept. — Olivier5

The contents of the set {all the As} are actual 'A's.

The content of the set {the concept of the singular letter A} is itself a concept.

One is a conceptual collection of actual objects, the other is a conceptual collection of conceptual objects (with only one member).

Categories generally are idiosyncratic. — Kenosha Kid

The same tends to be true of universals: in practice they have hazy boundaries, and those boundaries vary across people, so I don't see much a difference here between the two ideas. A category is still a universal if it is to be used effectively in communication. If your 'blue' is to be meaningful to me, there has to be some fairly wide overlap between my category of blue and yours.

What you are saying is that "universals" are not as universal as we may think, their limits are hazy, which is true and indeed an important point in that the verification of universals by interviewing locutors is never perfect. You can always find a guy who disagrees somewhere.