The distinction resides in the point-of-use (...) and the talking about the point-of-use (...).
— Mww
I don't understand. Can you give me an example. — T Clark
naming something is a very brief and concise way of expressing something which is much richer in experience than a single word could convey. — Manuel
And yes, naming changes things in a sense, absolutely. — Manuel
Kant seems to think that apples are separate from the rest of everything before they become things. Before they are named. — T Clark
The representation always presupposes that which is represented; words always presuppose that to which they relate. — Mww
This is quite apparent from the fact we know a priori we cannot look directly at the thing called “sun”, which makes explicit there is something about that object not contained in the mere word that represents it. — Mww
Apples are separate from the rest of everything else after they are named. “Apple” represents the separation. — Mww
Not before. After. Objects are already things, therefore not by becoming things, but by becoming phenomena. Phenomena precede naming. — Mww
Apple is merely a word that represents some real physical object with certain empirical properties; that object, that thing, before it is given to human perception, just is in the world, just whatever it is, just whatever that happens to be. And no more than that can be said about it. — Mww
There's no way to directly share X experience with another person. — Manuel
And yes, naming changes things in a sense, absolutely.
— Manuel
How so? — Mww
There is a sense in which things do not exist until they are named. — T Clark
How can an apple be a thing if it has not been separated from the rest of everything else. — T Clark
Tao, which is the name we use for that which can not be named. — T Clark
What we do by naming, using words, is telling stories. — T Clark
There's no way to directly share X experience with another person. — Manuel
The words I use is the way I can publicly express X, but X is much more complex and nuanced than the word I use. — Manuel
So yes, no change in the "object itself", so to speak, — Manuel
the object as you describe to me changes from what you actually experience. — Manuel
I wouldn't go as far as to say that our naming of things brings our world of things into existence, and I don't think Kant would either. — Janus
“....If the question regarded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience....”
....and that should be sufficient to validate for your thinking.
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I think our world of things is already precognitively implicit — Janus
Couldn’t be otherwise, could it, really? Yours goes to show the temporality of the human cognitive system, often ignored.
“....For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd....”
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I think language makes things determinate for us in highly abstract ways. — Janus
I might offer that reason makes things determinate; language makes determined things mutually understood.
Again.....thanks for the invite. I’ll show myself out. I mean....really. Where’s the good cognac, anyway? — Mww
There's no way to directly share X experience with another person. — Manuel
There are ways of sharing experience other than using names and words. — T Clark
There's no way to directly share X experience with another person.
— Manuel
True, but that doesn’t explain any changes in the thing. — Mww
eyes.....and all I might know from that is “dog”. Add in “greater than 50% white, black lips and nose, ears never below the eyes, less than 15lbs, less than 13” high”......you’ve changed what I understand of your experience, but the thing of your experience remains as it ever was. — Mww
We open the armagnac and share it - we might talk about sharing the experience of drinking.
Then things get philosophical and someone says something like that we only know what the armagnac tastes like to each of us; we can't share what it tastes like in itself... and the little man appears, because the taste of armagnac-in-itself is as nonsensical as the little man who wasn't there. — Banno
the idea of an intersubjective locus of meaning makes no sense without subjectivities that interact. — Joshs
I'm fishing for "what it is" that is inexpressible. Or rather, pointing out that there is a prima facie contradiction in saying that there is something that cannot be expressed. If there is something then one ought be able to individuate it; to name it; hence, "S". But I think the argument shows that there are problems with naming "S".
The issue is phrased as if there were a limit on language such that there is something that language cannot set out. I'm saying that instead, there is a misguided notion that there is a something were there is none; that what is described is not a limit on language but an illusion. — Banno
Kants thing in itself, direct notions of eternity, nothingness, etc, at first thought, seem to represent thing which are unknowable. They purport to represent things outside of human cognition. But, surely, all there is is human cognition? In such an instance, there is no unknowable, in the way it is commonly assumed, instead, the unknowable is always knowable. — Aidan buk
The exception being Cilantro; for some people it tastes like soap. It oddly correlates with whether or not an individual can smell stink bugs. I want to say they identified a genetic marker. So, when the same interactions do produce non-trivial little men it is noted.Let's look at the "senses" of share at work here. We open the armagnac and share it - we might talk about sharing the experience of drinking. — Banno
is reason (beyond the most basic concrete animal kinds) possible without language? — Janus
As to good cognac I can offer you only the representation of it — Janus
I think I understand what you mean - in a sense you are saying there is no mind independent object, and all this thinking about it never leaves mind. I agree, and believe idealism would agree with you. — Pop
Would mind independent objects be what Kant called "Thing-in-Itself"? Kant seems think they exist, but outside of the reason's boundary. They cannot be known, but are postulated? — Corvus
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