A variation on Wittgenstein - yes. — Banno

:ok:

I'm questioning what it is that makes S a "distinct sensation". How could one know that the second sensation is a recurrence of S? — Banno

I already told you, it would depend on how good my memory is. Supposing I possess a perfect memory, I would immediately recognize a sensation as one I had experienced before and I would also recall the name S that I had given it.

...and how could you decide if that memory was correct? There's nothing to compare it to, except itself.

This is not quite the private language argument - see SEP 3.3 Interlude: the Rejection of Orthodoxy.

You’re right that for Merleau-Ponty what counts in perception is differences and relationships between colors , but he would also argue that colors , and all other perceptions, only emerge as as expressions of the body’s actions in the world. — Joshs

That's where I think he needlessly complicates the matter. One cannot spot a difference between two colors without having a sense of each individual color. So perception (of similitudes and differences) builds upon sensation rather than compete with it as a rival paradigm.

...and how could you decide if that memory was correct? There's nothing to compare it to, except itself. — Banno

I realize that but what's the point? The fact that memory is unreliable and also that there's no memory-independent corroboration available does nothing to disprove that some aspects of consciousness are indescribable. Right? :chin:

I'm a bit surprised to see you agree here, Joshs.

Given that it makes no nevermind, why not just say that there isn't a how-the-colour-red-looks-to-Luke? — Banno

I was only agreeing that all supposed shared ’we’ experiences conceal a gap between my experience ce and your experience. I did t mean to
suggest that my experience of the color red is a persisting datum that can be returned to as
identical.

You can't convey the subjective character of "how it looks/feels to me" in language (such that others can know, e.g., how red looks to you), so there's no point in trying. Does this make the concept of qualia useless? It apparently finds its use in philosophical discussions. — Luke

My first observation is that qualia is only useful
for certain philosophers, but it seems to me that for those philosophers most closely involved in the latest research in visual perception ( J.J.Gibson, Noe and O, Reagan) it is not a useful concept.

As far as conveying subjective experience in language, I’m i. the camp that esther than constituting some ineffable and mysterious content added to objective experience, the subjective ‘feel’ has to do with organizational aspects of experience that can and are languaged in some sense. For instance, do you know what color is? It’s a black shape either emerging out of
or receding into a dark background. You can demonstrate this yourself. Cut out a white cardboard circle, paint one half black , and then drawn a series of black lines following the curvature of the circle on either side of the disk emerging from the r black half. Then attach it to a fan and watch the appearance of red and blue.

This explains why red is a metaphor for anger and aggression, and blue represents calm and coldness.
Red is literally a shape popping out at us and blue is a shape receding from us, even as these are just feature of a motionless surface.
So our language, through its metaphors , is in fact describing organizational characteristics ( agrees or approach vs passive receding) of the supposedly ‘private’ feel of color. But is this any different situation than the communicability of affectivity in general? Are all affects moments of engagement with others?

Ok.

some aspects of consciousness are indescribable. — TheMadFool

I still feel language is not up to the task... — TheMadFool

I'm fishing for "what it is" that is inexpressible. Or rather, pointing out that there is a prima facie contradiction in saying that there is something that cannot be expressed. If there is something then one ought be able to individuate it; to name it; hence, "S". But I think the argument shows that there are problems with naming "S".

The issue is phrased as if there were a limit on language such that there is something that language cannot set out. I'm saying that instead, there is a misguided notion that there is a something were there is none; that what is described is not a limit on language but an illusion.

According to the Wikipedia article on Qualia, qualia are defined as individual instances of subjective conscious experiences, where an example of a qualia would be the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache.

According to the SEP article on qualia, philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia.

According to the IEP article on qualia, qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences.

I could say that "I have sensation S", meaning that I have the sensation of an individual instance of subjective conscious experience, eg, the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache

I could also have said that "I have the sensation of a qualia".

In answering the OP, as I know that individual instances of subjective conscious experiences exist, then according to the Wikipedia, SEP and IEP definitions of qualia, qualia exist.