And a reminder about what's meant by "behaviorism":

"Behaviorism
Behaviorism was a movement in psychology and philosophy that emphasized the outward behavioral aspects of thought and dismissed the inward experiential, and sometimes the inner procedural, aspects as well; a movement harking back to the methodological proposals of John B. Watson, who coined the name. Watson’s 1913 manifesto proposed abandoning Introspectionist attempts to make consciousness a subject of experimental investigation to focus instead on behavioral manifestations of intelligence. B. F. Skinner later hardened behaviorist strictures to exclude inner physiological processes along with inward experiences as items of legitimate psychological concern. Consequently, the successful “cognitive revolution” of the nineteen sixties styled itself a revolt against behaviorism even though the computational processes cognitivism hypothesized would be public and objective — not the sort of private subjective processes Watson banned. Consequently (and ironically), would-be-scientific champions of consciousness now indict cognitivism for its “behavioristic” neglect of inward experience.

The enduring philosophical interest of behaviorism concerns this methodological challenge to the scientific bona fides of consciousness (on behalf of empiricism) and, connectedly (in accord with materialism), its challenge to the supposed metaphysical inwardness, or subjectivity, of thought. Although behaviorism as an avowed movement may have few remaining advocates, various practices and trends in psychology and philosophy may still usefully be styled “behavioristic”. As long as experimental rigor in psychology is held to require “operationalization” of variables, behaviorism’s methodological mark remains. Recent attempts to revive doctrines of “ontological subjectivity” (Searle 1992) in philosophy and bring “consciousness research” under the aegis of Cognitive Science (see Horgan 1994) point up the continuing relevance of behaviorism’s metaphysical and methodological challenges." --IEP entry on behaviorism.

Why doesn't hard content externalism lead to behaviourism? — frank

Not that we should assume there would automatically be some awful problem if it did. But,

I think Chomsky avers (somewhere on youtube) that Hume and Heraclitus were privy to the same insight [the inscrutability of reference]. Of course he draws a different lesson from it than Quine. But he doesn't say the doctrine itself is mistaken, or even that it is behaviouristic. And it isn't. It points out that you can't objectively ground reference in behaviour. — bongo fury

It's a game of pretend. There won't be any fact of the matter of exactly what anyone was pretending. How could there?

It's a game of pretend. There won't be any fact of the matter exactly what anyone was pretending. How could there? — bongo fury

That's why I say hard behaviorism collapses all meaning, including the theory itself. Is this wrong?

So you're saying externalism does lead to behaviourism? Contrary to your thread title?

So you're saying externalism does lead to behaviourism? Contrary to your thread title? — bongo fury

I'm looking for a reason to say it doesn't.

I'm looking for a reason to say it doesn't. — frank

It (meaning, mental content, what have you) is a game of pretending that words and pictures refer to things (externally, not in the head). We're just second guessing each other's fantasies about the reference. We can't use observed behaviour to justify any particular fantasy.

It (meaning, mental content, what have you) is a game of pretending that words and pictures refer to things (externally, not in the head). We're just second guessing each other's fantasies about the reference. We can't use observed behaviour to justify any particular fantasy. — bongo fury

But the kind of behaviorism I'm thinking of doesn't allow that there is any kind of referencing involved in communication.

Speech itself is merely behavior. Some behaviors are repeated because they bring about something positive.

Wouldn't a sort of "hard" externalism seem to mesh with that kind of behaviorism?

We can't use observed behaviour to justify any particular fantasy.
— bongo fury

But the kind of behaviorism I'm thinking of doesn't allow that there is any kind of referencing involved in communication.
— frank

Fair enough. By justify I meant choose. If there were some fact of the matter of which symbols mapped to which things then behaviourism wouldn't be wrong to reduce or replace that mapping (the reference that 'happened') with some description of behaviour. But according to Quine there is always a choice of mappings. We never know for sure what 'happened'. We have to play the game of pretend, and allow for, second guess, multiple hypotheses of what was pretended.

Which is how a 'hard' externalism about the mappings, i.e their not being in the head, can fail to mesh with behaviourism.

So for Quine, it's quite possible that you understand what I mean in the sense that we're consciously referencing the same stuff, we just don't for sure that this is happening?

in the sense that we're consciously referencing — frank

Why would you be expecting Quine to be getting into our heads?

referencing the same stuff, we just don't
know for sure — frank

Why would you be expecting Quine to regard this question as a matter of fact?

in the sense that we're consciously referencing — frank


Why would you be expecting Quine to be getting into our heads? — bongo fury

If we're planning to do some scientific research on what's in our heads, I think he would say we shouldn't do that due to the unavailability of facts. That doesn't mean he ruled out subjectivity, though, right? In our off hours away from the lab, we could say that we might be thinking about the same thing?

If we're planning to do some scientific research on what's in our heads, I think he would say we shouldn't do that due to the unavailability of facts. — frank

This sounds wrong. Not sure what you meant.

That doesn't mean he ruled out subjectivity, though, right? — frank

I don't know what "that" is, but he was usually happy to rule out such notions. Are you surprised?

In our off hours away from the lab, we could say that we might be thinking about the same thing? — frank

Again, why would you be expecting Quine to be internalist (getting into our heads) and determinatist (matter of fact) about reference?

Again, why would you be expecting Quine to be internalist (getting into our heads) and determinist (matter of fact) about reference? — bongo fury

I've actually always assumed he did rule out subjectivity, but I'm rethinking it, actually based on what you said.

There's a difference between saying that we can't know whether we're thinking of the same thing, and ruling out subjectivity. Why should I take Quine as saying the latter?

I've actually always assumed he did rule out subjectivity, but I'm rethinking it, actually based on what you said. — frank

Then ignore what I said.

Why should I take Quine as saying the latter? — frank

Because the word is carrying too much baggage.

that we can't know whether we're thinking of the same thing — frank

Can't because it's hard to determine :down: , or can't because it's indeterminate :up: ?

And why 'think' when this was about externalism?

Why should I take Quine as saying the latter? — frank


Because the word is carrying too much baggage. — bongo fury

The OP makes it pretty clear that we aren't talking specifically about Quine. You brought him up and now ditch the effort. That's weird.

Can't because it's hard to determine :down: , or can't because it's indeterminate :up: ?

And why 'think' when this was about externalism? — bongo fury

All sorts of things are indeterminate for all practical purposes for me with my poor 21st technology. I don't therefore rule out those things.

I think we're done?

Brains might sync as people interact.

You brought him up — frank

Yes, to offer one straight answer to your question.

and now ditch the effort. — frank

How so?

indeterminate for all practical purposes for me with my poor 21st technology. I don't therefore rule out those things. — frank

So, contra Quine. As long as you see that.

I think we're done? — frank

Okely.

Brains might sync as people interact. — frank

Of course. Cool stuff.

Yes, to offer one straight answer to your question. — bongo fury

Thanks. I appreciate it. I didn't understand it, but I'll return to it shortly.

That's a hard solution to avoid as "strong" content externalism just seems like a version of behaviorism.

I suppose that one can argue that the content of our perceptions are veridical only when the external content actually coincides with what we imagine. That is if the cow we think we see is actually a cow. So on this view, thinking that you see a cow that turns out to be sheep would be equivalent to saying that the content in your head is false. So even if you think you saw a cow, your thinking that you say it is not content after all.

But this just makes no sense. It's an arbitrary stipulation on what content is, which leaves out almost everything.

If, however, you use content externalism in a much less radical manner, then perhaps it can be articulated a little.

That's a hard solution to avoid as "strong" content externalism just seems like a version of behaviorism. — Manuel

What I don't understand is how to make sense of a strong version of behaviorism. Doesn't it rule out sense in communication?

however, you use content externalism in a much less radical manner, then perhaps it can be articulated a little. — Manuel

But there really isn't anything newsworthy about weak content externalism, is there?

What I don't understand is how to make sense of a strong version of behaviorism. Doesn't it rule out sense in communication? — frank

It rules out almost everything. A human being is reduced to a stimulus-reacting nothing. You wouldn't be able to tell a human from an amoeba under strong behaviorism. So it's not even good science, unless it's radically altered.

But there really isn't anything newsworthy about weak content externalism, is there? — frank

Nope. Not that I can see. Yet I see more papers talking about externalism of all varieties than internalism, which is coherent and looks to me to be scientific. Everybody's internalist when it comes to other animals, we all assume they have an intrinsic nature such that a dog will behave dog-like and not chimp -like, etc.

But when it comes to human beings, internalism becomes this mysterious magic stuff to some. This is strange to me.

A human being is reduced to a stimulus-reacting nothing. You wouldn't be able to tell a human from an amoeba under strong behaviorism. So it's not even good science — Manuel

A human being will react to poem, an amoeba won't. What's unscientific about that?

A human being will react to poem, an amoeba won't. — Isaac

Under strong behaviorism, how would you know that?

Any movement made by the amoeba can be taken as sign that it is reacting to the poem.

But of course amoeba's don't react to poems and humans do, as you point out. So you need to postulate an innate mechanism that allows human beings to react to poems that amoeba's lack.

If it's based on behavior alone, without assuming an innate structure to each creature, I don't see how one could make that distinction, unless you believe there is no difference between creatures.

Under strong behaviorism, how would you know that?

Any movement made by the amoeba can be taken as sign that it is reacting to the poem. — Manuel

How do you think we found anything out about amoebae then? Theories all rely on repeatability. If the amoeba repeatedly responds to a poem in some predictable way (but not to some control, like a random collection of words), then we've got everything we thought about amoebae pretty wrong haven't we?

you need to postulate an innate mechanism that allows human beings to react to poems that amoeba's lack. — Manuel

I think you've misunderstood what behaviourism is. None of its proponents suggest that there is no mechanism, that the brain's just a non-functioning blob.

I think you've misunderstood what behaviourism is. None of its proponents suggest that there is no mechanism, that the brain's just a non-functioning blob. — Isaac

Which is why I used the term "strong" behaviorism, one which would do away with any innate mechanism. I agree that I doubt any proponent today would hold such a view.

Less radical versions are fine and necessary.

out almost everything. A human being is reduced to a stimulus-reacting nothing. You wouldn't be able to tell a human from an amoeba under strong behaviorism. So it's not even good science, unless it's radically altered. — Manuel

That's what I thought. Thanks!

Nope. Not that I can see. Yet I see more papers talking about externalism of all varieties than internalism, which is coherent and looks to me to be scientific. Everybody's internalist when it comes to other animals, we all assume they have an intrinsic nature such that a dog will behave dog-like and not chimp -like, etc.

But when it comes to human beings, internalism becomes this mysterious magic stuff to some. This is strange to me. — Manuel

So content internalism is satisfactory to the average scientist, but philosophers insist on externalism? Why? Because they think they'll be conceding some religious view otherwise?

Which is why I used the term "strong" behaviorism, one which would do away with any innate mechanism. I agree that I doubt any proponent today would hold such a view. — Manuel

Absolutely no one, ever, would hold such a view. There's little point in constructing arguments against views that no one holds is there?

It's difficult to generalize in this respect, there are philosophers who accept internalism without much problems such as Strawson, Chomsky, Haack, McGinn, etc.

I suspect some philosophers think that by sticking to externalism, they're putting aside spooky stuff like experience (looking at the blue of the sky, or explicitly thinking about a beach, etc.) and then stick to things that are publicly observable and hence be "scientific". It's hard to say.



I don't agree. Putnam, for example, suggested the thought experiment of a brain-in-vats as an exercise. Nobody literally believes we are brain in vats, though some believe in the simulation hypothesis. It's still useful to look at what extreme ideas would look like.

I don't agree. Putnam, for example, suggested the thought experiment of a brain-in-vats as an exercise. Nobody literally believes we are brain in vats, though some believe in the simulation hypothesis. It's still useful to look at what extreme ideas would look like. — Manuel

I thought the BIV was useless too, so that's not a persuasive argument. Perhaps highlight some of the conclusion you find useful?

I think that in principle, if we knew enough about the brain we wouldn't need an external world. You would just need to stimulate the appropriate are of the brain to recreate an experience which would be indistinguishable from one in ordinary life.

Granted, this scenario is science fiction, but I think the principle is correct. The main point I take from it is that the world is not necessary to explain our experience.

But as you hinted at, what's useful depends on the person involved. I don't find the "do machines think?" question to be useful, but clearly, other people do.