That would require one to be an epistemic autonomist, and to in fact be epistemically autonomous. Epistemic autonomy is not possible. Because, as you later say: — baker

I don't see why you say that. As I see it all it requires is not being concerned about the opinions of others and making up your own mind.

Except that humans have developed such vastly different ideas of what counts as "thriving", "happiness", "peace", "harmony" that the above criteria are too general. People can thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony while living under tyranny. People can also thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony if they are politically correct androids. — baker

I disagree. Sure people can make the best of bad situations, but I don't believe anyone with any self-respect would choose to live under any form of tyranny. As to being politically correct androids, I don't count failing to think for yourself as an example of fulfilling your potential and hence it also doesn't count as an example of thriving in my view.

Note, I haven't said you have to agree with my view; you should have your own view which you have worked out for yourself, if you have the capacity for that at least; otherwise you will fail to reach, or even approach, your potential in my view.

And what is more, spiritually advanced people tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged. — baker

Oh really, and how do you know that? What criteria do you personally employ to enable you to judge whether someone is spiritually advanced or not?

Of course. But as ↪Apollodorus
points out repeatedely, acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to a schizoaffective disorder. — baker

Rubbish! Chronic and crippling doubt may lead to mental disorders, but mere acknowledgement of uncertainty is just being intellectually honest.

Your arguments are not convincing; surely you can do better?

Better = That which gives more pleasure overall, taking into account space and time. — hope

Reduces suffering is more to my taste.

I don't see why you say that. As I see it all it requires is not being concerned about the opinions of others and making up your own mind. — Janus

If one is blissfully ignorant of how one's opinions came to be (and whom one got them from), then all is well in la-la land...

This is also a reason why "ancient wisdom" isn't so popular: to acknowledge ancient wisdom would be to acknowledge that one's ideas aren't one's own, but that one got them from others. Now, that's deflating.

I disagree. Sure people can make the best of bad situations, but I don't believe anyone with any self-respect would choose to live under any form of tyranny. As to being politically correct androids, I don't count failing to think for yourself as an example of fulfilling your potential and hence it also doesn't count as an example of thriving in my view.

Oh really, and how do you know that? What criteria do you personally employ to enable you to judge whether someone is fulfilling their potential?

Note, I haven't said you have to agree with my view; you should have your own view which you have worked out for yourself, if you have the capacity for that at least; otherwise you will fail to reach, or even approach, your potential in my view.

Oh, so you know what my potential is?

Come on.

And what is more, spiritually advanced people tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged.
— baker
Oh really, and how do you know that? What criteria do you personally employ to enable you to judge whether someone is spiritually advanced or not?

I'm being both cynical and not. I've noticed that people who tend to describe themselves as "spiritually advanced" or who imply as much tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged. (Or their fans do it on their behalf.)

Personally, I'm not sure what it means to be "spiritually advanced" (if I would know that, I wouldn't be here at this forum). But my overall impression is that being spiritually advanced might very well have nothing to do with the usual lovey-dovey notions that some people promote in the name of spirituality (kindness, compassion, empathy), but something much more Darwinian. I have this impression based on the things that the supposedly spiritually advanced people do that get described as "kind, compassionate, empathetic", and those acts include killing, raping, and pillaging.

Rubbish! Chronic and crippling doubt may lead to mental disorders, but mere acknowledgement of uncertainty is just being intellectually honest.

Your arguments are not convincing; surely you can do better?

You've been operating out of some unstated premises, it's those I want you to spell out.

Of course! One of the things I've regretted in my adult life, is the paucity of my education in the classics of ancient literature and philosophy. I was always a poor student, for various reasons, but aside from that, hardly any of this material was on my curriculum. Later in life, I've come to realise just how profound the classical philosophical tradition is, even though my knowledge of it is fragmentary. In my view - which is shared with Pierre Hadot, who is a scholar of the history of philosophy - most of what passes for philosophy in today's world, has nothing to do with philosophy as understood in the classical tradition. Philosophy proper is a transformative understanding of the nature of life. — Wayfarer

Oh, how fresh you sound! How romantic!

The upshot of being born and raised in old-fashioned Europe is that one did get a classical education. But it's also an education that kills one's interest in the Classics. (There is a cynical saying -- "The Classics are those that everybody knows and nobody reads.")

Fully aware of that. If it had been drilled into me I would have hated it.

The upshot of being born and raised in old-fashioned Europe is that one did get a classical education. But it's also an education that kills one's interest in the Classics. (There is a cynical saying -- "The Classics are those that everybody knows and nobody reads.") — baker

What do you consider a classical education and at what age?

I don't think that's right. What I call 'red' at the two extremes of the range some may call 'orange' or 'mauve'. That would just be personal perception and choice; I can't see what it has to do with theory. — Janus

On what basis would you say "it's red", rather than "it's orange", unless you are applying some sort of theory which enables your judgement? But I really don't know how you are proposing to define "theory". Doesn't personal choice involve theory in your understanding?

In the case of the colour chart, the fact that there is theory involved in the judgement is more obvious, because it's recorded on paper. But if you do not refer to a colour chart aren't you still referring to some sort of theory in your mind, which supports your choice? I don't think you'd say that the choice of words is random.

And yet precsiely those same people who demand the Universe to be a welcoming place for them, who demand it to be secure and comforting for them get to thrive in it. Because such people, believing they are entitled to security and comfort in this world, tame rivers, kill the infidels, and pursue science, in order to make the world a safe place for themselves. And they get it done. — baker

The materialist/determinist metaphysics is persistent in its denial of the obvious, that intention is a cause. Aristotle produced volumes of material which explains the reality of this obvious fact, as "final cause". So this materialist/determinist perspective ought not even be called "metaphysics", because it's simply a denial of the reality of that whole realm of activity which lies beyond the grasp of physics. It's more like anti-metaphysics.

Then they'll posit "a world" which is at the same time, both beautiful and terrifying, with complete disregard for the fact that such are simply the judgements of intentional beings. So they never get to the real metaphysical questions, such as how does this world support, or provide for real intentional judgements, because they employ contradictory statements like that, to make the reality of intention disappear behind a cloud of smoke and mirrors.

This is also a reason why "ancient wisdom" isn't so popular: to acknowledge ancient wisdom would be to acknowledge that one's ideas aren't one's own, but that one got them from others. Now, that's deflating. — baker

Actually, far from deflating, this realization may be very motivating. When one's ideas are "out of sync" with the conventional knowledge of the day (materialist/determinist), that person may become quite isolated in one's own disillusion. To find consistency in "ancient wisdom" is satisfying and encouraging.

Socrates expected to find something else in Anaxagoras because Anaxagoras says that Mind directs and causes all things. He assumes that Mind is like his mind and its cause like his. What he expected was an explanation for why it is best that things are as they are. But not only did Anaxagoras fail to provide such an explanation, Socrates himself failed. He goes on to tell of his "second sailing", his investigation by means of accounts, logoi. He posits the Forms as hypotheticals with the Good as their cause. He orders the world according to his own mind not Mind.

But as ↪Apollodorus points out repeatedely, acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to a schizoaffective disorder. — baker

Nope, Apollodorus does not say that "acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to schizoaffective disorder". It is not the acknowledgment but giving in to doubt and uncertainty, especially when coupled with Straussian esotericism, that can open the trapdoor leading to schizoaffective or delusional disorder. Two totally different things IMO.

The problem is that those external points of reference are often hostile to us, and we have to find a way to rely on and trust people who, at the very least, don't care if we live or die. — baker

Sure. This is what we have intelligence, wisdom, and discernment for.

But if the first principles are provided by intuition, and intuition is not reliable, then how is it possible that we start from a higher level of certainty in our logical proceedings? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the distinctions Aristotle makes between the sciences makes the question different depending upon what is being sought:

"Since there is a science about nature, clearly it must be distinct from both a practical and a productive science. For the principle of motion in a productive science is in that which produces and not in that which is produced, and this is either some art or some other power. Similarly, the principle of motion in a practical science is not in the thing done but rather in the doers. But the science of the physicist is concerned with things which in themselves have a principle of motion. It is clear from what has been said that physics must be neither a practical nor a productive science, but a theoretical one, for it must come under one of these genera of sciences." — Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Kappa, 1064a, 10, translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle

Regarding the status of the color red, the old Philosopher seems to be favoring Janus during this discussion of Protagoras' view:

"Moreover, it is foolish to attend alike to the opinions and imaginations of disputing parties, for clearly those on one side must be mistaken.
This is evident from what happens with respect to sensations; for the same thing never appears sweet to some people and the contrary of this to others, unless in the one case the sense organ which jjudges the the said flavors is injured or defective. In such a case, we should believe those on one side to be the measure but not those on the other. My statement applies alike to the good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly, and all other such. For the claim of our opponents does not differ from that of those who make each thing appear two by pressing below the eye with their finger, and say that there are two things, because two things appear, and again that there is one, for each thing appears as one to those who do not press a finger." — Ibid, 1063a

The anthropomorphic element is an important criteria to employ when comparing models of the divine.
For instance, the creator in Timaeus seems to work in a similar fashion to how we make a plan and then build "copies" of it. While Aristotle uses a lot of the cosmogony found in that dialogue, he makes clear that nobody is going out for beers with the Unmoved Mover after work.

The anthropomorphic element is an important criteria to employ when comparing models of the divine. — Valentinus

What do you think is the relationship between models of the divine and models of the origin of the universe?

What do you think is the relationship between models of the divine and models of the origin of the universe? — Fooloso4

I hope the questions don't get harder to answer after attempting to meet this one. They probably will, though.

The interest in understanding this place where we are born, taken by itself, argues against seeing them as separate sets of models. The possibility that our response to what has been given to us is a dynamic relationship with the original set up develops a separation that allows for a difference to be considered.

Amongst the arguments about whether this is the best of all possible worlds, the desire to change it is always well nigh behind.

If one is blissfully ignorant of how one's opinions came to be (and whom one got them from), then all is well in la-la land... — baker

All ideas may be "the same old stew reheated"; but so what? You choose the idea and opinions out of the suite of those culturally available to you that seem to fit best with your lived experience. We don't have to be that rare person who comes up with a completely novel idea (if there be such at all) in order to think for ourselves.

On what basis would you say "it's red", rather than "it's orange", unless you are applying some sort of theory which enables your judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not theoretical (for me at least). I would say it's red rather rather than orange if it seems to be red rather than orange. It's just a seeming or a feeling. as associated with my felt sense of my overall experience of colour, not theoretical at all.

The interest in understanding this place where we are born, taken by itself, argues against seeing them as separate sets of models. — Valentinus

Doesn't that depend on one's interests? Someone who takes no interest in talk about gods will see them as separate, with scientific models being appropriate for investigation and theological models as inappropriate.

I am not sure if the matter is resolved through identifying different interests.

Your question about the models should stand out there for a while. A large rock in the river.

Regarding the status of the color red, the old Philosopher seems to be favoring Janus during this discussion of Protagoras' view: — Valentinus

The point I was making is that I think it is impossible to make any sort of measurement at all, even the most basic sense judgement, what Aristotle refers to as a "measure", in your quoted passage, without applying theory. As he says in that passage, to judge a flavour is to "measure", and what I say is that to measure requires theory.

It's not theoretical (for me at least). I would say it's red rather rather than orange if it seems to be red rather than orange. It's just a seeming or a feeling. as associated with my felt sense of my overall experience of colour, not theoretical at all. — Janus

You "feel" the difference between the meaning of two words, rather than thinking it? That's a new one on me. You call it "orange" because when you see it you get the feeling of orange from it?

I can't say that I know what orange feels like, but I think I can judge whether or not something is orange. When I make this judgement I do not refer to my feelings, I refer to my memories, so clearly my judgement is not derived from my feelings, it's derived from my mind.

You "feel" the difference between the meaning of two words, rather than thinking it? That's a new one on me. You call it "orange" because when you see it you get the feeling of orange from it?

I can't say that I know what orange feels like, but I think I can judge whether or not something is orange. When I make this judgement I do not refer to my feelings, I refer to my memories, so clearly my judgement is not derived from my feelings, it's derived from my mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Orange is a sensation, a feeling, just as red is. When I look at something and it feels or seems or looks orange to me I say it is orange. There is no right or wrong in this as there is no definite boundary between orange and red. If I said it was green, yellow or blue that would be a different matter. I have no idea what you are looking for beyond that.

I think I understand the basis of your skepticism. What is unclear to me is how it relates to Aristotle. The guy kept arguing for a shared body of experience. Maybe he was wrong. Is there another way to understand the texts?

When I look at something and it feels or seems or looks orange to me I say it is orange. There is no right or wrong in this as there is no definite boundary between orange and red. — Janus

The issue is not whether there is a right or wrong to this judgement, but whether there is theory employed in this judgement. When you say "it feels or seems or looks orange to me", how do you think you can make that judgement without applying theory? Obviously your eyes are not making the judgement that "orange" is the word to use, so it's not the sense organ which judges that the thing is orange. Do we agree that it is the mind which makes this judgement? If so, then how do you think that your mind can judge the colour as orange rather than red or some other name for a colour, or even some other random word, without the use of theory? What type of principles do you think your mind might rely on in making such a judgement if they aren't theoretical principles?


A "shared body of experience"? What do you mean by this?

A "shared body of experience"? What do you mean by this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle often refers to what "what most of us encounter" versus the exceptions. If you need citations, I will provide tomorrow.
I will sleep now.

When you say "it feels or seems or looks orange to me", how do you think you can make that judgement without applying theory? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no theory in mind, so I am not applying a theory. I'm not claiming that it is orange or red just that it looks or seems orange or red to me. As I said it's a matter of a lifetime of impressions and associations, not theories, that have formed my association of 'orange' or 'red' or any colour word with some impressions and not with others. If you think it is a theory then explain just what the theory is and what its predictions could be.

If you think it is a theory then explain just what the theory is and what its predictions could be. — Janus

How could I know that theory? It's your theory which is being applied, and you refuse to tell it to me. You even refuse to acknowledge its existence. Isn't "associations" of ideas exactly what theory is? How can you say you are making associations, but the associations are not theoretical?

This reminds me of Plato's portrayal of Socrates. Socrates would ask all sorts of people (artists and craftspeople) who obviously had some sort of practical knowledge because they knew how to do things, to explain the knowledge which enabled them to do what they did. And they couldn't, just like you can't explain the knowledge which enables you to judge something as orange. You seem to think that it's just something that your senses do, you "feel" the difference between orange and red.

Consider this imaginary scenario. A very young child is learning colours. The person sees that if there is a hint of yellow in the red, it ought to be judged as orange. So the person applies this theory (you agree that this is theory?) and states "orange" accordingly, and this is accepted by others. After some time, the person no longer needs to apply the theory, as the judgement is habitualized, it becomes 'automatic'. The person then completely forgets all about that learning process, and having to apply that theory to make the decision, because this process is no longer present to the person's conscious mind. What happens to this theory? Is it not still playing an important role in the person's judgement of colour?

One way to express my uncertainty about interests can be observed at the beginning of the Timaeus.

The polity of the Republic, where storytelling is closely regulated, is inserted into a story about the distant past. That seems to complicate one's relationship to the cosmogony rather than provide orientation to our present endeavors.

Aristotle explicitly objects to the confusion in that text and generally seeks to clarify the contexts in which we talk about different things. Does that difference in approach mean Plato and Aristotle are using different models of the divine?

One way to express my uncertainty about interests can be observed at the beginning of the Timaeus. — Valentinus

Do you mean his or Plato's interest in telling this unlikely "likely tale"? Or the city at war? Or the cause of the cosmos or in action?

... where storytelling is closely regulated, is inserted into a story about the distant past. That seems to complicate one's relationship to the cosmogony rather than provide orientation to our present endeavors. — Valentinus

Do you mean that we must take into consideration of Glaucon and the others, or those at that time who read the dialogue, who were educated through the stories of Homer and Hesiod, and how our own education is quite different? If so, then I agree. It is not so straight forward for us to read an ancient author about things that were ancient to that author. We are in that respect twice removed.

Does that difference in approach mean Plato and Aristotle are using different models of the divine? — Valentinus

Different from each other or different from us? Since the problem of a purposive universe was raised and the claim by @Wayfarer that something along the way was lost, we need to consider whether in what way what was said to be lost was even present, but also whether our understanding of the universe should include models of the divine, what that means, and what they are.

I was referring to when Critias related the story of what an Egyptian priest told Solon about ancient Athenians:

"The city and citizens, which you yesterday described to us in fiction, we will now transfer to the world of reality. It shall be the ancient city of Athens, and we will suppose that the citizens whom you imagined were our veritable ancestors of whom the priest spoke; they will perfectly harmonize and there will be no inconsistency in saying that the citizens of your republic are these ancient Athenians" — Plato, 26d, translated by Benjamin Jowett

What is one to make of the "fiction that becomes a fact" immediately before a creation story is told? This is especially peculiar when the "fiction" involved questions the value of fictions. Yes, we are twice removed from the conversation.

I meant to ask if Plato and Aristotle are using the same model despite taking such different approaches. Aristotle takes the cosmogony and edits it so that it can become an argument. Plato works many different arguments that are not integrated into a system in that way. Plato often makes reference to the "fabulous" to draw out a quality he is in accord with or opposes. Since the two thinkers cannot be compared directly as competing models, what would using the same or different model of the divine look like in their case?

I figure I am asking Wayfarer's question from a different starting point. We have developed a language for what is "theological" or not. We have certainly changed our world view over the centuries. If we have lost something then it is going to be difficult to express. Otherwise, it is not lost at all.

We still make cosmogonies.

I was referring to when Critias related the story of what an Egyptian priest told Solon about ancient Athenians — Valentinus

This is interesting in several respects that I won't go into. I will only mention the idea of the old and venerable. We tend to put more value in what is new as more advanced. Plato acknowledges the old but is himself an innovator. The story of the ancient Athenians stands in contrast to Socrates' city in speech. It is significant that in retelling the story of the Republic Socrates neglects to mention the philosopher-king, without whom the city would not harmonious with itself let alone in perfect harmony with the ancient city.

What is one to make of the "fiction that becomes a fact" immediately before a creation story is told?

It becomes fact only if we accept Critias' story to be true. It seems to be fiction in the guise of fact. To pose the question another way: what is the role of poetry in philosophy?

I meant to ask if Plato and Aristotle are using the same model despite taking such different approaches. Aristotle takes the cosmogony and edits it so that it can become an argument. — Valentinus

The Timaeus is strange for a Platonic dialogue. It is almost a monologue, and Socrates uncharacteristically says very little. He does, however, remind Timaeus to call upon the gods in accordance with custom. (27b) This raises the problem of theology, to what extent talk of gods is a matter of custom, of nomos rather than logos.

what would using the same or different model of the divine look like in their case? — Valentinus

One problem the Timaeus raises is what serves as the model. In this case, what is the model of the gods, what is it they are made to look like.

All this calculation of a god who always is concerning the god who was one day to be (34a-b)

The god that came to be is the cosmos. All that comes to be passes away. Not all gods are eternal, unchanging gods. What does it mean to be divine?

The person sees that if there is a hint of yellow in the red, it ought to be judged as orange. So the person applies this theory (you agree that this is theory?) — Metaphysician Undercover

No I don't agree it is a theory; it is a name for a perceptible difference, a distinction.

Theories are imagined purportedly plausible explanations for observed phenomena. They come with predictions as to what would be observed if they were correct. If you think it is a theory then I think you have an eccentric notion of what the word means.

No I don't agree it is a theory; it is a name for a perceptible difference, a distinction. — Janus

There's no name for the perceptible difference. One thing is an orange colour, and another thing is a red colour. What would be the name of the difference between them? There is no name for the difference between them, only an explanation for the observed phenomena, one has yellow in it, the other does not. Seems to me like such differences, or distinctions, are not named, they are described by exactly what you say theories are, "plausible explanations for observed phenomena".