Perhaps it is, and what you are doing isn't.
Either way, this stands:
You take this as implying that light is manufactured in the brain. That's an obvious mistake. — Banno
If Heidegger invented the light bulb, I'd use it. It actually has a use, and a beneficial one, apart from its inventor. But I don't read him merely because he was a loathsome man. — Ciceronianus the White
This is pure flippancy. — Constance
Before you even get to science questions, you have more basic questions about what science takes up as a world. For example, look at experience and its structure... — Constance
We don't need phenomenology in order to explain how a prism works. Indeed, it adds nothing. — Banno
When it comes to things like consciousness, how it operates, and how it produces cognition, perception, experience, etc. it is all guess work. — Apollodorus
So where do we stand, and what in fact is knowledge? — Jan Ardena
The question you should be looking at is, What is the standard for assessing the worth of phenomenological philosophy? Prior to this, one has to look at philosophy itself, and inquire as to where the value lies here. — Constance
Knowledge is what we experience and what we believe to be true. Anything else is opinion. And then there are lots of things that we do not know. — Apollodorus
If we know that “knowledge is experience… etc”, then our knowledge must be outside of of our experience, and what we believe to be true. — Jan Ardena
But an opinion is also what we believe to be true.Knowledge is what we experience and what we believe to be true. Anything else is opinion. And then there are lots of things that we do not know. — Apollodorus
There are different degrees of certainty. — Apollodorus
"We" as the totality of knowers. Individuals know only a fraction of the total. — Apollodorus
is a mischaracterisation.Knowledge is what we experience and what we believe to be true. Anything else is opinion. And then there are lots of things that we do not know. — Apollodorus
I feel bad that I haven't responded before this. I really like talking to you. I think we share a common outlook, an openness, on many of the issues we're discussing. It's just that you are playing on a piano, maybe a pipe organ, and I am playing on a three-string banjo. This old banjo is just right for the song I'm trying to sing. — T Clark
I am looking at that question, and the answer I see is "it has no worth". — Banno
There is only one conclusion, and I mean only one, that issues form this radical hermenuetics of the brain in vat problem: Nothing whatever can be affirmed outside phenomena, thus, the inside and outside of the brain in a vat is nonsense, for it is nonsense to speak of an outside to something all possible insides and outsides contexts of which are bound to a singularity. — Constance
Pls proceed to explain how it is that my cat gets "in" the brain thing.
— Constance
Viewing humans as living organisms in an environment (which is what we are, I believe), I can't help but think this is tantamount to asking someone to explain how our food gets into our stomachs. — Ciceronianus
I see, but don't you see the difference? It would be as if explaining how food get in the stomach included an explanatory dead zone, and so there would be nothing to say. — Constance
How do we deal with the problem of private language? If naming-words refer necessarily to internal phenomena - all singularly private and mutually incomparable - then we cannot communicate. 'Yes, I understand, you are saying things are like such-and-such!' - But 'such and such' can be neither like nor unlike anything shared between us, for nothing is shared. Worse, we cannot distinguish one phenomenon from another even in our own case. If the distinctive criteria for some experience make sense to the person having that experience, then those criteria have a sense that can be explained, communicated and shared between us.
If your view is true then necessarily you cannot explain it to me. Your explanation is a kind of accompanying music to a phenomenal film that is playing in your mind. And my understanding is whatever I might be hearing. — Cuthbert
Of course, which is evidenced by asking questions such as, "How do the scientists know they are not brains in vats, themselves, being controlled and experimented on by other scientists who could also be brains in vats?" You wouldn't be asking this if you wouldn't think that inside vs. outside is a meaningful distinction.The BIV scenario takes for granted that there is an outside and an inside.
— baker
Does it? — Constance
No, it makes it a poorly conceived one.This makes the BIV a metaphysical problem, for there is nothing foundational presented.
The problem of knowledge exists because it is assumed that there is a knower in general, who is outside of the world to be known, and who is defined in terms antithetical to the traits of the world. With analogous assumptions, we could invent and discuss a problem of digestion in general. All that would be required would be to conceive the stomach and food-material as inhabiting different worlds. Such an assumption would leave on our hands the question of the possibility, extent, nature, and genuineness of any transaction between stomach and food.
But because the stomach and food inhabit a continuous stretch of existence, because digestion is but a. correlation of diverse activities in one world, the problems of digestion are specific and plural: What are the particular correlations which constitute it? How does it proceed in different situations? What is favorable and what unfavorable to its best performance?—and so on. Can one deny that if we were to take our clue from the present empirical situation, including the scientific notion of evolution (biological continuity) and the existing arts of control of nature, subject and object would be treated as occupying the same natural world as unhesitatingly as we assume the natural conjunction of an animal and its food? Would it not follow that knowledge is one way in which natural energies cooperate? Would there be any problem save discovery of the peculiar structure of this cooperation, the conditions under which it occurs to best effect, and the consequences which issue from its occurrence? — Ciceronianus
The problem of knowledge exists because it is assumed that there is a knower in general, who is outside of the world to be known, — Ciceronianus
You may not like Heidegger, but he is certainly close to Dewey. — Constance
Why is it that talk about the hammer is not nonsense but talk about removing perceptual apparatus is? — Constance
Of course, which is evidenced by asking questions such as, "How do the scientists know they are not brains in vats, themselves, being controlled and experimented on by other scientists who could also be brains in vats?" You wouldn't be asking this if you wouldn't think that inside vs. outside is a meaningful distinction. — baker
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