Well, I think it hinges on whether divinity is conceived as being personal or not, (it might be either life or mind, but this would not answer that question as to personality) and on the associated question as to whether the nature of divinity is in principle entirely rationally determinable. I think that question is pertinent even when it comes to human personality. If the universe is entirely material and deterministic, and divinity is entirely immanent then, in principle, both divinity and human personality should be entirely determinable.

Metaphysics would then be an entirely naturalistic disciple and would have no power to determine moral action. Moral action itself would be a kind of illusion, an illusion that might be extirpated once sufficient knowledge is attained. There might be many possible versions of naturalistic metaphysics, some of which could incorporate the possibility that nature is not deterministic, but probabilistic. But none of these systems of metaphysics could hold any ultimate moral sway.

I think it is only when it is allowed that there are spiritual realities as well as material and conceptual realities, and that unlike the material and conceptual, the spiritual reality is not rationally determinable even in principle, but may only be intuited, that it would be possible to allow for an irreducible human freedom and responsibility and a reality that grounds (even though that grounding cannot be precisely explicated, but may only be alluded to) moral intuition and action.

Cool!

Yes. I tend to behave as though our common sense beliefs are true, and my metaphysics largely coincides with our common sense beliefs: the world exists and is real, it is full of objects and other people, other people have minds, murder and rape are wrong, and so on.

Would you say common sense is dualistic?

Would you say common sense is dualistic? — Mongrel

In what sense? I'm not sure what you're asking. Bit vague.

Common sense says ideas are real things. Common sense says physical stuff is real. Dualistic?

I think what you mean to suggest is that our experiences of mental and physical phenomena seem fundamentally different, so common sense says that that they are fundamentally different.

No. I was asking if common sense speech and behavior implies dualistic beliefs.

Common sense says ideas are real things. Common sense says physical stuff is real. Dualistic? — Mongrel

Realistic. To be dualistic, like aletheist said, you'd have to consider them to be fundamentally different and, in some ways, mutually exclusive.

I was asking if common sense speech and behavior implies dualistic beliefs. — Mongrel

Maybe. But common sense saying that ideas and physical stuff is real doesn't go far enough to imply dualism.

Maybe. But common sense saying that ideas and physical stuff is real doesn't go far enough to imply dualism. — Sapientia

So how would you describe your common sense metaphysics?

So how would you describe your common sense metaphysics? — Mongrel

Eh? That's not very specific. If you want me to categorise it as either monist, dualist or pluralist, then I won't do that as I'm undecided.

I would describe my common sense metaphysics as common, sensible and metaphysical. X-)

What a jip!

What a jip! — Mongrel

Then, can you be more specific? I suppose I could describe it in a number of ways, but where to begin?

Idealistic, materialistic, some combo of the two?

Idealistic, materialistic, some combo of the two? — Mongrel

Some combo of the two. There certainly seems to be idea-like stuff and material-like stuff, and I would say that that's a common sense metaphysical view. But when you delve deeper it gets more complicated. I wouldn't say that that's enough to rule out either idealism or physicalism or enough to conclude dualism, because that can be consistent with all three; they'd just interpret it in different ways. For example, a physicalist might say that the idea-like stuff is physical or supervenes on the physical.

Searle says the man on the street is a Cartesian.

Searle says the man on the street is a Cartesian. — Mongrel

If Searle said "Jump of a cliff"...

So the man on the street believes that the pineal gland is the principal seat of the soul? And that material objects exist because God exists, God is no deceiver, and God created me and gave me reason, which tells me that my ideas come from external corporeal things?

But seriously, maybe Searle is right that the man on the street is a dualist. I reckon that the man on the street probably has views along those lines, but whether they can rightly (or accurately) be called dualism, I'm not so sure. The man on the street probably hasn't thought about it in depth, if at all really.

The man on the street probably hasn't thought about it in depth, if at all really. — Sapientia

Right. So you're sort headed in the same direction TGW and BC were: our thoughts, speech, and actions aren't informed much by metaphysics. It's the other way around.

But that still leaves the question: what is it in an idealist's experience that gives rise to idealistic metaphysics?

Or could it be something different? Could a metaphysical view be adopted because of medicinal value? A person becomes a physicalist because of childhood fears of ghosts. The fear is eased by assurance that the ghosts aren't real?

The idealist has a childhood fear of oblivion, and so must populate the world with immortal souls?

I don't think the man off the street thinks in terms of realism, idealism, physicalism, monism, etc.

But I wouldn't then say they have no metaphysical beliefs, either. If we're talking about practical metaphysical beliefs of the every day, then I think it would be wrong to think in those categories. God, soul, freedom? Definitely a concern of pretty much everyone. But the fundamental nature of these things, whether they are material or not? Nah.

But God, soul (or mind, if you will), and freedom are certainly metaphysical topics -- they are dominant parts of the nature of reality. And they are the sorts of things which influence the way people behave, too (or, at least, are connected to -- I think the direction can go both ways, i.e. when people stop believing in God they start to behave differently, and when people stop believing in libertarian free will, they begin to judge differently)

Right. So you're sort of headed in the same direction TGW and BC were: our thoughts, speech, and actions aren't informed much by metaphysics. It's the other way around. — Mongrel

At least for the man on the street. But the man on the street probably isn't as philosophical as we are. Nevertheless, in practice, yes, I doubt we're that different from the man on the street in terms of our day-to-day thoughts, speech and actions. We're only philosophical at times, not at all times. And we're more likely to be philosophical in certain circumstances, which provoke in us a more philosophical reaction, as opposed to the typical reaction of a layperson.

I think that there's definitely a limit to what can be applied in practice, at least consistently over a long period of time, when it comes to philosophy. Hume was wise enough to recognise this.

But that still leaves the question: what is it in an idealist's experience that gives rise to idealistic metaphysics? — Mongrel

I think that it's the level of certainty that we have of our own experience - epitomised by, for example, Descartes' cogito or Hume's impressions. This is then contrasted with the level of uncertainty of anything outside of this experience.

Or could it besomething different? Could a metaphysical view be adopted because of medicinal value? A person becomes a physicalist because of childhood fears of ghosts. The fear is eased by assurance that the ghosts aren't real?

The idealist has a childhood fear of oblivion, and so must populate the world with immortal souls. — Mongrel

I very much doubt that. Sounds like wild speculation that a novice to both psychology and philosophy might have just thought up.

My dad taught me about Platonism at a young age. I tend to return to the Republic quite often as it is a very comforting book for a male at least.

I then became familiarized with Stoicism in my teenage years, again from my father, which taught me that every person has the capacity to reason and dictate one's behavior through reason. How? Think Rawl's veil of ignorance.

Then a little later, as the emotions subsided and desires became less intense, I got involved in Buddhism, albeit rather superficially.

The metaphysics of it all is that human nature is inherently good; but, rampant desires and emotions can distort it into something terrible. That reality is essentially mathematics at play and that human nature can be quelled by disregarding one's lusts, desires, and negative emotions (through such stuff as CBT, which really is a form of Western Buddhism, without delving into psychoanalysis of the source of desires, passions, and wants.).

through such stuff as CBT, which really is a form of Western Buddhism... — Question

Actually I think CBT is nearer to Stoicism - there's a really good, current, practical philosopher, Jules Evans, who has made a career out of that - although there are many common points between stoicism and Buddhism.