A "non-fully predetermined" world is not compatible with a "fully predetermined world", so how could "free will" be compatible with both of these? — Metaphysician Undercover

Free will is compatible with both. In a NFPW world you cant know (in principle) what the outcome of your choice will be. In a FPW this can be known in principle.

When two things are clearly incompatible ("NFPW" and "FPW"), how can something else be compatible with both?

As per your description, how can free will allow that you both can, and can't, know what the outcome of your choice will be?

As per your description, how can free will allow that you both can, and can't, know what the outcome of your choice will be? — Metaphysician Undercover

In quantum mechanics someone cannot know a physical outcome with 100% certainty (though the wavefunction develops deterministically). Your not knowing doesnt influence your free will
Nor does full knowledge.

you've just misrepresented "compatibilism". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know that there is only one correct or normative version of compatibilism. What's your version?

That is a common misunderstanding of Dennett by his critics who apparently haven't even bothered to read his works. He doesn't deny that it's real, he just says that it isn't what we folksily think it is. If you say consciousness is not real then you are actually committing the very error you mistakenly attribute to Dennett. What could it mean to say it is ideal other than that it is merely an idea? — Janus

Yes. I've read several of Dennett's books, and his arguments are very clear. But, in calling Consciousness an "illusion", he was basically explaining it away. He's saying, C is not what you think it is. And for most people it's the Soul (the essence of me). So, what he's saying is that Souls are not real, "merely an idea", hence not important. I happen to agree that the "soul" is an idea, an image representing the Self. But, I disagree about its importance to humans, since C is all we know about Self and World. As Descartes concluded, thinking is what I am. A thinking being is not just Real, it's Ideal. :smile:

So long as science was able to stick to the story that the so-called material ultimates were real, then well and good, as far as they're concerned; but that was exactly what was undermined by quantum physics. All of the 'spooky action at a distance' and 'God playing dice' and the rest. But of course, if you so much as refer to any of that, then you're 'peddling woo'. — Wayfarer

Yes. Since Quantum Theory undermined Atomism, along with the fundamental assumptions of Materialism, scientists and philosophers have been scrambling to re-interpret some of the spooky-woo elements of QT. But, not being a born-again Atheist, and being not fully committed to the materialistic worldview, I finally decided to give-in to the implications of that emerging paradigm, and accept that Reality may not be what it appears to be, to the physical eye. That "enlightenment" didn't turn me on to any particular religion, but I gave me new respect for some of the ancient thinkers, who tried to make sense of the weirdness of the world. Besides, if spooky-action-at-a-distance and quantum-leaps ain't woo, I don't know what is. :nerd:

Reality Is Not What It Seems :
___Carlo Rovelli
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality_Is_Not_What_It_Seems

The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality :
___Donald Hoffman
https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-evolutionary-argument-against-reality-20160421/

Since Quantum Theory undermined Atomism, along with the fundamental assumptions of Materialism
... — Gnomon

I disagree. QT has only "undermined" John Dalton, not Democritus. This old canard is idealist – anti-realist – preaching-to-the-choir at best. As a reflective metaphor, classical atomism (re: the Cārvāka, Democritus-Epicurus-Lucretius), especially with respect to the concept of 'void' in comparison to the concept of 'field', quite anticipates QFT (even the Standard Model) & statistical mechanics in broad strokes (without, of course, the theoretical details) as I've pointed out quite a few times without challenge by any of the usual suspects from TPF's *quantum-woo brigade* (QWB). :roll: :sweat:

I've been telling him that – less well said – for over a decade. Some woo-folks just seem to "feel" objectivity is a bug rather than a feature of modern science (or naturalism). — 180 Proof

I don't know about the "less well said", but I agree that the objectivity of science seems to unsettle some. I don't see it as diminishing anything "spiritual" because for me the spiritual consists entirely in affective response ( the right kind of course: so, compassion for other beings and a feeling of reverence for life; that kind of thing).

I disagree. QT has onlu "undermined" John Dalton, not Democritus. This old canard is idealist – anti-realist – preaching-to-the-choir at best. As a reflective metaphor, classical atomism (re: the Cārvāka, Democritus-Lucretius), especially with respect to the concept of 'void' in comparison to the concept of 'field', quite anticipates QFT (even the Standard Model) & statistical mechanics in broad strokes (without, of course, the theoretical details) as I've pointed out quite a few times without challenge by any of the usual suspects from TPF's *quantum-woo brigade* (QWB). :roll: :sweat: — 180 Proof

:up:

But, in calling Consciousness an "illusion", he was basically explaining it away. He's saying, C is not what you think it is. And for most people it's the Soul (the essence of me). — Gnomon

There is that mistake again; Dennett does not say consciousness is an illusion, he says that the intuitive notion of what consciousness is is an illusion. Yes, he's saying consciousness is not what you think it is.There is nothing wrong with the poetic notion of soul; the question is do we have any good reason to believe that there is an essential entity, the immortal soul?

Dennett does not say consciousness is an illusion, — Janus

He thinks the first-person perspective is an illusion, or no different in meaning from the third-person perspective.

Wouldn't you say the world must have been created when the first humans arose somewhere around 300,000 years ago?

I judged that comment I made 'too sarcastic' and deleted it. I try to avoid sarcasm.

As a reflective metaphor, classical atomism (re: the Cārvāka, Democritus-Lucretius), especially with respect to the concept of 'void' in comparison to the concept of 'field', quite anticipates QFT (even the Standard Model) & statistical mechanics in broad strokes (without, of course, the theoretical details) as I've pointed out quite a few times without challenge — 180 Proof

OK here's a challenge. You won't be able to back that up with any reputable sources. The classical atomism of the Greeks and Indians was unambiguously posited on the existence of point-particles, indivisible material units. Democritean atomism posits only atoms and the void as the sole constituents of the entire cosmos. It's not remotely comparable to quantum field theory. There are some possible comparisons between 'fields' and ancient concepts of prana or chi or what not, but it has nothing to do with atomism per se. Again, Heisenberg outlines this in his lecture The Debate between Plato and Democritus. (Spoiler alert - he declares Plato the victor.)

The Buddhists challenged Indian atomists by saying that if an atom was infinitesimally small, then it couldn't have any sides, because sides are parts, and an infinitesmal thing doesn't have parts. So if it has no parts, it can't come into contact with anything. But of course neither the Buddhists (who actually believed in a kind of atom as a momentary constituent of experience) nor their opponents anticipated fields (although again, Buddhism had an esoteric doctrine of the 'Buddha field' but that is hardly relevant I think.)

I judged that comment I made 'too sarcastic' and deleted it. I try to avoid sarcasm. — Wayfarer

It's still there on my computer. The universal mind must be malfunctioning.

:up:

OK here's a challenge. You won't be able to back that up with any reputable sources. — Wayfarer

Sound reasoning suffices to exorcise your appeals to authoritative woo, sir. For instance, what part of the post linked below can't you grasp?

... as I've pointed out quite a few times without challenge ... — 180 Proof

The anachronistic concept of "point particles" maps almosts completely on to fundamental (i.e. "uncuttable") planck units (re: my link). Atomists propose a conceptual metaphor, not an explanatory model; so QFT – the irony of 'a non-physicalist aka "idealist" hijacking and pseudo-scientistically repurposing a physical theory as (wait for it, wait for it) physical evidence against a conceptual metaphor in order to advance a ("perennial") hopelessly confused non-physical agenda' is almost-painfully too rich – refutes nothing except the woo-bags who incorrigibly (dogmatically) keep making this category mistake.

You have to be able to do better than that. ‘Tortuous prose’ falls short.

There is only one profound philosophical point that has been made by quantum physics, which is, the undermining of the idea that there are fundamental physical units or realities that exist independently of or outside of any act of measurement or perception by observers. And that point stands.

Wtf are talking about? Your scientific illiteracy is tiresome only because you lean so heavily on it and show no willingness or ability to think philosophically through the interpretations of the concepts at issue. Also, moving the goal posts and strawmanning atomists shows bad faith. You rationalize from a position, Woofarer, rather than soundly argue to a position; cite all the misreadings you'd like ...

I have plenty of references for what I’ve said. Current book I’m reading on it is Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin. Others I’ve read recently are Manjit Kumar’s Quantum, and David Lindley’s Uncertainty. I can provide as many references and specifics as you like.

To re-iterate: science has found no fundamental material particle corresponding to the atom. At best it has deductive arguments based on mathematical reasoning for same. You’re the one grasping at straws and as always ducking for cover by throwing insults and ad homs.

To re-iterate: science has found no fundamental material particle corresponding to the atom. — Wayfarer

Yeah, sure, and classical atomism does not theoretically posit "fundamental material particles" because its not a scientiific model but a conceptual metaphor. Just to re-iterate. But see, Wayf, you do not understand what you're talking about or have read on this subject. Again, conspicuously, you make my point. One more time. Can you think things through or only repeatedly cite ad nauseam like a trained parrot what apparently you need to misunderstand?

classical atomism does not theoretically posit "fundamental material particles" because its not a scientiific model but a conceptual metaphor. — 180 Proof

I did a term paper under Keith Campbell at the University of Sydney, on the subject of Philosophy of Matter, and Lucretius’ atomism (gained High Distinction.) And I say you’re wrong. ‘Atomos’ means literally ‘uncuttable’, it was envisaged as an absolutely existing point-particle. You’re the one using it, or misusing it, as a conceptual metaphor.

Can you think things through or only repeatedly cite ad nauseam like trained parrot what apparently you need to misunderstand? — 180 Proof

One more time - can you engage in a debate without resorting to ad hominems and insults?

I've not resorted to ad hominems but have attacked your statements as mostly erroneous, confused and often fallacious. As for "insults", truth hurts it seems, doesn't it? :shade:

Prove me wrong, Woofarer, expose me once and for all as an incoherent, reductive materalist gasbag and shut me up by accepting my challenge to debate formally – the proposition: (e.g.) Modern physics disproves classical atomist metaphysics. You affirm the proposition, I oppose. You get final say on picking the moderator, same (or similar) rules as my previous debate with Hanover (details to be further discussed in pm). What say you? :smirk:

My thoughts exactly. Mainstream culture has drawn conclusions from the supposed 'discoveries of science', such as that the Universe is the product of physical forces, which have considerable philosophical and social ramifications. — Wayfarer

As opposed to what? Non-physical "forces"? That's one side of the problem. The other is the nature of some of the "conclusions" drawn. How many people, for example, would you say, when they speak of the "universe," or science itself, have even a remote idea of what they're talking about? And how would you know?

Science having "considerable philosophical and social ramifications": do you have a problem with that? In fact, when you speak of science, exactly what are you talking about? Because I suspect you lost sight of that a long time ago - or never had it. Here's a hint: it's a tool.

:100:

I buy the buzzing confusion. I buy the stone. I buy the atom and I buy QM. And I buy the "I." Being is a predicate; it is what an I predicates. No I, no predication, no being.

That is, there is a buzzing confusion, also a stone when the buzzing confusion resolves itself into a stone. Atoms and quantum phenomena. All the g/Gs anyone could possibly want. But the language, thinking, and understandings pertaining to each essentially different, similarities, resemblances, notwithstanding. The trick is keeping track of them at least well enough to not be completely confused by the similarities and the ability of language to stitch together in language things which do not go together.

I have a barrel of fish. Do I have a fish? It would seem so, though the barrel and quantity fall away. I extract a spleen from the fish. Do I still have a fish? It would seem not, the fish - a quality - having fallen away.

For anything to be, it must fall within the applicable parameters of its being. Outside those parameters, no such being.

That leaves the question, is there a tree in the forest, or even a forest, if no one's around? Or a variant of the question: how can anything be supposed, if there is no such thing as a presupposition? This seems an ultimate critique of knowledge - there has to be a knower, and the limits of that knowledge constrained by the nature of the knowing.

As the late Heath Ledger's "Joker" might say Why so scared, @Wayfarer? :razz:

've not resorted to ad hominems — 180 Proof

'woofarer' is an ad hominem.

To say that quantum physics did not completely revolutionise the conception of physics is not a matter for debate. The question of 'the role of the observer' and the nature of the wave-function in the Schrodinger equation of physics are still the basis of controversy and the reason for the ongoing debates about the interpretation of quantum physics. All of this is common knowledge.

These are the sources for what I've said.

Quantum: Einstein, Bohr and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality, Manjit Kumar

Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science, David Lindley

What is Real? The The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics Adam Becker.

Nature Loves to Hide: Quantum Physics and the Nature of Reality, a Western Perspective, Shimon Malin.

If you want to discuss what's in those books, then go ahead. But not interested in a debate.



Can't make a lick of sense out of anything you've written there.

He thinks the first-person perspective is an illusion, or no different in meaning from the third-person perspective. — Wayfarer

Again I have to disagree. Dennett thinks the first person perspective is not what we think it is, not that it is an illusion. Our perceptual and affective experiences are real (what could be more real?); it is what we naively think they are which is an illusion; a kind of reification.

The term naive realism applies equally to the reification of the experiencer ("cogito, ergo sum") as real 'non-physical' entity, as it does to objects as real physical entities. We are, naively, reification machines.

Again I have to disagree. — Janus

Again, you’d be mistaken. Just read this passage again and tell me what you think Nagel has wrong when he spells out what Dennett says and what he thinks is wrong with it. That review is titled ‘Is Consciousness an Illusion?’, which is a constant theme in Dennett’s writing.

Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality.

The term naive realism applies equally to the reification of the experiencer ("cogito, ergo sum") — Janus

‘Cogito’ is first-person participle - ‘I think’. Tell me how that ‘reifies’ anything.

Granted, Husserl says in Crisis of European Sciences, that Descartes does tend to make an error of reifiying the cogito as something objectively real, ‘the little tag-end of the world’ is how he put it. He nevertheless believes that Descartes discovery of the cogito was a milestone in modern philosophy.

We are, naively, reification machines. — Janus

:100:

'woofarer' is an ad hominem. — Wayfarer

Maybe Woofarer is unflattering but it's not an ad hominem.

To say that quantum physics did not completely revolutionise the conception of physics is not a matter for debate.

And since I've never said nor inplied this, I guess we agree on something.

But not interested in a debate.

Of course you're not. :smirk:

Again, you’d be mistaken. Just read this passage again and tell me what you think Nagel has wrong when he spells out what Dennett says and what he thinks is wrong with it. That review is titled ‘Is Consciousness an Illusion?’, which is a constant theme in Dennett’s writing. — Wayfarer

'Curiously, then, our first-person point of view of our own minds is not so different from our second-person point of view of others’ minds: we don’t see, or hear, or feel, the complicated neural machinery churning away in our brains but have to settle for an interpreted, digested version, a user-illusion that is so familiar to us that we take it not just for reality but also for the most indubitable and intimately known reality of all. — Thomas Nagel, Is Consciousness an Illusion?

Above is what I presume to be a passage from Dennett quoted by Nagel in the passge you asked me to look at again. As I read it Dennett is saying that we don't perceive the processes that produce what we call our 'first person experience'; we are blind to its origin. We know intimately how it seems to us, and from that basis we interpret it as a kind of independent non-physical reality, whose nature we are certain we correctly intuit. It's the interpretation of consciousness that Dennett is questioning not the consciousness itself.

So this:

"Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”

I think is quite mistaken because Dennett is not asking us to turn our backs on our experiences of " color, flavor, sound, touch, etc.", which no sane person could deny we enjoy, but to question the naive interpretation of those experiences which purports to tell us what the true nature of the perceiver is: an independently (from the body) existent non-physical substance or essence or soul. Of course, as you say the "cogito" by itself is not a reification; it is the "ergo sum" which is the reification.The fact that Descartes' formulation may have been a "milestone' in the sense of being influential in the course of modern philosophy doesn't make it right. Spinoza was already onto Descartes' error long before Damasio.

The fact that Descartes' formulation may have been a "milestone' in the sense of being influential in the course of modern philosophy doesn't make it right. Spinoza was already onto Descartes' error long before Damasio. — Janus

:fire: