So where are we left with your JTB on my view? Not in a very good place. Facts don’t matter, truth is meaningless, and belief is an aside. You may not wish to get me started on justification. — Ennui Elucidator

So, what more can be said about facts wrt. to justification if you care to elaborate?

Facts are independent of a knower, knowledge, on the other hand, is not. — TheMadFool

So, facts exist, as in, independently, out there somewhere, waiting to be discovered?

Frankly my views on it are anathema to a civilized audience.

Justification strikes me as an ethical evaluation, i.e. that given a particular set of circumstances (both with respect to X and the way in which we have decided X is acceptably established as true), one should believe X. So rather than doing the work of establishing knowledge from JTB by way of internal evaluation (“Do I have sufficient warrant to believe X” or “Do I have sufficient warrant to believe X is true?’), justification is actually the way in which we evaluate the claims of other people’s claims to knowledge. The reason that this distinction is important is because we simultaneously 1) recognize (at least currently) that belief formation is not necessarily (or perhaps even a little bit) the result of some higher order epistemic evaluation that compels belief and 2) demand that the only warrant for belief is higher order epistemic evaluation. This highlights a feature of justification - that it is a social phenomenon about mental coercion rather than an effort at accurate description about why an individual assents to a particular belief.

In essence, I am arguing that “knowledge” is about social conventions (yes, yet another entry in our language community) and the power to demand either that people accept or reject a particular belief. There is no content to discussions of knowledge aside from “you should agree with me” because I (or my reasoning) can compel you. Differently, arguments about epistemology are probably arguments about impotence of intellect.

T Clark’s contributions are (at least on first blush) a refreshing break from the tyranny of conventional JTB talk. Even if his ideas ultimately lead to a social construction of provisional knowledge which people should accept given the current warrant, it leaves room in the conversation for people to give warrant as needed to their particular circumstance where the consequences of being wrong become unacceptable for the individual. I get that the intellect (the power of the pen) is meant to be greater than the body (the power of the sword), and one can see the development of ideas about truth and knowledge independent of conventional power being worthy pursuits, but it is consequences outside of our individual control that end up playing the bigger role in our social expressions of belief, truth, justification, and knowledge.

Justification strikes me as an ethical evaluation, i.e. that given a particular set of circumstances (both with respect to X and the way in which we have decided X is acceptably established as true), one should believe X. So rather than doing the work of establishing knowledge from JTB by way of internal evaluation (“Do I have sufficient warrant to believe X” or “Do I have sufficient warrant to believe X is true?’), justification is actually the way in which we evaluate the claims of other people’s claims to knowledge. The reason that this distinction is important is because we simultaneously 1) recognize (at least currently) that belief formation is not necessarily (or perhaps even a little bit) the result of some higher order epistemic evaluation that compels belief and 2) demand that the only warrant for belief is higher order epistemic evaluation. This highlights a feature of justification - that it is a social phenomenon about mental coercion rather than an effort at accurate description about why an individual assents to a particular belief. — Ennui Elucidator

Very very interesting. I would comment that epistemic evaluation is of import to the statement that facts are truth apt. Nobody but me is talking about the social ramifications of fact-hood by being truth-apt by for example political organizations or fact checkers.

And this happens in reality, boo-hoo! :nerd:

Are there rules about when a statement can become a fact or attain the qualifier of "fact-hood"? — Shawn

A statement will be a fact if and only if it is true.

Seems pretty straight forward.

is this a synthetic a priori? — Shawn

Archaic language. Understanding that facts are true is part of learning the language game around facts and truth.

Banno says that a fact is a true state of affairs — Shawn

Well, no; it pays to be pedantic here. There are no untrue states of affairs; if it is the case, then it it true. So a fact is a state of affairs.

Understanding that facts are true is part of learning the language game around facts and truth. — Banno

You say this as if it was a rule. A lot of talk over the past four years in my country of residence was the ambiguity between alternate-facts and actual facts. Searle talks about social institutions not stating facts but supporting how facts attain their status through the intersubjectivity of the individual interacting in society.

Would you agree with Searle?

There are no untrue states of affairs — Banno

So a fact is a state of affairs. — Banno

But scope matters, doesn't it? As well as the epistemic content relevant to the breadth of the scope, no?

Does this change anything?

It is undeniable that there is uncertainty in everything we call a fact. — T Clark

I'll deny that!

Which might say nothing more than that some fools will doubt anything just for kicks. It reamins to be shown that unreasonable scepticism has a purpose.

Do you doubt that you are reading this post? Evan as you read the post?

And do you doubt that there is a post to read? A forum for it to appear on?

But such things are odd bits of biography; stuff to tell your psychoanalyst. Those doubts will not prevent you from replying!

The price of doubting everything is incoherence.

But this is old stuff. Bread and butter philosophy.

Would you agree with Searle? — Shawn

More often than not.

SO, what do you make of the notion of an alternate fact?

But scope matters, doesn't it? As well as the epistemic content relevant to the breadth of the scope, no? — Shawn

Language games occur within a way of living; is that what you have in mind?

So, facts exist, as in, independently, out there somewhere, waiting to be discovered? — Shawn

What would the alternative be? We make shit up? :chin:

Language games occur within a way of living; is that what you have in mind? — Banno

Not entirely. When stating a fact, don't we have to consider the scope of the state of affairs?

Perhaps more to the point, are facts subject to sensibility?

Perhaps an example...

What would the alternative be? We make shit up? :chin: — TheMadFool

No, I mean that if we assume that truth is something up for debate, then are there possibly differing senses of facts?

Truth isn't up for debate - that'd be belief.

Truth isn't up for debate - that'd be belief. — Banno

I assumed that was justification?

You have to believe whatever is proffered as justification, if it is to serve its purpose.

You have to believe whatever is proffered as justification, if it is to serve its purpose. — Banno

But, justification is truth-apt. Beliefs need not be.

What would the alternative be? We make shit up? :chin:
— TheMadFool

No, I mean that if we assume that truth is something up for debate, then are there possibly differing senses of facts? — Shawn

Indeed, the word "fact" seems to be an endorsement of the correspondence theory of truth.

But, justification is truth-apt. Beliefs need not be. — Shawn

Might leave you to think on that. Did you mean "truth-apt" or "true"?

Truth-apt is capable of being either true or false.

Can one have beliefs that are not just not true, but not even able to be true or false?

Might leave you to think on that. Did you mean "truth-apt" or "true"? — Banno

I'm operating from the assumption that there isn't one theory of truth, be it (coherentist, correspondence, or pragmatic, neither deflationary) that encompasses the ability to determine the truth of a fact.

Truth-apt is capable of being either true or false. — Banno

Yes, that is true. But, it seems to me that justification enables different theories of truth to determine whether an utterance is true or not. And, in my view to determine the fact-hood of an utterance.

Can one have beliefs that are not just not true, but not even able to be true or false? — Banno

I'm not quite sure what this means in total. Care to explain?

Indeed, the word "fact" seems to be an endorsement of the correspondence theory of truth. — TheMadFool

And seemingly, this is what Banno has been professing as the way to determine an utterance being a fact from a proposition...

Indeed, the word "fact" seems to be an endorsement of the correspondence theory of truth.
— TheMadFool

And seemingly, this is what Banno has been professing as the way to determine an utterance being a fact from a proposition... — Shawn

Any theory/definition of truth in which the correspondence between what's truth-apt (propositions) and what we call reality is weakened or nonexistent is what some might call a make-believe world (the mind calling the shots instead of reality). Different strokes for different folks I suppose.

I'm not quite sure what this means in total. Care to explain? — Shawn

You said beliefs need not be truth-apt. That means there are beliefs that are not even able to be true or false.

That looks like nonsense.

Hence, beliefs are truth-apt.

You said beliefs need not be truth-apt. — Banno

Yes, like opinions, prejudices, bias... They all fall under the banner of 'beliefs', no?

hey all fall under the banner of 'beliefs' — Shawn

Your opinion can't be true? Nor your beliefs?

Being true is what a fact does. If you disagree, then you are on your own. — Banno

So you count as true the Dreamtime of the "Aboriginals". For them its a fact.

A statement will be a fact if and only if it is true.

Seems pretty straight forward. — Banno

Problem with facts are the fact that, all accounts and descriptions of occurrences is just interpretations, which call for verifications before qualifying as knowledge. (including this fact)