For Aristotle, there was no demarcation between physics and metaphysics. That changed with modern science. Whereas metaphysics explains the big picture, modern science is restricted to mathematical models and a notion of truth grounded in the predictive capacity of those models. This is a demarcation, not a negative criticism of either metaphysics or science. — Edward Dougherty, The Real War on Science
Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.
Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.”
The demand for quantitative prediction places a burden on the scientist. Mathematical theories must be formulated and be precisely tied to empirical measurements.
In my own terms, following on what you wrote and contra Wayfarer's anti-modern polemical definition: naturalism, since antiquity, denotes describing or explaining some aspect of nature only in terms of (an)other aspect(s) of nature. Questions like 'Is nature all that is real?' or 'Are supernaturalia real?' are speculations which are simply outside of naturalism's remit. Chinese daojia and Greek atomism, as examples, have always had this naturalistic approach, or stance, in common. A naturalist can be agnostic about 'the supernatural', methodologically not relying on it to build explanatory models, though, of course, many have become dogmatic to the point of scientism perhaps as a vestigial (institutionalized?) overreaction to Scholasticism, Romanticism and the Counter-Enlightenment. — 180 Proof
A naturalist can be agnostic about 'the supernatural', methodologically not relying on it to build explanatory models, though, of course, many have become dogmatic to the point of scientism — 180 Proof
The epistemic preeminence of science is not because "science assumed the cloak of authority" but rather simply due the fact that science is metaphysics which works and is reliably objective — 180 Proof
You stereotyping me as some 'reductive, scientistic, atheistic, anti-supernaturalist' — 180 Proof
Had I instead quipped 'science is magic that works', you'd now be trying to mischaracterize my position as 'science is magic'. Read in the full context of that post, what you allege is patently false and you know it. And certainly in the context of the three of my posts I quoted to you previously. The only thing you're "challenging", Wayfarer, is another one of your strawmen.And now, challenged by me, you're trying to say that you agree that science is not, in fact, a metaphysic. — Wayfarer
The cultural context we’re all in is that ‘neo-Darwinian materialism’ is the ‘official doctrine’ of the mainstream academy; that we’re products of an evolutionary process that is wholly natural and presumably governed by physical laws without reference to anything beyond that. — Wayfarer
another one of your strawmen. — 180 Proof
It is significant that you start this statement with "cultural context" — Fooloso4
Nietzsche's On the Use and Abuse of History for Life — Fooloso4
Existentialism does not fall on one side or the other of natural/supernatural, physical/metaphysical. In general, contemporary philosophers who see history and culture as fundamental to human being do not fall on one side or the other. — Fooloso4
Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver, Ideas have Consequences
There is the view that the abandonment of metaphysics in the Western tradition is an intellectual calamity, although of course that is regarded as reactionary in today's culture, but I think it is likely true. — Wayfarer
I have studied metaphysics and philosophy informally, although did undergraduate philosophy at Uni, so any guidance, further readings, on this question welcome.
Here I want to consider whether there is a difference between what is real and what exists.
'Exist' is derived from a root meaning to 'be apart', where 'ex' = apart from or outside, and 'ist' = be. Ex-ist then means to be a seperable object, to be 'this thing' as distinct from 'that thing'. This applies to all the existing objects of perception - chairs, tables, stars, planets, and so on - everything which we would normally call 'a thing'. So we could say that 'things exist'. No surprises there, and I don't think anyone would disagree with that proposition.
Now to introduce a metaphysical concern. I was thinking about 'God', in the sense understood by classical metaphysics and theology. Whereas the things of perception are composed of parts and have a beginning and an end in time, 'God' is, according to classical theology, 'simple' - that is, not composed of parts- and 'eternal', that is, not beginning or ending in time.
Therefore, 'God' does not 'exist', being of a different nature to anything we normally perceive. Theologians would say 'God' was superior to or beyond existence (for example, Pseudo-Dionysius; Eckhardt; Tillich.) I don't think this is a controversial statement either, when the terms are defined this way (and leaving aside whether you believe in God or not, although if you don't the discussion might be irrelevant or meaningless.)
But this made me wonder whether 'what exists' and 'what is real' might, in fact, be different. For example, consider number. Obviously we all concur on what a number is, and mathematics is lawful; in other words, we can't just make up our own laws of numbers. But numbers don't 'exist' in the same sense that objects of perception do; there is no object called 'seven'. You might point at the numeral, 7, but that is just a symbol. What we concur on is a number of objects, but the number cannot be said to exist independent of its apprehension - at least, not in the same way objects apparently do. In what realm or sphere do numbers exist? 'Where' are numbers? Surely in the intellectual realm, of which perception is an irreducible part. So numbers are not 'objective' in the same way that 'things' are.
However this line of argument might indicate that what is real might be different to what exists.
I started wondering, this is perhaps related to the Platonic distinction between 'intelligible objects' and 'objects of perception'. Objects of perception - ordinary things - only exist, in the Platonic view, because they conform to, and are instances of, laws. Particular things are simply ephemeral instances of the eternal forms, but in themselves, they have no actual being. Their actual being is conferred by the fact that they conform to laws (logos?). So 'existence' in this sense, and I think this is the sense it was intended by the Platonic and neo-Platonic schools, is illusory. Earthly objects of perception exist, but only in a transitory and imperfect way. They are 'mortal' - perishable, never perfect, and always transient. Whereas the archetypal forms exist in the One Mind and are apprehended by Nous: while they do not exist they provide the basis for all existing things by creating the pattern, the ratio, whereby things are formed. They are real, above and beyond the existence of wordly things; but they don't actually exist. They don't need to exist; things do the hard work of existence.
So the ordinary worldly person is caught up in 'his or her particular things', and thus is ensnared in illusory and ephemeral concerns. Whereas the Philosopher, by realising the transitory nature of ordinary objects of perception, learns to contemplate within him or herself, the eternal Law whereby things become manifest according to their ratio, and by being Disinterested, in the original sense of that word.
Do you think this is a valid interpretation of neo-platonism? Do you think it makes the case that what is real, and what exists, might be different? And if this is so, is this a restatement of the main theme of classical metaphysics? Or is it a novel idea? — Jeeprs
See Nietzsche's On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, how second natures become first natures. Existentialism does not fall on one side or the other of natural/supernatural, physical/metaphysical. . — Fooloso4
The Foreword
“Incidentally, I despise everything which merely instructs me without
increasing or immediately enlivening my activity.” These are Goethe's words.
With them, as with a heartfelt expression of Ceterum censeo [I judge
otherwise], our consideration of the worth and the worthlessness of history
may begin. For this work is to set down why, in the spirit of Goethe's saying,
we must seriously despise instruction without vitality, knowledge which
enervates activity, and history as an expensive surplus of knowledge and a
luxury, because we lack what is still most essential to us and because what is
superfluous is hostile to what is essential. To be sure, we need history. But we
need it in a manner different from the way in which the spoilt idler in the
garden of knowledge uses it, no matter how elegantly he may look down on
our coarse and graceless needs and distresses. That is, we need it for life and
action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and action or merely for
glossing over the egotistical life and the cowardly bad act. We wish to use
history only insofar as it serves living. But there is a degree of doing history
and a valuing of it through which life atrophies and degenerates. To bring this
phenomenon to light as a remarkable symptom of our time is every bit as
necessary as it may be painful. — Nietzsche - On the Use and Abuse of History for Life
Idetestdon't read Nietszche. — Wayfarer
"Metaphysics in its classic sense has always been understood to be the rational investigation of the eternal order. — Wayfarer
'neo-Darwinian materialism’ is the ‘official doctrine’ of the mainstream academy; that we’re products of an evolutionary process that is wholly natural and presumably governed by physical laws without reference to anything beyond that. — Wayfarer
Very similar style
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