First, I don’t assume determinism. I assume a form of compatibilism that is largely rooted in what most would nowadays term indeterminism (rather than one that is grounded in determinism). This part is exceedingly hard to explain in a nutshell. But such is my stance: compatibilism. — javra

I somehow mixed up "determinacy" (which comes up in the title of this thread) with "determinism" (which doesn't). I did actually think you're a compatibilist when it comes to mind because you were talking about "non-sentient teloi" in a bracket in your opening post..Where this occasionally tripped me up is in this: "How does a 'goal' determine an outcome, when you clearly say it doesn't?" I think that's why I focussed on the telosis?

For any given goal, there can be subordinate goals and supraordinate goals. Subordinate goals will serve the purpose of accomplishing the given goal. Ultimate supraordinate goals can potentially take the form of what various philosophers have described as a psyche’s overarching and generalized will to – be this will to power (Nietzsche), to meaning (Frankl), to pleasure or else the “pleasure principle” (Freud, which I acknowledge is not that great of a philosopher), and so forth (self-preservation also comes to mind as a candidate for some), which would then as an ultimate supraordinate goal hold all other goals as subordinates of itself. — javra

I almost got this far. What's new to me is that at the end of a sring of the goal hierarchy you end up with something like "generalised will". That's interesting.

And, I’m now thinking, other examples might have better served my purpose (my intent, or goal, or telos) of clarifying where I’m coming from. — javra

Yeah, it being a fairly formal transaction with typical goals for typical participants raises some questions. It's an interesting example, though.

Even if "the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed", that needn't contradict the statement that "we are sensing at the present". The present could just as easily be defined as the time at which we are sensing, instead of "the time of things" - whatever that is. — Luke

I did not deny that we are sensing at the present, I deny that we experience the present, as Javra said. What I was trying to argue is "that we sense at the present" is a logical conclusion, not directly derived from experience. Your post simply demonstrates a logical necessity to assume 'the present", as I've argued. We conclude, from logic, that we must be experiencing at the present, but we do not actually experience the present.

That is, when is the present moment if "the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed"? If the present moment is not 'the time at which things are sensed', then the present moment must presumably be time shifted by adding or subtracting some arbitrary amount of time to or from 'the time at which things are sensed', in order to account for light bouncing off an object, brain function, or something else. In other words, you are still using 'the time at which things are sensed' as your benchmark of the present moment, except that you account for some arbitrary "gap" or "medium" between an event and our sensing it. I can tell you what I am sensing at any given time, but what is the definition of this arbitrary gap or "medium" between some event and my sensing it? What, according to you, is the amount of time between the present moment and the moment things are sensed? — Luke

As I explained, we derive directly from experience, memories, (that something just happened, or happened a long time ago), and also anticipations (concerning things which will happen). This provides what you call the "benchmark of the present moment". We do not derive directly from experience, the idea that things are happening (and we are experiencing things happening) at the present.

The reason why I say this is that "time" is conceptual. So to have a concept of "the present" which is grounded in, or substantiated by a concept of "time" (i.e. to have a temporal notion of "present"), requires that there is coherency between the two "time" and "present". To produce a concept of time requires reference to past and future, as I described. And when the concept of "time" is constructed in this way, the idea that things are happening at the present moment becomes incoherent. because no time passes at the present moment, and activity requires the passage of time.

As an alternative, you might suggest that we start with the simple notion that we are experiencing things occurring at "the present". From here, we cannot derive a concept of time though, without referencing past or future, .so this concept of "the present" is not temporal.

This is the problem with Javra's proposition. If we start with the assumption that we are experiencing "the present", then there is no means by which 'the present" says anything temporal, it's just, 'being-here', 'being-there', or something like that, in an eternal (as in outside of time) way. And there is no problem with saying that we experience the present, so long as we do not conflate this idea of "present" with the temporal idea of "the present", which gives the present a relation to past and future. to give 'being present' a temporal meaning requires reference to before and after. So Javra's proposition gives us no approach to "goals".

It's merely two different ways of describing "experience". Javra describes experience as being present, and I describe experience as consisting of memories and anticipations. What I am arguing is that Javra's description, of being-here, or being-there, excludes temporality from experience, whereas my description makes temporality an essential part of experience. And unless we start with a description like mine, we have no basis for a "goal" based ontology which is also supported by experience. We could still make a goal based ontology but it would be supported by assumptions produced in some way other than experience. In other words, Javra has no way to get from the description of experience as "being present", to the premise that having a goal is experiential, without switching to a description of experience which includes the anticipation of the future as an essential part of the experience.

So I think simple perceptual identification is already well along in capturing the centra composted of the kind of intentionality you have in mind. — Joshs

Thanks again for the informative post. Yes, I in fact do agree with what you've outlined. For me, at least, the intending that occurs so as to perceive through any of the physiological senses occurs via sub/unconscious process of mind. While I don't want to derail the thread's theme with this, I by this infer that a total mind is composed of a multitude of sub/unconscious agencies (which in a healthy individual typically work in harmony, i.e. in unison) in addition to the conscious agency which we experientially know ourselves to be. An emotion or want that bothers us consciously (e.g., a pang of envy which we then proceed to dispel as inappropriate ) serves as an example of such a sub/unconscious agency that stands out to us for as long as we are opposed to what the emotion/want desires, or else intends. But I'm probably opening up a whole can of worms with this. Still, this is how I've so far made sense of perceptions being intentional, both in the sense of aboutness and in the sense of intending: via the intending of very basic unconscious agencies that together constitute the mostly involuntary conscious act of perception (leading to the notion of aboutness).

Yes, I'll need to read more into Husserl. Please let me know if anything just said in this post - regarding a multitude of agencies that typically work in unison constituting a single mind - strikes you as too audacious.

So its know, I'll contribute later on.

Please let me know if anything just said in this post - regarding a multitude of agencies that typically work in unison constituting a single mind - strikes you as too audacious. — javra

The modular view of mind has a long pedigree in cognitive science. Check out Marvin Minsky’s ‘Society of Mind’.

I did not deny that we are sensing at the present, I deny that we experience the present — Metaphysician Undercover

What's the difference?

As I explained, we derive directly from experience, memories, (that something just happened, or happened a long time ago), and also anticipations (concerning things which will happen). This provides what you call the "benchmark of the present moment". We do not derive directly from experience, the idea that things are happening (and we are experiencing things happening) at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

We "derive directly from experience" our conscious perceptions of the world, just as much as our memories or anticipations. We don't need the additional "idea" of these things (over and above these things).

To produce a concept of time requires reference to past and future, as I described. And when the concept of "time" is constructed in this way, the idea that things are happening at the present moment becomes incoherent. because no time passes at the present moment, and activity requires the passage of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I could equally say that no time passes in the past or the future, either. In that case, according to your logic, past and future cannot produce the concept of time, either.

you might suggest that we start with the simple notion that we are experiencing things occurring at "the present". From here, we cannot derive a concept of time though, without referencing past or future, .so this concept of "the present" is not temporal. — Metaphysician Undercover

The concepts of "past", "present" and "future" are interrelated. You "derive" the present from the past and future as much as you "derive" the past and future from the present.

If we start with the assumption that we are experiencing "the present", then there is no means by which 'the present" says anything temporal, it's just, 'being-here', 'being-there', or something like that, in an eternal (as in outside of time) way. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we can say that we are always experiencing at the present moment, or that the present moment is (defined as) the time at which we are sensing/experiencing. The "outside of time" (or B-theory or untensed) way of expressing this is as being "simultaneous with" (some time or event).

It's merely two different ways of describing "experience". Javra describes experience as being present, and I describe experience as consisting of memories and anticipations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your description of experience does not include conscious perceptions of the world?

What's the difference? — Luke

There is an object of experience, just like there is an object of sensation. The present is not an object of experience, nor is it an object of sensation. So, we do not experience the present, though we conclude logically that we experience at the present.

We "derive directly from experience" our conscious perceptions of the world, just as much as our memories or anticipations. We don't need the additional "idea" of these things (over and above these things). — Luke

The present is not a perception. And, since it is clear that a conception is not the same type of thing as a sense perception, nor is it the same type of thing as a memory or an anticipation, being composed of elements from all these three, I think we do need the additional "idea" over and above these things.

I could equally say that no time passes in the past or the future, either. In that case, according to your logic, past and future cannot produce the concept of time, either. — Luke

I agree with the first part here, you can equally say that no time passes in the past and future, but you cannot say that this statement does not employ a concept of time. You have used "time" in that statement. So you simple employ a particular concept of time, within which time passes, and claim that such a conception of past and future would not require that particular concept of time, but it just requires a different conception of time.

But we can say that we are always experiencing at the present moment, — Luke

I look at this as incoherent. No time passes at a "moment", so it is impossible that we are doing anything at the "present moment" because activity requires the passage of time. I find "present moment" to be logically incoherent and that is why I assume the need for two dimensional time, a thick present, or a present with breadth. The idea of a timeline, with a point that marks the present, even if that point is supposed to be moving, is inconsistent with what we experience. We experience activity, change occurring at the present, therefore there must be temporal duration of the present, and not a "present moment".

Your description of experience does not include conscious perceptions of the world? — Luke

That's right, I am a skeptic and I find the proposed concept of "the world" to be unacceptable as a starting premise. There are objects of sensation, as I said above, but as I also said previously, these objects are all in the past by the time they are perceived by me through the medium of sensation. Therefore I class such perceptions with memories, images which appear to me, but the true object represented by the image is in the past. So what you call "conscious perceptions of the world" (assuming that you refer to sense perceptions) are in fact memories, by the time the images are present to the conscious mind.

There is an object of experience, just like there is an object of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

What's the difference?

I think we do need the additional "idea" over and above these things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you've grasped the point. You said that we "derive directly from experience" our memories and anticipations. But then you said:

"We do not derive directly from experience, the idea that things are happening (and we are experiencing things happening) at the present."

But of course we do "derive directly from experience" that "we are experiencing things happening". It is this that we do not need the additional "idea" for. Some might even say that our experience (or our "experiencing things happening") is less conceptual than our memories and anticipations.

I agree with the first part here, you can equally say that no time passes in the past and future, but you cannot say that this statement does not employ a concept of time. You have used "time" in that statement. So you simple employ a particular concept of time, within which time passes, and claim that such a conception of past and future would not require that particular concept of time, but it just requires a different conception of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whatever. If time doesn't pass at the present moment, then time doesn't pass. And you can't have a past or future without a present moment.

I find "present moment" to be logically incoherent and that is why I assume the need for two dimensional time, a thick present, or a present with breadth. — Metaphysician Undercover

How long do you need the present moment to be? It makes little difference.

There are objects of sensation, as I said above, but as I also said previously, these objects are all in the past by the time they are perceived by me through the medium of sensation. Therefore I class such perceptions with memories, images which appear to me, but the true object represented by the image is in the past. So what you call "conscious perceptions of the world" (assuming that you refer to sense perceptions) are in fact memories, by the time the images are present to the conscious mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I ask you again:

What, according to you, is the amount of time between the present moment and the moment things are sensed? — Luke

In other words: what is the time difference between an experience and a sensation?

As regards the experiential nature of time, I feel like viewing more of your debate with Luke.

For my part, I don’t understand how your claim that present perceptions are aspects of the past can be obtained without reliance on inferences made by neuroscience. With these neuroscientific inferences being themselves an aspect of reasoning, and not one of direct experience. Note that I’m not disagreeing with the neuroscience. I’m only clamming that as far as direct awareness is concerned, the perceptions we are directly aware of are taken to occur in the now, whereas memories we are directly aware of (which are qualitatively different than direct perception) are taken to indicate nows that have already passed by. All this being independent of our concepts (i.e., generalized ideas) regarding time – which, as concepts, are abstractions abstracted from concrete experiences. And I maintain that these concrete experiences consist of an ever-changing now, of former nows, and of nows that have yet to be: with former and future nows being meaningful only in reference to the ever-changing now which we perpetually live through at the level of direct experience. And yes, I agree that the now we live through is extended in duration, otherwise we would not be able to experience sounds (as we once previously discussed on a different thread, with emphasis on musical notes).

But, again, I don’t think the nature of time is all too pertinent to what I’m stipulating for as long as there is general agreement in there being a past, present, and future.

If we agree that a goal significantly determines one’s intentions toward said goal, that one’s intending to achieve said goal occurs in the present, that the future is not fixed (or actualized) prior to it becoming the present moment, and that the goal (i.e., that aim one intends to make actual) references a future state of affairs, why again do you object to claiming that the as of yet unactualized (ese stated, potential) future one strives to make actual determines one’s presently occurring intentions toward said goal? Such that here, a potential future state of affairs determines the actuality of present activities.

Hence, that in some sense aspects of the future determine aspects of the present … rather than aspects of the past determining aspects of the present. The former again being deemed by me to be backward determinacy (i.e., teleology) and the latter being forward determinacy (i.e., causation).

The modular view of mind has a long pedigree in cognitive science. Check out Marvin Minsky’s ‘Society of Mind’. — Joshs

Cool, and reassuring. Thanks for the reference.

But of course we do "derive directly from experience" that "we are experiencing things happening". It is this that we do not need the additional "idea" for. Some might even say that our experience (or our "experiencing things happening") is less conceptual than our memories and anticipations. — Luke

My point was that we do not derive directly from experience, that things are happening at the present, when "the present" is supposed to be a temporal concept. I'm sorry if I didn't make myself clear.

Sure, the additional "idea" is not necessary, but if you remove that distinction which I'm trying to make, you'll never understand what I'm trying to say, and keep repeating the same questions over and over again.

It may be true, that we are experiencing things happening, but this does not mean that we are experiencing the present, unless you remove the temporal conception of "the present". So if you insist that there is no need that "the present" as an "idea", so that things happening is synonymous with the present, you just create an inability to understand the difference which I am trying to explain.

If you do not agree with me, you might argue that there is no difference between things happening, and the present, but as i explained, there is an inconsistency between "the present" as a "moment", and things happening at the present. So you need to reject one or the other.

Whatever. If time doesn't pass at the present moment, then time doesn't pass. And you can't have a past or future without a present moment. — Luke

Time could pass at the present, so that there is no "moment" of the present. That's the point of two dimensional time.

Then I ask you again: — Luke

As I said, I find "present moment" to be incoherent.

For my part, I don’t understand how your claim that present perceptions are aspects of the past can be obtained without reliance on inferences made by neuroscience. — javra

Neuroscience supports what I'm saying, but is not necessary. Even Plato argued that there was a medium, light, between seeing, and the object seen. All I'm doing is extending this acknowledgement of a medium, from the external of the body, to the internal, so that there is a time delay between the sense organ, and recognition by the mind, such that sensation is temporally prior to conscious apprehension.

With these neuroscientific inferences being themselves an aspect of reasoning, and not one of direct experience. — javra

The problem is that "time" itself is an aspect of reasoning, not an aspect of direct experience. So to move toward an ontology which is based in temporal conceptions such as "goals" which implies future, we need something other than direct experience, as a premise. The difficult thing here is to find the premise which provides us with the highest probability of being true. So we want a temporal premise which appears as close as possible to being consistent with experience, without distorting and manipulating our description of "experience", in a way which would be caused by an attempt to rationalize a premise already held due to prejudice or bias.

I’m only clamming that as far as direct awareness is concerned, the perceptions we are directly aware of are taken to occur in the now... — javra

I think that you are employing a preconceived, temporal conception of "now" here. This is the point I was trying to explain to Luke. We cannot employ descriptive terms which are purely conceptual, ("now" being based in a concept of time rather than something empirical), and claim to be making an empirical observation. This is what happens when we proceed toward description, we employ predication. So we take preconceived ideas, descriptive terms, as predicates, and apply them toward describing our perceptions. Basically, this is observation. However, the descriptive terms may not be well defined, causing ambiguity and confusion, and this is the case with your use of "the now".

What does "the now" mean to you? If you define "the now" as the time which you are perceiving, then you are begging the question. If we define "the now" in relation to a justified conception of time, we have something much more solid to start from. But this is not easy to do. As I said earlier, by the time you even say "now" that now is in the past. So if "now" is supposed to refer to the present, we do not want to place it in the past in our conceptualization. How do we define "now" then? That's why I suggested we define "now" as the divisor between past and future.

..are taken to indicate nows that have already passed by... — javra

This exposes another problem with "the now". We experience the passage of time as continuous. Do you agree, that a continuous passage of time is most consistent with experience? How do you support individual and discrete "nows"? Is there one long continuous "now", or is there many past "nows"? Notice that both of these put "now" into the past, assuming that the past presence of "now", or past "nows", are part of "now". But why would we do this? Now ought not consist of something past.

And I maintain that these concrete experiences consist of an ever-changing now, of former nows, and of nows that have yet to be: with former and future nows being meaningful only in reference to the ever-changing now which we perpetually live through at the level of direct experience. And yes, I agree that the now we live through is extended in duration, otherwise we would not be able to experience sounds (as we once previously discussed on a different thread, with emphasis on musical notes). — javra

Now you mix the two incompatible definitions of "now". You talk of one extended, ever-changing "now", but then you say it consists of past nows and future nows. It's only when you put the now into the past and future, that you derive these "nows". If we define "now" as the divisor between past and future, we no longer have this problem. We have one continuous now, which separates past from future, and all the individual, discrete "nows" are really just the products of memories and anticipation, therefore distinct from the true continuous "now".

But, again, I don’t think the nature of time is all too pertinent to what I’m stipulating for as long as there is general agreement in there being a past, present, and future. — javra

You are proposing an ontology based in a temporally grounded idea "goals", so the nature of time is very important. If we do not have principles to separate past memories from future goals, such an ontology cannot even get started. You asked me yourself, how do I distinguish memories from anticipations, in my mind. If we do not have clear definitions of what constitutes the difference between past present and future, such an ontology would be lost in ambiguity.

If we agree that a goal significantly determines one’s intentions toward said goal, that one’s intending to achieve said goal occurs in the present, that the future is not fixed (or actualized) prior to it becoming the present moment, and that the goal (i.e., that aim one intends to make actual) references a future state of affairs, why again do you object to claiming that the as of yet unactualized (ese stated, potential) future one strives to make actual determines one’s presently occurring intentions toward said goal? Such that here, a potential future state of affairs determines the actuality of present activities. — javra

What you describe here is having one's attention firmly fixed on the future, one's goals. As I described in an earlier post, addressed to Arcturus, we need to distinguish between this, and having one's attention firmly fixed on the past, empiricism. Please read that post. It is only by having a very good understand of what constitutes "the past", and what constitutes "the future", that we can distinguish principles derived from facing the past, from principles derived from facing the future. There is an inversion involved with any sort of "turning around" (for example, what is behind you on the left will be on your right when you turn around), and the inversion between past and future is difficult. So I believe that making this distinction is very important, so that we can determine the nature of the inversion, allowing that principles of empiricism (backward facing) can be transposed to a forward facing goal-oriented ontology.

Therefore, to answer the question "why again do you object to claiming that the as of yet unactualized (ese stated, potential) future one strives to make actual determines one’s presently occurring intentions toward said goal? Such that here, a potential future state of affairs determines the actuality of present activities", let me again refer to what you call "a goal". The "goal" exists as part of what you call "present activities". However, as an object, or objective, it is a thing, and therefore has the status of a static state, the desired object, or state. This is inconsistent with "activities", and such a conception is based in backward facing memories of remembered states, what you called "nows".

When we turn around, to face the future, "the goal" becomes something active rather than passive, as the means, what you call "telosis", and the goal, as "an object" becomes elusive. In Aristotles ethics, the end is "that for the sake of which". But each end is just the means to a further end, onward indefinitely, until we posit a final end, which he suggested as "happiness". But he further suggested that the highest virtue was to be found in activity, because as living beings our nature is to be active. Now we have the problem that activity is usually represented as a means to an end, telosis, because we ask what is the purpose of any activity. But this is just the product of the backward facing ontology which makes "the end" a static object. When we replace this with an ideal, such as "to better ourselves", then activity, or practice is implied rather that a static goal. And the goal itself is to be active.

This is my proposition. Forward facing "goals" are activities, such that true goals are described as activities. Backward facing descriptions, observations, are expressed in terms of static states. This implies that activity does not really happen at the present, it occurs in the future, in relation to our experiential perspective which we call the now.

.

What does "the now" mean to you? If you define "the now" as the time which you are perceiving, then you are begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

I imagine that if I were to be having a conversation with some non-philosophically inclined person and to then spontaneously ask, “Are we right now talking to each other in the present, in the past, or in the future?” that this other person would easily say, “In the present” (given that they’d reply in a few seconds’ time and wouldn’t find my question overly strange). And that it takes considerable conceptualization of the nature of time to question this intersubjective reality regarding an extended present period of time that unfolds during any conversation – one that transpires prior to percepts becoming memories, and before as of yet unactualized percepts occur as actualized percepts (which, again, have yet to be recollections).

In short, my take is that experiential now (or present, or current moment) consists of that extended duration in which our actualized percepts are not yet memories which our conscious selves recall. Our experiential past consists solely of what is recollection to us. And our experiential future consists of expectations, predictions, and aims - and, hence, in a roundabout way, of future percepts obtained via the physiological senses that have yet to transpire. It takes inference and temporal reasoning to consider that all our non-recalled actualized perceptions in fact occur in the objective past by a magnitude of nanoseconds relative to our experience of them. But, again, to me this does not constitute our experiences regarding the extended present moment; which, again, is at least in part composed of actualized percepts that have not yet become consciously recalled memories.

That said, what our discussions are teaching me is that the basic temporal placement of our experiences – be these of memories, of immediate percepts obtained via the physiological senses, or of ends we move toward - are less then uncontroversial. A worthwhile lesson. In honesty, this was my principal reason for starting this thread. Upward determinacy (bottom-up; or Aristotelian material causes) and downward determinacy (top-down; or Aristotelian formal causes) would occur such that what determines is fully simultaneous to that which is determined. Causation (Aristotelian efficient causes) is by definition forward moving sequentially and, hence, temporally: first the occurrence of the cause, followed by the occurrence of the effect. It then seemed a neat way of categorizing the Aristotelian notion of final causes (hence, teleology) in relation to the aforementioned three: as backward moving from a yet to be actualized end to activities intending to actualize this end that occur in the present. And in truth, I do have a hidden agenda in so categorizing. But this dispute regarding the temporal placement of our experiences confirms my qualms. I'm placing the cart before the horse. Bummer for me. :)

Still, I don't find this to affect the uncontroversial assertion that intents partly determine behavior. Right? IOW, by my reckoning, the reality of our experiencing ourselves to be goal-driven in a good part of what we do is not contingent on establishing the temporal placement of goals. So I figure we can further address telos-driven determinacy without needing to agree on the temporal location of teloi.

What you describe here is having one's attention firmly fixed on the future, one's goals. As I described in an earlier post, addressed to Arcturus, we need to distinguish between this, and having one's attention firmly fixed on the past, empiricism. Please read that post. — Metaphysician Undercover

From that post:

If we place cause and effect in a temporal relation to each other, the cause is always further away from the observing perspective, than the effect is. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can understand what you're getting at in most of the post. I find disagreement mostly on two counts. That teleology - here, goal-driven determinacy - occurs would not of itself dispel the reality of causation. As in, "that billiard ball caused that other to move". But I'm not sure if by the analogy of the cave you intended to claim that all causation is illusory. More importantly to me is this quote above. When I cause these words to appear on my screen, me as cause to the words that appear is not "further away from the observing perspective" than are the words I type as effect and observe. Furthermore, if any degree of free will occurs, then to the same degree the observing agent in question is a causally undetermined cause of the effects which unfold. One which is always partly driven, hence partly determined, by the intents it has in so causing the effects it produces. But I get that these issues are both complex and controversial, and they do complicate the basic issue of the thread: the ontology of teloi.

Getting back to your latest post to me:

When we turn around, to face the future, "the goal" becomes something active rather than passive, as the means, what you call "telosis", and the goal, as "an object" becomes elusive. In Aristotles ethics, the end is "that for the sake of which". But each end is just the means to a further end, onward indefinitely, until we posit a final end, which he suggested as "happiness". But he further suggested that the highest virtue was to be found in activity, because as living beings our nature is to be active. Now we have the problem that activity is usually represented as a means to an end, telosis, because we ask what is the purpose of any activity. But this is just the product of the backward facing ontology which makes "the end" a static object. When we replace this with an ideal, such as "to better ourselves", then activity, or practice is implied rather that a static goal. And the goal itself is to be active.

This is my proposition. Forward facing "goals" are activities, such that true goals are described as activities. Backward facing descriptions, observations, are expressed in terms of static states. This implies that activity does not really happen at the present, it occurs in the future, in relation to our experiential perspective which we call the now. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, more concretely exemplified, my goal of completing this post to my satisfaction is in and of itself an activity in which way? Regardless of the goal's temporal placement, it is a state of affairs which has yet to transpire that I want to accomplish. My activities to actualize this goal might differ, but the goal remains fixed for as long as I strive to accomplish said goal. The goal is static while the activities done to actualize it are dynamic.

Also, since you've brought up Aristotle's notion of "a final end (or ultimate telos)", remember that for Aristotle this ultimate telos was an unmoved mover (this with no intimation of personhood whatsoever) of all that is. Being unmoved, this final telos cannot be an activity. It instead teleologically drives all that is activity - this while remaining determinate, or fixed, or static, in a metaphysical sense. At the very least here, the telos cannot be activity.

I'll leave it at that for now and see where you stand regarding this.

But, again, to me this does not constitute our experiences regarding the extended present moment; which, again, is at least in part composed of actualized percepts that have not yet become consciously recalled memories. — javra

That the present is extended, is the reason why it ought not be called a "moment". "Moment" usually refers to a much more precise point in time, not an extended duration. When we realize that the "experiential present" is an extended period of time, rather than a moment in time, we need principles which separate now from past, and now from future, or else any divisions made are arbitrary.

Consider that the average human reaction time is around two to three tenths of a second. If we take this as a base for a non-arbitrary length of "now", then we can see that other possible durations of "now", would provide us with completely different perspectives of various activities. But what makes this "now" the best "now"? With our duration of "now" for example we can't sense electrons moving (other than getting burned or shocked by them), but a being with a much shorter "now" might in some way be able to observe moving electrons. Likewise, if a being had an extremely extended "now", like a hundred years or so, this being would not be able to observe the earth moving around the sun, because in that period of time which is "now" for that being, the earth would have circled the sun a hundred times, rendering itself a blur, just like an electron cloud is a blur to us.

This provides a good argument for why we need to be careful with naive realism. Our temporal perspective, the length of any supposed experiential "now" has a huge influence on how what we call "the world" appears to us. So we need to take this into account, and validate any principles we use to designate the length of "now", when speculating ontological principles, because how the world appears, from the perspective of experience, is greatly shaped by the particular temporal perspective.

Upward determinacy (bottom-up; or Aristotelian material causes) and downward determinacy (top-down; or Aristotelian formal causes) would occur such that what determines is fully simultaneous to that which is determined. — javra

The difference between upward causation, and downward causation, may simply be the product of different temporal perspectives, different lengths of "now".

Still, I don't find this to affect the uncontroversial assertion that intents partly determine behavior. Right? IOW, by my reckoning, the reality of our experiencing ourselves to be goal-driven in a good part of what we do is not contingent on establishing the temporal placement of goals. So I figure we can further address telos-driven determinacy without needing to agree on the temporal location of teloi. — javra

I agree that goals determine behaviour, and that having goals is a large part of our experience. And I would also add that to be facing one goals, facing the future, is to be forward facing in time.

More importantly to me is this quote above. When I cause these words to appear on my screen, me as cause to the words that appear is not "further away from the observing perspective" than are the words I type as effect and observe. — javra

Take the forward looking perspective, looking ahead in time. You have the goal of making certain words appear on the screen. You act, and then the words appear. You, as an observer, "the observing perspective", see the words appear. Now you have to look back in time to remember your goal having caused the words to appear Having the goal to make the words appear was prior in time to the words appearing, therefore further away, in time, from you as observer, than the words appearing is. Perhaps I wasn't clear to say "further away in time", but I was talking about temporal relations.

OK, more concretely exemplified, my goal of completing this post to my satisfaction is in and of itself an activity in which way? Regardless of the goal's temporal placement, it is a state of affairs which has yet to transpire that I want to accomplish. My activities to actualize this goal might differ, but the goal remains fixed for as long as I strive to accomplish said goal. The goal is static while the activities done to actualize it are dynamic. — javra

My argument is that to characterize the goal as an endstate is a misrepresentation. Your true goal is to write the post, and this is an activity. That there is an end, a completion is a feature of "the post", not a feature of your goal. Most likely you will continue on, and write another post, so finishing that one particular post is not really your end goal, it's juts a step along the way, in an activity which has stops and starts.

Incidentally, this is probably one reason why goal directed activity is so hard for physics to understand. Physics doesn't have the principles to understand one extended activity, which consists of many stops and starts (writing many different posts for example), these would be distinct actions in physics, therefore not necessarily in the same direction. But with goal directed activity, the activity may stop and start, while keeping going in the same direction (the same goal).

My activities to actualize this goal might differ, but the goal remains fixed for as long as I strive to accomplish said goal. The goal is static while the activities done to actualize it are dynamic. — javra

I agree that this is the way "a goal" is commonly characterized, but I think it's a mistake. Suppose that you fix a goal in your mind, and you are what we call "determined" to achieve that end. I believe that this is not the best disposition to have. Consider that things change, circumstances evolve, and unknown factors become known. We must be willing to adapt our goals accordingly, as we move forward. So being hard set in one's ways, and to relentlessly seek to fulfill a fixed goal, is not good. We must be flexible.

In reality, the goal and the activity mix together, and become one. The activity is directed toward a goal, but the goal then gets adapted to match what the activity is capable of. Then the activity must be readjusted to meet the new goal. The proposed endstate is what, death?

Also, since you've brought up Aristotle's notion of "a final end (or ultimate telos)", remember that for Aristotle this ultimate telos was an unmoved mover (this with no intimation of personhood whatsoever) of all that is. Being unmoved, this final telos cannot be an activity. It instead teleologically drives all that is activity - this while remaining determinate, or fixed, or static, in a metaphysical sense. At the very least here, the telos cannot be activity. — javra

The unmoved mover is a thinking which is thinking on thinking, and this is clearly an activity. That's why Aristotle described the most virtuous activity as contemplation. And this divine thinking, of the unmoved mover was posited to account for the eternal circular motions of the planets.

That the present is extended, is the reason why it ought not be called a "moment". "Moment" usually refers to a much more precise point in time, not an extended duration. When we realize that the "experiential present" is an extended period of time, rather than a moment in time, we need principles which separate now from past, and now from future, or else any divisions made are arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Per Wiktionary, "moment" has two non-specialized definitions: a brief but unspecified duration of time and, potentially at odds with this, the smallest portion of time. But in both cases, there is a duration - rather than it being akin to a mathematical point on a linear diagram of time. I was using "moment" in the first specified sense. As to the divisions being arbitrary, they are in the sense that the experiential division between past, present, and future are fully grounded in the experiences of the arbitrator. Yet, as I previously mentioned with conversations, there is an intersubjectively experienced present whenever we in any way directly interact.

This provides a good argument for why we need to be careful with naive realism. Our temporal perspective, the length of any supposed experiential "now" has a huge influence on how what we call "the world" appears to us. So we need to take this into account, and validate any principles we use to designate the length of "now", when speculating ontological principles, because how the world appears, from the perspective of experience, is greatly shaped by the particular temporal perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

No disagreements here. But I'll just add that I don't find the experiential present to be a quantifiable duration - in part, precisely because it is experientially arbitrary.

The difference between upward causation, and downward causation, may simply be the product of different temporal perspectives, different lengths of "now". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't find this to be the case. For instance, natural laws determine things in a downward direction: from the source's form, i.e. the given natural law, to the many givens that are partly determined by it. Same can be said of a culture's form (or that of any subculture, for that matter) partly determining the mindset of any individual who partakes of it. These being examples of downward determinacy. In contrast, the type of forest that occurs (temporal, tropical, or else healthy or sickly, etc.) as a form will be significantly determined upwardly by the attributes of individual trees to be found in a given location. Or else the attributes of a given statue as form, such as the potential sound it would make were it to be hit, will be in part determined by the statue's material composition (wood, bronze, marble, etc.). These latter two are examples of upward determinacy. In both upward and downward determinacy, that which determines and that which is determined by it occur simultaneously. You can't have one occur before or after the other - if at all conceivable - and still preserve the determinacy in question. So the lengths of "now" would hypothetically only make a difference to this in terms of whether the given determinacy is at all discerned. But if discerned, the determinacy would be found to have the determiner(s) and determinee(s) concurrently occurring.

And I would also add that to be facing one goals, facing the future, is to be forward facing in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm confused here. Weren't you arguing that goals are not found in the future? Facing one's goals would then not be tantamount to facing one's future - as far I've so far understood your arguments.

You act, and then the words appear. You, as an observer, "the observing perspective", see the words appear. Now you have to look back in time to remember your goal having caused the words to appear Having the goal to make the words appear was prior in time to the words appearing, therefore further away, in time, from you as observer, than the words appearing is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Two disagreements. My goal of, say, writing this post to my satisfaction does not cause the specific words that appear in this post. I could have chosen words that are different to those that now appear while still being determined by the exact same goal I hold or writing this post to my satisfaction. Not only do I not take determinacy, in this case teleological, to result in determinism but I also find goals or intents to allegorically act as mathematical attractors to causal processes, such as in my causing a word to appear on the screen. This in the sense that one can do different things for as long as each of the two or more alternative paths yet lead to the fixed potential end one strives to make the actual end of ones given set of activities, this being the given goal. It is not my stated goal which causes these individual typed words but, rather, it is I as a conscious being (that is partly determined by my goal) who causes these specific words. Again, I could have chosen to cause different words than what appear while yet being driven by said goal.

The second contention is that my typing words on this screen is perpetually under the sway of getting closer to my goal of writing this post to my satisfaction. My goal always dwells ahead of me while I type words. The end I pursue - technically, the potential end that I want to make actual - has not yet occurred. When and if the goal is actualized (I could erase all I've written and try again some other time), all activities that strive to actualize it end with its actualization (when I've written this post to my satisfaction, I no longer type words for this purpose). It is not until my goal is actualized that I might look back at what I once wrote and need to also then look back to what my intents were in so writing. But for every existing goal that I hold - every goal that has not yet come to fruition - it is never behind me but, instead, is found in front of me. So, I'm not currently looking back in time to remember my goal of finishing this post to my satisfaction; I'm instead looking forward to the time that this goal will (fingers crossed) become actualized. A time period I approach with every activity striving to accomplish it.

Have I misunderstood what you were intending to express?

But my initial point was that if you uphold free will, as I think you do, then it is you in the present as, in part, "the observing perspective" which causes effects via your free will. You as cause is the very observing perspective addressed. Yet this free will that causes effect is always in part determined by its intents, or goals, in so causing - which, again, dwell ahead as that which one is nearing.

Incidentally, this is probably one reason why goal directed activity is so hard for physics to understand. Physics doesn't have the principles to understand one extended activity, which consists of many stops and starts (writing many different posts for example), these would be distinct actions in physics, therefore not necessarily in the same direction. But with goal directed activity, the activity may stop and start, while keeping going in the same direction (the same goal). — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with much of this. Yet still find that a goal is a state of affairs, or a state of being, one is attempting to make actual - rather than the activities one engages in toward this goal. Each goal is a potential end, or stop - and becomes an end or stop for all those activities striving to actualize it once the goal becomes actualized. And to complicate matters, not only are there subordinate and supraordinate goals but most goals are plastic, fluid, in their nature, sometimes appearing, changing, or disappearing based on a multitude of both conscious and unconscious factors. But in the vein of keeping things simple:

I agree that this is the way "a goal" is commonly characterized, but I think it's a mistake. Suppose that you fix a goal in your mind, and you are what we call "determined" to achieve that end. I believe that this is not the best disposition to have. Consider that things change, circumstances evolve, and unknown factors become known. We must be willing to adapt our goals accordingly, as we move forward. So being hard set in one's ways, and to relentlessly seek to fulfill a fixed goal, is not good. We must be flexible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not in any way opposed to this. Its why I added "for as long as I strive to accomplish said goal".

In reality, the goal and the activity mix together, and become one. The activity is directed toward a goal, but the goal then gets adapted to match what the activity is capable of. Then the activity must be readjusted to meet the new goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Goals can change. True. Yet a goal is still a potential state of affairs one wants to accomplish. No?

For any given goal, activities done for the sake of the goal can take innumerable alternative paths for so long as they're judged in one's ever-changing context to best approach the goal's actualization. So again, I yet find that for any given goal, the goal is fixed, or static, while the activities striving for the goal are not - again, this for as long as the goal is actively maintained.

The proposed endstate is what, death? — Metaphysician Undercover

Notice that you're here equivocating between telos (potential end striven for) and endstate (actual end arrived at). Also that an endstate is the culmination of any activity - and not the ultimate cultimation of all of one's activities. But to be more forthright, death, as in a complete non-being of what once was, is only one of a number of possible ultimate endstate scenarios for any individual psyche. That we die is a certainty. That our mortal death equates to eternal non-being is a faith, for it cannot be demonstrated. An arduous topic, though.

The unmoved mover is a thinking which is thinking on thinking [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I have so far not found this in Aristotle (but I grant most of my readings are secondhand). Can you point out some references from Aristotle that substantiate this interpenetration of what the unmoved mover is for Aristotle?

Telos and teleosis have just reversed the role of cause and effect in the physical world. The effect proceeds the cause.

Per Wiktionary, "moment" has two non-specialized definitions: a brief but unspecified duration of time and, potentially at odds with this, the smallest portion of time. But in both cases, there is a duration - rather than it being akin to a mathematical point on a linear diagram of time. I was using "moment" in the first specified sense. As to the divisions being arbitrary, they are in the sense that the experiential division between past, present, and future are fully grounded in the experiences of the arbitrator. Yet, as I previously mentioned with conversations, there is an intersubjectively experienced present whenever we in any way directly interact. — javra

OK, I always understood "moment" to refer to a point in time, but we can define it that way, as a short duration, if you want. I just wish to ensure that there is no ambiguity, so that if we talk about a point, which divides one portion of time from another, this is not a "moment", as we hereby define it, a moment is not a point, it's a short duration. So if we posit a short duration, a "moment", as the divisor between the future and the past, what this means to me is that we assume a short duration of time which we cannot determine whether it has passed or not.

However, I think that an "intersubjective experienced present" is not sufficient for an ontology. I believe that the passing of time is something which occurs whether or not there are human beings in existence, and as I explained, the way that the world appears would be quite different to other types of beings which experienced a different duration of present. Therefore it is incorrect to assume that an intersubjective description of the present provides with a true description.

I don't find this to be the case. For instance, natural laws determine things in a downward direction: from the source's form, i.e. the given natural law, to the many givens that are partly determined by it. Same can be said of a culture's form (or that of any subculture, for that matter) partly determining the mindset of any individual who partakes of it. These being examples of downward determinacy. In contrast, the type of forest that occurs (temporal, tropical, or else healthy or sickly, etc.) as a form will be significantly determined upwardly by the attributes of individual trees to be found in a given location. Or else the attributes of a given statue as form, such as the potential sound it would make were it to be hit, will be in part determined by the statue's material composition (wood, bronze, marble, etc.). These latter two are examples of upward determinacy. In both upward and downward determinacy, that which determines and that which is determined by it occur simultaneously. You can't have one occur before or after the other - if at all conceivable - and still preserve the determinacy in question. So the lengths of "now" would hypothetically only make a difference to this in terms of whether the given determinacy is at all discerned. But if discerned, the determinacy would be found to have the determiner(s) and determinee(s) concurrently occurring. — javra

I have to reject this passage completely. I don't see that the proposal of "natural laws" has been justified. Laws are made by human beings, and are therefore artificial. Some people seem to think that the the laws of physics, which are descriptive laws, are representative of some sort of prescriptive "natural laws", which govern the way that inanimate things behave. But this really makes no sense to me, because prescriptive laws need to be interpreted and understood by conscious beings, to be followed, so I can't see how we can conclude that the motion of an inanimate object is somehow determined by a natural law.

Furthermore, I think you have the relationship between the individual human being, and the culture, backward. Individuals act to create a culture, so that the "culture" is just a reflection of the acts of individuals. The culture is not causally active in determining individual acts, the individuals are active in determining the culture. The entirety of the "culture" can be reduced to individual acts, because only the individuals are active, the culture is not. Being inactive, the culture itself has no causal force. The relation between the individual human being, and the culture, is really not different from the relation between the individual tree, and the forest.

So I believe your examples of downward causation are really upward causation, in disguise. This is why determining the true length of the present is so important. When your present "moment" is too long, you do not apprehend all the rapid activities of the smallest parts, which are responsible for creating the appearance of a whole. All you see is the whole, as a static thing, and you think that this static thing somehow has a magical force which might control the activities of the individuals, in downward causation, because you do not see the extremely fast activity of the parts, which actually act in an upward causational way, to produce the appearance of a whole.

I'm confused here. Weren't you arguing that goals are not found in the future? Facing one's goals would then not be tantamount to facing one's future - as far I've so far understood your arguments. — javra

I guess you misunderstand. The goals are not in the future, as I said. but facing one's goals is how a person faces the future, because this is our only means of relating to the future. So the goals are as a medium, an intermediary between the conscious mind and the future. To face the medium is to face the thing which lies beyond the medium, but the medium is not that thing, nor is the medium within that thing, it is between you and the thing.

Two disagreements. My goal of, say, writing this post to my satisfaction does not cause the specific words that appear in this post. I could have chosen words that are different to those that now appear while still being determined by the exact same goal I hold or writing this post to my satisfaction. — javra

I don't agree with this. You cannot write different words, without having a different goal. You are simply saying that you could, to back up your position, but you really can't. That is why "meaning" is defined as what is meant. To change the words changes the meaning, therefore what was meant, so it's necessarily a different goal. I think you are just free and easy in your writing as to what a "goal" is, but you haven't taken the time to determine through introspection what your goals are really like.

This in the sense that one can do different things for as long as each of the two or more alternative paths yet lead to the fixed potential end one strives to make the actual end of ones given set of activities, this being the given goal. It is not my stated goal which causes these individual typed words but, rather, it is I as a conscious being (that is partly determined by my goal) who causes these specific words. Again, I could have chosen to cause different words than what appear while yet being driven by said goal. — javra

This as well, is very doubtful to me. I do not see how two distinct activities could lead to the very same end state. I used to think in this way, but I've come to see it as false. Minute differences are still differences, and mathematical allegories don't suffice because "equal" is different from same.

So I really think that you are making up a falsity, saying that you could have chosen different words, while still being driven by the same goal. Obviously, if the words you chose were different, you'd have been driven by a different goal. I really do not think that you are taking the time and effort required to think about what goals are really like, as they exist within you. I find that they really do not take a form which is easy to name or describe as a desired end state. We seem to be trained to make long term goals which are describable as desired end states, so that we might be able to state them, but all the very short term goals, which we are acting on at the moment of the present, are not even stateable. So we fool ourselves, thinking that goals are these stateable long term plans, when in reality what really influences our actions the most are short term intentions which we haven't even the ability to state as goals.

The second contention is that my typing words on this screen is perpetually under the sway of getting closer to my goal of writing this post to my satisfaction. My goal always dwells ahead of me while I type words. The end I pursue - technically, the potential end that I want to make actual - has not yet occurred. When and if the goal is actualized (I could erase all I've written and try again some other time), all activities that strive to actualize it end with its actualization (when I've written this post to my satisfaction, I no longer type words for this purpose). It is not until my goal is actualized that I might look back at what I once wrote and need to also then look back to what my intents were in so writing. But for every existing goal that I hold - every goal that has not yet come to fruition - it is never behind me but, instead, is found in front of me. So, I'm not currently looking back in time to remember my goal of finishing this post to my satisfaction; I'm instead looking forward to the time that this goal will (fingers crossed) become actualized. A time period I approach with every activity striving to accomplish it. — javra

This is a fine description, but can you see that it is not "the observing perspective". To be always looking forward toward your goals, and intent on obtaining your goals, leaves no room for "observing". To observe requires taking note of what happened, and this is to look back and to remember. The observing perspective is very different from the goal oriented perspective, that's one of the principal points I've been arguing.

But my initial point was that if you uphold free will, as I think you do, then it is you in the present as, in part, "the observing perspective" which causes effects via your free will. You as cause is the very observing perspective addressed. Yet this free will that causes effect is always in part determined by its intents, or goals, in so causing - which, again, dwell ahead as that which one is nearing. — javra

So I disagree with this. I think the free will is tied to the goal driven, forward looking perspective, not the backward looking "observing perspective". The point of observing is to be passive, not active.

Goals can change. True. Yet a goal is still a potential state of affairs one wants to accomplish. No? — javra

Well, this is how you would define "goal", and it is how we have been trained to. What I am arguing is that it doesn't really represent what truly motivates us to act. I think that we are already motivated to act, and therefore are acting naturally. Goals will assist us in directing our actions, but this requires that they become integrated into the action, as part of the acting. To represent goals as desired end states is to separate them from the acting.

Notice that you're here equivocating between telos (potential end striven for) and endstate (actual end arrived at). Also that an endstate is the culmination of any activity - and not the ultimate cultimation of all of one's activities. But to be more forthright, death, as in a complete non-being of what once was, is only one of a number of possible ultimate endstate scenarios for any individual psyche. That we die is a certainty. That our mortal death equates to eternal non-being is a faith, for it cannot be demonstrated. An arduous topic, though. — javra

I don't agree here for the reasons given. I don't agree with your concept of actual end states. I don't think we ever get to end states, we keep goin until death. There is an end state in relation to the goal, if the goal is achieved, you can say you've reached an end state. But that's not a real end state in relation to the person, the person keeps going. Nor is there a real end state if the goal is not achieved, because the person could keep trying, or alter the goal. This is why your description of "goals", and end states upon achievement or failure is not accurate. The end state is a fictional position only existing in relation to the goal when "goal" is defined in this way. Since this definition of "goal" produces this fictional end state, we need to consider that it doesn't accurately represent what goals really are within human beings.

I have so far not found this in Aristotle (but I grant most of my readings are secondhand). Can you point out some references from Aristotle that substantiate this interpenetration of what the unmoved mover is for Aristotle? — javra

You'd have to read his Metaphysics toward the end of Book12.

I just wish to ensure that there is no ambiguity, so that if we talk about a point, which divides one portion of time from another, this is not a "moment", as we hereby define it, a moment is not a point, it's a short duration. — Metaphysician Undercover

To conceive of a point that divides past from future is already an act of dealing with a conceptual abstraction of what time is ontotologically. It is not what we directly experience time to be - but is, instead, how some of us conceptualize the objective nature of time to be. Some claim our experiences of time to be an illusion, yet we nevertheless experience time as such.

So if we posit a short duration, a "moment", as the divisor between the future and the past, what this means to me is that we assume a short duration of time which we cannot determine whether it has passed or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, because it is experienced as the (extended) present.

However, I think that an "intersubjective experienced present" is not sufficient for an ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nor am I claiming that an "intersubjective experienced present" is sufficient for an ontology of time. But it is a necessary account of what our experiences of time consists of - if we are to be truthful about what we directly experience (be our experiences illusory or not).

I believe that the passing of time is something which occurs whether or not there are human beings in existence, and as I explained, the way that the world appears would be quite different to other types of beings which experienced a different duration of present. Therefore it is incorrect to assume that an intersubjective description of the present provides with a true description. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, we experientially find that the ever-changing present we live in consists of befores and afters. Right now listening to crickets chirping in the backyard while at my laptop. At the very least every individual chirp I hear occurs for me in the extended present, not in the past and not in the future. Yet each individual chirp likewise has a starting state and an ending state, and the start of the chirp occurs before the end of the chirp, despite the total chirp again occurring for me within what I experience as the present moment (neither memory nor prediction, but a present actuality). When time is conceived of as a series of befores and afters, time passes even within the experiential present moment. This confuses our conceptualizations of what time is, but it is an honest account of what we (or at the very least I) experience to unfold withing the extended duration of the present moment.

Secondly, if there is causal interaction between an ant and a human - here presuming each to experience different magnitudes of the present's duration - there will then occur an intersubjectively experienced present moment between the two of them. This would take a lot to unpack, but how could you demonstrate the falsity to a shared present moment occurring between causally interacting agents?

Thirdly, I am not here attempting to express an ontology of time via these observations. Nevertheless, the notion that an intersubjectively experienced present occurs for all agents that causally interact while they are causally interacting can be viewed as holding certain parallels to the relativity of simultaneity.

So I believe your examples of downward causation are really upward causation, in disguise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Downward determinacy and upward determincay are not mutually exclusive. That said, one aspect of culture is language. Yes, we might and on occasion do communally change the language which we speak in minute ways (dictionaries change over time), yet that does not negate that the thoughts and expressions pertaining to a collective of individual psyches which speak the same language are in large part governed by the language which they speak. It's why foreign words are sometimes introduced into a language by those who are multilingual so as to express concepts that would otherwise be inexpressible (if at all imaginable) in the given language. Zeitgeist as one example of this. We as individual constituents of a language do not create the language we speak in total; our thoughts and expressions are instead in large part downwardly determined by the language(s) we speak. Do you disagree with this as well? If so, on what grounds?

This as well, is very doubtful to me. I do not see how two distinct activities could lead to the very same end state. I used to think in this way, but I've come to see it as false. Minute differences are still differences, and mathematical allegories don't suffice because "equal" is different from same. — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking an expression at face value, you find it an impossibility that there can be more than one way to skin a cat? Here "skinning the cat" is the goal. The "one or more ways" are the means toward said goal. If you do find this to be an impossibility, on what grounds? Determinism?

This is a fine description, but can you see that it is not "the observing perspective". To be always looking forward toward your goals, and intent on obtaining your goals, leaves no room for "observing". To observe requires taking note of what happened, and this is to look back and to remember. — Metaphysician Undercover

When I remember something I do not experience a perception obtained via my physiological senses' interaction with external stimuli; I instead experience a memory, which has many of the same perceptual qualities as an imagination but is instead felt to correlate to present moments I once experienced but no longer do, past present moments in which I then experienced perceptions obtained via my physiological sense's interaction with external stimuli. To observe is to take note of what is happening ... in the present. The observing perspective takes place in the experienced present, not in the experienced past. See my initial reply regarding the experienced extended present.

Well, this is how you would define "goal", and it is how we have been trained to. What I am arguing is that it doesn't really represent what truly motivates us to act. I think that we are already motivated to act, and therefore are acting naturally. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you here equating "goal" strictly to a consciously held desired outcome? If so, then lets start using a less restrictive term, because this is not the only thing I mean by "goal". How about "intent" as that which one intends, be this consciously or unconsciously. If you find no difference in these terms, then what is it to you that "truly motivates us to act ... naturally" which is neither goal nor intent?

To represent goals as desired end states is to separate them from the acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

This consists of an assumption on your part regarding what I hold in mind that is erroneous.

I don't agree here for the reasons given. I don't agree with your concept of actual end states. I don't think we ever get to end states, we keep goin until death. There is an end state in relation to the goal, if the goal is achieved, you can say you've reached an end state. But that's not a real end state in relation to the person, the person keeps going. Nor is there a real end state if the goal is not achieved, because the person could keep trying, or alter the goal. This is why your description of "goals", and end states upon achievement or failure is not accurate. The end state is a fictional position only existing in relation to the goal when "goal" is defined in this way. Since this definition of "goal" produces this fictional end state, we need to consider that it doesn't accurately represent what goals really are within human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

Running a marathon is an activity driven by the desire to finish the marathon. So is the person's finishing, or not finishing, the marathon not real, else fictional?

You'd have to read his Metaphysics toward the end of Book12. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. Familiarized myself with the cliff-notes, so to speak. Turns out I disagree with Aristotle on this.

To conceive of a point that divides past from future is already an act of dealing with a conceptual abstraction of what time is ontotologically. It is not what we directly experience time to be - but is, instead, how some of us conceptualize the objective nature of time to be. Some claim our experiences of time to be an illusion, yet we nevertheless experience time as such. — javra

I've been arguing that we do not directly experience time at all. It's conceptual, an abstraction. You end the paragraph with "we nevertheless experience time as such" , but you don't say what you think we experience time as. We've defined "moment" as a short duration of time, but what is duration? We've really said nothing about how we come to a notion of "time", or how we would distinguish a short duration from a long duration. Even the idea of "duration", the dimensional extension of time does not appear to be derivable directly from experience. It's more like a comparison of activities, one to the other, and noticing that one takes longer (extends past the other), that gives us a conception of time as duration.

This is why I proposed the difference between past and future, as something derived directly from experience, as the principal defining terms for "present", and also "time". I think that we directly experience a substantial difference between past and future, which is fundamental to the way that we view the world, and it inheres within us, and influences everything we do and think. You asked me, how do I distinguish between the experience of a memory and the experience of an anticipation, and I cannot answer this for you. It's something deep within my intuitions, as fundamental to my experience itself, that I recognize things remembered as distinct from things anticipated. I therefore have a fundamentally different attitude toward things anticipated than i do toward things remembered. How I can distinguish one from the other, I cannot say, but this is only because this distinction is so deep, at the base of my experience.

There is a way, I believe, towards understanding why this fundamental distinction exists within our minds, and why that difference is always evident to us. The separation between the two exists as the difference between the particular, and the general. Memories of the past are always of particular things which have occurred. Anticipations, being grounded in what you called potential, are always general. This is why anticipatory problems, like anxiety disorders are so difficult to deal with. There is never a particular thing which causes the anxiety, it's just a general feeling.

We can, as you do, name a particular goal, as that which causes the anticipation, but having what we might call "a particular goal" is really just to direct the anticipation in a particular direction. It does not address the question of what anticipation really is, like we might say that a memory is a representation of a particular incident in the past. We cannot say that anticipation is of a particular incident in the future (such as a goal), because it doesn't really exist that way. It's something general, and shaped by the conscious mind to be directed in a specific direction.

Right, because it is experienced as the (extended) present.

However, I think that an "intersubjective experienced present" is not sufficient for an ontology.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Nor am I claiming that an "intersubjective experienced present" is sufficient for an ontology of time. But it is a necessary account of what our experiences of time consists of - if we are to be truthful about what we directly experience (be our experiences illusory or not). — javra

In all truthfulness, I really don't believe that we experience time as passing at all, therefore what we experience as the present is not an extended duration of time. If you rid yourself of any conception of time, and think about what you are experiencing, there is a lot of things happening, but we cannot say that this is time we are experiencing, we are experiencing changes. We only derive a concept of time as passing when we compare changes, with measurement, and apply numbers. Then we start to talk about time as something passing. But if we start strictly with our experience, we have things changing (external observations), and intuitions of future and past (internal observations of memories and anticipations), but we don't have a passing time. We only construct a passing time when we put these two distinct types of experiences together, derive an independent future and past, and say that things change as the future becomes the past. But I still don't see the principles whereby you derive the idea of time as passing. It can't be from experience, because we don't in anyway sense time, and we don't experience it internally, we only seem to have intuitions of a distinction between past and future.

First, we experientially find that the ever-changing present we live in consists of befores and afters. Right now listening to crickets chirping in the backyard while at my laptop. At the very least every individual chirp I hear occurs for me in the extended present, not in the past and not in the future. Yet each individual chirp likewise has a starting state and an ending state, and the start of the chirp occurs before the end of the chirp, despite the total chirp again occurring for me within what I experience as the present moment (neither memory nor prediction, but a present actuality). When time is conceived of as a series of befores and afters, time passes even within the experiential present moment. This confuses our conceptualizations of what time is, but it is an honest account of what we (or at the very least I) experience to unfold withing the extended duration of the present moment. — javra

I can see your point, to think of your experience in terms of befores and afters, But this is to look at time from the perspective of memory. Notice that you only assign (judge) a before and after, after remembering the entire sequence. We can remove the need for this type of judgement if we look directly at our experience of memories and anticipations, to derive our conception of time. Now there is no need for such a judgement (a judgement which could be wrong), because we refer directly to our experience, of the difference between things remembered and things anticipated, to produce a conception of time, and we have no need to say that one is before the other, or after the other, they both exist within us, together, but are simply different. That's what experience tells us, that remembered things are different from anticipated things.

But when you make a judgement of before and after, you are already employing a preconceived notion of time in that judgement. So when I hear a cricket chirp, I notice it's in the past, a memory, and I might anticipate another, in the future, but without a conception of time, I can't analyze the chirp, breaking it down into parts, saying one part is "before" another part . I think that this is fundamental in experience, that we notice things as wholes, and breaking them into parts in analysis, or even making a relationship between one thing and another, such as the before/after relationship, is conceptualizing. The memory/anticipation separation is not a relationship, it's a distinction, as a first step toward breaking things into parts. It is an act of conceptualizing, but a first step, therefore not requiring prior conceptualizations.

Downward determinacy and upward determincay are not mutually exclusive. That said, one aspect of culture is language. Yes, we might and on occasion do communally change the language which we speak in minute ways (dictionaries change over time), yet that does not negate that the thoughts and expressions pertaining to a collective of individual psyches which speak the same language are in large part governed by the language which they speak. It's why foreign words are sometimes introduced into a language by those who are multilingual so as to express concepts that would otherwise be inexpressible (if at all imaginable) in the given language. Zeitgeist as one example of this. We as individual constituents of a language do not create the language we speak in total; our thoughts and expressions are instead in large part downwardly determined by the language(s) we speak. Do you disagree with this as well? If so, on what grounds? — javra

I disagree with you fundamentally on this issue, so I do not see any point really in discussing it. I think that assuming "a collective of individual psyches" as a whole, is a fundamental ontological error. derived from a category mistake which males a generalization into a particular. When we see things as similar, we class them as 'the same" in some respect, placing them in a collection, or set. But that set does not have real existence, as an object or a true whole, and despite the fact that you can point to all sorts of relations between the particular individuals, members of the collective, this does not justify the claim that such a collective is a true whole. So for example, we see a species as a whole, therefore you might call that whole a particular individual, but this is just making a universal into a particular. What is fundamental to a particular, as an individual, is difference, not sameness.

Taking an expression at face value, you find it an impossibility that there can be more than one way to skin a cat? Here "skinning the cat" is the goal. The "one or more ways" are the means toward said goal. If you do find this to be an impossibility, on what grounds? Determinism? — javra

I say this on the grounds of how a particular object, a thing, is defined, by the law of identity, each thing being different from every other. When you define "goal" in such a way, so as to make it a thing (the particular desired endstate), then you must respect the differences between particular things, what Aristotle called accidentals. Since the accidentals between two things are different, then despite being the same type of thing, the two things are distinct. And the existence of a contingent thing is inseparable from its causes,, as what is required for the existence of that thing. So we cannot say that two contingent things, being "two" because they exist under differing circumstances, are the same thing, because that would contravene the law of identity. The best we can say is that they are two of the same type of thing.

What I propose to you, is that we recognize "a goal" as a general type of thing, a universal rather than a particular thing. This would allow that two distinct sets of circumstance could lead to two distinct endstates consistent with "the same goal". "The same" being used in the sense of similar, meaning the same type, not in the sense of "the same" as in the law of identity. But then "a goal" cannot be a particular endstate, but a general, type of endstate, allowing that many different endstates might fulfill the criteria of that one stated goal..

I think that this is consistent with our experience of anticipations, desires, and intentions. Take hunger for example. In it's raw anticipatory form, it is simply an unpleasant feeling, an anxiety of want and need. When we apprehend this feeling we associate it with the very general need for food. The goal starts as most general, the desire to quell the uneasy feeling. But then to fulfill this goal, we specify general types of things which one might want to eat, or what is available to eat. In relation to the goal, we maintain its generality so as to keep many possibilities. But when we observe particular items of food available to eat, we rapidly narrow down the goal to a particular item which is readily available. So the shaping of the goal, is a narrowing done from the very general, to the more specific, then perhaps to the particular. But when we reach the particular, the goal to eat this particular hamburger, we cannot say that this is the same goal as the goal to eat another hamburger beside that one, even though the two goals can both be described as the same goal, to eat a hamburger.

In this sense, fulfilling a goal can be said to be bringing about a particular endstate from a general goal. In maintaining a separation between the goal, as something general, and the endstate as something particular, we allow that many different endstates can truthfully be said to fulfill the same goal. But if we say that the goal is a particular endstate, eg., I need that particular hamburger, then we misrepresent what a goal really is, and force upon ourselves an unrealistic need (the need for a particular endstate) in relation to fulfilling our goals. Fulfilling our goals does not require particular endstates, and creating this illusion that on particular thing is required to fulfill your goal is self-deception.

So I do accept that a goal can be fulfillrd in many different ways, and I understand this as the goal being something general, and each endstate as something particular, so that many different endstates might fulfill the conditions outlined by "the goal", as describing something general. This is the same principle we find when many different things are said to be the same type.

When I remember something I do not experience a perception obtained via my physiological senses' interaction with external stimuli; I instead experience a memory, which has many of the same perceptual qualities as an imagination but is instead felt to correlate to present moments I once experienced but no longer do, past present moments in which I then experienced perceptions obtained via my physiological sense's interaction with external stimuli. To observe is to take note of what is happening ... in the present. The observing perspective takes place in the experienced present, not in the experienced past. See my initial reply regarding the experienced extended present. — javra

I don't agree with this, and I don't believe you actually do experience things in the present the way that you claim to. Take your cricket chirp for example. By the time you recognize that it is a cricket chirping, is it not in the past, and you are dwelling on it as a memory? you are remembering it. And by the time you analyze it for a start and end, isn't it already in the past, a memory? Even if you think, "there's a start", after it starts, and before the end, the start is already in the past, and just a memory.

So I believe that you are simply denying the role that memory is playing in your experience at the present. Committing things to memory is not necessarily a conscious activity, so recalling things from memory, remembering, could take place without the person even knowing that the things were already memorized, and being recalled. Imagine that you are watching someone do something, or listening to a piece of music. You would have no idea as to what was going on, if your memory was not constantly providing you with what just happened before that moment. Because you are not consciously committing what si happening to memory, and recalling it, you do not want to say that the memory is active here. But it is.

Now you might want to extend the present "moment" beyond that quarter of a second which is human response time, to include things longer in the past as part of the present, but then I think that you would be simply using an inaccurate representation of the "moment" just for the sake of denying the role which your memory plays in your experience

And as for observation, to "observe" is to take note of what is happening, so remembering is obviously a necessary aspect. The thing observed is definitely in the past by the time the observation is made, so observation, as much as it is a part of the present, is always of the past. We take note of what has happened, so observation is in itself a recollection of what has already happened. It is not as you and many others seem to believe, a taking note of what is happening, it is a recreation of what has already happened, through the use of memory. As human beings we do not have the capacity to take note of things as they happen, we need to interpret first. So we remember, and take note after the fact, using our memories to the best of our ability, to recreate what has just happened.

Running a marathon is an activity driven by the desire to finish the marathon. So is the person's finishing, or not finishing, the marathon not real, else fictional? — javra

I still don't agree with this. The motivating desire is to run the marathon, not to finish the marathon. If the desire actually was, as you say, to finish the marathon, the most inspired marathoners would be looking for the best cheats, ways to finish without making the effort of running. But clearly the goal is to make the effort and actually run the marathon, not just to reach the finish line. The "finish" is simply the glory, or satisfaction of knowing that this particular desired activity has been carried out. The goal is not to finish, but to carry out the activity, but the activity is such that it has a clearly defined "finish". So the finish is not the goal, it just so happens that the desired activity is one which has a clearly defined finish. So the finish indicates that the goal of carrying out the activity, has been obtained.

Since its such a large part of our contention, I'm going to ask a few questions that I take to be relevant to what I find to be the experience of time:

Do you hold percepts that you deem to be immediately obtained from the workings of your physiological senses? Images obtained via the physiological sense of sight that pertains to your physiological eyes; sounds obtained via the physiological senses of sound that pertains to your physiological ears; smells obtained via the physiological sense of smell that pertains to you physiological nose; etc.?

E.g.: I see that horse you're point to, and I can hear it neighing.

Next, can you hold any percepts that you deem to not be immediately obtained from the workings of your physiological senses? Images that you see with the mind's eye but not with your physiological eyes; sounds that you hear with the mind's ears but not with your physiological ears; smells that you smell with the mind's nose but not with your physiological nose; etc.?

E.g.: I see the unicorn I am right now visualizing, and I can hear its neigh in my imagination.

If you honestly answer "no" to either of these, then we have drastic differences in what we experience, and I'd be inclined to find out more about our differences. Assuming that you can experience both as I can:

Next, are the memories you experience of the first or of the second type of perception?

Answering these I think would give me a better idea of where it is that we might differ.

Downward determinacy and upward determincay are not mutually exclusive. That said, one aspect of culture is language. Yes, we might and on occasion do communally change the language which we speak in minute ways (dictionaries change over time), yet that does not negate that the thoughts and expressions pertaining to a collective of individual psyches which speak the same language are in large part governed by the language which they speak. It's why foreign words are sometimes introduced into a language by those who are multilingual so as to express concepts that would otherwise be inexpressible (if at all imaginable) in the given language. Zeitgeist as one example of this. We as individual constituents of a language do not create the language we speak in total; our thoughts and expressions are instead in large part downwardly determined by the language(s) we speak. Do you disagree with this as well? If so, on what grounds? — javra

I disagree with you fundamentally on this issue, so I do not see any point really in discussing it. I think that assuming "a collective of individual psyches" as a whole, is a fundamental ontological error. derived from a category mistake which males a generalization into a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just to clarity, is your stance that of deeming the notion of a language to be a "fundamental ontological error". Thereby making languages ontologically nonexistent? Because in what I wrote I was addressing a language as having downward determinacy upon a collective of individual psyches.

Taking an expression at face value, you find it an impossibility that there can be more than one way to skin a cat? Here "skinning the cat" is the goal. The "one or more ways" are the means toward said goal. If you do find this to be an impossibility, on what grounds? Determinism? — javra

I say this on the grounds of how a particular object, a thing, is defined, by the law of identity, each thing being different from every other. When you define "goal" in such a way, so as to make it a thing (the particular desired endstate), then you must respect the differences between particular things, what Aristotle called accidentals. Since the accidentals between two things are different, then despite being the same type of thing, the two things are distinct. And the existence of a contingent thing is inseparable from its causes,, as what is required for the existence of that thing. So we cannot say that two contingent things, being "two" because they exist under differing circumstances, are the same thing, because that would contravene the law of identity. The best we can say is that they are two of the same type of thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pardon the crudity of this. If one were to skin a cat from tail to head rather than from head to tail then the given outcome of having skinned the cat would itself be different?

In this sense, fulfilling a goal can be said to be bringing about a particular endstate from a general goal. In maintaining a separation between the goal, as something general, and the endstate as something particular, we allow that many different endstates can truthfully be said to fulfill the same goal. But if we say that the goal is a particular endstate, eg., I need that particular hamburger, then we misrepresent what a goal really is, and force upon ourselves an unrealistic need (the need for a particular endstate) in relation to fulfilling our goals. Fulfilling our goals does not require particular endstates, and creating this illusion that on particular thing is required to fulfill your goal is self-deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

What your thinking of in terms of particulars and generalities I'm thinking of in terms of subordinate intents relative to the given intent itself - and then of supraordinate intents to boot. In the example you've given, the intent is that of alleviating the hunger one experiences. A subordinate intent might be to intake a particular hamburger. And a subordinate intent of so doing might be to open up the fridge. And then, the supraordinate teleological reason for intending to alleviate one's hunger is, or at least can be, that of intending to survive. Before continuing, do you find so addressing the matter problematic? And if so, why?

Running a marathon is an activity driven by the desire to finish the marathon. So is the person's finishing, or not finishing, the marathon not real, else fictional? — javra

I still don't agree with this. The motivating desire is to run the marathon, not to finish the marathon. If the desire actually was, as you say, to finish the marathon, the most inspired marathoners would be looking for the best cheats, ways to finish without making the effort of running. But clearly the goal is to make the effort and actually run the marathon, not just to reach the finish line. — Metaphysician Undercover

Finishing the marathon is implied in running the marathon, otherwise one would either 1) run indefinitely without ever stopping or else 2) run for a few yards or so and consider one's goal actualized. And, as with most anything else, implicit in finishing a marathon is that of doing so honestly. If one were to finish a marathon by driving a car, how would that yet be a marathon? If one were to take a shortcut from the marathon's path, one again would cross the finish line without having run the given marathon.

Do you hold percepts that you deem to be immediately obtained from the workings of your physiological senses? Images obtained via the physiological sense of sight that pertains to your physiological eyes; sounds obtained via the physiological senses of sound that pertains to your physiological ears; smells obtained via the physiological sense of smell that pertains to you physiological nose; etc.? — javra

No, I do not agree with immediate "percepts". There is mediation between the sense organ and the image in the mind. That's why I argued that the thing sensed is always in the past. I feel pain in my toe, and I know that there is mediation between the feeling, and the organ which does the sensing. I believe this is the case with all senses. So the feeling, or "percept" is a creation of the mind, the subconscious part of the mind, in response to the sense organ, then presented to the conscious part of the mind as the "percept", image, or feeling.

My OED defines "percept" as a concept resulting from perceiving. This is what the ancients, like Aristotle described as the activity of abstraction. The mind abstracts certain properties from the object, through the use of the senses.

Next, can you hold any percepts that you deem to not be immediately obtained from the workings of your physiological senses? Images that you see with the mind's eye but not with your physiological eyes; sounds that you hear with the mind's ears but not with your physiological ears; smells that you smell with the mind's nose but not with your physiological nose; etc.?

E.g.: I see the unicorn I am right now visualizing, and I can hear its neigh in my imagination. — javra

Since I understand all such images, to be creations of the mind, there is no clear dividing line between fictitious images (eg. unicorns), and the percepts created with the assistance of the sense organs. The existence of hallucinations, and dreaming (which is imaginary yet appears to the mind to be real sensing) supports my position. The conscious part of the mind, which I believe to be a relatively small part, provides us with the capacity to distinguish between fictitious images and true percepts, but it is limited in this capacity, and is not always correct, as hallucinations demonstrate.

If you honestly answer "no" to either of these, then we have drastic differences in what we experience, and I'd be inclined to find out more about our differences. Assuming that you can experience both as I can: — javra

I do not believe that these differences are "differences in what we experience". I think they are differences in the way that we each interpret our experience. I think that "what we experience" is fundamentally very similar, each of us being a very complex organism, which, when you take into account the extent of complexity, are extremely similar. We are very complex, and very similar, so I conclude that "what we experience" is very similar, as this is provided for by innate features, genetics etc. The "experience" I would say is mostly produced by the subconscious, and we could say that the conscious mind is what experiences the experience.

However, the interpretation of the experience is necessarily carried out by the conscious mind, as that which experiences. And the conscious mind is greatly influenced, shaped, by acquired features, i.e. learning. As you probably know, learning is very circumstantial, so it varies greatly from one person to the next. Now when we, each one of us individually, interprets our experience, respectively, we come up with a very large variety of differences in our explanations. This I believe is not indicative of a large difference in the way that we experience (according to innate features), but it is indicative of a large difference in what each one of us has experienced, the circumstances (learning) upon which the conscious mind becomes accustomed to making judgements.

Next, are the memories you experience of the first or of the second type of perception? — javra

So I think I've answered this one already. I see no clear division between the first and second type, as the first type is not grounded at all, and not a real acceptable category. So memories suffer from the same problem, they are often false, influenced by the creativity of the mind, and we have no real way to distinguish a true representation of the past from a false representation. This is why people can honestly insist "I remember it this way", and be demonstrated to be incorrect.

Just to clarity, is your stance that of deeming the notion of a language to be a "fundamental ontological error". Thereby making languages ontologically nonexistent? Because in what I wrote I was addressing a language as having downward determinacy upon a collective of individual psyches. — javra

Yes, I think that is a fair conclusion. I see the concept of "a language" as an ontological entity, to be fundamentally flawed. You can look at the way Wittgenstein breaks down language as an example. If we look at language as a game, for analogy, we see that "a language" as a game, breaks down into a multitude of smaller language games, and cannot exist as one coherent game, as the multitude of smaller games have rules which are inconsistent with each other. This denies the possibility of "a language' as a coherent whole. If we proceed further in the direction of breaking down language in analysis, we will find that each individual instance of use will assign a particular meaning to the words employed, which is unique to the particular circumstances of that instance, and this is the foundation of meaning, rather than a top-down imposition of rules determining how to use language.

Pardon the crudity of this. If one were to skin a cat from tail to head rather than from head to tail then the given outcome of having skinned the cat would itself be different? — javra

This is the point of the distinction between general and particular. The description of an activity is always general, running, walking, sitting, drinking, etc.. Until you mention the particular entities, individuals involved in describing a particular activity which has already occurred, the named or described activity will remain as something general. An activity is an attribute, or property, which may to predicated of numerous different individuals who may do the named activity.

However, we can narrow down the generality of the named or described activity by being more specific. So, to "skin a cat", is quite specific, it refers to a specific type of procedure which must be done with a specific type of animal. However, even in that degree of specificity there is still a vast amount of generality. You might for example specify the colour of skin required. Also, you might specify the technique, as your example, head to tail, or tail to head.

Of course the outcome will be different depending on the technique, as a different technique will provide a different product, even if the differences are minimal. That is why such differences are called "accidentals", because they are insignificant with respect to the named activity "skin a cat". But if we change the specification, because for some reason the differences which seemed insignificant before, are now viewed as important, one might specify "skin a cat from tail to head", and the differences are no longer viewed as accidentals.

What your thinking of in terms of particulars and generalities I'm thinking of in terms of subordinate intents relative to the given intent itself - and then of supraordinate intents to boot. In the example you've given, the intent is that of alleviating the hunger one experiences. A subordinate intent might be to intake a particular hamburger. And a subordinate intent of so doing might be to open up the fridge. And then, the supraordinate teleological reason for intending to alleviate one's hunger is, or at least can be, that of intending to survive. Before continuing, do you find so addressing the matter problematic? And if so, why? — javra

This is close, but not quite what I'm thinking. The difference between generalities and particulars is a category difference, The subordinates and supraordinates are all within the same category, as generalities. The difference between them is just like the difference of making things more specific, in the example above. The more general the goal, the more opportunity for different possibilities in fulfillment. As we move toward less and les general, i.e. more specific, the possibilities are narrowed down.

Here is the reason for maintaining the category separation. Suppose we get to the extremely specific. My goal is to eat that particular hamburger, now. Until the action is actually carried out, there is still possibilities, with a bun, condiments, etc.. It is only after the action is carried out, that it can be described as a particular, without any possibilities. This is the endstate, and it is categorically distinct from the goal, as a particular occurrence, having already occurred. The goal is a view to the future, with respect for possibilities, while the endstate is something which has happened and is now in the past, there are no more possibilities if truth is to be respected.

So that is the reason why we need a good understanding of "the present", because the present, "now" is what provides us with that category separation, and confusing the two categories is a category mistake. We have a difference between the activity described as a goal for the future, and the activity as described as a past occurrence (the endstate). What lies between these, within the medium, is the accidentals of the actual activity. No matter how specific we get with our description of the desired activity, we cannot include all the possibilities for accidentals, so the goal will always remain as something general in relation to the activity which will be brought about, allowing for a multitude of different possible endstates to fulfill the conditions of that goal.

Finishing the marathon is implied in running the marathon, otherwise one would either 1) run indefinitely without ever stopping or else 2) run for a few yards or so and consider one's goal actualized. And, as with most anything else, implicit in finishing a marathon is that of doing so honestly. If one were to finish a marathon by driving a car, how would that yet be a marathon? If one were to take a shortcut from the marathon's path, one again would cross the finish line without having run the given marathon. — javra

Yes, that is the nature of the named activity, to "run a marathon", that finishing it, and not cheating, are implied by the definition. That is a feature of the specification. What I was pointing out is that "run a marathon" is not exactly the same specification as "finish a marathon", and one might be defined differently from the other, with different things implied.

From your second to last post:

I can see your point, to think of your experience in terms of befores and afters, But this is to look at time from the perspective of memory. Notice that you only assign (judge) a before and after, after remembering the entire sequence. We can remove the need for this type of judgement if we look directly at our experience of memories and anticipations, to derive our conception of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

And from your last post:

No, I do not agree with immediate "percepts". There is mediation between the sense organ and the image in the mind. That's why I argued that the thing sensed is always in the past. I feel pain in my toe, and I know that there is mediation between the feeling, and the organ which does the sensing. I believe this is the case with all senses. So the feeling, or "percept" is a creation of the mind, the subconscious part of the mind, in response to the sense organ, then presented to the conscious part of the mind as the "percept", image, or feeling. — Metaphysician Undercover

We seem to have come to a standstill. I find that you incorporate so much of neuroscientific knowledge and inferential reasoning into your understandings of percepts, this so as to accommodate your understanding of time, that you conflate what is immediately experienced with very abstract inferences concerning a hypothetical nature of time.

To sum up your stance as I understand it: We know from science that all our immediate percepts occur nanoseconds after our physiological senses first register data, and you thereby conclude that all our perceptions occur in the past. We however do not perceive expectations, so these are not of the past, being instead inferred to regard the future. There then must be inferred a transition between this non-past and past, an infinitesimal threshold of some sort, and this you demarcate as the non-experienced but purely conceptual present.

Please specify where I’ve characterized your stance badly, if I have.

To the average person on the street (who most likely doesn’t even have the learning to know that our immediate percepts of which we are consciously aware occur nanoseconds after our physiological senses register information) that all our “perceptions are remembrances” would be utter nonsense. To such, there is a clear distinction between “I am now seeing a house” and “I am remembering a house I once saw ten years back”. By the conclusions you've so far advocated, I'm tempted to speculate that this person should instead be saying, or at least conceptualizing, “I am right now remembering that house over there that I’m now point to (with our awareness of our so pointing also being a memory to us, since this awareness too is perceptual and therefore of the past)” and “I am remembering a house that I visually first remembered ten years back.” Again, to the average person so conceptualizing is nonsense, precisely because it contradicts the experiential nature of present perceptions as contrasted to what is commonly understood by memories.

I, again, was addressing what we directly experience, and not any reasoning regarding the mechanisms of our perceptions or the ontological nature of time.

But I accept that we will disagree on this.

Just to clarity, is your stance that of deeming the notion of a language to be a "fundamental ontological error". Thereby making languages ontologically nonexistent? Because in what I wrote I was addressing a language as having downward determinacy upon a collective of individual psyches. — javra

Yes, I think that is a fair conclusion. I see the concept of "a language" as an ontological entity, to be fundamentally flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can only extrapolate from this that the proposition, "We are now debating in the English language," is to you untrue - this because the notion of "the English language" as something that exists is fundamentally flawed to you. Am I wrong in this?

This is close, but not quite what I'm thinking. The difference between generalities and particulars is a category difference, The subordinates and supraordinates are all within the same category, as generalities. The difference between them is just like the difference of making things more specific, in the example above. The more general the goal, the more opportunity for different possibilities in fulfillment. As we move toward less and les general, i.e. more specific, the possibilities are narrowed down.

Here is the reason for maintaining the category separation. Suppose we get to the extremely specific. My goal is to eat that particular hamburger, now. Until the action is actually carried out, there is still possibilities, with a bun, condiments, etc.. It is only after the action is carried out, that it can be described as a particular, without any possibilities. This is the endstate, and it is categorically distinct from the goal, as a particular occurrence, having already occurred. The goal is a view to the future, with respect for possibilities, while the endstate is something which has happened and is now in the past, there are no more possibilities if truth is to be respected.

So that is the reason why we need a good understanding of "the present", because the present, "now" is what provides us with that category separation, and confusing the two categories is a category mistake. We have a difference between the activity described as a goal for the future, and the activity as described as a past occurrence (the endstate). What lies between these, within the medium, is the accidentals of the actual activity. No matter how specific we get with our description of the desired activity, we cannot include all the possibilities for accidentals, so the goal will always remain as something general in relation to the activity which will be brought about, allowing for a multitude of different possible endstates to fulfill the conditions of that goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've decided not to comment due to our disagreements regarding what the experienced present consists of, or, rather, of whether there is such as thing as an experienced present.

We seem to have come to a standstill. I find that you incorporate so much of neuroscientific knowledge and inferential reasoning into your understandings of percepts, this so as to accommodate your understanding of time, that you conflate what is immediately experienced with very abstract inferences concerning a hypothetical nature of time. — javra

You're missing the fundamental point though. I insist that we have no experience of time. Time is conceptual only, therefore any temporal notions are derived from abstract concepts.

To sum up your stance as I understand it: We know from science that all our immediate percepts occur nanoseconds after our physiological senses first register data, and you thereby conclude that all our perceptions occur in the past. We however do not perceive expectations, so these are not of the past, being instead inferred to regard the future. There then must be inferred a transition between this non-past and past, an infinitesimal threshold of some sort, and this you demarcate as the non-experienced but purely conceptual present. — javra

This is not quite right. What I said is that I distinguish between memories and anticipations as fundamentally different. I do not know how I make such a distinction, it's just a base intuition.

I do not use neuroscientific knowledge to justify my claim that there is mediation in sensation, just simple logic like Plato used in describing seeing. There is spatial separation between sense organs. The mind unifies these spatially separated places, and this requires that something traverses the gap. And traversing a spatial gap is not instantaneous.

In other words there is mediation, a medium, between the parts of my body, in the same way that there is a medium between you and I, it's just on a smaller scale. This is not a new idea, the ancient atomists proposed that bodies consisted of atoms and void. I replace void with medium because void doesn't make sense to me.

To the average person on the street (who most likely doesn’t even have the learning to know that our immediate percepts of which we are consciously aware occur nanoseconds after our physiological senses register information) that all our “perceptions are remembrances” would be utter nonsense. To such, there is a clear distinction between “I am now seeing a house” and “I am remembering a house I once saw ten years back”. By the conclusions you've so far advocated, I'm tempted to speculate that this person should instead be saying, or at least conceptualizing, “I am right now remembering that house over there that I’m now point to (with our awareness of our so pointing also being a memory to us, since this awareness too is perceptual and therefore of the past)” and “I am remembering a house that I visually first remembered ten years back.” Again, to the average person so conceptualizing is nonsense, precisely because it contradicts the experiential nature of present perceptions as contrasted to what is commonly understood by memories. — javra

The average person on the street is like Plato's cave dweller, believing that the reflections, or representations of reality, are reality. The philosopher has the task of leading those cave dwellers out of the entrapments of their false opinions. What Plato taught is that we build up layers of representation, and this is like a narrative. What I say is that the real thing which is being represented must be in the past by the time the representation is created.

I, again, was addressing what we directly experience, and not any reasoning regarding the mechanisms of our perceptions or the ontological nature of time. — javra

Sure, but we do not directly experience time. Time is derived from abstraction. So you have no basis for saying that one event is before or after another event, because from experience you have no principles to substantiate the meaning of before or after. And you are proposing an ontology of goal driven determinacy. I propose that we move to substantiate "before" and "after" by referring directly to our experience of memories and anticipations.

you have no basis for saying that one event is before or after another event — Metaphysician Undercover

the real thing which is being represented must be in the past by the time the representation is created — Metaphysician Undercover

I revealed the basis for my conception of time as the difference between memory and anticipation. Before and after are not essential to this conception. Javra's conception is based in before and after, which is circular if before and after are not based in something other than time.

I revealed the basis for my conception of time as the difference between memory and anticipation. Before and after are not essential to this conception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does "the real thing which is being represented" come before or after "the time the representation is created", given that the former "must be in the past" of the latter? Or is there "no basis for saying that one event is before or after another event"?

Your conception, based in past and future, is just as circular.

Javra's conception is based in before and after, which is circular if before and after are not based in something other than time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your conception, based in past and future, is just as circular. — Luke

Luke, since I’m not sure what to make of your statement, I’ll take it at face value. So, out of curiosity, I’ll make this reply:

Circularity applies to reasoning that is circular. For example, one relies on X to explain Y and on Y to explain X. “Direct awareness of” is a brute fact, with no circularity involved. For example, one sees a pink elephant (whether or not what one sees is a hallucination is irrelevant to the reality that one sees a pink elephant; one’s so seeing is a brute fact to oneself). My own direct experience is that when I snap my fingers, I hear the one snap in the lived present; i.e., I neither experience it as an auditory memory nor as an auditory anticipation, but as a total sound which is happening concurrently with my direct awareness of the world external to me. As part of this brute experience, the snap has a beginning and an end, neither of which is memory to me when I hear the snap. Furthermore, the snap’s beginning occurs before the snaps end; this, again, at the very least in my own direct experience, is in no way a reasoned inference but an immediate observation (with no need to here address Kantian like innate intuitions required to so observe). This brute direct experience of the snap hence consists of a before and after, neither of which is memory or anticipation. From concrete direct experiences such as this, I then abstract before and after into the notion of time (with many more details involved in so abstracting).

Q: How does so abstracting what time is from the concrete particulars of direct experience consist of circularity of argumentation? Although I’m neither a philosophical empiricist nor a philosophical rationalist, but a bit of both, in this case this is what empiricism consist of: deriving generalized ideas from the concrete particulars of immediate experience. Does one then deem that all philosophical empiricisms are circular in argumentation?

Does "the real thing which is being represented" come before or after "the time the representation is created", given that the former "must be in the past" of the latter? Or is there "no basis for saying that one event is before or after another event"?

Your conception, based in past and future, is just as circular. — Luke

We haven't determined the basis for saying that either one, the past or the future is before or after the other one. I would be inclined to say that the anticipation of an event is prior to the memory of an event, and since anticipation relates to the future, and memory to the past, the future is before the past, from my experiential perspective.

Furthermore, the snap’s beginning occurs before the snaps end; this, again, at the very least in my own direct experience, is in no way a reasoned inference but an immediate observation (with no need to here address Kantian like innate intuitions required to so observe). — javra

In the case of a "snap", also other quick sounds like a gunshot, I do not experience a beginning and end. It's all at once, a snap. Only by inference do I decide that there must be a beginning and an ending.

In the case of a longer sound, like a held tone, a horn or a bell, I do experience a distinct separation between a beginning and an ending. But this is only because the beginning is a memory by the time the end comes, And by the time the ending is anticipated the beginning is already a memory.

So, I find that the only thing which allows me to experience a separation between the beginning and the ending of a sound is memory and anticipation. And any quick sound, like a snap or a pop, is already ended by the time I notice that it has started, so it doesn't appear to me like I experience a beginning and ending of such a sound, though I know that it must have them.

How does so abstracting what time is from the concrete particulars of direct experience consist of circularity of argumentation? — javra

According to my described experience, above, I don't really believe that you experience a beginning and ending to an abrupt, quick sound like a snap. I think you experience it all at once, as a snap, because the human response time is not quick enough for you to separate the beginning from the end, in your perception. If you really think that you do, try to describe the difference between what the beginning sounds like, and what the ending sounds like, without the assistance of a recording device, or referencing reverberations which are not really part of the initial snap.

Nevertheless, if you actually can separate the beginning of such a sound from the ending of that sound, to prove that you experience them distinctly, this simply supports what I am arguing. I think that you can only make this distinction because the beginning of the sound has already registered in your memory when you hear the end of the sound. So your conclusion that a sound has a beginning and an ending really is dependent on the separation between memory and anticipation.

In the case of a "snap", also other quick sounds like a gunshot, I do not experience a beginning and end. It's all at once, a snap. Only by inference do I decide that there must be a beginning and an ending. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're telling me that devoid of your conscious reasoning, aka inferences, what you would experience is an eternal sound, one that is thereby devoid of a beginning (a transition from no sound to sound) and an end (a transition from sound to no sound)?

A closely related question: You thereby consciously reason each and every instance of sound that you hear to determine its beginnings and endings as these stand relative to all other sounds that overlap? For instance, suppose you're blindfolded and a buddy snaps his fingers on both hands at approximately the same moment, with each hand being placed next to one of your different ears; without inferences (again, conscious reasoning) that you decide upon, you would be unable to discern which hand's snap ended first relative to the other, hence ending before the other?

(As can be confirmed with recordings and their analysis: An "all at once" sound, such as a snap, a hand clap, a car honk, a dog's bark, and so on a) holds duration (is not durationless, nor even of infinitesimal duration), b) is constrained, or limited, or bounded by a start and end, and, furthermore, c) the beginnings of such "all at once" sounds typically have different auditory qualities then the endings, in addition to the transitions from "no sound to sound" and from "sound to no sound" - again typically unless one is addressing certain synthesized sounds. But maybe this part in brackets is neither here nor there since we're addressing our direct experiences.)

... an interesting topic. I figure either one of us is in some way mistaken, or we experience things differently.

EDIT: Upon closer scrutiny, it turns out that when I snap my fingers there's first a swooshing frictional sound made by rubbing my middle finger against my thumb that overlaps with a popping sound made when my middle finger touches my palm at a fast enough rate ... quite audible to me when I snap my fingers slowly. Evidencing that in my experiences there can be discerned a unique beginning sound from a different ending sound in an individual finger snap - with no memory utilized on my part to so discern (in my own experiences). Thought this to be an interesting tidbit to add.

Luke, since I’m not sure what to make of your statement, I’ll take it at face value. — javra

I was not being critical of you. I only meant to point out that MU's criticism could equally be directed at himself.

We haven't determined the basis for saying that either one, the past or the future is before or after the other one. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how can you assert that: "the real thing which is being represented must be in the past by the time the representation is created"?

I would be inclined to say that the anticipation of an event is prior to the memory of an event, and since anticipation relates to the future, and memory to the past, the future is before the past, from my experiential perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you require in order to determine "the basis for saying that either one, the past or the future is before or after the other one"?