You're telling me that devoid of your conscious reasoning, aka inferences, what you would experience is an eternal sound, one that is thereby devoid of a beginning (a transition from no sound to sound) and an end (a transition from sound to no sound)? — javra

The more I think about it the more I realize that it's not possible to separate basic experience from conscious reasoning in this way, as the two are deeply mixed and this route may not lead us anywhere.

But to answer your question, I'd have to say no, I don't think that's accurate. Remember, I place memory and anticipation as fundamental parts of experience, and the subconscious probably works with these without the use of conscious reasoning. I believe that such transitions are clearly noticeable, and simultaneous differences in sound are also clearly noticeable. What I do not believe is that they are noticed as "beginnings", and "ends".

Do you recognize that in such transitions, the beginning of one thing is always also the end of the other? So whether the noted instance is a beginning or an ending is completely dependent on which thing you are giving your attention to, as the significant thing. This issue becomes quite pronounced when we look at time itself, and apprehend the present as the divisor between future and past. The common practise is to say that the past ends at the present, and the future begins at the present. But that is just because we emphasize the past, and order furthest away things in the past as "before" closer things. When we see that time itself is a thing which is changing, a thing labeled as dates hours, etc., we have a different perspective. Then we can see the future passing through the present to become past, as the named part labeled by a date, moves from future to past. We see that the present is when the future becomes the past, so the present is when the past begins, and the future ends.

What I doubt, and dismiss, is the idea that the subconscious works with a concept of time, the conception of something called "time" which is passing. I think that this is a conscious judgement. And since the notions of before and after as we commonly use them, are derived from this idea, that time is a sort of medium which validates such judgements, I also dismiss the idea that the subconscious provides us with determinations of before and after.

Consider for example recalling numerous different events, and giving them a temporal order. How is that order determined? In this example, we are doing it consciously, consciously determining a temporal order of past events. But the type of inference used seems to be very sketchy, and it might be varied. For things close together in time, we might say this was required for that, as cause, and was therefore before, .and for things far apart in time, it might just come automatically, as obvious, this was recent and that was a long time ago. The latter, the judgement which comes automatically, would be the closest to a judgement made without conscious inference. How do you think such a judgement is made?

You thereby consciously reason each and every instance of sound that you hear to determine its beginnings and endings as these stand relative to all other sounds that overlap? — javra

I would only do this if I was thinking about beginnings and endings of sounds, but usually i do not think about that. I just hear the sounds, and act accordingly, without thoughts about how the sounds begin and end.

For instance, suppose you're blindfolded and a buddy snaps his fingers on both hands at approximately the same moment, with each hand being placed next to one of your different ears; without inferences (again, conscious reasoning) that you decide upon, you would be unable to discern which hand's snap ended first relative to the other, hence ending before the other? — javra

I would be much more inclined to attempt to determine which snap started before the other, I think that's an easier thing to determine than which one ended first. Don't ask me why, but I think we are sort of trained this way, if we are asked to judge which sound is first, we judge which one starts first. But that's a judgement based in anticipation, I would be expecting, and waiting for the sounds, prepared to make the required judgement. If it just so happened, that two pops suddenly went off, almost simultaneously, one beside each of my ears, I might not know which was first. And even if I could make that judgement accurately, it would require that I reflect on my memory. So either way, it supports my position, that such judgements of before and after are based in memory and anticipation.

EDIT: Upon closer scrutiny, it turns out that when I snap my fingers there's first a swooshing frictional sound made by rubbing my middle finger against my thumb that overlaps with a popping sound made when my middle finger touches my palm at a fast enough rate ... quite audible to me when I snap my fingers slowly. Evidencing that in my experiences there can be discerned a unique beginning sound from a different ending sound in an individual finger snap - with no memory utilized on my part to so discern (in my own experiences). Thought this to be an interesting tidbit to add. — javra

How can you say "with no memory utilized on my part"? Wasn't your decision that there was a swooshing sound prior to the snapping sound, made after the entire sequence of sounds, therefore based in your memory of the sounds? Let's assume that it was not. Then wasn't it based in your anticipation of the sounds? Remember, I argue that judgements of before and after are based not only in memory, but in anticipation as well. Clearly when you say "closer scrutiny" this means that the event was highly anticipated, allowing you to make this judgement.

Now I think we've stumbled across a very important aspect of goal driven determinacy. It appears to me, that when making such judgements, as which comes first, or is the beginning distinguishable from the ending, it is far more effective to approach the object (event) from an anticipatory perspective, then from a perspective of remembering the event. If an event occurs, and then you are asked to make such a judgement, only from your memory, it would be very difficult. But if you are prepared for the event, anticipating it, you'll have far more success in noting what occurs.

Then how can you assert that: "the real thing which is being represented must be in the past by the time the representation is created"? — Luke

Why not? I'm talking strictly about future and past, not before and after. And future and past are determined based on memory and anticipation. The point is that there is no need to bring before and after into this discussion at this point.

What do you require in order to determine "the basis for saying that either one, the past or the future is before or after the other one"? — Luke

This would require definition I believe. So instead of defining before and after in relation to time (because this is circular if we are conceiving of time through the experience of before and after), we need to give "prior to" a different definition, such as logically prior to. When one concept is required logically, for another, the other being dependent on the one, then the one is logically prior. This creates a hierarchy of meaning, pointing to the most important, or significant things as first, prior to, or before the less significant, such that the highest goals, as most important, are prior to, the less important. And since the concept of time is to be derived from the designation of before and after, the highest goals are most causally effective, being prior in time to the lesser goals.

Then how can you assert that: "the real thing which is being represented must be in the past by the time the representation is created"?
— Luke

Why not? I'm talking strictly about future and past, not before and after. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then perhaps you could explain the basis of your claim that “the real thing which is being represented must be in the past by the time the representation is created". Why must the one be in the past of the other?

Don’t we already know that the future is after the past?

Then perhaps you could explain the basis of your claim that “the real thing which is being represented must be in the past by the time the representation is created". Why must the one be in the past of the other? — Luke

It's not "in the past of the other", it's "in the past", where "past" is defined as the things whose existence is demonstrate by memories. "Past" and "future" are not defined here in relation to each other, they are defined in relation to memory and anticipation.

;

Don’t we already know that the future is after the past? — Luke

No, our understanding of time is very inadequate, so we do not know that, that's the point I'm making. Placing the past as before the future is a feature of the way that people conceive time. In a different conception of time, one based in a goal driven ontology, there is good reason to place the future as before the past.

Do you recognize that in such transitions, the beginning of one thing is always also the end of the other? So whether the noted instance is a beginning or an ending is completely dependent on which thing you are giving your attention to, as the significant thing. This issue becomes quite pronounced when we look at time itself, and apprehend the present as the divisor between future and past. The common practise is to say that the past ends at the present, and the future begins at the present. But that is just because we emphasize the past, and order furthest away things in the past as "before" closer things. When we see that time itself is a thing which is changing, a thing labeled as dates hours, etc., we have a different perspective. Then we can see the future passing through the present to become past, as the named part labeled by a date, moves from future to past. We see that the present is when the future becomes the past, so the present is when the past begins, and the future ends. — Metaphysician Undercover

When we look at the question of how a goal can act to determine the activity which occurs at the present (free will activity) we need to consider how a thing can come into being at the present. Free will indicates that we must dismiss the idea that these things are determined by the past. However, the existence of the thing which comes into being at the present is in some way determined by the goal. If you understand things as coming into being at the present, then you can apprehend them as coming out of the future and moving into the past, just like time does. Therefore the future ought to be placed as before the past.

It's not "in the past of the other", it's "in the past", where "past" is defined as the things whose existence is demonstrate by memories. "Past" and "future" are not defined here in relation to each other, they are defined in relation to memory and anticipation. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you distinguish memories from anticipations?

How do you distinguish memories from anticipations? — Luke

Javra asked the same question, so I went through this already, I believe it's some type of intuition. There is I think, a noticeable difference though, in that a memory is something very specific, while anticipation is very general. Consider that if a memory gets very general, that's when it is fading away and being lost, but when anticipation is very general, that's when it is the strongest, as anxiety.

How do you think that you distinguish memories from anticipations?

How do you think that you distinguish memories from anticipations? — Metaphysician Undercover

Apart from the distinction already made by the relevant meanings of the two words, the short answer is: sense perception. I anticipate what I will see (or otherwise will sense), and I remember what I have seen (or otherwise have sensed). And I have sense perceptions in/of the present moment.

This doesn’t seem like an option for you given your position that we do not experience the present, and that the present is merely a conceptual or logical assumption that we use to divide the future from the past.

It is unclear to me what you are anticipating or remembering if not a perceptual experience. From what you’ve said, it seems that you can only anticipate and remember memories. This is all re-presentation and no presentation.

I’m unsure how you escape circularity here, since you’ve said that past and future are defined in relation to memory and anticipation. You haven’t said so, but it seems that you can only define memory and anticipation in relation to past and future.

Consider that if a memory gets very general, that's when it is fading away and being lost, but when anticipation is very general, that's when it is the strongest, as anxiety. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t understand what you mean by memories or anticipations being “general”. I find that I anticipate and remember specific events or qualities.

Apart from the distinction already made by the relevant meanings of the two words, the short answer is: sense perception. I anticipate what I will see (or otherwise will sense), and I remember what I have seen (or otherwise have sensed). And I have sense perceptions in/of the present moment. — Luke

Yes, I forgot to state the obvious. a memory is of an event which I recognize as being in the past, and I anticipate events I recognize as being future events. I talked about this at the beginning of my involvement in the thread.

This doesn’t seem like an option for you given your position that we do not experience the present, and that the present is merely a conceptual or logical assumption that we use to divide the future from the past. — Luke

I don't see why you say this. I experience memories and anticipations. I do not experience the present. However, since there is a substantial difference between what I experience as memories, and what I experience as anticipations, which I understand as the difference between past and future, I conclude that something must separate the past from future, i.e. the present. I may even conclude that my experience is in the present, because past experiences are gone and future ones have not yet happened, but I don't yet see principles whereby I can say that the present is something which I experience. I have experienced some things which I remember, and I will experience some things which i anticipate, and I do experience memories and anticipations, but how do you think that I experience the present?

Yes, I forgot to state the obvious. a memory is of an event which I recognize as being in the past, and I anticipate events I recognize as being future events. — Metaphysician Undercover

I experience memories and anticipations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you experience the memories and anticipations of events, but you do not experience the events themselves (via sense perception). Otherwise, you are collapsing the distinction between memories that we recall and "memories" that are sense perceptions.

I may even conclude that my experience is in the present, because past experiences are gone and future ones have not yet happened, but I don't yet see principles whereby I can say that the present is something which I experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is at least some concession, given your earlier statement that:

We sense the past, not the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you can have experiences in the present but not of the present, and you can have experiences of the past (but not in the past)?

I don't yet see principles whereby I can say that the present is something which I experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure about "principles", and this may be heading down the 'absolute' path, but if you accept that we exist in time, then our (veridical) experiences can only be of the time at which we find ourselves. And whatever time we find ourselves at is the present moment (for us).

Otherwise, you are collapsing the distinction between memories that we recall and "memories" that are sense perceptions. — Luke

Yes, that's what I've done, sense perceptions are basically memories. I've argued that there is a medium between the sense organ and the conscious perception, such that the thing sensed is is in the past by the time of the perception. Javra concurred that neuroscience supports this, but I do not base my opinion in neuroscience. Further, I argued that the subconscious uses the memory in presenting the "image" what you would might call the "percept", to the conscious mind, such that the image is already a memory by the time it is present to the mind, as it is a representation.

Memories that you recall, and memories that are sense perceptions is an untenable distinction, I believe, unless you intend this to be a distinction between conscious and subconscious use of memory.. It is just another form of the distinction between recent and long ago memories. Any distinction between the two would be completely arbitrary without further principles. However, we do have further principles in thi case. First, the conscious mind is doing the "recalling", and I am arguing that the subconscious is presenting the sense representations to the conscious mind, as memories, though the condvioud mind is not aware that they are actually memories. So that's a big difference. Also I would argue that memories are related to anticipations, and it is in relation to anticipation, that memories as sense perceptions are separated from other very short term memories in the subconscious activity of the mind. This is why, in an extremely active world, with activity occurring all around us, we remember better, what we direct our attention toward (anticipation at play). This example is of the conscious mind, but the subconscious is similar, I believe.

That is at least some concession, given your earlier statement that: — Luke

It's what I've been saying all along. We might conclude that our experience is in the present, but we cannot say that it is an experience of the present. You might call it a concession, but I haven't changed my opinion. Further, I'm prepared to proceed to the point of saying that we actually do experience the present, so long as we define "the present" in a way which is coherent, in the sense of making it something which can be experienced.

That's why I said "but I don't yet see principles whereby I can say that the present is something which I experience." I believe that it is in describing "the present" as something which can be experienced, which necessitates the conclusion that the future is before the past. When we understand that the passing of time is a real thing, which is experienced by us as "the present", then we see the present as the end of the future, and the beginning of the past. Consider that if the future is before us, and the past is after us, the past is always growing, becoming, as the future is shrinking, therefore the future is ending at the present while the past is just beginning at the present.

I'm not sure about "principles", and this may be heading down the 'absolute' path, but if you accept that we exist in time, then our (veridical) experiences can only be of the time at which we find ourselves. And whatever time we find ourselves at is the present moment (for us). — Luke

Yes, this would be the case, if we find ourselves "in" time. But most presentists I've talked to remove "the present" from time, making it a non-dimensional division between past and future, by which the past and future are distinct from the present, and illusory. Making the human mind outside of time. existing at the present, as distinct from time which is either past or future, supports the assumption of eternal properties of the mind, Platonic Ideas.

Now, Javra has stated that the present consists of a duration of time, the present moment is a duration. So within that duration some parts must be in the future relative to other parts which would be in the past. What this implies is that within the present, there is also future and past. And when we see that, within our experienced present, part is in the future, and part is in the past, then we can acknowledge that the part in the future is before (prior to) the part in the past.

Memories that you recall, and memories that are sense perceptions is an untenable distinction, I believe — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't believe it is untenable. It is the distinction between perception and memory; between the experience of consciously perceiving an event via the senses, and (later) recalling that experience via the memory. These are very qualitatively different. You do not perceive memories (or anticipations) via your senses; you perceive the world via your senses. And I consider it a misuse of the word to say that we "recall" our perceptions of the world (while perceiving).

Now, Javra has stated that the present consists of a duration of time, the present moment is a duration. So within that duration some parts must be in the future relative to other parts which would be in the past. What this implies is that within the present, there is also future and past. And when we see that, within our experienced present, part is in the future, and part is in the past, then we can acknowledge that the part in the future is before (prior to) the part in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

To address what you've last written, a correction: I've repeatedly asserted that the experienced present has a duration. For clarity, implicitly requisite in this is that I'm referring strictly to conscious awareness as that which experiences - i.e., to the first person point of view - and not to the experiences of our own unconscious minds, of which we as first person points of view can only infer. Furthermore, yes, within this experienced present, there are givens that occur before other givens (else, givens that occur after other givens) but, from the vantage of the experienced present as experienced by the first person point of view, these occurrences that consist of befores and afters are yet the present - hence, are neither the experiential future (which consists of yet to be experienced experiential present moments) nor the experiential past (which consists of already-experienced experiential-present-moments that are re-presented to our conscious selves, either automatically relative to us as conscious selves or via our volition as conscious selves of so remembering, with the latter most often termed "recall"). The befores and afters that occur in the experienced present are neither our experienced past nor our experienced future. But before further engaging in explaining this:

First, you've repeatedly claimed that we do not experience time. One such example:

I've been arguing that we do not directly experience time at all. It's conceptual, an abstraction. You end the paragraph with "we nevertheless experience time as such" , but you don't say what you think we experience time as. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is direct contradiction to time perception studies - with the sole point to referencing such studies here being that we as first person points of view do hold subjective awareness of time. Hence, we experience time. To my knowledge, this experiencing of time is something utterly non-controversial among both academics and non-academics. Can you point to a reference of someone who affirms that we humans do not experience time? (Again, they might claim that our experiences of time are illusory, but not that we don't directly experience time, aka temporal order.) ((Also, note the amount of information on the linked Wikipedia page regarding the subjective experience of time.))

What I've called the "experienced, or experiential, present" W. James famously termed the "specious present":

James defined the specious present to be "the prototype of all conceived times... the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible" — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_perception#Philosophical_perspectives

The person he borrowed this term from, E. R. Kelly, is quoted to more elaborately comment:

The relation of experience to time has not been profoundly studied. Its objects are given as being of the present, but the part of time referred to by the datum is a very different thing from the conterminous of the past and future which philosophy denotes by the name Present. The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the past—a recent past—delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named the specious present, and let the past, that is given as being the past, be known as the obvious past. All the notes of a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in the present. All the changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be contained in the present. At the instant of the termination of such series, no part of the time measured by them seems to be a past. Time, then, considered relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts, viz., the obvious past, the specious present, the real present, and the future. Omitting the specious present, it consists of three ... nonentities—the past, which does not exist, the future, which does not exist, and their conterminous, the present; the faculty from which it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious present.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Specious_present

I have and will use "the experiential present" rather than "the specious present" precisely due to my disagreement with the inference that what I experience is "fictitious", as per the part of Kelly's quote I've boldfaced. (I am most certain of what I directly experience, and less certain of the inferences I abstract from such - this outlook being pivotal to my approach to philosophy in general; a different topic, maybe.) Nevertheless, there is yet mention of an experienced present in Kelly's inference of it being "fiction".

This quote by Kelly, quite likely, cuts to the marrow of our disagreement on this subject. Only that you go a step further and tell me that I don't experience time at all.

Experiments have shown that rats can successfully estimate a time interval of approximately 40 seconds, despite having their cortex entirely removed.[23] This suggests that time estimation may be a low level process.[24] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_perception#Neuroscientific_perspectives

To emphasize, what this implies is 1) that conscious reasoning (which occurs in the cerebral cortex) is not a necessity to the discernment of temporal sequences - hence, the discernment of time - and (here overlooking the rest of the linked to article) 2) that lesser animals are quite capable of experiencing time - again implying that conscious reasoning is not essential to the activity.

As to memory, for the sake of brevity, I did and will for now continue to address memory as strictly that which is brought into consciousness by the unconscious which of itself re-presents a perceptual event that has already transpired and ended. To be as explicit as I currently can, this experiential memory (i.e., memory as it is experienced by the first person point of view) always consists of long term memory (e.g., a phone # I had ten years back); usually consists of short term memory and/or working memory (the memory of a phone # I have been exposed to 10 seconds after the fact), and on rare and extra-ordinary occasions of sensory memory (e.g., the experience of an afterimage). Complexities galore with all of this. And yes, I dully acknowledge the role of various memory types. Yes, having said this, what I do not agree with is that there is no experiential difference relative to the first person point of view in question between, for example, looking at an apple (this being the person's experiential present) and remembering once seeing an apple (this being the person's experiential past). Here, experientially, there is a clear distinction between what I deem to be the present perceptions I am aware of and what I deem to be former perceptions I am aware of - one whose threshold is fuzzy, granted, but experientially a clear distinction nevertheless.

(In some ways it's akin to watching a movie and claiming that what we are in fact experiencing is a series of still frames when, in fact, we are experiencing fluid motion while so viewing. Slow down the movie reel's motion and there will be a threshold where we witness both motion and still frames, true. Yet our perception of unadulturated motion is nevertheless experientially real when the movie progresses at its intended pace. In a roundabout way, the same allegorically applies to our experienced present (our seeing motion) and the nitty-gritty analysis of sensory and working memory (the still frames of a movie reel): the perceived present is to us experientially real, despite being made up in many a way by memory. Maybe this will help in getting across what I mean by "experiential present".)

Note, though, that by "experiential" I am neither addressing sub/unconscious experiences nor am I inferring what is experienced to necessarily be an objectively factual state of affairs - one that necessarily occurs in manners indifferent to one's experiences.

I would have furthered this post with more direct replies to your last post to me, but I realize that if we disagree on there being an experienced (or, else, specious) present, we then lack any and all common ground that would be required for further discussing this topic.

I don't believe it is untenable. It is the distinction between perception and memory; between the experience of consciously perceiving an event via the senses, and (later) recalling that experience via the memory. These are very qualitatively different. You do not perceive memories (or anticipations) via your senses; you perceive the world via your senses. And I consider it a misuse of the word to say that we "recall" our perceptions of the world (while perceiving). — Luke

As I explained, there is a medium between sense organs and conscious perception which needs to be accounted for. I called this the subconscious part of the mind The images, or percepts are not received by the conscious mind, directly from the senses, they are created by the subconscious and presented to the conscious. That's why when you are dreaming you do not know that you are just dreaming rather than actually sensing things. The subconscious is creating the same type of images without the senses.

For clarity, implicitly requisite in this is that I'm referring strictly to conscious awareness as that which experiences - i.e., to the first person point of view - and not to the experiences of our own unconscious minds, of which we as first person points of view can only infer. — javra

Do you agree with me, that what you call the unconscious mind, what I call the subconscious, acts as a medium between the sense organs and the conscious mind? If so, then you ought to be able to understand that what the subconscious presents to the conscious, as what is experienced by the conscious, is something created by the subconscious, as a representation, or even a symbol or sign, of what is sensed. This means that we must rid ourselves of the naive realist belief, that the first person perspective, conscious awareness, is an experience of anything other than a world created by the person's own subconscious system. That this is the truth is evidenced by hallucinations and dreams.

Furthermore, yes, within this experienced present, there are givens that occur before other givens (else, givens that occur after other givens) but, from the vantage of the experienced present as experienced by the first person point of view, these occurrences that consist of befores and afters are yet the present - hence, are neither the experiential future (which consists of yet to be experienced experiential present moments) nor the experiential past (which consists of already-experienced experiential-present-moments that are re-presented to our conscious selves, either automatically relative to us as conscious selves or via our volition as conscious selves of so remembering, with the latter most often termed "recall"). The befores and afters that occur in the experienced present are neither our experienced past nor our experienced future. But before further engaging in explaining this: — javra

What I'm trying to get you to do, is drop this notion of before and after, which is derived from a conception of time which sees time as a moving arrow, or something like that, moving from past to future, such that the things first encountered by the arrow are before the things later encountered. I want you to completely rid yourself of this idea, which puts time as something moving external to you, and then place time as within you. Only then, I believe, can you truly understand time as demonstrated by your experience. If you allow that time is something flowing within you, rather than an external arrow, you will be able to see that future things, goals and anticipations are before you, and past things, memories are after you.

Consider, "I am a being", and "a being exists at the present". Now imagine the possibility that the present is what is moving in time, and the rest of what is called "time", the future and past, are outside, external to the present. But the present, hence the being existing at the present as well, is moving through that medium. See, the future is before you, and the past is after, as you are moving into the future, and leaving the past behind. Now, exchange the idea that the present, along with the being at the present, is moving, for the idea that the being at the present is a static thing, and the external "time", the outside future and past are moving through the static being, at the present. Again, the future is before you, as that which is approaching, and the past is after you, as that which has gone by, when time passes through you in this way.

This is direct contradiction to time perception studies - with the sole point to referencing such studies here being that we as first person points of view do hold subjective awareness of time. — javra

I checked your reference here, and see that both of the two presented theories of how a person experiences time, utilize a conscious judgement. The first, "the strength model", describes a conscious analysis of a memory, to judge the strength of the memory, and the second, "the inference model" describes consciously comparing different events.

As I said before I don't think this subject of debate will be fruitful, as there are too many differences of opinion as to what constitutes basic perceptual experience, and what constitutes conscious judgement. The issue I believe is that we have a constant, very rapid interplay, back and forth feedback relation between the conscious and the subconscious. I think that scientific studies of this "time perception" fail in their inability to observe and account for anticipation, which by its nature relates to non-existent, unobservable things. So there is another complete dimensional aspect of time experience which involves the anticipation of something, and the actual occurrence of that something, which scientific studies cannot access. Since an extremely rapid interplay between anticipation of the event and actual occurrence of the event might be occurring at a subconscious level, the people doing the studies could not access this through conscious anticipation.

I have and will use "the experiential present" rather than "the specious present" precisely due to my disagreement with the inference that what I experience is "fictitious", as per the part of Kelly's quote I've boldfaced. (I am most certain of what I directly experience, and less certain of the inferences I abstract from such - this outlook being pivotal to my approach to philosophy in general; a different topic, maybe.) Nevertheless, there is yet mention of an experienced present in Kelly's inference of it being "fiction". — javra

But do you see the reason why Kelly calls this fictitious? It's exactly the same thing that I've been telling you. He says it is not the present at all, but the past, and to think that the specious present is really the present is a delusion. "The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the past--a recent past--delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the future and the past." Hence, your "experiential present" is really a part of the past, according to Kelly, and as the principal for defining of "the present" it suffers the same problem mentioned above. It does not incorporate as part of the "experiential present", the role of anticipation, being concerned only with that "recent past", leaving out the equally important, near future.

This quote by Kelly, quite likely, cuts to the marrow of our disagreement on this subject. Only that you go a step further and tell me that I don't experience time at all. — javra

This is because I think accepting the truth of "I don't experience time at all" is key to understanding time. Once we realize that "time" is completely conceptual, an imaginary, made up thing, with absolutely nothing experienced which corresponds, then we can apply healthy skepticism and demolish the entire concept to start again in conception of "time", from scratch.

To emphasize, what this implies is 1) that conscious reasoning (which occurs in the cerebral cortex) is not a necessity to the discernment of temporal sequences - hence, the discernment of time - and (here overlooking the rest of the linked to article) 2) that lesser animals are quite capable of experiencing time - again implying that conscious reasoning is not essential to the activity. — javra

I don't know the extent of what occurs in the cerebral cortex, so I can't comment on this, other than to say that rats and other lesser animals are conscious. So when I refer to a conscious judgement, I'm not necessarily talking about applying formal logic.

But I don't see how one could demonstrate that a rat can estimate a 40 second interval. Can you say to the rat, show me forty seconds, and the rat counts it out accurately? Then you say show me 36 seconds, and the rat demonstrates an interval of 36 seconds. And then the rat could demonstrate the difference between 39 seconds and 40 seconds? Needless to say, I'm very skeptical of this report.

As to memory, for the sake of brevity, I did and will for now continue to address memory as strictly that which is brought into consciousness by the unconscious which of itself re-presents a perceptual event that has already transpired and ended. To be as explicit as I currently can, this experiential memory (i.e., memory as it is experienced by the first person point of view) always consists of long term memory (e.g., a phone # I had ten years back); usually consists of short term memory and/or working memory (the memory of a phone # I have been exposed to 10 seconds after the fact), and on rare and extra-ordinary occasions of sensory memory (e.g., the experience of an afterimage). — javra

I think I see the root of the problem right here. Experience appears to be continuous. Any startings or endings must be assigned by some sort of judgement, to a particular aspect of the experience. This is a type of individuating. So when you say you will address "memory as strictly that which is brought into consciousness by the unconscious which of itself re-presents a perceptual event that has already transpired and ended", you don't even allow that the real conscious experience is a continuous process which has memory already inherent within it. And you are assuming endings which are only assigned arbitrarily by the conscious mind.

Suppose for the sake of argument, that the subconscious mind already individuates. producing separate events with a beginning and an end, and presents these to the conscious as still frames, appearing like a continuous movie. The conscious mind then chooses its own beginnings and endings. and commits the discrete individual events to memory. If this is the case, then the continuity of experience is an illusion. But why would our bodies create this illusion for us? Well, we haven't accounted for anticipation yet. Perhaps, the future is apprehended by anticipation as continuous. Now the conscious mind, having its attention first and foremost directed forward at anticipating the future, requires that the representation produced by the subconscious be continuous, in order for it to be consistent with the anticipatory perspective it naturally has. So the subconscious presents the past (which consists of discrete individuals, memories) as a continuous process

The point now, in relation to the quoted passage, is that you define "memory" as the discrete, individuated instances produced by the conscious mind. The conscious mind commits to memory specific experiences with distinct beginnings and endings which have been assigned by conscious judgement. However, in restricting "memory" in this way, you exclude from your knowledge of "memory" all the millions and billions of years of evolutionary processes which have given rise to the memory processes employed by the subconscious mind. Therefore you will only get a very primitive conception of "memory" because you are limiting yourself to conscious memory which is only the tip of the iceberg of memory as a whole.

Yes, having said this, what I do not agree with is that there is no experiential difference relative to the first person point of view in question between, for example, looking at an apple (this being the person's experiential present) and remembering once seeing an apple (this being the person's experiential past). Here, experientially, there is a clear distinction between what I deem to be the present perceptions I am aware of and what I deem to be former perceptions I am aware of - one whose threshold is fuzzy, granted, but experientially a clear distinction nevertheless. — javra

I think you ought to have respect for what Kelly says in your quoted passage. The instance of "looking at an apple", is really an experience of what has been, not of what is. The subconscious, with its billions of years of evolutionary experience of producing memories creates from this experience a representation of the apple. And as Kelly says, this is a fictitious present, because he describes it as a delusive present, being really memory. The role of memory here is obvious, and evident through observational scientific practise. However, what we have very little, if any understanding of, is the other side of the coin, the role of anticipation. So we cannot really, truthfully say, as Kelly does, and what I said earlier, that the specious present, the experience of "looking at an apple" is simply a recent past experience, because we need to take into account the role of anticipation when the subconscious create the image which is presented to the conscious, and we call looking at the apple.

(In some ways it's akin to watching a movie and claiming that what we are in fact experiencing is a series of still frames when, in fact, we are experiencing fluid motion while so viewing. Slow down the movie reel's motion and there will be a threshold where we witness both motion and still frames, true. Yet our perception of unadulturated motion is nevertheless experientially real when the movie progresses at its intended pace. In a roundabout way, the same allegorically applies to our experienced present (our seeing motion) and the nitty-gritty analysis of sensory and working memory (the still frames of a movie reel): the perceived present is to us experientially real, despite being made up in many a way by memory. Maybe this will help in getting across what I mean by "experiential present".) — javra

Yes, this is exactly what I'm talking about above. We need to take into account both the appearance of still frames, and the appearance of a continuous movie. We see that the still frames are created by the act of committing things to memory. In the example of conscious remembering, the conscious mind assigns a beginning and ending to the event, and memorizes it that way. But why is the subconscious presenting us with the appearance of a continuous experience, if its presentation consists of discrete memories? If we take the principles of the conscious memory, the production of discrete memories, and apply this at the subconscious level, then we can understand that the subconscious mind is producing memories as discrete individuals. Then it presents these to the conscious mind as the appearance of a continuous process. Why would it do this? As I said above, the only thing which seems reasonable to me, is that it needs to do this in order to be compatible with the conscious mind's focus on the future, anticipation. So the conscious mind is actually within the continuous future, and can only comprehend what the senses are giving it, discrete individual memories, if the subconscious presents these discrete individual memories in the appearance of a continuous process.

As I explained, there is a medium between sense organs and conscious perception which needs to be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, as I asked, what logical reason is there for locating the present at the beginning of this "medium" (or "gap") instead of at its end? We know that the end point of this "medium" is the time of our current conscious awareness, but at what point in time is the beginning (and why)?

Anyway, do you not acknowledge any distinction between perception and memory?

I plan on replying in further detail later on. For now:

Without in any way denying the reality of conscious experience, down the line of my reasoning I fully acknowledge that conscious experience is the product of a commonwealth of subconscious agencies that hold their own subconscious experiences. And, even more, that conscious agency, which includes conscious experience, is itself a unified bundle of subconscious agencies, such that the sum is greater than its parts. But the issue here is that of conscious experience per se.

Whereas conscious experience is a brute fact, subconscious experiences are inferred, and this by none other than conscious experience.

On what grounds would you disagree with the previous sentence?

And, as I asked, what logical reason is there for locating the present at the beginning of this "medium" (or "gap") instead of at its end? We know that the end point of this "medium" is the time of our current conscious awareness, but at what point in time is the beginning (and why)? — Luke

I don't think that the present is a "point" in time. We went through this already with your use of "moment". What I think is that what we refer to as "the present" is a type of duration (not quite in the same sense as Javra, because I give time a second dimension to account for this type of duration which is the duration of the present). So "the present" is not a point, but it consists of some past and some future. And I believe that the conscious awareness, being goal oriented, is most likely in the future part, like i believe that the sense apparatus is in the past part of the present.

Anyway, do you not acknowledge any distinction between perception and memory? — Luke

No, as I explained there is memory inherent within perception, so I think that trying to make such a distinction is misleading. It's like what E.R. Kelly says is "delusive" in Javra's quoted passage: "The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the past--a recent past--delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the future and the past." So perception, as the signature feature of the "specious present", which is really a fictitious present, is actually a form of memory.

On what grounds would you disagree with the previous sentence? — javra

It's difficult for me to grasp "subconscious experiences", because "experience" is what we commonly assign to conscious beings. However, I see the need to posit something like subconscious experience, because for example, I myself described, "memory" as an aspect of the subconscious, developed over billions of years of evolution. If memory isn't of experience, then what is remembered? We have a very similar problem with "Intention". We commonly associate intentional actions with conscious free willing human beings. And since this is the common association then we start to think that only human beings make intentional acts. But then we have no words to describe all the purposeful actions of the lesser beings.

Anyway, to make a long story short, I think that "experience", like "intention" is a property of a whole being. These two terms express something which cannot be said of a part, but refer to aspects of the unifying feature, which makes parts exist as a whole. This I think, is one reason why we say that the sum is greater than its parts, there are properties which cannot be associated with the individual parts, and can only be associated with whatever it is which unifies the parts to make a whole. . So we can say that the whole being, as a being, experiences, but it doesn't make sense to say that a part of a being experiences. And also, I think it would make sense to say that a living being which doesn't have consciousness, like a plant, still experiences, but it doesn't make sense to me to say that the subconscious part of a conscious being, experiences. This has to do with what type of things we can attribute to a part, and the type of things we can attribute to a whole, and the reason why a whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

And, as I asked, what logical reason is there for locating the present at the beginning of this "medium" (or "gap") instead of at its end? We know that the end point of this "medium" is the time of our current conscious awareness, but at what point in time is the beginning (and why)?
— Luke

I don't think that the present is a "point" in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't refer to it here as a point in time. I referred only to the beginning and end points of your "medium" or "gap", and I asked you at which end of that "medium" you located the present.

What I think is that what we refer to as "the present" is a type of duration (not quite in the same sense as Javra, because I give time a second dimension to account for this type of duration which is the duration of the present). So "the present" is not a point, but it consists of some past and some future. And I believe that the conscious awareness, being goal oriented, is most likely in the future part, like i believe that the sense apparatus is in the past part of the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the present has a duration with its own beginning and end points, then why is your view that the present "consists of some past and some future"? Where (or when), in the duration of the present, is the past separated from the future? Are the past and future separated by the entirety of the duration of the present such that the past and future do not meet (option 1 below)? Or are they separated at some point within the duration of the present such that the past and future do meet (option 2 below)? Or are they separated at some point within the duration of the present such that the past and future do not meet (option 3 below)?

Here is a pictorial representation (including a third option):

1. [Past][Present][Future]
2. [Past Pres][ent Future]
3. [Past Pr]ese[nt Future]

If it is option 2 or 3, then why does the present overlap the past and the future?

If it is option 2, then what do you call the point/line that separates the past from the future?

Anyway, to make a long story short, I think that "experience", like "intention" is a property of a whole being. These two terms express something which cannot be said of a part, but refer to aspects of the unifying feature, which makes parts exist as a whole. This I think, is one reason why we say that the sum is greater than its parts, there are properties which cannot be associated with the individual parts, and can only be associated with whatever it is which unifies the parts to make a whole. . So we can say that the whole being, as a being, experiences, but it doesn't make sense to say that a part of a being experiences. And also, I think it would make sense to say that a living being which doesn't have consciousness, like a plant, still experiences, but it doesn't make sense to me to say that the subconscious part of a conscious being, experiences. This has to do with what type of things we can attribute to a part, and the type of things we can attribute to a whole, and the reason why a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe (?) this plays a significant role in how we diverge.

By subconscious experiences (which I grant is not a mainstream usage of terms) I in part am address things such as this: When we forget an item, ask ourselves "where did I place it" with our inner voice, and then consciously experience an intuition regarding where the item is that reminds us, it is not us as a consciousness that knew of the answer but aspects of our subconscious mind that informed us after we as consciousness sent out a request to our subconscious mind to be so informed. It is the subconscious mind's agency (here simplistically abstracting a unified subconscious) which informs us as consciousness - and not our conscious agency. In this example is inferred that aspects of our subconscious mind hold an awareness of what we as consciousness desire to know, along with a subconscious awareness of the answer that we are momentarily ignorant of consciously - and this inferred awareness of the subconscious can be termed the non-conscious experience of one total psyche, or sub/unconscious experience. Same can be said of one's conscience, which is aware of what one as consciousness is aware of but informs (or even goads) one as consciousness of alternative avenues to that which one as consciousness intends; one's conscience then being another example of a subconscious agency that can be inferred to experience.

To me consciousness is a unified agency composed of an ever-changing plurality of subconscious agencies. (With some subconscious agencies, such as one's conscience, not being unified with it; minimally, while a conscience is sensed by a consciousness.)

So, to me consciousness is exactly one part of a total psyche - which consists of parts in addition to that of consciousness.

I grant that this is a complex subject, but I'm not sure how to proceed from here if we in fact disagree in regard to what conscious experiences and conscious intentions entail.

At any rate, by the experiential present of consciousness I, again, am not referring to a total psyche, but to strictly consciousness as a first person perspective - which holds first person awareness and which infers about matters such as the mechanisms for its first person awareness.

I didn't refer to it here as a point in time. I referred only to the beginning and end points of your "medium" or "gap", and I asked you at which end of that "medium" you located the present. — Luke

You are asking me to locate the present at a point. I already said that the present cannot be located at a point. The conscious part is future, the sense part is past, relative to each other, though we might say they are both at the present. Without a second temporal dimension, grounded in real physical evidence, locating the present as any particular duration is arbitrary.

If the present has a duration with its own beginning and end points, then why is your view that the present "consists of some past and some future"? — Luke

Time is continually passing. Why would I think that the present has beginning and end points? That doesn't make any sense.

Where (or when), in the duration of the present, is the past separated from the future? Are the past and future separated by the entirety of the duration of the present such that the past and future do not meet (option 1 below)? Or are they separated at some point within the duration of the present such that the past and future do meet (option 2 below)? Or are they separated at some point within the duration of the present such that the past and future do not meet (option 3 below)? — Luke

Do you see that the passing of time is a process? And any process requires a duration of time. So the process whereby the future becomes the past (this is how I describe the present) must itself require a duration of time. As I said already, this requires a second dimension of time, what is sometimes called thick time, I call it the breadth of time.

If the passing of time is a real physical process, then there must be a corresponding change to the universe. That is, the universe as it is in the future is different from the universe as it is in the past. I assume there is a process whereby the universes changes from being in the future, to being in the past. And, since the universe has a vast array of different types of objects, large and small for example, it makes sense to think that some types of objects might be affected by the passing of time before others are. This would mean that at any given time (if we could assume a point on a time line) some types of things are in the future while others are in the past.

So the second dimension of time is required because the common modeling of time shows such a continuous timeline, which can theoretically be divided at any point. But if we take such a point to represent the physical reality of "the present", we'll find that at any proposed point of the present, some things are in the past while others are in the future. Now we need to be able to map this process, whereby somethings are in the future and other things are in the past, relative to the one dimensional continuous timeline. And, since this is a process, it requires "time", and this "time" is not represented by the continuous one dimensional time line, so we need another dimension of time. We need to give the timeline breadth.

This is most like your option 2. I believe that past and future actually overlap, with time having breadth. So your first question 'why do future past overlap?'' is explained by the present being a process which itself requires time, and the theory that not everything in the universe is affected by this process simultaneously. And the answer to the second question is that there is a process which separates the future from the past. This process is the coming into existence of the past, it is a becoming of the past, and it comes from the future.

By subconscious experiences (which I grant is not a mainstream usage of terms) I in part am address things such as this: When we forget an item, ask ourselves "where did I place it" with our inner voice, and then consciously experience an intuition regarding where the item is that reminds us, it is not us as a consciousness that knew of the answer but aspects of our subconscious mind that informed us after we as consciousness sent out a request to our subconscious mind to be so informed. It is the subconscious mind's agency (here simplistically abstracting a unified subconscious) which informs us as consciousness - and not our conscious agency. — javra

I wouldn't describe this in the same way. I agree that there is in a sense, subconscious agency, but such agency is not independent, it is at the direction of the whole. So in your example, the conscious mind is the representative for the whole, and it is what directs the subconscious to act that way. And if we go back to our explanation of sensation, in which the subconscious is actively creating images, presenting them to the conscious, again, the subconscious is acting this way at the direction of the whole. This is really no different from the physical organs which all have functions in relation to the whole. All such purposes, or functions, are in relation to the whole, in support of the whole. The individual systems, which have agency themselves, do not have independence. they receive their agency from the whole, being dependent on the whole for it..

Ontology is extremely important here because we need to be very careful concerning our designation as to what constitutes the "whole". We are prone to thinking that the conscious mind is representative of the self, and is therefore the spokesperson for the whole. But this is really an illusion that the conscious mind creates for itself, to make itself feel important. We know that the conscious mind can very easily be corrupted by minor chemical imbalances, mental illness, and simple forms of moral corruption, just like physical organs might get corrupted in their functions, by illness. So we can see that the conscious mind is really just another part, though it likes to act as the representative for the whole. We really do not seem to have the vaguest notion as to what really constitutes the "whole".

And the ontology gets worse still. Many conscious minds like to congregate, and communicate, existing as a culture, or society. and then they will insist that the culture, society, or even the species is itself a whole. That's the ontology of Darwinism, it makes a species a whole. But these conscious minds who get together and claim the existence of such a "whole" have no principles, criteria or justification, as to what constitutes a whole, so such designations have no validity whatsoever. These conscious minds must feel some emptiness, imperfection, or deprivation, recognizing that the conscious self is not properly a whole, so they seek fulfillment elsewhere, trying to create a whole out of a group of conscious minds. But what is really required for a good ontology is for these conscious minds feeling imperfect, to turn inward, and recognize that the "self" which represents the conscious mind is only a small part of the whole person.

To me consciousness is a unified agency composed of an ever-changing plurality of subconscious agencies. (With some subconscious agencies, such as one's conscience, not being unified with it; minimally, while a conscience is sensed by a consciousness.)

So, to me consciousness is exactly one part of a total psyche - which consists of parts in addition to that of consciousness. — javra

This, is quite similar to what I've said above. The only real difference is in the way that we each describe "agency". I assign "true agency" only to the whole. This means that although the parts are active in agency, they are subservient, or directed by the whole, according to their respective functions. So, from my perspective, when we say that "consciousness is exactly one part", then we remove "true agency" from consciousness. That the conscious self is the director of the living organism is just an illusion. And this we know is the truth because the conscious mind has no power to direct the vast majority of the living systems within the body, which are said to be involuntary.

This opens up a hole which is the lack of a whole. If the conscious mind is not the proper representative of "the whole" then what is? We need to assume that there is a whole, which serves to direct all the parts in their respective functions, or else nothing unifies. All the subconscious agencies need to be directed by the "true agency", or else there is no unity, but we cannot assign "true agency" to the conscious mind, as this is just another part.

At any rate, by the experiential present of consciousness I, again, am not referring to a total psyche, but to strictly consciousness as a first person perspective - which holds first person awareness and which infers about matters such as the mechanisms for its first person awareness. — javra

Let's say that the first person perspective, being the conscious mind, places itself at the highest point in the hierarchy, the first in the temporal perspective, as being capable of causing free willing activities, as time passes. However, this is an illusion it creates for itself, because it only wants to look at all the physical parts downstream (in time) from it, which it has some control over. When it looks upstream, toward the true controlling whole, therefore what controls it, it is completely lost, and cannot see anything. It doesn't even know what things look like up there. Even to say "look" up there, is a misnomer, because this implies using the eyes to see, but to see is to look downstream into the past.

Here's a little thought experiment to see what I mean. Consider your perspective at the present. You can look backward in time, and see from your memories all about the past, what it looks like, sounds like, etc.. This is all in the past, everything you know. Now look forward, toward the future with your mind. There is absolutely nothing there. It's like a black hole of emptiness in front of you you cannot sense anything there. This is what the passing of time is, the world goes from being composed of nothing sensible, to being composed of everything which exists, at each moment of passing time. So whatever it is which is in front of us in time (the future) is extremely difficult for us to comprehend because it is in no way at all sensible, it seems like there is nothing there. We cannot sense into the future because the world is such that whatever it is that is in the future cannot be sensed. And since we get the majority of our principles of knowledge through sensation, we are lost when we look with our minds toward the future, and try to understand the future. This is why we cannot grasp the principles of what unifies the whole, these are in the future even relative to the conscious mind, which is in the future relative to the sense organs.

The conscious part is future, the sense part is past — Metaphysician Undercover

Where in the past? At what point/event does the sense part begin?

Why would I think that the present has beginning and end points? That doesn't make any sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

So the process whereby the future becomes the past (this is how I describe the present) must itself require a duration of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

A duration of time has beginning and end points.
You claim that the present has/is a duration of time.
Therefore, the present has beginning and end points.

As to "true agency", in a slip of the tongue where the conscious mind intends X and the subconscious mind intends Y, which of the two if any hold the "true agency" of the whole? I say both hold (true) agency to the degree that agency occurs, each in this case being a discordant aspect, or part, of the whole psyche.

But, as with our discussion of our awareness of time, I find that you are quick to superimpose ontological principles obtained from inferences upon what we consciously experience. Nothing wrong with that, only that it diverges from the perspective which I'm doing my best to work with, which is as follows: That we (as conscious minds, i.e. as first person perspectives) experience what we experience is the strongest form of certainty regarding what takes place that we can obtain; everything which we (as first person perspectives) infer - including about why we experience what we experience - is of a lesser degree of certainty. And, implicit in all this, we can only hold a first person perspective awareness.

Going back to the principle topic of the experienced present, that we experience a present that is neither memory of former present times nor extrapolation of upcoming present times is an occurrence of the strongest degree of certainty. That this experienced present is specious, fictitious, illusory, etc. is a conclusion drawn from inferences made by the conscious mind that wells within the experienced present which, as conclusion, is less certain than that which is experienced - here, namely, the present moment. And, furthermore, a conclusion that requires there first being an experienced present which is then to be labeled "specious, or fictitious, or illusory".

All the same, because I feel like we're going around in circles in regard to the experienced present, I'm tempted to let things be for now.

Where in the past? At what point/event does the sense part begin? — Luke

I don't really know what you're asking. I'm not talking in terms of points.

A duration of time has beginning and end points.
You claim that the present has/is a duration of time.
Therefore, the present has beginning and end points. — Luke

Only when we measure a specific duration, points are required. We can talk about a duration in the general sense, such as "an hour", and no points are required because no specific hour is to be separated from the rest of time. Talking about "the present" as a duration in a general way, is the same principle. Points would be required to say that the present is a specific duration, but not to say that it is a duration, because i am not trying to measure that duration.

As to "true agency", in a slip of the tongue where the conscious mind intends X and the subconscious mind intends Y, which of the two if any hold the "true agency" of the whole? I say both hold (true) agency to the degree that agency occurs, each in this case being a discordant aspect, or part, of the whole psyche. — javra

I think I tried to express in the last post, that we do not know what holds the "true agency" of the whole. but it is I believe the same principle which is responsible for unification. Aristotle designated "the soul" as that first principle of agency of a living being. Then he named the potentialities of the soul, consisting of things like self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. Each of these capacities, he explained, are best known as potentialities because they are not all the time active, so they need to be activated each time they become active. This implies the need to assume a first actuality of the living being, the soul.

But, as with our discussion of our awareness of time, I find that you are quick to superimpose ontological principles obtained from inferences upon what we consciously experience. Nothing wrong with that, only that it diverges from the perspective which I'm doing my best to work with, which is as follows: That we (as conscious minds, i.e. as first person perspectives) experience what we experience is the strongest form of certainty regarding what takes place that we can obtain; everything which we (as first person perspectives) infer - including about why we experience what we experience - is of a lesser degree of certainty. And, implicit in all this, we can only hold a first person perspective awareness. — javra

I think that I agree with this. But I will stress (and perhaps you still disagree). that time is not something which we experience. So anything we say about time, what it is, how it passes, etc., is inferred. Therefore our knowledge of time cannot obtain that strongest form of certainty, so it will always remain, to some degree, speculative.

Going back to the principle topic of the experienced present, that we experience a present that is neither memory of former present times nor extrapolation of upcoming present times is an occurrence of the strongest degree of certainty. — javra

Whether or not "the present" is something experienced, is as I've said, dependent on how "present" is defined. If it is defined in relation to time (the division between past and future for example, or a specific part of time) then the present is not something experienced, but something conceptual, derived from a concept of time. But if we define it without reference to time, (what does it mean to be present, for example), describe this, and then perhaps proceed toward a conception of time if necessary, we cam make "the present" refer to something experienced.

That this experienced present is specious, fictitious, illusory, etc. is a conclusion drawn from inferences made by the conscious mind that wells within the experienced present which, as conclusion, is less certain than that which is experienced - here, namely, the present moment. — javra

By referring to it as "the present moment", you seem to be defining "present" as something temporal, therefore not something experienced, and not obtaining that highest degree of certainty. That this is true is very evident from the fact that we first had to clarify whether "moment", as a temporal term refers to a point in time, or a duration of time. Then when it was ascertained that we were talking about a duration of time, there was no indication as to how long this duration is. Obviously, "the present moment" is not something known with a high degree of certainty, and it is not something experienced.

All the same, because I feel like we're going around in circles in regard to the experienced present, I'm tempted to let things be for now. — javra

What I think we might do is remove any temporal references from our description of "the experienced present", which are loaded with third person prejudices and biases, which we have learned from others, rather than directly from personal experience, and start from a clean slate. Do you agree that when we are experiencing the present, we are experiencing things happening, like events? And do you feel as i do, an inclination to interfere with, change, and even create, things happening? If so, we might proceed to look at what motivates and supports such an inclination.

Only when we measure a specific duration, points are required. We can talk about a duration in the general sense, such as "an hour", and no points are required because no specific hour is to be separated from the rest of time. Talking about "the present" as a duration in a general way, is the same principle. Points would be required to say that the present is a specific duration, but not to say that it is a duration, because i am not trying to measure that duration. — Metaphysician Undercover

That analogy does not hold because an hour has a specific duration of an hour, which begins at 0 minutes and ends at 60 minutes. There is no “general duration” of an hour with an unspecified duration. There is likewise no such thing for the present. If the present has a duration then it can be specified by its beginning and end points.

What I think we might do is remove any temporal references from our description of "the experienced present", which are loaded with third person prejudices and biases, which we have learned from others, rather than directly from personal experience, and start from a clean slate. Do you agree that when we are experiencing the present, we are experiencing things happening, like events? And do you feel as i do, an inclination to interfere with, change, and even create, things happening? If so, we might proceed to look at what motivates and supports such an inclination. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sure how to proceed. An event is not eternal but has a beginning and an end, with the former preceding the latter; otherwise expressed, with the beginning occurring before the end and the end occurring after the beginning. Again, I find this intrinsic to awareness when addressing specific, concrete events - and not something ascertainable only after inferences are made. And to address befores and afters is to address temporality.

Then there are a) events (in the plural) I sense myself to be actively partaking in - even if only as an observer - some of which I feel myself capable of changing to some extent were I to so want, b) events that I can remember which have already transpired and which I sense myself to no longer have any capacity to affect, and c) events I can for example foresee happening or that I intend to bring about through some form of effort. But here, again, I find the experiential nature of what I can only term "time": the progression into (c) with (a) and with the perpetual passing away of an ever-changing (a) into realms of (b). Experiential because I don't need to put it into language or infer it in order to immediately experience it. Temporal because I can only linguistically describe (c) as the future (b) as the past and (a) as the (lived, experiential) present.

So I don't know how to remove all temporal references from what is directly experienced nor from activities one engages in.

BTW, have you never experienced time slowing down for you when, for one reason or another, you paid extra-close attention to details (e.g., a first kiss or a near car crash) - and, conversely, time speeding up for you when you were so engaged in some activity that you hardly payed any attention to the environmental details you'd normally take into account (e.g., an enthralling festivity or an intense preoccupation with a hobby)? This relative to the time clocks keep.

That analogy does not hold because an hour has a specific duration of an hour, which begins at 0 minutes and ends at 60 minutes. — Luke

No that's not true, an hour does not need to start at 0 and end at 60, it could start any time. There is a specified duration, a length of time, but no requirement of a starting or ending point. This is the case for all units of measurement, a meter, a gram, even a numeric quantity. That's what makes these so-called "units" universals rather than particulars; in themselves there is no particular ending or beginning point. . Only in application, the act of measuring a particular thing, are points required

Not sure how to proceed. An event is not eternal but has a beginning and an end, with the former preceding the latter; otherwise expressed, with the beginning occurring before the end and the end occurring after the beginning. Again, I find this intrinsic to awareness when addressing specific, concrete events - and not something ascertainable only after inferences are made. And to address befores and afters is to address temporality. — javra

We disagree here, and we went through this already with your "snap" example. If I am meditating, or doing anything really, and there is a snap noise, it passes through me as a noise, and I hear it, but I do not recognize a beginning and an ending to it. It is only on reflection that I realize that it must have had a beginning and an ending. And in all my experience of simple awareness, I never experience one thing as before or after another thing, this is always a conscious judgement I make upon reflection. It may be the case, that within my evolved intuitions, this capacity has not been developed, as important, yet within your evolved intuitions it has been developed, so you have intuitions which judge before and after subconsciously, while I have to judge this consciously.

In my experience of simple awareness I find a continuous stream of differences, changes, things which are distinct from each other, in many different ways, but I do not seem to have any awareness of how they differ from each other, they are simply different. So without conscious judgement I do not recognize one thing as bigger than another, as greener than another, louder than another, or before another. I do not even distinguish the end of one thing and the beginning of another thing because I do not even separate things. These are all judgements which require associating words with what is happening, and for me this requires conscious judgement.

Then there are a) events (in the plural) I sense myself to be actively partaking in - even if only as an observer - some of which I feel myself capable of changing to some extent were I to so want, b) events that I can remember which have already transpired and which I sense myself to no longer have any capacity to affect, and c) events I can for example foresee happening or that I intend to bring about through some form of effort. But here, again, I find the experiential nature of what I can only term "time": the progression into (c) with (a) and with the perpetual passing away of an ever-changing (a) into realms of (b). Experiential because I don't need to put it into language or infer it in order to immediately experience it. Temporal because I can only linguistically describe (c) as the future (b) as the past and (a) as the (lived, experiential) present. — javra

Referring to your divisions here, I do not see a clear separation between a) and c). Whenever I am actively partaking in an event, (a), there is always a view toward what I intend to bring about (c). However, I can make a clear division within a), between actively participating, and observing. This is like the difference between playing a game, and watching a game being played. The two are very distinct, and I think a division is called for here. Sometimes at a sporting event, fans will get very loud and actually try to influence the game, but this is not the same as participating in the game. Likewise, at a rock concert, some fans get very excited, and try to somehow influence the performance. Do you agree that there is a very big difference between participating in (active), and observing (passive), events?

If we start with this distinction we can proceed toward b) and c) in a slightly different way. From the perspective of a passive observer, we can see past events, b), as requiring no action, and we can continue to observe indefinitely, in the attempt to deny the need for an activity, c) on the part of the observer. In other words, as a passive observer we have no view to the future, all is past and there is no requirement for action. That is to make c) irrelevant. But from the perspective of an active participant, we already have invested interest, goals we intend to bring about, c), as we are actively making that effort, and we cannot just step out of this position to become an observer, without forfeiture.

BTW, have you never experienced time slowing down for you when, for one reason or another, you paid extra-close attention to details (e.g., a first kiss or a near car crash) - and, conversely, time speeding up for you when you were so engaged in some activity that you hardly payed any attention to the environmental details you'd normally take into account (e.g., an enthralling festivity or an intense preoccupation with a hobby)? This relative to the time clocks keep. — javra

I've been involved in a number of vehicle accidents. They all happen extremely fast, but afterwards I remember everything happening in every smallest fraction of a second, as if there was a long time span between them. This is how I remember the incidents and I'm quite sure that this is how the events occurred to me at the time they happened. I attribute this apparent "time slowing down" to a heightened sense of anticipation, anxiety, what you call paying extra close attention.to details.

I believe that this heightened sense of awareness, this type of anxiety can be trained into oneself, cultured, and this is done by high level athletes involved in fast games like hockey. There is also probably a significant difference amongst human beings at the innate level, and this partially accounts for what we call gifted athletes. When you watch someone like Alex Ovechkin play hockey, he appears to be always one step ahead of the game (the rest of the players) in his anticipation, so he must be able to process an extremely rapid succession of events, in the same way that you and I would process a much slower succession of events. This I think is what they call being on top of your game, being in the zone.

We might look the other way too, toward "time speeding up". You can see that these two roughly correspond to the way I divided a). For the active participant with a vested interest, each detail matters, so time slows down, but for the passive observer who just wants to see it all and do nothing about it, time speeds up.

No that's not true, an hour does not need to start at 0 and end at 60, it could start any time. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean "it could start any time"? I wasn't talking about when it started. I was talking about the duration of an hour, which has the temporal length of one hour. A length is the distance between two points. What do you think the length of one metre is?

A length is the distance between two points. What do you think the length of one metre is? — Luke

A metre is the distance traveled by light in 1/299 792 458 of a second. It is not the distance between two points. You are making the classic category mistake of confusing the particular with the universal. A particular, measured metre is the distance between two points, like a metre stick has two ends, as an instance of a particular measured metre. But the universal, "metre" refers to a defined length, not a distance between two specific points. .

And in all my experience of simple awareness, I never experience one thing as before or after another thing, this is always a conscious judgement I make upon reflection. It may be the case, that within my evolved intuitions, this capacity has not been developed, as important, yet within your evolved intuitions it has been developed, so you have intuitions which judge before and after subconsciously, while I have to judge this consciously. — Metaphysician Undercover

Awareness can greatly differ between individuals, yet I still take this quote with a grain of salt. Maybe we're using words differently? By "conscious judgment" I understand deliberation between alternatives that one then settles on in the form of a conclusion. This deliberation often takes significant time, such that by the time a deliberation is made regarding what is observed, that observed (and deliberated upon) has usually already transcended into either the far reaches of short term memory or else into the first instances of long term memory. But, by then, a plethora of new observations have already occurred. Where each such novel observation to require conscious deliberation to discern, one would never be able to react more or less instantly to a stimulus. Such as in turning one's head automatically milliseconds after hearing an unexpected loud boom ... one that distracts one from all the deliberations one engages in. Here, this loud boom would serve as one sonic event. And one would know that one turned one's head after one hears the boom - rather then before - in manners devoid of deliberation, I would assume.

In my experience of simple awareness I find a continuous stream of differences, changes, things which are distinct from each other, in many different ways, but I do not seem to have any awareness of how they differ from each other, they are simply different. So without conscious judgement I do not recognize one thing as bigger than another, as greener than another, louder than another, or before another. I do not even distinguish the end of one thing and the beginning of another thing because I do not even separate things. These are all judgements which require associating words with what is happening, and for me this requires conscious judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't help but think of how lesser animals discern comparative sizes, colors, loudness, and which events occur before others (with this discernment being requisite in, for example, both classical and operant conditioning) without associating words with what is happening. As adults we're accustomed to using language for many if not most activities, yet certainly we were able to discern the items listed when we were pre-linguistic children - otherwise we could not have learned what words signify. Again, although awareness can greatly differ between adult human individuals, I can't help but take what you here say with a grain of salt.

Still, I'll take your word for it if in your reply you maintain the same.

Referring to your divisions here, I do not see a clear separation between a) and c). Whenever I am actively partaking in an event, (a), there is always a view toward what I intend to bring about (c). — Metaphysician Undercover

While this muddles the picture, the same can be said regarding how almost all occurrences of both (a) and (c) are contingent upon what takes place within realms of (b). As one simplistic example, one cannot anticipate that the sun will rise again tomorrow without memory of the sun's activities in past days. The same applies to predicting what another person will do. And so forth. Anticipation is conjoined with (long term) memory.

That said, my ability to influence occurs within realms in which I am actively observing; plans of what to do in case of X, Y, and Z so as to satisfy intent i, are themselves formulated, changed, and maintained by the conscious mind within realms of (a). So, while I agree that all conscious activities that occur during (a) extend toward (c) in one way or another - this being the theme of intent-driven determinacy regarding what occurs within (a) (to not say "within the experienced present") - I yet find a clear distinction in that (c) hasn't yet happened physically whereas (a) is happening physically (and, to complete the list, (b) has already happened physically).

[Edit: for clarity, "hasn't yet happened, is happening, and has already happened physically" strictly relative to one's immediate awareness of occurrences - rather than relative to one's abstract ideas regarding the ontological nature of physicality and time. And I get that I'm repeating myself in expressing "immediate awareness/experience of," which I know you find contentious. Hence the feeling of going in circles ... ]

There would be more to say but, here again, there is use of a temporality which we so far disagree upon.

However, I can make a clear division within a), between actively participating, and observing. This is like the difference between playing a game, and watching a game being played. The two are very distinct, and I think a division is called for here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, but then, granting this basic distinction between consciousness's receptivity and consciousness's activities, do you yet agree that they both occur within (a)? Consciousness's activities are pervasive throughout consciousness's receptivity: from turning our gaze to analyzing what we see, these are all events that intertwine what we passively observe with what we voluntarily do as consciousnesses at any given moment.

BTW, I qualify this with "consciousness's" because perception is, as you've previously commented on, creative from the point of view of the subconscious mind, and is therefore an activity in and of itself when looked at from the perspective of a total mind. Arguably, an activity that holds its own sub/unconscious intents - with these being involuntary from the pov of consciousness.

We might look the other way too, toward "time speeding up". You can see that these two roughly correspond to the way I divided a). For the active participant with a vested interest, each detail matters, so time slows down, but for the passive observer who just wants to see it all and do nothing about it, time speeds up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Forgot to address this part:

Do you then not find this slowing and speeding up of time to be experiential in nature? What is commonly termed "time perception". I'm asking so as to clarify where we stand on the capacity of experiencing time. Again, not philosophical time which can only be an abstraction obtained via inference but lived time as it's innately experienced.

A metre is the distance traveled by light in 1/299 792 458 of a second. It is not the distance between two points. — Metaphysician Undercover

How is the distance traveled by light in 1/299 792 458 of a second not the distance between two points?

By "conscious judgment" I understand deliberation between alternatives that one then settles on in the form of a conclusion. This deliberation often takes significant time.. — javra

I don't think that conscious judgement requires deliberation between alternatives. Nor does it always require "significant time". Some judgements take weeks, some days, some hours, some minutes, some seconds, but many are very simple and seem almost instantaneous. If someone holds up three fingers and asks how many fingers is this, is the answer not a conscious judgement? What about holding up an object and asking what colour it is? To answer such simple questions requires conscious judgement, but usually not deliberation between alternatives, nor does it take "significant time".

But, by then, a plethora of new observations have already occurred. Where each such novel observation to require conscious deliberation to discern, one would never be able to react more or less instantly to a stimulus. Such as in turning one's head automatically milliseconds after hearing an unexpected loud boom ... one that distracts one from all the deliberations one engages in. — javra

A reaction like turning one's head in response to a boom does not require the judgement that the sound had a beginning and an end. Nor does it require the judgement that the turning of the head will be after the boom. So I really don't see that you have any sort of argument here. Notice that such a milliseconds response of turning one's head is generally accompanied by a thought like "what was that?", not "that was a loud boom". The latter is a conscious judgement which probably would not occur in the time frame of that reaction.

I guess we'll just have to disagree on this matter because it doesn't seem like either one of us will be convincing the other.

I can't help but think of how lesser animals discern comparative sizes, colors, loudness, and which events occur before others (with this discernment being requisite in, for example, both classical and operant conditioning) without associating words with what is happening. As adults we're accustomed to using language for many if not most activities, yet certainly we were able to discern the items listed when we were pre-linguistic children - otherwise we could not have learned what words signify. Again, although awareness can greatly differ between adult human individuals, I can't help but take what you here say with a grain of salt. — javra

I'm beginning to see that you and I have completely different ideas as to what constitutes a "conscious judgement". The examples I've used, of applying language in the description of something, I use because I think that it is obvious and clear that if words were used to describe something, then necessarily conscious judgement was used, because we might agree that to use language in description requires a conscious judgement concerning the thing described. But not all conscious judgements involve language. Many lesser animals are conscious, yet they do not use language. Would you not agree that they make conscious judgements? But I can't say that I know what the conscious judgements made by lesser animals would be like. I watch my dogs and cats when they seem to make judgements about where they are going, and things like that, but I can't say I know what such a judgement would be like. Nor can I say that I know what my conscious judgements were like prior to me learning to use language, because I can't remember that time. There seems to be a correlation though, between learning language and increased memory power, so I wouldn't be surprised if these two factors facilitate a change in the way that conscious judgement is made also.

While this muddles the picture, the same can be said regarding how almost all occurrences of both (a) and (c) are contingent upon what takes place within realms of (b). As one simplistic example, one cannot anticipate that the sun will rise again tomorrow without memory of the sun's activities in past days. The same applies to predicting what another person will do. And so forth. Anticipation is conjoined with (long term) memory. — javra

I don't agree that both a) and c) are contingent on b). This is one point where I strongly disagree with conventional determinist principles. And this is why I've argued to place anticipation and future as prior to, or before past. When I described anticipation as a general feeling of anxiety, not directed toward any particular goal, this description denies the need for anticipation to be based in a past memory. This is what allows for what I would call the true forward looking perspective.

The physical world, as it is (which really means as it has been up until now) places restrictions on our possibilities for the future. We cannot do something which is beyond, or outside the range of what is allowed for by the conditions of the past, and we may say that these limitations are the basis for what we deem as "physically impossible". This inclines us to be always looking into the past, to see how we are constrained by the past. But with an understanding of free will, and a slightly different conception of time, we can dismiss the continuity between past and future, which we take for granted (eg. Newton's first law), as not necessary. There is a continuity between future and past, through the present, which we observe and demonstrate the reality of, through prediction, but the continuity is not necessary; as Newton said I believe, it's dependent on the Will of God. When this continuity is understood as not necessary, then the constraints which the past place on the future are not necessary either.

It is this perspective, which allows anticipation, and forward looking thinking to be unconditionally free from the constraints of the past this provides us with the true possibility of freedom. And that this perspective is the true perspective can be logically derived, if it is true that time had a start. If time had a start, then at that instant, when time was just beginning to pass, there was only future, and no past. Time could not have begun to pass unless there was a future, but at this beginning there would have been no past. So if time did have a start, then the perspective which places the future as before the past is the true perspective because there was necessarily a future before there was any past.

That said, my ability to influence occurs within realms in which I am actively observing; plans of what to do in case of X, Y, and Z so as to satisfy intent i, are themselves formulated, changed, and maintained by the conscious mind within realms of (a). So, while I agree that all conscious activities that occur during (a) extend toward (c) in one way or another - this being the theme of intent-driven determinacy regarding what occurs within (a) (to not say "within the experienced present") - I yet find a clear distinction in that (c) hasn't yet happened physically whereas (a) is happening physically (and, to complete the list, (b) has already happened physically). — javra

I pretty much agree with this, but I would still like to insist on a division of a), between the passive and active aspects of the person in the situation of a) (to not say experiencing the present). The passive "observer" is not consistent with c), but in many ways is consistent with b), while the active participant is consistent with c) but in many ways not consistent with b).

Do you then not find this slowing and speeding up of time to be experiential in nature? What is commonly termed "time perception". I'm asking so as to clarify where we stand on the capacity of experiencing time. Again, not philosophical time which can only be an abstraction obtained via inference but lived time as it's innately experienced. — javra

No, I definitely do not find this to be experiential. In all my experiences of time slowing down, my experience seemed completely normal at the time, except for a feeling of being hyper-aware, in the sense of anticipatory. It was only afterwards, when going through my memory as to what occurred, that I would think how was I capable of doing all those things in what I now understand to have been an extremely short time. In other words, I was very aware, and I was reacting very quickly, but it never occurred to me at the time that time was going slower. And afterwards I was amazed at how much I could remember happening, and doing, in such a short time, but I never thought of it as time slowing down until you mentioned it now, and I think that's a good way of describing it. However, it doesn't describe what I experienced, only what I determined afterwards.

Likewise, for time speeding up. We used to have a saying, "time flies when you're having fun", but I take that as a metaphor. When I get involved in something extensive, suddenly it's later than I thought. It's not the case that I experience time going faster, it's just that I am so involved in what I am doing, that I pay no attention to the clock, and I do not realize how much time has passed.

Those examples, time slowing down, and time speeding up, are really more evidence that we do not experience time. If we do not pay attention to the clock we quickly lose track of how much time has passed. Then when we try to make the judgement as to how much time has passed, simply by referring to what we remember as having happened, we are very wrong. Gotta go---where has all the time gone?

How is the distance traveled by light in 1/299 792 458 of a second not the distance between two points? — Luke

The "distance traveled by light in 1/299 792 458 of a second" is a metre, and "the distance between two points" could be any distance. Obviously one is not the same as the other. You can continue in your category mistake all you want, I really don't care if you refuse to correct it.