Hence I suspect that most people would call the reconstructed ship A something like "the original ship of Theseus" to distinguish it from ship B as "the current ship of Theseus." — aletheist

How do you make that distinction - the original and the current?

What if we use a simpler example? You and I each have an axe. We swap axe-heads. Do we each have the same axe we started with? Have we swapped axes? Or do we each have a new axe, with the old axes having been "destroyed"? If we each have the same axe we started with, what if we then swap handles?

Does the time between the swapping of axe-heads and the swapping of handles matter, such that if we did this within the space of a few minutes then we've switched axes but if we did this within the space of a year then we've retained our original axes? Does the proportion of the change matter, such that if we swap 10% of each axe at a time then we've retained our original axes but if we switch 60% (and then 40%) of each axe then we've switched axes?

As children it is common for us to play games. One of these games involves breaking apart toys into its components and then rebuilding. We've all done it and we've seen others do it too. In such cases we never think that the process of annihilation - reconstruction yields a different toy. Are you saying this common sense intuition is wrong? — TheMadFool

I think I explained this. Identity, based on continuity of existence, is an assumption only. As such there are no real objective standards for assigning such "identity" to an object, such "identity" is somewhat arbitrary. There are however, conventions, but the conventions are informal, and vary depending on many different factors, just like our conventions for using words. So if we describe the activity of taking the thing apart and rebuilding it, as a continuity of existence of the thing, then we believe that it maintains its identity according to that convention. But if we describe the activity as an annihilate of the thing, and a rebuilding of a new thing, then we believe that the thing does not maintain its identity, according to that convention.

So that is the 'switch' from 'the ship' to 'a person' . And, note, the assumption that 'an entire being' CAN be replaced by replacing the components, in the same way that an artefact can. So there's an implicit materialist assumption: that personal identity is of the same order as the identity of material objects, whereas I don't know if that is true at all — Wayfarer

No bait and switch - at least not intentionally. You said there's no paradox and I gave an example in which the paradox is unambiguously manifest.

Also, why is it so hard to imagine a person being physically renewed at the atomic level. There's no logical contradiction involved implying it is possible. So, your objection on this point is moot.

I understand what you mean - basically that full-blown materialism(?) is not sufficient to explain the human phenomenon. For that reason I understand personal identity may differ from the identity of material objects. However, is this difference relevant to the paradox?

The basic assumption you're making, in the case of personal identity, is that the whole is not simply the sum of its parts. There's that extra thing which, according to you, I've overlooked. This is not the case in the paradox. Surely you'll agree that the ship (the whole) is more than the sum of its parts (the planks, nails, etc). So, my analogy actually factors the very thing you accuse me of ignoring.

That's why I said that a process metaphysics prevents the sort of paradoxes that can arise in trying to analyse this within an object-based metaphysics. — andrewk

Your post suggests that the paradox is solved by simply switching one's perspective (process/object metaphysics). Isn't that a cop out?

In addition, if I understood you correctly, as per process metaphysics it is valid to say both ships A and B are referents of the sign ''the ship of Theseus". If this is the case what is the criteria/conditions that need to be followed/met for the conclusion that both ships A and B are "the ship of Theseus"? Can you clarify. Thanks

I'm not quite sure whether the paradox is a matter of convention alone. To explain let me differentiate ''convention'' into two sub-categories.

1. Arbitrary conventions. For example it is an arbitrary convention that the symbol ''1'' refers to unity/one. There's no logic behind it. It's random.

2. Reason-based conventions. For example there's logic behind the convention that it is good to return a favor - it makes for a better society.

If there's any convention in the paradox we're discussing it is not of type 1 (arbitrary). Rather ''identity'' is a reason-based convention. We have to reason out what ''identity'' means and then, much later after rigorous analysis, we establish the convention that ''identity'' means so and so.

Hence, we can't simply brush aside the problem by saying it's just a matter of convention.

How do you make that distinction - the original and the current? — TheMadFool

The "original ship of Theseus" is the one made up of the original planks. The "current ship of Theseus" is the one that has had all of its planks replaced over time. Remember, these are just possible names that I suggested people might use to distinguish them; there is nothing philosophically significant about the terms "original" and "current" themselves.

The "original ship of Theseus" is the one made up of the original planks. The "current ship of Theseus" is the one that has had all of its planks replaced over time. Remember, these are just possible names that I suggested people might use to distinguish them; there is nothing philosophically significant about the terms "original" and "current" themselves. — aletheist

I'd like to point out a small issue with such an interpretation. The criteria/conditions that define the ''original'' ship of Theseus is significantly different from the criteria/conditions that define the ''current'' ship of Theseus. After all if the criteria/conditions are same then there would be just ONE referent of the sign ''the ship of Theseus''. Also, there wouldn't be a paradox to begin with.

However, isn't this equivocation? Using one definition of ''the ship of Theseus'' we get the original ship and using a different definition we get the current ship.

I guess the paradox exposes our defective comprehension of identity.

↪John
nowhere did I imply or say that they were trivial.

I answered the first question previously. — Wayfarer

Saying

That still says nothing more than A = A, and that everything A is A because it is not not A. — Wayfarer

made it seem to me that you did think it was trivial, you seem to be asking for more than that. My apologies if I have misunderstood you.

So you do think thought and language are abstractions, rather than practices? If you answered the question as to what they are abstracted from I don't know where to find that answer. Could you point me to the post where you answered it, or answer it again if it's not too much trouble?

If there's any convention in the paradox we're discussing it is not of type 1 (arbitrary). Rather ''identity'' is a reason-based convention. We have to reason out what ''identity'' means and then, much later after rigorous analysis, we establish the convention that ''identity'' means so and so.

Hence, we can't simply brush aside the problem by saying it's just a matter of convention. — TheMadFool

OK, I agree very few conventions, if any are purely arbitrary. So even in the symbols, 1 and 2, etc., there are some reasons why these are the symbols which became used and not something else. So I assume that there are reason why, when the kid takes the toy apart and rebuilds it, we think of that as part of the identity of the toy, yet if we remolded the broken drinking glass to remake the glass, we would identify it as a new glass. Conventions come into existence for different reasons, so they are not truly arbitrary. Why do you think it's not a matter of convention?

The simpler example is not a good analogy to the ship, because a somewhat different logic is at work. An axe has only two significant components; the head and the handle, with the head being the more significant ( because more can be done to it to change the character and the effectiveness of the axe). If you swap heads (which is the same as swapping the handles apart form the question of ownership) of two axes, then you have different 'hybrid' axes.

The talk of percentages doesn't help at all, there is no precise logic of percentages operating in such cases, Of course if a handles wears out, and replaced, then it would normally be thought it remained the same axe. But this sameness has more to do with its history of utility. If we swap a perfectly good handle for no reason then the fact that this swapping is arbitrary might lead us to think we have changed the character of the axe, and that it is not now the same axe. In any case, greater importance in terms of identity is certainly given to the head.

I think we intuitively know the rough answer to these kinds of questions and it will differ in the case of each different kind of tool or equipment. The fact that no general principle can be precisely formulated makes it seem that there are paradoxes where there really are none. Identity comes down to nothing more than the logic of our practices when it comes to human-produced things. That logic is sometimes fuzzy is all.

No bait and switch - at least not intentionally. You said there's no paradox and I gave an example in which the paradox is unambiguously manifest.

Also, why is it so hard to imagine a person being physically renewed at the atomic level. There's no logical contradiction involved implying it is possible. So, your objection on this point is moot.

I understand what you mean - basically that full-blown materialism(?) is not sufficient to explain the human phenomenon. For that reason I understand personal identity may differ from the identity of material objects. However, is this difference relevant to the paradox?

The basic assumption you're making, in the case of personal identity, is that the whole is not simply the sum of its parts. There's that extra thing which, according to you, I've overlooked. This is not the case in the paradox. Surely you'll agree that the ship (the whole) is more than the sum of its parts (the planks, nails, etc). So, my analogy actually factors the very thing you accuse me of ignoring. — TheMadFool

The objection is that 'the soul is not material' and not composed of parts, whereas an artefact is. The soul is not 'an extra thing', to say so is to treat it as another object. 'The ship' is only more than the sum of its parts because it represents an idea, namely, the idea of a ship, and it is associated with history in the minds of people. So it is only other than, or more than, the sum of its parts, in the minds of people.

So again, humans are designated as 'beings' or 'human beings'. To equate the question of identity of beings with that of objects, is to overlook or obfuscate the real distinction between beings and objects. That's why I said it was a bait and switch - whatever you say about the question in terms of the identity of an object such as a ship, can't be assumed to then equally apply to the question of the nature of being. You would have to make a new argument, instead of just casually switching between 'the case of the ship' and 'the case of person A'. That move is inherently reductionist.

Now, of course, most people will object 'the soul doesn't exist, if you say it does exist, how do you prove that it does?' The way I understand the soul, it is not a separate entity to the body, but the totality of the being - the body, but also all the proclivities, talents, dispositions, the past, and the destiny - the sum of the whole being (which as I understand it is nearer the Aristotelean view than the Cartesian). As to whether the soul exists or not, that question is analogous to the question 'does reality exist' - which is an inadmissable question, because for any such question to be asked, someone must exist to ask it.

So essentially that is a Cartesian type of argument, with the caveat that, unlike Descartes, I don't believe that res cogitans is something that can be known objectively, it is never a 'that' to the observer, in the way that ships and other objects are.

So you do think thought and language are abstractions, rather than practices? If you answered the question as to what they are abstracted from I don't know where to find that answer. Could you point me to the post where you answered it, or answer it again if it's not too much trouble? — John

I have always assumed that language, number, grammar and the like, if not wholly and solely abstractions, rely on abstractions. When we say something is 'like' something, or 'the same' as something, what the mind is doing is abstracting characteristics and attributes from a range of types and comparing them. What is that, if not abstraction? Rationality must surely be dependent on abstraction, musn't it? All of the 'laws of thought' that we've been discussing are reliant on abstraction (and generalisation, which is a type of abstraction.)

I have always assumed that language, number, grammar and the like, if not wholly and solely abstractions, rely on abstractions. When we say something is 'like' something, or 'the same' as something, what the mind is doing is abstracting characteristics and attributes from a range of types and comparing them. What is that, if not abstraction? Rationality must surely be dependent on abstraction, musn't it? All of the 'laws of thought' that we've been discussing are reliant on abstraction (and generalisation, which is a type of abstraction.) — Wayfarer

I guess what I'm really looking for is a good explanation as to exactly what constitutes abstraction. We see differences and similarities and from there we generalize to recognize different types of entities. I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously, so I don't think abstraction, which if it is really to be anything at all must be a function of symbolic language, plays any crucial role in recognizing entities for what they are ('what they are' meaning their significance, whether to human or animal).

Of course the logical analysis of difference, similarity, sameness and identity is only possible by means of symbolic language, but it's hard to see where the abstraction is in all that, because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, even if these marks or sounds are "visualized internally", that process is itself really as much a "felt' or "visceral" one as for example the sensation of pain or pleasure is. Well at least that is my experience; I guess I can't, in the strict sense, speak for others, but it seems reasonable to assume a commonality of experience.

The logical analysis of difference, similarity, sameness and identity is only possible by means of symbolic language, but it's hard to see where the abstraction is in all that, because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, — John

You're not seeing the forest for the trees. 'Concrete entities' is an abstraction. It 'stands for' a particular type of idea which you wish to communicate to me. It's not a matter of where abstraction is in that - it is an abstraction.

I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously — John

Please illustrate to me the process by which you would explain the concept of 'prime number' to an animal. (I think the reason you think that animals are capable of abstraction, is because it is very non PC nowadays to believe that animals and humans have essentially different capabilities. It's one of the consequences of the effect of Darwinism on philosophy.)

that process is itself really as much a "felt' or "visceral" one as for example the sensation of pain or pleasure is. — John

Mathematicians devote their entire career to the exploration of mathematical realities. These have nothing whatever to do with visceral processes or sensations. The beauty of maths may evoke feelings, but it is not dependent on the viscera.

'Concrete entities' is an abstraction. — Wayfarer

How is it an abstraction? "Concrete entities" is, in this case, some marks on the computer screen which elicit felt and visualized associations in me when I see them. It seems to me that you are tendentiously defining it as an abstraction, but apparently cannot explain in what exactly its abstractness consists. There's no point just making the same assertion over and over; you need to explain the logic behind your assertion.

Please illustrate to me the process by which you would explain the concept of 'prime number' to an animal. — Wayfarer

You haven't read what I wrote carefully enough. I have already stated that symbolic language is required in order to produce logical analyses and explanations. You are attacking a straw man and ignoring the salient point of my argument; which is the fact that animals obviously can recognize entities without using symbolic language. Why would I claim that animals are capable of abstraction, when I am arguing that abstraction is not really anything even in relation to symbolic language use? As I said before if abstraction is really anything at all it is dependent on symbolic language. But the fact that more is possible with symbolic language does not guarantee that abstraction is really anything significant. In order to show that abstraction is real and significant you need to explain exactly what it consist in. I don't believe you can: I have tried and I am convinced that I cannot.

The beauty of maths may evoke feelings, but it is not dependent on the viscera. — Wayfarer

I would say this is plainly wrong. Mathematics is entirely dependent on mathematicians' abilities to see what is self-evident. I can't see how this is anything more than an intuitive, embodied capacity, just as language use itself seems to be. It is learned and developed through embodied experience just as any other skill is.

"Concrete entities" is, in this case, some marks on the computer screen which elicit felt and visualized associations in me when I see them. — John

This is getting ridiculous, John. These 'marks' are letters and words, you are able to read them because you're a human being possessed of language. That is not a 'straw man' argument.

It seems to me that you are tendentiously defining it as an abstraction, but apparently cannot explain in what exactly its abstractness consists. — John

Explaining 'abstraction' requires making use of abstraction. Such general terms are invariably difficult to define, because 'a definition' is 'to describe one thing in terms of another'. It's very easy to explain what a spanner is, but very difficult to define consciousness, or life. In any case, there's quite a good encyclopedia entry on abstraction on Wikipedia, with many references and footnotes.

There's no point just making the same assertion over and over. — John

There's no point in asking the same question over and over.

Mathematics is entirely dependent on mathematicians' abilities to see what is self-evident. — John

There was a famous proof that required solving for centuries - Fermat's Last Theorem, I think it was called. According to you, it can't have existed. There are entire university deparements dedicated to solving maths problems, which according to you, should all be self evident.

You are attacking a straw man and ignoring the salient point of my argument; which is the fact that animals obviously can recognize entities without using symbolic language. — John

Animals respond to stimuli and engage in limited communications for specific behaviours.

That is the last thing I am saying on this.

This is getting ridiculous, John. These 'marks' are letters and words, you are able to read them because you're a human being possessed of language. That is not a 'straw man' argument. — Wayfarer

I agree it is getting ridiculous, but not for the reason you think. I haven't anywhere said that I would be able to read text if I was not a human being in possession of linguistic ability.

Explaining 'abstraction' requires making use of abstraction. — Wayfarer

Again you are just presenting something as a self-evident truism without offering any explanation. It might be self-evident to you, but it is not to me, and many others; so what then?

There's no point in asking the same question over and over. — Wayfarer

There is if I think it is an important question that has not been adequately answered.

There was a famous proof that required solving for centuries - Fermat's Last Theorem, I think it was called. According to you, it can't have existed. There are entire university deparements dedicated to solving maths problems, which according to you, should all be self evident. — Wayfarer

Again a straw man. Fermat's Last Theorem is recorded, no doubt in countless places, and anyone who wanted to understand it would have to access those written records or speak to someone who had. And I have not argued or even implied that everyone should find the answer to Fermat;s Last Theorem self evident, any more than I would argue that anyone should be able to sit down at the piano and play Bebop. Given enough embodied experience and skill, a suitably talented person might be able to solve the Theorem or play Bebop, both of which abilities would be embodied as the ability to see what is self-evident in the involved in the Theorem and its relation to mathematics in general and in the relationship involved in harmonizing the Bebop scale and its relation to Jazz in general, respectively.

Animals respond to stimuli and engage in limited communications for specific behaviours. — Wayfarer

Sounds like you think animals are nothing more than biological machines.

That is the last thing I am saying on this. — Wayfarer

It's up to Wayfarer. I don't take any of this stuff personally; none of it is of any significance to me beyond its mere intellectual interest.

I haven't anywhere said that I would be able to read text if I was not a human being in possession of linguistic ability. — John

But you did say that.

I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously. — John

and that

"Concrete entities" is, in this case, some marks on the computer screen which elicit felt and visualized associations in me when I see them — John

I don't think 'animals do the same'. That is the point at issue. Animals have some ability to communicate and rudimentary problem-solving skills, but they're not capable of rational abstraction or language in the human sense (chimp studies, Caledonian crows, and Paul the Octopus notwithstanding).

And they're not 'marks', they're words - attached to which is the whole architecture of language, semiotics, linguistics, grammar, intentionality, and other higher-order intellectual skills that humans have, that animals don't have. And they can't be reduced to 'felt responses', that trivialises the nature of rationality. (If you agree, squeak twice ;-) )

Sounds like you think animals are nothing more than biological machines. — John

I think animals are animals. They're not machines, and they're also not humans.

Explaining 'abstraction' requires making use of abstraction.
— Wayfarer

Again you are just presenting something as a self-evident truism without offering any explanation — John

OK, from the article I mentioned:

Abstraction in its main sense is a conceptual process by which general rules and concepts are derived from the usage and classification of specific examples, literal ("real" or "concrete") signifiers, first principles, or other methods. "An abstraction" is the product of this process — a concept that acts as a super-categorical noun for all subordinate concepts, and connects any related concepts as a group, field, or category.

Conceptual abstractions may be formed by filtering the information content of a concept or an observable phenomenon, selecting only the aspects which are relevant for a particular purpose. For example, abstracting a leather soccer ball to the more general idea of a ball selects only the information on general ball attributes and behavior, eliminating the other characteristics of that particular ball. In a type–token distinction, a type (e.g., a 'ball') is more abstract than its tokens (e.g., 'that leather soccer ball').

Abstraction in its secondary use is a material process, discussed in the themes below.

2 Themes
2.1 Compression
2.2 Instantiation
2.3 Material process
2.4 Ontological status
2.5 Physicality
2.6 Referencing and referring
2.7 Simplification and ordering
2.8 Thought processes
3 As used in different disciplines
3.1 In art
3.2 In computer science
3.3 In linguistics
3.4 In mathematics
3.5 In music
3.6 In neurology
3.7 In philosophy
3.8 In psychology
3.9 In social theory

Isn't that a cop out? — TheMadFool

I don't understand what you mean by this question. Can you explain it?

In addition, if I understood you correctly, as per process metaphysics it is valid to say both ships A and B are referents of the sign ''the ship of Theseus". If this is the case what is the criteria/conditions that need to be followed/met for the conclusion that both ships A and B are "the ship of Theseus"? Can you clarify. Thanks — TheMadFool

I explained in the post to which you were referring that the criterion is that both instances be part of the process that we understand to be the ship of Theseus. If you are instead asking why that is my criterion, it is simply that - according to my empirical observations - that is the way people generally use language.

If you find this confusing, just think of the instance of yourself at noon yesterday, and the instance of yourself at noon today. They are two different locations on the same worldline/process, which is called <insert your name here>, so it is generally accepted practice to refer to either or both instances as <insert your name here>. Do you agree with that? If not, why not? If you do, then just replace the process that is your body by the process that is the ship of Theseus.

What something is is not simply a question of its material constitution but of its relationship to other things as well. — darthbarracuda

How does this bear on the paradox?

If I understand you correctly then it means you think both ships are valid referents of ''the ship of Theseus'' because both of them evolve through time developing relationships with other objects (sailors, ports, events, etc).

I don't understand what you mean by this question. Can you explain it? — andrewk

You said that process metaphysics ''resolves'' the paradox while object-based metaphysics doesn't.

Imho simply changing perspective doesn't truly solve the paradox.

Just because you alter your gaze from thorn to flower doesn't get rid of the thorns of a rose bush.

Looks like a cop-out to me.

I explained in the post to which you were referring that the criterion is that both instances be part of the process that we understand to be the ship of Theseus. — andrewk

Kindly explain what exactly you mean by ''process''.

Why do you think it's not a matter of convention — Metaphysician Undercover

As oxymorinic as it sounds it could be a case of reason-based convention, just not arbitrary convention.

The point being that if the paradox has any worth i is the exposure of our poor understanding of identity.

Just because you alter your gaze from thorn to flower doesn't get rid of the thorns of a rose bush — TheMadFool

That's because one can still get pricked by a thorn despite the averted gaze, which is in turn because the thorns are not just an artefact of the visual perspective. I am suggesting that the paradox you think you see is an artefact of your object-based perspective, and hence - unlike a thorn - is powerless to harm or annoy somebody that uses a different perspective.

Kindly explain what exactly you mean by ''process''. — TheMadFool

A process is a subset of the four-dimensional spacetime manifold The ones we are interested in usually have additional criteria such as path-connectedness.

I haven't anywhere said that I would be able to read text if I was not a human being in possession of linguistic ability. — John

But you did say that.

I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously. — Wayfarer

You didn't read it carefully. Here is the passage in full:

We see differences and similarities and from there we generalize to recognize different types of entities. I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously, so I don't think abstraction, which if it is really to be anything at all must be a function of symbolic language, plays any crucial role in recognizing entities for what they are ('what they are' meaning their significance, whether to human or animal). — John

I am saying that animals see differences and similarities such that they are able to recognize entities, I am not saying that they can read text or use symbolic language.

If abstraction to you is just exactly the same notion as generalization and nothing more, rather than representing some stronger claim about some purported 'reality' of abstract entities, then we have not been arguing about anything. Animals also generalize in the sense I would use it in that they respond in predictable ways to different types of entities. But they are not able, presumably, to be reflexively aware of their generalizations, or of their capacity to generalize, due to their lack of symbolic language. My point is just that from that it doesn't follow that there is anything abstract about symbolic language; it is an immanently embodied acquired skill like playing music; or painting pictures,which animals also cannot do.

If I understand you correctly then it means you think both ships are valid referents of ''the ship of Theseus'' because both of them evolve through time developing relationships with other objects (sailors, ports, events, etc). — TheMadFool

I would say that it shows that there never "was" a Ship of Theseus in the material sense, because the existence of relations makes material composition vague and indeterminate.

Yes, there never could have been an absolutely physically invariant Ship of Theseus. If that were the criterion for identity, then identity would be dead in the water from the start..

I think that process-esque type wholeness approach is best. An identity can be defined by its entire lifetime, and identifying something from our end takes a duration as well, and cannot be entirely atomized, but rather just arbitrarily and vaguely chop off a piece of its identity at one time, and then at another, noting physical differences, and asking how they can be identical? But it is the whole "ship of theseus" event, or phenomena that makes up its identity. Where we're referring to a whole universe of context within which the ship phenomenon took place.

So, I think that saying that something isn't self identical at t1, and t2, but physically vary between the two times, thus don't share all of the same properties, and can't be self identical is like saying that you're not self identical because your hand varies from your foot in their properties, and aren't self identical with each other, therefore you can't be self identical.

My point is just that from that it doesn't follow that there is anything abstract about symbolic language; it is an immanently embodied acquired skill like playing music; or painting pictures,which animals also cannot do. — John

'Immanently', meaning what?

In any case, symbols are abstractions, and language relies on abstractions. If a chick sees a shape like hawk being flown above the nest, it will hide, but not because it recognises a symbol, but because it sees a shape. Responding to stimuli, is a different kind of activity to interpreting symbols.

because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, — John

Concrete, meaning what?

'Immanently', meaning what? — Wayfarer

To me it means means it is of the body, and of the spirit. It is something we 'know from the inside', so to speak. I certainly allow that there is spirit as well as body and mind but spirit is as concrete as the body and the mind, I don't see anything "abstract" about it at all.

In any case, symbols are abstractions, and language relies on abstractions. — Wayfarer

More mere assertion, and no argument: we seem to be going around in circles now, and I don't really think it's that important any way, so it's probably best we leave it here.

This is where it started:

Of course the logical analysis of difference, similarity, sameness and identity is only possible by means of symbolic language, but it's hard to see where the abstraction is in all that, because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, even if these marks or sounds are "visualized internally", that process is itself really as much a "felt' or "visceral" one as for example the sensation of pain or pleasure is. Well at least that is my experience; I guess I can't, in the strict sense, speak for others, but it seems reasonable to assume a commonality of experience. — John

What is a 'concrete entity using concrete visual marks and sounds?' They're not actually 'made from concrete', so what is the meaning of 'concrete'?

If you're doing a maths equation, I fail to understand how that can be 'felt internally or viscerally'. I don't think it can even be 'seen in the minds eye'. I'm pretty terrible at maths but when I try and add up numbers, I don't see them replayed in my mind.

So the reason I am being persistent, is because I think this is plainly mistaken, and that it's an important mistake.

The nature of meaning is such that, the same meaning can be conveyed in completely different forms. You can translate a sentence into any number of languages, or represent it in any number of media - even concrete! So how can meaning be 'concrete'? What does 'concrete' and 'immanent' mean? Because, I think language itself is inherently abstract, and that if it weren't abstract, we couldn't actually think.