Hence I suspect that most people would call the reconstructed ship A something like "the original ship of Theseus" to distinguish it from ship B as "the current ship of Theseus." — aletheist
As children it is common for us to play games. One of these games involves breaking apart toys into its components and then rebuilding. We've all done it and we've seen others do it too. In such cases we never think that the process of annihilation - reconstruction yields a different toy. Are you saying this common sense intuition is wrong? — TheMadFool
So that is the 'switch' from 'the ship' to 'a person' . And, note, the assumption that 'an entire being' CAN be replaced by replacing the components, in the same way that an artefact can. So there's an implicit materialist assumption: that personal identity is of the same order as the identity of material objects, whereas I don't know if that is true at all — Wayfarer
That's why I said that a process metaphysics prevents the sort of paradoxes that can arise in trying to analyse this within an object-based metaphysics. — andrewk
How do you make that distinction - the original and the current? — TheMadFool
The "original ship of Theseus" is the one made up of the original planks. The "current ship of Theseus" is the one that has had all of its planks replaced over time. Remember, these are just possible names that I suggested people might use to distinguish them; there is nothing philosophically significant about the terms "original" and "current" themselves. — aletheist
↪John
nowhere did I imply or say that they were trivial.
I answered the first question previously. — Wayfarer
made it seem to me that you did think it was trivial, you seem to be asking for more than that. My apologies if I have misunderstood you.That still says nothing more than A = A, and that everything A is A because it is not not A. — Wayfarer
If there's any convention in the paradox we're discussing it is not of type 1 (arbitrary). Rather ''identity'' is a reason-based convention. We have to reason out what ''identity'' means and then, much later after rigorous analysis, we establish the convention that ''identity'' means so and so.
Hence, we can't simply brush aside the problem by saying it's just a matter of convention. — TheMadFool
No bait and switch - at least not intentionally. You said there's no paradox and I gave an example in which the paradox is unambiguously manifest.
Also, why is it so hard to imagine a person being physically renewed at the atomic level. There's no logical contradiction involved implying it is possible. So, your objection on this point is moot.
I understand what you mean - basically that full-blown materialism(?) is not sufficient to explain the human phenomenon. For that reason I understand personal identity may differ from the identity of material objects. However, is this difference relevant to the paradox?
The basic assumption you're making, in the case of personal identity, is that the whole is not simply the sum of its parts. There's that extra thing which, according to you, I've overlooked. This is not the case in the paradox. Surely you'll agree that the ship (the whole) is more than the sum of its parts (the planks, nails, etc). So, my analogy actually factors the very thing you accuse me of ignoring. — TheMadFool
So you do think thought and language are abstractions, rather than practices? If you answered the question as to what they are abstracted from I don't know where to find that answer. Could you point me to the post where you answered it, or answer it again if it's not too much trouble? — John
I have always assumed that language, number, grammar and the like, if not wholly and solely abstractions, rely on abstractions. When we say something is 'like' something, or 'the same' as something, what the mind is doing is abstracting characteristics and attributes from a range of types and comparing them. What is that, if not abstraction? Rationality must surely be dependent on abstraction, musn't it? All of the 'laws of thought' that we've been discussing are reliant on abstraction (and generalisation, which is a type of abstraction.) — Wayfarer
The logical analysis of difference, similarity, sameness and identity is only possible by means of symbolic language, but it's hard to see where the abstraction is in all that, because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, — John
I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously — John
that process is itself really as much a "felt' or "visceral" one as for example the sensation of pain or pleasure is. — John
'Concrete entities' is an abstraction. — Wayfarer
Please illustrate to me the process by which you would explain the concept of 'prime number' to an animal. — Wayfarer
The beauty of maths may evoke feelings, but it is not dependent on the viscera. — Wayfarer
"Concrete entities" is, in this case, some marks on the computer screen which elicit felt and visualized associations in me when I see them. — John
It seems to me that you are tendentiously defining it as an abstraction, but apparently cannot explain in what exactly its abstractness consists. — John
There's no point just making the same assertion over and over. — John
Mathematics is entirely dependent on mathematicians' abilities to see what is self-evident. — John
You are attacking a straw man and ignoring the salient point of my argument; which is the fact that animals obviously can recognize entities without using symbolic language. — John
This is getting ridiculous, John. These 'marks' are letters and words, you are able to read them because you're a human being possessed of language. That is not a 'straw man' argument. — Wayfarer
Explaining 'abstraction' requires making use of abstraction. — Wayfarer
There's no point in asking the same question over and over. — Wayfarer
There was a famous proof that required solving for centuries - Fermat's Last Theorem, I think it was called. According to you, it can't have existed. There are entire university deparements dedicated to solving maths problems, which according to you, should all be self evident. — Wayfarer
Animals respond to stimuli and engage in limited communications for specific behaviours. — Wayfarer
That is the last thing I am saying on this. — Wayfarer
I haven't anywhere said that I would be able to read text if I was not a human being in possession of linguistic ability. — John
and thatI think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously. — John
"Concrete entities" is, in this case, some marks on the computer screen which elicit felt and visualized associations in me when I see them — John
Sounds like you think animals are nothing more than biological machines. — John
Explaining 'abstraction' requires making use of abstraction.
— Wayfarer
Again you are just presenting something as a self-evident truism without offering any explanation — John
Abstraction in its main sense is a conceptual process by which general rules and concepts are derived from the usage and classification of specific examples, literal ("real" or "concrete") signifiers, first principles, or other methods. "An abstraction" is the product of this process — a concept that acts as a super-categorical noun for all subordinate concepts, and connects any related concepts as a group, field, or category.
Conceptual abstractions may be formed by filtering the information content of a concept or an observable phenomenon, selecting only the aspects which are relevant for a particular purpose. For example, abstracting a leather soccer ball to the more general idea of a ball selects only the information on general ball attributes and behavior, eliminating the other characteristics of that particular ball. In a type–token distinction, a type (e.g., a 'ball') is more abstract than its tokens (e.g., 'that leather soccer ball').
Abstraction in its secondary use is a material process, discussed in the themes below.
2 Themes
2.1 Compression
2.2 Instantiation
2.3 Material process
2.4 Ontological status
2.5 Physicality
2.6 Referencing and referring
2.7 Simplification and ordering
2.8 Thought processes
3 As used in different disciplines
3.1 In art
3.2 In computer science
3.3 In linguistics
3.4 In mathematics
3.5 In music
3.6 In neurology
3.7 In philosophy
3.8 In psychology
3.9 In social theory
I don't understand what you mean by this question. Can you explain it?Isn't that a cop out? — TheMadFool
I explained in the post to which you were referring that the criterion is that both instances be part of the process that we understand to be the ship of Theseus. If you are instead asking why that is my criterion, it is simply that - according to my empirical observations - that is the way people generally use language.In addition, if I understood you correctly, as per process metaphysics it is valid to say both ships A and B are referents of the sign ''the ship of Theseus". If this is the case what is the criteria/conditions that need to be followed/met for the conclusion that both ships A and B are "the ship of Theseus"? Can you clarify. Thanks — TheMadFool
What something is is not simply a question of its material constitution but of its relationship to other things as well. — darthbarracuda
I don't understand what you mean by this question. Can you explain it? — andrewk
I explained in the post to which you were referring that the criterion is that both instances be part of the process that we understand to be the ship of Theseus. — andrewk
Why do you think it's not a matter of convention — Metaphysician Undercover
That's because one can still get pricked by a thorn despite the averted gaze, which is in turn because the thorns are not just an artefact of the visual perspective. I am suggesting that the paradox you think you see is an artefact of your object-based perspective, and hence - unlike a thorn - is powerless to harm or annoy somebody that uses a different perspective.Just because you alter your gaze from thorn to flower doesn't get rid of the thorns of a rose bush — TheMadFool
A process is a subset of the four-dimensional spacetime manifold The ones we are interested in usually have additional criteria such as path-connectedness.Kindly explain what exactly you mean by ''process''. — TheMadFool
I haven't anywhere said that I would be able to read text if I was not a human being in possession of linguistic ability. — John
But you did say that.
I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously. — Wayfarer
We see differences and similarities and from there we generalize to recognize different types of entities. I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously, so I don't think abstraction, which if it is really to be anything at all must be a function of symbolic language, plays any crucial role in recognizing entities for what they are ('what they are' meaning their significance, whether to human or animal). — John
If I understand you correctly then it means you think both ships are valid referents of ''the ship of Theseus'' because both of them evolve through time developing relationships with other objects (sailors, ports, events, etc). — TheMadFool
My point is just that from that it doesn't follow that there is anything abstract about symbolic language; it is an immanently embodied acquired skill like playing music; or painting pictures,which animals also cannot do. — John
because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, — John
To me it means means it is of the body, and of the spirit. It is something we 'know from the inside', so to speak. I certainly allow that there is spirit as well as body and mind but spirit is as concrete as the body and the mind, I don't see anything "abstract" about it at all.'Immanently', meaning what? — Wayfarer
In any case, symbols are abstractions, and language relies on abstractions. — Wayfarer
Of course the logical analysis of difference, similarity, sameness and identity is only possible by means of symbolic language, but it's hard to see where the abstraction is in all that, because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, even if these marks or sounds are "visualized internally", that process is itself really as much a "felt' or "visceral" one as for example the sensation of pain or pleasure is. Well at least that is my experience; I guess I can't, in the strict sense, speak for others, but it seems reasonable to assume a commonality of experience. — John
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