Did you read my discussion above with Cheshire?

OK, not fully, just the latter parts regarding French grey. Should I have? But I'm still interested to hear about how you reply to the two examples I gave regarding color's meaning.

In case it's pertinent, I browsed through the thread and read it. Your discussion with Cheshire centers on what color the term of a color references: the meaning of a term. Whereas what I'm addressing is what colors themselves symbolize and thereby mean: the meaning of a color.

What came first: use or definition?) — baker

One issue I have with Wittgenstein's claim that meaning is use is that even definitions viewed in terms of essences is, after all, use of a word to stand for a certain idea or object. I don't recall anyone attempting to clarify how Wittgenstein's theory differs in a significant way from essence-based definitions which are, bottom line, also use.

Wittgenstein doesn't make use of essences; that's part of the point of rejecting meaning as stuff in people's heads, together with showing how what is a simple depends on what you are doing - essence as a simple.

Folk keep asking the questions that Wittgenstein answered, but refusing to read Wittgenstein.


:roll:

Wittgenstein doesn't make use of essences; that's part of the point of rejecting meaning as stuff in people's heads, together with showing how what is a simple depends on what you are doing - essence as a simple. — Banno

It looks like I wasn't clear enough. My bad, the ability to articulate my thoughts wasn't ever my strong suit. I'll give it another shot.

First off, we have to acknowledge the fact that even when words are being thought of as possessing an essence they are being used, used to represent the idea/object that the word stands for. For example, if I define "water" as "that clear liquid we drink, and use for cooking, bathing, and washing", I am, for certain, using the word "water" to stand for "that clear liquid we drink, and use for cooking, bathing, and washing." Note kindly that in this case the word "water" is used but then it has an essence as stated in "that clear liquid we drink, and use for cooking, bathing, and washing."

My question is, how does the use of the word "water" in the above paragraph differ from Wittgenstein's use when he claims that meaning is use. There's got to be a difference, right? After all, a word is used in both cases but in one, there is an essence to the word but not, according to Wittgenstein, in the other. :chin:

Something I learned many moons ago in my psychology of language class. From Wikipedia:

The hypothesis of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, the Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, is a principle suggesting that the structure of a language affects its speakers' worldview or cognition, and thus people's perceptions are relative to their spoken language.

I, and I think psychologists in general, were skeptical of this even back when I took the class, but I think there is something there. My children were all involved in a French Immersion program from the time they were in kindergarten. Watching them, it has always seemed to me that having two languages gives you two different minds.

I love German. I think being able to speak it a little opens me up to concepts and ways of thinking. On the other hand, I think that's the weak version of the Whorf hypothesis, i.e. some ideas are easier to express and come more naturally in one language vs. another, but it's possible to translate. Or, you can just steal the word. — T Clark

Not to be dramatic or self-important, but this "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis" is exactly the same idea that I've felt intuitively for years without any special knowledge of the subject; I had never heard of this specific hypothesis before now. I have no expertise or argument to use to back up this intuition.

I need to think about it more, as you would say.

:up:

Lol, there aren't sentences in poetry...

Lol, there aren't sentences in poetry... — Noble Dust

Whose woods these are, I think I know. His house is in the village, though. He will not see me stopping here to watch his woods fill up with snow.

Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe. All mimsy were the borogoves, and the mome raths outgrabe.

Not all poems have sentences, but some do.

Not to be dramatic or self-important, but this "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis" is exactly the same idea that I've felt intuitively for years without any special knowledge of the subject; — Noble Dust

As I noted, I think this is probably an oversimplification.

Not all poems have sentences, but some do. — T Clark

Fair enough, but hairy belly appeared to be assuming there always are, which to me smacked of a lack of knowledge of poetry, which made me laugh internally, considering the role poetry plays in language and it's evolution.

As I noted, I think this is probably an oversimplification. — T Clark

Can you elaborate on why you think so?

In short, a language does not strictly exist in my head, no. Yet meaning - or, what is intended via symbols - does. — javra

Hi. If I may interrupt, I think we tend to use 'meaning' in a way that suggests that it's attached to a person. 'I said ketchup, but I meant mustard.' It reminds me of W's talk of toothaches. It's the 'grammar' of our language that 'toothaches' and 'intentions' are (as if) private entities. But I think that it ('meaning') nevertheless boils down the social. How could I learn what an 'intention' is without interacting with others? Even if you postulated some internal-private machinery that's just there, we'd still have the issue of how certain tokens get attached to these entities. And we'd also have the question (one of many like it) of how we could know that we all have the same internal machinery (is my green your green?). What tempts us to put meaning-language mostly (if not entirely) in the head...when it can only be made sense of as part of a social world?

Can you elaborate on why you think so? — Noble Dust

The Whorf hypothesis, at least in my day, was a strong statement that language controls the kinds of things we can think about. Since then, I think the concept has become more nuanced, but I think it's easy to overstate the effect. The idea that language encourages us to think in certain ways and limits our ability to think in others is very attractive. I felt that way when I first heard about it.

PandnotPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHQandnoTQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAH...

The idea that language encourages us to think in certain ways and limits our ability to think in others is very attractive. — T Clark

I get the sentiment, but I would word it differently. The intuition that I get is that there is an extent to which words help us construct our reality. So it's not that language "encourages" (language isn't sentient, is it?) or that it "limits" us, but rather that language is one aspect of experience that shapes our reality. It's part of our reality and it plays a role in shaping it at the same time.

No worries, but to evade the circularity that could manifest in arguments, I did give two examples regarding the meaning of color that could be addressed by anyone if they were inclined to engage in an honest discussion regarding what I posted. A wink to @Banno.

No worries, but to evade the circularity that could manifest in arguments, I did give two examples regarding the meaning of color that could be addressed by anyone if they were inclined to engage in an honest discussion regarding what I posted. A wink to Banno. — javra

Yeah, I'm always avoiding explaining Wittgenstein - over more than a dozen years and thousands of posts. Never mention him, that's me. Won't enter into any conversations about his stuff.

Maybe if I can find a fuck to give, I'll reply to you.

Religion will do that to you.

Folk keep asking the questions that Wittgenstein answered, but refusing to read Wittgenstein. — Banno

Religion will do that to you too.

Religion will do that to you. — Noble Dust

Yea, true, but only when it consists of following infallible folk. At any rate, doubt that Wittgenstein took himself to be such, though I can't say as much about some of his adorers.

Maybe if I can find a fuck to give, I'll reply to you. — Banno

Cute. Especially seeing how you put in the effort to reply. :lol:

Good to see you two have each other's company to enjoy.

When you can be interesting, let me know.

Yea, true, but only when it consists of following infallible folk. At any rate, doubt that Wittgenstein took himself to be such, though I can't say as much about some of his adorers. — javra

Witty can seem infallible; indeed, on the surface, he does. Hence his religious followers.

Interesting! :wink: :razz:

Interesting indeed!

Should someone let the lofty one know? I think it even more interesting were s/he to discover it for themselves.

I think we already did, but they won't understand it, so it doesn't matter.

:smile: