The meaning of french grey is what you do with it; ordering and applying a colour that is pleasing. — Banno

What? It's the name of a color. They make a crayon. I didn't get to label it. I maintain that this phrase above is never resident in some one's mind during an internal process of understanding things. No one thinks to themselves in a convoluted way. The meaning is what you do with it with respect to the context and any ceremonial entailments. How do you describe what it is to mean something? Seems thread relevant.

The meaning is what you do with it with respect to the context and any ceremonial entailments. — Cheshire

Yep.

How to describe the unscribable? If you can describe it isn't it describable? I mean, if you answer this question don't describe it?

Nailed it

Lao Tzu - The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.

Some guy - Hey, Lao Tzu, you're talking about something that can't be talked about. What's with that?

Lao Tzu - Tao as a thing is entirely illusive and evasive. Evasive and illusive. In it there is image. Illusive and evasive. In it there is thinghood. Dark and dim.

Some guy - This is such bullshit.

Lao Tzu - Go fuck yourself.

As one example, the pain or pleasure I might at one moment associate with a given color due to my own idiosyncratic experiences - with this color momentarily leading my thoughts to a certain outcome of affect and, in so governing my thoughts' intentionality, granting this color a momentary meaning to me - will be a fully private occurrence. That the color orange momentarily means putrid to me on grounds that it vividly reminds me of an orange I one ate that was spoiled will be a meaning of the color orange that is fully private to me. — javra

While all of this is plausible, I do suspect that the 'grammar' of the word 'private' drags us toward thinking of some mind-box with a private picture show. Then one can worry about solipsism or the thing-in-itself and so on. But we don't have to start with this Cartesian picture. Or rather we can become aware of it as an optional inheritance. The whole 'one peeping Tom homunculus per body' is just the way we've done things. One headstone per corpse. One proper name. One bearer of praise and blame (and whatever 'free will' is supposed to be beyond this.)

I suppose we can try to build language from the inside out (little souls learning to get in sync) or from the outside in ('soul' talk is a part of coordinated action talk, etc., as if of a relatively hidden variable, or a variable accessible by conversation rather than stethoscope.)

One issue I have with Wittgenstein's claim that meaning is use is that even definitions viewed in terms of essences is, after all, use of a word to stand for a certain idea or object. I don't recall anyone attempting to clarify how Wittgenstein's theory differs in a significant way from essence-based definitions which are, bottom line, also use. — TheMadFool

I think of W as just one slap in the face among others, to wake foolosophers up from a dream. Some of his early metaphors still hold, IMO. The ladder is disposable. The evidence of something like understanding Wittgenstein is talking less silly talk. Definitions can still be useful, but they are taken far less seriously than a certain kind of philosopher might want to take them (as if they were formal definitions that might be used in a mathematical proof.). I think the big point is that meaning is out there with them not in here with me. No one cares about my 'definition' of [choose a sound-mark]. Why should they? I don't decide what 'justice' or 'knowledge' or 'science' means, though I can bark and squeak like the rest on such matters. Yeah, a few of us bark and squeak so well that others' barks and squeaks come to resemble our own stolen noises. But the main thing is to just look and listen at what's going on ('meaning is use' blah blah blah.)

Thank you for addressing the example I gave. Since you claim it to be plausible, you didn’t give me much to argue against, for I too find it quite plausible.

BTW, do you by “homunculus” simply intend a euphemism for “consciousness”? The little person within the total person that itself has a littler person within, and so on ad infinitum, is not something I can fathom anyone believing in.

At the moment, don’t have much interest in arguing one way or another about the reality of consciousnesses. But I thought I’d ask, since I am curious.

Thank you for addressing the example I gave. Since you claim it to be plausible, you didn’t give me much to argue against, for I too find it quite plausible. — javra

I guess I've just been impressed by some holes that have been poked in the initially plausible Cartesian framework. Not just by Wittgenstein, either, though he's an obvious reference. Ryle makes some killer arguments.

BTW, do you by “homunculus” simply intend a euphemism for “consciousness”? The little person within the total person that itself has a littler person within, and so on ad infinitum, is not something I can fathom anyone believing in.

At the moment, don’t have much interest in arguing one way or another about the reality of consciousnesses. But I thought I’d ask, since I am curious. — javra

Yeah, something like consciousness, the man in the box, etc. To me it's not about arguing for or against the existence of consciousness (which of course exists in the usual way) but blowing open certain conversational habits about this 'consciousness' stuff. I think that some seeming-deniers of consciousness are really attacking certain vague/complacent uses of the word.

One issue I have with Wittgenstein's claim that meaning is use is that even definitions viewed in terms of essences is, after all, use of a word to stand for a certain idea or object. I don't recall anyone attempting to clarify how Wittgenstein's theory differs in a significant way from essence-based definitions which are, bottom line, also use.
— TheMadFool

I think of W as just one slap in the face among others, to wake foolosophers up from a dream. Some of his early metaphors still hold, IMO. The ladder is disposable. The evidence of something like understanding Wittgenstein is talking less silly talk. Definitions can still be useful, but they are taken far less seriously than a certain kind of philosopher might want to take them (as if they were formal definitions that might be used in a mathematical proof.). I think the big point is that meaning is out there with them not in here with me. No one cares about my 'definition' of [choose a sound-mark]. Why should they? I don't decide what 'justice' or 'knowledge' or 'science' means, though I can bark and squeak like the rest on such matters. Yeah, a few of us bark and squeak so well that others' barks and squeaks come to resemble our own stolen noises. But the main thing is to just look and listen at what's going on ('meaning is use' blah blah blah.) — Zugzwang

Wittgenstein, it seems, was especially affected by the word "game." He realized that, in truth, no one really knows how to define it but then everyone uses it and uses it correctly. It's actually a paradox very similar to St. Augustine's time paradox:

What then is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know. — St. Augustine (on time)

LoL

Lao Tzu - The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.

Some guy - Hey, Lao Tzu, you're talking about something that can't be talked about. What's with that?

Lao Tzu - Tao as a thing is entirely illusive and evasive. Evasive and illusive. In it there is image. Illusive and evasive. In it there is thinghood. Dark and dim.

Some guy - This is such bullshit.

Lao Tzu - Go fuck yourself. — T Clark

:lol:

I reckon the grear Lao Tzu is referring to what I suppose is some kind of God-like entity or a Cosmic Principle that's behind all there is, every object, every phenomenon, basically everything, with the Tao.

Lao Tzu then goes on to say that the Tao is nameless i.e. it can't be named which seemingly contradicts the fact that he calls/names it the Tao. Lao Tzu out of necessity must invent a word for that which he wishes to talk about even though no word is suited for the task. He picked "Tao" for some reason now lost to history.

What's important to note here is Lao Tzu is employing apophasis to get us to realize what the Tao is. It's unnameable: Is it a stone? No? Is it a thought? No! Is it this (pointing to something)? No! Is it that (pointing to another thing)? No! No! No! No!...The bottom line is that the Tao is not anything that we know, that which we know always nameable.

Apophasis, I'm told, is also a technique used in theism.

Even the great buddhist master Nagarjuna adopts a similar attitude with Nagarjuna's tetralemma. The buddha precedes him but the teralemma, I believe, came into its own at the hands of the talented Nagarjuna.

What's going on?

I read the OP as asking whether there are things we can't describe in the English language and you guys are droning on about how we use language.

Can I convey my phenomenal state of the phone before me through representational symbols with 100% accuracy? I'd say no. No words could convey the boredom I'd experience while that transpired. The full experience isn't reducible or conveyable except in some hypothetical construct offering a very simplified example and an infinite amount of time.

You'll never know how I feel, regardless of the depth and breadth of our therapy sessions. Just ask any angst ridden teenager if you need further empirical proof.

I reckon the grear Lao Tzu is referring to what I suppose is some kind of God-like entity or a Cosmic Principle that's behind all there is, every object, every phenomenon, basically everything, with the Tao. — TheMadFool

I'm reluctant to get into a discussion about that here. You've been in threads with me and others where this was discussed. If I remember correctly, you have a pretty good idea of what Lao Tzu means by "Tao" even if you don't agree with how he sees things.

He picked "Tao" for some reason now lost to history. — TheMadFool

"Tao" means "way." "Te" sort of means "virtue." "Ching" means book. Tao Te Ching means the book of the way and virtue, more or less.

What's important to note here is Lao Tzu is employing apophasis to get us to realize what the Tao is. — TheMadFool

I think you're right, but I've always preferred to think about it as a joke Lao Tzu is telling.

What's going on? — TheMadFool

As I noted, I think you have a fairly good idea of what is going on. Methinks the laddie doth protest too much.

I read the OP as asking whether there are things we can't describe in the English language and you guys are droning on about how we use language. — Hanover

I don't see how we can discuss the subject of the OP without talking about how we use language.

representational symbols with 100% accuracy — Hanover

Describing something doesn't mean representing something "with 100% accuracy." Red Delicious apple. About 3 inches diameter. Red. I don't normally need to count how many seeds.

I get what you're saying, but unless one assumes that all life is endowed with language, then language appeared at some point in time after life appeared. — javra

I think that such a starting point should only be seen provisionally, and as an artificial imposition on what is otherwise a dynamic flux.

Take, for example, vocal chords: language as we know it is impossible without vocal chords. But for vocal chords to come into existence, dozens of other things had to happen, evolve. On the other hand, as we began to speak, our vocal changed, developed further, so as to be able to produce more and more sophisticated sounds. Which in turn made it possible for language to be more complex. (Of course, the development of vocal chords is not the only factor in the development of language.)

Looking at the "which came first" question a bit more literally in the ontological sense assumes a discrete point from which on some feature can be observed as existing, and not existing prior it. I think such an ontological analysis should only be seen provisionally, so as to not gloss over of the causes and conditions that had to be in place for some feature to become observable.

My neighbor's son is about two years old. He's struggling with speech. I've been observing (listening) to how he's developing his language abilities. He still can't utter actual words, but he has distinctly gone from a phase where he sort of yelled and cried the way small babies do, to a kind of deliberate "uuurggghhh" but which is nevertheless specific enough, recognizable. It seems that he's trying hard to utter a word, that he has something to say, but it just won't come out right.

On the whole, phases of language development in a child can be observed, but it is not possible to pinpoint the exact time and date where the child went from one phase to another, as if to completely leave behind the previous phase. The lines aren't so sharp. This is also why I think that the dichotomy between words that create the limits of concepts with which we think and the agency to express concepts we choose to think via words is not clearcut, and meaningful only provisionally.

(For comparison: We distinguish between, say, the upper body and the lower body, but any dividing line we were to draw on our waists would be only provisional, it wouldn't be definitive. This is because the division between the upper body and the lower body exists conceptually, but not on the body itself.)

Besides, rare as they might be, novums - new features - perpetually occur, thereby the evolution of any living language, and how are novums not invented?

But most things that seem new are actually made of old, already existing things.

don't see how we can discuss the subject of the OP without talking about how we use language. — T Clark

The OP is ambiguous to the extent one wonders if it's asking (1) whether English in particular offers limitations in what it can describe as opposed to what might be only explainable in French, for example or (2) whether certain concepts are ineffable and not reducible to langauge.

As to (1), I think the consensus is no, that all langauges in principle can equally explain things, even if it requires more words or longer explanations. For example, in English, we can say "quantum mechanics" and know what that means, whereas in a tribal langauge of the rain forest, no such words or concepts exist, but it could be eventually translated sufficiently.

As to (2), I've argued they are, and that's what I addressed.

What you've addressed iare the sociological biases inherent in language, which I'd agree with. If our houses are built for our particular needs, I can imagine langauge would be similar. I don't think that what I've said regarding #1 impacts #2, but i can see debate there.

As to my objection as to what is being droned on about is this insistence to deny any reality being seperate from langauge. It attempts to. solve the problem of metaphysics and qualia by denying them.

Describing something doesn't mean representing something "with 100% accuracy." Red Delicious apple. About 3 inches diameter. Red. I don't normally need to count how many seeds. — T Clark

Of course you don't provide the irrelevant for the purposes of the conversation. My point us that my experience of the apple can never be conveyed to you.

My point us that my experience of the apple can never be conveyed to you. — Hanover

You mean it can't be conveyed via language.

We can conceive of machinery that would record your experience and make it available to others, so it's metaphysically possible. Whether that's physically possible in this world, we don't know yet.

Your point stands, though.

Lao Tzu - The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.

Some guy - Hey, Lao Tzu, you're talking about something that can't be talked about. What's with that?

Lao Tzu - Tao as a thing is entirely illusive and evasive. Evasive and illusive. In it there is image. Illusive and evasive. In it there is thinghood. Dark and dim.

Some guy - This is such bullshit.

Lao Tzu - Go fuck yourself. — T Clark

Nicely done, TC. It does however make me feel quite justified in walking away from any kind of fathomless, inscrutable writings. What possible use can they have (for me)?

Have to say (and this is not a criticism) I find it interesting that you can reconcile this with your model of pragmatism.

Wittgenstein, it seems, was especially affected by the word "game." He realized that, in truth, no one really knows how to define it but then everyone uses it and uses it correctly. It's actually a paradox very similar to St. Augustine's time paradox:

What then is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know.
— St. Augustine (on time) — TheMadFool

Good quote. That's W in a nutshell, perhaps. 'Knowing what it is' is something banal like knowing how and when to invoke and respond to the familiar token. We can know what time it is without knowing what time is (if we insist on believing that time must be something in the first place...something more than a useful token.)

We can conceive of machinery that would record your experience and make it available to others, so it's metaphysically possible. Whether that's physically possible in this world, we don't know yet. — frank

But I take the perception as all encompassing, not limited to just the apple I perceive, with its color, snell, etc.., but the itch on my foot, the anxiety of my overdue bill, the calm from the sound of the rain, etc. all within the state of the perception at that second We have no known symbolic feed of that from me to you like we do "apple" or even through photographic or audio representations.

If you mean by "metaphysically" possible, to mean "hypothetically" or "imaginable," perhaps, but i don't think it's physically possible and it does strain the imagination.

The OP is ambiguous to the extent one wonders if it's asking (1) whether English in particular offers limitations in what it can describe as opposed to what might be only explainable in French, for example or (2) whether certain concepts are ineffable and not reducible to langauge. — Hanover

I thought it was clear from the OP that this discussion was about question (1). I didn't see any ambiguity. That's what my responses started out as answers to. Perhaps I was wrong. Now we've moved over into a discussion of facts vs. truth vs. knowledge vs. belief.

As to (1), I think the consensus is no, that all langauges in principle can equally explain things, even if it requires more words or longer explanations. — Hanover

I might have some quibbles with this, but generally I agree.

What you've addressed iare the sociological biases inherent in language, which I'd agree with. If our houses are built for our particular needs, I can imagine langauge would be similar. I don't think that what I've said regarding #1 impacts #2, but i can see debate there. — Hanover

Again, I generally agree.

(2) whether certain concepts are ineffable and not reducible to langauge. — Hanover

As to (2), I've argued they are, and that's what I addressed. — Hanover

If you're saying that certain concepts are not reducible to language, I'm in agreement with a major qualification. I've spent a lot of time discussing The Tao Te Ching on the forum. To me, it's message is that there are experiences that are not reducible to language, not concepts. For me, concepts, ideas, are creatures of language. I think the distinction is important. It's central to how I think about reality. And I'll say it again as I always do, that's a metaphysical judgement, not a fact.

Nicely done, TC. It does however make me feel quite justified in walking away from any kind of fathomless, inscrutable writings. What possible use can they have (for me)?

Have to say (and this is not a criticism) I find it interesting that you can reconcile this with your model of pragmatism. — Tom Storm

I'll just say - for me as an engineer and usually a pragmatist, Lao Tzu's way of seeing things is the one vision I've found that provides a convincing foundation for everything I believe. Nothing else I've found provides a better metaphysical basis for science, engineering, and problem solving. That's another way of saying I don't find them fathomless or inscrutable at all.

Now you'll ask me to explain. I'll just say first, I don't think it's really relevant to this discussion. And then, It's something I've discussed many times on the forum, including in discussions you've participated in. I haven't really tried to convince people. I'm mostly just trying to express my thoughts and feelings - my experience - clearly enough that people can understand them, whether or not they agree. Looks like I haven't done a good job with you.

But I take the perception as all encompassing, not limited to just the apple I perceive, with its color, snell, etc.., but the itch on my foot, the anxiety of my overdue bill, the calm from the sound of the rain, etc. all within the state of the perception at that second We have no known symbolic feed of that from me to you like we do "apple" or even through photographic or audio representations.

If you mean by "metaphysically" possible, to mean "hypothetically" or "imaginable," perhaps, but i don't think it's physically possible and it does strain the imagination. — Hanover

It's just a question of whether you're holding that it's impossible in principle to share your experience or if you're going for a softer version of that.

The idea of telepathy and 'uploading' consciousness has been a mainstay of science fiction for around 60 years, so it would be hard to make the case that it's inconceivable. If we want to say it's physically impossible, that might require a working theory of consciousness, which doesn't exist yet.

I'm left with: my intuition is that there's an aspect of my experience that I can't communicate through language. Why should I doubt this intuition? Kierkegaard agrees with me

I guess some would say Wittgenstein answers why I should doubt it?

Looks like I haven't done a good job with you. — T Clark

Probably more the case that I don't see what you see, even with patient explanations.

I'm left with: my intuition is that there's an aspect of my experience that I can't communicate through language. Why should I doubt this intuition? Kierkegaard agrees with me — frank

Not to have you do my research for me, but do you have a quote from Kierkegaard for that?

I reckon the grear Lao Tzu is referring to what I suppose is some kind of God-like entity or a Cosmic Principle that's behind all there is, every object, every phenomenon, basically everything, with the Tao.
— TheMadFool

I'm reluctant to get into a discussion about that here — T Clark

:ok:

"Tao" means "way." "Te" sort of means "virtue." "Ching" means book. Tao Te Ching means the book of the way and virtue, more or less. — T Clark

:up:

I think you're right, but I've always preferred to think about it as a joke Lao Tzu is telling. — T Clark

Great attitude!

As I noted, I think you have a fairly good idea of what is going on. Methinks the laddie doth protest too much. — T Clark

:ok:

Not to have you do my research for me, but do you have a quote from Kierkegaard for that? — Hanover

He talked about how the 'quality of being that comes to rest in the sanctuary of the form' has no beginning or end and there are no words that can describe it.

I'd have to look for it. I think it may have been in his journal.

Wittgenstein, it seems, was especially affected by the word "game." He realized that, in truth, no one really knows how to define it but then everyone uses it and uses it correctly. It's actually a paradox very similar to St. Augustine's time paradox:

What then is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know.
— St. Augustine (on time)
— TheMadFool

Good quote. That's W in a nutshell, perhaps. 'Knowing what it is' is something banal like knowing how and when to invoke and respond to the familiar token. We can know what time it is without knowing what time is (if we insist on believing that time must be something in the first place...something more than a useful token.) — Zugzwang

:ok: