If we refer back to the OP, and in particular to how we use the word know, how we use this word is governed by the rules of use, much of course is implicit and difficult to weed out. We can see this by the many different theories of epistemology, some just point to one or two kinds of uses, and other theories are just confusions, grammatical confusions.

How do we learn the use of the word know? Understanding this gives us clues to the rules of use. We know we don't learn it in private, there's not some innate knowing, it's done with others, and only with others. It's a social word. We justify what we know to others, it starts socially, by learning the concept and using it correctly. Knowing has to be seen in the context of being wrong (I thought I knew), but how in the world could you be wrong about "I know this is my hand" in Moore's context? A grammatical mistake, right? Can we be mistaken in Moore's context? The same is true of our sensations, "I know this is my pain" what?

My understanding of Wittgenstein's grammar is that grammar sets out the rules governing the moves we make in language. — Sam26

I don’t know if you were following the thread below:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11479/bedrock-rules-the-mathematical-and-the-ordinary-cavell-kripke-on-wittgenstein

It looks like you’re taking the position of Luke, Hacker and Baker on what Wittgenstein means by grammar and rules. Antony and i were, in different ways , arguing for a different reading of Wittgenstein, in which rules and grammar only have existence in radically contextual, situational and personal situations.

Antony and i were, in different ways , arguing for a different reading of Wittgenstein, in which rules and grammar only have existence in radically contextual, situational and personal situations. — Joshs

I've got three or four threads going in two different forums, so it's hard to keep up with everything that's going on. But, I definitely would have a problem with this reading of Wittgenstein.

I definitely would have a problem with this reading of Wittgenstein. — Sam26

This is the ‘postmodern’ reading that authors like Cavell, Cora Diamond and James Conant endorse. Also , Baker, who along with Peter Hacker, produced a series of works on Wittgenstein in the 1980’s which have been taken as authoritative by many academics( and seems to be consistent with your perspective), rejected his earlier Hacker-Baker position by the 1990’s in favor of one consonant with the above writers. This is not to say that one position is right and the other wrong, but that there is a lively ongoing debate.

Ya, this debate has been going on a long time. My philosophy professor back in 1978 actually had Cora Diamond as one of his professors. He was working on his doctorate around 1973 at the UVA. I remembered his disagreements with her, only vaguely though. These interpretations, I'm sure, will go on forever.

This post is a bit sloppy, sorry.

1. Wittgenstein has issues with ostensive definitions but, personally, I don't find anything amiss with this often employed definitional technique. So, assume ostensive definitions are legit.

2. Private language argument: Suppose a private experience in the life of a private linguist W, a sensation to which you assign the word "S."

The question is, will W use the word "S" correctly all the time?

If W has a perfect 20/20 memory, W will definitely do so and we have a private language.

In real life memory isn't as reliable as it should be for W to recall the sensation S is assigned to the word "S." Sometimes W forgets. When this happens, W can either give up trying to remember either the word "S" (W experiences the sensation S but forgets "S") or the sensation (W recalls "S" but fails to link it to the sensation) in which case no private language.

The other option is to go with whatever sensation (has the word "S" but can't get a fix on the sensation) or whatever word (has the sensation but no word "S") that seems correct. However, there's a world of a difference between seems correct and actually correct. The end result - the word "S" is used incorrectly. In short, W's private language is incoherent.

To sum it all up:

a) A private language is possible for a person with eidetic memory given that ostensive definitions are given a clean bill of health.

b) In the real world, memory is unreliable. A private language is impossible.

"'Only you can know if you had that intention.' Wittgenstein, explains how we might use such a statement, i.e., how it might make sense to use know in this way. The only way it would make sense, is as an expression of doubt, not as an expression of knowing. Only you could know? What does that mean? In other words, as he said earlier, you don't know it, you have it, viz., the intention, in this context. — Sam26

By the same argument when I look at the tree in my backyard, I don't know or believe there is a tree in my backyard, I see the tree in my backyard, I see that there is a tree in my backyard.

By the same argument when I look at the tree in my backyard, I don't know or believe there is a tree in my backyard, I see the tree in my backyard, I see that there is a tree in my backyard. — Janus

Hi Janus,
I think we have to be careful here. We do use sensory experiences as justification to believe that something is the case. So, it's very appropriate to say, "I know the orange juice is sweet." Someone might reply, "How do you know? (this would be the case even if you just said, "The orange juice is sweet.)" You answer, "Because I tasted it." Sensory experiences are important in observing experiments also. It's true that you can simply say, "I see the tree," but many statements of knowledge are said without the "I know..." Note that the doubt often makes sense in these situations, which demonstrates the appropriateness of the knowledge.

"For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression (PI 245)."

I would be interested in what others think of this passage. What would be in between pain and the expression of pain? Is there something there that could be referenced? I would think not. I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at. What is it that he's trying to get us to think about? — Sam26

See the sentence immediately preceding this...

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"

and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.

Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression.

Hi Janus,
I think we have to be careful here. We do use sensory experiences as justification to believe that something is the case. So, it's very appropriate to say, "I know the orange juice is sweet." Someone might reply, "How do you know? (this would be the case even if you just said, "The orange juice is sweet.)" You answer, "Because I tasted it." Sensory experiences are important in observing experiments also. It's true that you can simply say, "I see the tree," but many statements of knowledge are said without the "I know..." Note that the doubt often makes sense in these situations, which demonstrates the appropriateness of the knowledge. — Sam26

Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard"..

If I ask you how you know it is a tree, you can show it to me.

Do that with the pain.

If I ask you how you know it is a tree, you can show it to me. — Banno

Then all that you will know is 1) what he supposes is a tree, and 2) whether you agree with what he supposes, or not. And unless I've long misread you, you're satisfied with that. But I am not. Nor, imo, should you be (if you are). So that leaves still open the question, how do you know.

And of course commonality of usage is one way, but wouldn't you agree that "commonality" is not-so-simple?

That would seem to just be an example of the contingency of perspective. I can see the tree in my backyard now, but I can't show it to you. If you ask me how I know it is a tree. I will say that it is the kind of thing I have learned to call 'tree'. If you were here I could show you the tree, but I can never show you the sensation in my toe; so it is just the extreme case of the contingency of perspective; you can never get yourself into a position so as to be able to feel my sensations.

But I am not. — tim wood

Why not?

so it is just the extreme case of an accident of perspective; — Janus

Yeah, I'm not so sure. It might be a difference of kind rather than perspective.

"I have a pain in your toe", while odd, does not seem to be ill-formed nor contradictory.

"I have a pain in your toe", while odd, does not seem to be ill-formed nor contradictory. — Banno

It seems syntactically well-formed but semantically ill-formed; to me at least. Is it contradictory? Perhaps according to the logic of ownership? Like saying "your pain belongs to me".

Nobody taught you how to speak English? — Luke

Right, I'm self-taught, through the scientific methods of observation, and trial and error. Aren't you?

So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"

and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.

Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno

"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch. Ouch replaces the natural pain behavior, like crying etc, but that doesn't mean that the pain in your neck is the same (not sure what you mean by same) as ouch, that would be weird.

The child is learning new pain behavior, but that doesn't mean we can't refer to pain. For example, a doctor asks, "Where are you having pain?" You respond, "Here, in my big toe." It's true that a child in Wittgenstein's example (PI 244) learns to replace crying with "ouch" or "that hurts," but this doesn't mean that it's always muddled to refer to pain. It depends on how we're referencing the pain. If we think that meaning is attached to my pain, then that for sure is muddled. It's also muddled to say, "I know I'm in pain." but we can definitely refer to pain in certain contexts. Remember he's starts out talking about meaning in reference to a private language, and how that's nonsense due to rule-following and such. He then goes on to explain how we learn to associate words with certain behaviors in social contexts. He's not denying in the last paragraph of 243 that we can express or refer to our inner experiences. He's denying it in particular contexts.

"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch. — Sam26

Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.

What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:

To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.

The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.

So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar.

Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.

What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.

The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.

So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar. — Banno

What you are missing, is that there is some form of judgement between the pain and the expression, as I described here:

What lies between pain and the expression of pain is some sort of judgement. The determinist will say that this is not a judgement at all, it's an automatic reaction, cause and effect; hit me and I will react. ,But using words as a form of expression is seen to sometimes consist of conscious judgement. So word use seems to cross the boundary between automatic reaction, and conscious judgement, consisting of some of each. — Metaphysician Undercover

That it is necessary to assume a medium, such as a form of judgement, is required due to the fact that there are many different possibilities for a single person's response to pain. The multitude of possibilities implies that there cannot be a direct causal relation between pain and expression. So, we must assume a medium which "chooses" from the possibilities.

We can see "pain" as the name of a type of sensation, just like "phone" is the name of a type of object. So I think your post displays ambiguity between naming a particular object, as one might do with a proper noun, and using a word like "phone" to refer to one object out of a group of things which could be called by the same name. Notice that 'the phone in my hand' would single out one phone out of many possible phones, but it is the context 'in my hand' which makes the word a name. You could have used any word to name the object. It's not necessary to call it "a phone", so that is not its name. However, if you held up a phone and talked about 'the cup in my hand', people would be very confused as to why you were referring a phone as a cup. This is why "meaning is use" is not straight forward, and actually somewhat deceptive. If meaning really was use, "cup" would be acceptable as being used to refer to the object. But "meaning is use" doesn't account for some preconceived notions that people have developed, which leads them to misinterpret other people's use.

You ought to recognize that "phone" is not the name of the object in your hand, though it might appear that way, when "phone" is given that context. In reality "phone" signifies a whole class of similar objects. Likewise, "pain" is not the name of the sensation in your big toe, after you stub your toe, it is the name of a type of sensation. Since both, "pain" and "phone" signify a type of thing, and are not properly the name of any one thing, .the proposed separation, or distinction between the two, which you describe is unwarranted.

"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch.
— Sam26

Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.

What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.

The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.

So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar. — Banno

In 245 it seems that he's saying you can't use language to get between pain and its expression. There's nothing between me having the pain, and the expression ouch. The ouch is an outward expression (linguistic expression) of the inner experience. The ouch replaces other outward natural expressions, i.e., we learn to replace crying with words and sentences. So, the ouch is bringing the natural expression into language. At the end of 246 I think we see what he's getting at, it's the mistaken idea that ouch somehow describes crying. It doesn't describe it, but replaces it. If we were trying to use the expression of pain as a description of crying, this, it seems, would have the affect of "...try[ing] to use language to get between pain and its expression."

This also means that we don't learn the language of pain by referring to an object, like we might learn to use the word cup, i.e., we would teach a child how to use the word cup by pointing to objects that are it's referent. We can refer to where we're having the pain, for example, in my toe. We do this all the time with others, so we know that to refer to where I'm having the pain, is a correct use of the word. It's not as though I'm deriving meaning from this context, the context of pointing to my toe as the source of the pain, and this is the point.

I agree with you that the meaning of pain is not the name of a sensation, but I can use the word pain to refer to where I'm having a pain on my body. I'm not sure, but it seems you think that if I refer to a pain on my body, that this equates to what we mean by pain, but it doesn't. We're not naming the sensation on our bodies, we're simply showing where its located. The location of a cup is not the meaning of cup. Where is the cup, or where is the pain, is something different. I have to learn to use these words first before I can locate them. Although the pain location is not as specific, unless we're pointing at a cut on our toe, then the pain location is a little more specific.

To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation. — Banno

I don't quite follow this paragraph. I don't know about you, but it seems to me that we're talking about what is ordinarily meant by these words. The only thing out of the ordinary is the incorrect use of language.

I agree that the use of the word pain in a sentence has the same grammatical structure as the use of the word phone; and this is where some of the confusion lies. But, again, I disagree that we only express pain, we also refer to them, and we do it all the time. Of course it's not exactly the same as referring to the phone. And, I wouldn't call it a superficial reference when referring to the pain in my toe. You seem to think it's superficial because the pain is not a thing like a phone, but it's just as real, so it doesn't seem superficial. And, in this context what would superficial mean except some subjective view of referring.

I'm not sure, but it seems you think that if I refer to a pain on my body, that this equates to what we mean by pain, but it doesn't. — Sam26

Oh, no not at all. I agree with you.

Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno

The referent in "I have a pain in my hand" is my hand, not the pain.

but it's just as real, — Sam26

Yes, it's real. So is the beetle. ∮293 takes pain as its example. Note the last paragraph there: if we treat pain talk as object-reference then the object vanishes.

Indeed the more I re-read this the more convinced I am that pain talk expresses, but doesn't refer.

The referent in "I have a pain in my hand" is my hand, not the pain.

but it's just as real,
— Sam26

Yes, it's real. So is the beetle. ∮293 takes pain as its example. Note the last paragraph there: if we treat pain talk as object-reference then the object vanishes.

Indeed the more I re-read this the more convinced I am that pain talk expresses, but doesn't refer. — Banno

The referent, is where the pain is, viz., in my hand. It's not the hand. The hand just happens to be the location of the pain. The point of the beetle example is that someone doesn't know "...what the pain is only [my emphasis] from his own case (293)!" In the case of "the pain in the hand," I'm not suggesting that anyone knows what the pain is from their own private case. In this case (the pain in the hand) we've learned how to properly use the word pain in social settings, and we are properly referring to a pain in the hand. Moreover, pointing to the hand as the location of the pain, is not deriving meaning based on this context. In other words, my example doesn't make this mistake, and this is the mistake we should concern ourselves with.

Indeed the more I re-read this the more convinced I am that pain talk expresses, but doesn't refer. — Banno

How do words refer to sensations? — There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and name them? — PI 244

...we are properly referring to a pain in the hand. — Sam26

I'll maintain that we are referring to the hand, and expressing the pain. But I think it a moot point.

Where are you heading with this thread? We've differed as to what is to count as "knowledge" before; is the concern here more about sensation or about

private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject.

(Good to see you writing again...)

Did you read the rest of ∮244? I used it, above. It supports my view.

The line you quote is the foil for bringing down the notion of reference. See the phone example. This is an instance of a superficial grammar misleading folk into thinking in a certain way. It's a recurring theme in PI.

'll maintain that we are referring to the hand, and expressing the pain. But I think it a moot point. — Banno

No, it's not a moot point, if you mean by moot that it has no relevance, it's very important to understanding W.

Where are you heading with this thread? We've differed as to what is to count as "knowledge" before; is the concern here more about sensation or about private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Banno

I'm trying to show why statements like,

Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject

are meaningless; and, how its being meaningless, is connected with Wittgenstein's PLA.

I thought our other disagreement was over pre-linguistic beliefs, but I'm not sure.

See the sentence immediately preceding this...

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"

and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.

Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno

As demonstrated by my argument above, the fact that "ouch", or "I have a pain in my neck", can serve as a replacement for crying, indicates these cannot be the sensations themselves which are being expressed. They are a response to the sensation. And we apprehend them as representative of the sensation. In the one case we even refer to the sensation as "a pain". The idea that we express the sensation with these expressions, rather than respond to the sensation is rather ludicrous.

Moot in it's more original sense - a disagreement to which we might return as the need arrises, but in which we should not allow ourselves to be mired.

I thought our other disagreement was over pre-linguistic beliefs, but I'm not sure. — Sam26

Ah, three points of disagreement, then. Even more fun.

Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject — Sam26

So if, as I think both you and Wittgenstein have it, knowledge must be justified, then an experience is not known; justification makes no sense here. I'd agree with that.

I also have a problem with the notion of an experiential state; there's a reification there that I find uncomfortable. Experiences are not always sufficiently static to count as individuals; or at least there are issues for consideration in the individuating of sensations. (@Metaphysician Undercover mentioned something along these lines above, but it made no sense.)

Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard".. — Janus

Usually when we refer to sensory experiences we're talking about the five senses, so in this sense feeling a pain is not sensory. We do use the words in similar ways, i.e., the grammar is the same, viz., "I feel the pain" vs "I feel the table." Our sensory experiences generally refer to things in reality. I see the tree, hear the trumpet, touch the table, smell the flowers, etc. However, pain manifests itself as a cry, or the word ouch for example.

Moreover, it makes sense to claim to know based on sensory experiences, but not, to claim to know that I'm having a pain, which has been the main idea of this thread. There's no knowing one is having a private sensation, I just have them.