My understanding of Wittgenstein's grammar is that grammar sets out the rules governing the moves we make in language. — Sam26
Antony and i were, in different ways , arguing for a different reading of Wittgenstein, in which rules and grammar only have existence in radically contextual, situational and personal situations. — Joshs
I definitely would have a problem with this reading of Wittgenstein. — Sam26
"'Only you can know if you had that intention.' Wittgenstein, explains how we might use such a statement, i.e., how it might make sense to use know in this way. The only way it would make sense, is as an expression of doubt, not as an expression of knowing. Only you could know? What does that mean? In other words, as he said earlier, you don't know it, you have it, viz., the intention, in this context. — Sam26
By the same argument when I look at the tree in my backyard, I don't know or believe there is a tree in my backyard, I see the tree in my backyard, I see that there is a tree in my backyard. — Janus
"For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression (PI 245)."
I would be interested in what others think of this passage. What would be in between pain and the expression of pain? Is there something there that could be referenced? I would think not. I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at. What is it that he's trying to get us to think about? — Sam26
"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.
Hi Janus,
I think we have to be careful here. We do use sensory experiences as justification to believe that something is the case. So, it's very appropriate to say, "I know the orange juice is sweet." Someone might reply, "How do you know? (this would be the case even if you just said, "The orange juice is sweet.)" You answer, "Because I tasted it." Sensory experiences are important in observing experiments also. It's true that you can simply say, "I see the tree," but many statements of knowledge are said without the "I know..." Note that the doubt often makes sense in these situations, which demonstrates the appropriateness of the knowledge. — Sam26
Then all that you will know is 1) what he supposes is a tree, and 2) whether you agree with what he supposes, or not. And unless I've long misread you, you're satisfied with that. But I am not. Nor, imo, should you be (if you are). So that leaves still open the question, how do you know.If I ask you how you know it is a tree, you can show it to me. — Banno
Nobody taught you how to speak English? — Luke
So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"
and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.
Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno
"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch. — Sam26
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.
Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.
What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.
The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.
So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar. — Banno
What lies between pain and the expression of pain is some sort of judgement. The determinist will say that this is not a judgement at all, it's an automatic reaction, cause and effect; hit me and I will react. ,But using words as a form of expression is seen to sometimes consist of conscious judgement. So word use seems to cross the boundary between automatic reaction, and conscious judgement, consisting of some of each. — Metaphysician Undercover
"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch.
— Sam26
Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.
What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.
The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.
So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar. — Banno
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation. — Banno
I'm not sure, but it seems you think that if I refer to a pain on my body, that this equates to what we mean by pain, but it doesn't. — Sam26
The referent in "I have a pain in my hand" is my hand, not the pain.Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno
but it's just as real, — Sam26
The referent in "I have a pain in my hand" is my hand, not the pain.
but it's just as real,
— Sam26
Yes, it's real. So is the beetle. ∮293 takes pain as its example. Note the last paragraph there: if we treat pain talk as object-reference then the object vanishes.
Indeed the more I re-read this the more convinced I am that pain talk expresses, but doesn't refer. — Banno
...we are properly referring to a pain in the hand. — Sam26
private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject.
No, it's not a moot point, if you mean by moot that it has no relevance, it's very important to understanding W.'ll maintain that we are referring to the hand, and expressing the pain. But I think it a moot point. — Banno
I'm trying to show why statements like,Where are you heading with this thread? We've differed as to what is to count as "knowledge" before; is the concern here more about sensation or about private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Banno
are meaningless; and, how its being meaningless, is connected with Wittgenstein's PLA.Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject
See the sentence immediately preceding this...
"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.
So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"
and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.
Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno
Ah, three points of disagreement, then. Even more fun.I thought our other disagreement was over pre-linguistic beliefs, but I'm not sure. — Sam26
Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject — Sam26
Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard".. — Janus
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