A bit more on Socrates second sailing:

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings.... — Fooloso4

I wonder what 'looking into beings' might mean? Is it a reference to 'contemplation of the nature of being'?

It [mortification] was a widespread practice in ancient asceticism.
— Wayfarer

Although knowledge of the history and culture are informative we cannot simply assume that a widespread practice is what the puzzling claim about the practice of dying and being dead is about. — Fooloso4

Let's revisit:

The Phaedo talks about the immortal soul but whether or not the soul is immortal remains in question.
— Fooloso4

It’s phrased in such a way as to leave it an open question. — Wayfarer

One that only the dead can answer, providing death is not, as Socrates suggests in the Apology, nothingness. — Fooloso4

Again, in the Meno, Socrates suggests that the soul is immortal and subject to repeated re-birth:

Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things. — Meno 81b

So, not only 'the dead' can answer, if the soul is able to recollect being born and dying.

It is this indeterminacy that some find intolerable. They desire that things be fixed and determined and knowable. Plato gives them what they want, stories and images they mistake for the truth. — Fooloso4

So, why do you think he does that? What might his motivation have been?

There are four levels of awareness given in the Allegory of the Cave:

1. Shadows on the cave wall.

2. Images of outside objects and beings whose shadows are seen on the wall

3. Outside reflections and shadows of outside objects and beings.

4. Objects themselves.

Taking a geometrical figure, e.g., a triangle drawn on paper or in the sand, this would correspond to level (1) of the shadows on the wall, which is the level of sensibles.

As we look at the drawn triangle, we notice that “it falls short of” being perfect which gives rise in our mind of the concept of perfection that, at this stage, is indeterminate. This would correspond to level (2) of the man-made images of outside objects.

Guided by this concept of perfection, we next form in our mind a perfect triangle as an ideal mathematical object, that corresponds to level (3) of outside reflections in water, etc. This is the first level of intelligibles, the mathematical level where we are outside the cave and begin to get used to the outside world.

Contemplation (or dialectical examination) of the ideal object leads to the next intelligible level of Forms, in this case Shape or Triangularity, which corresponds to level (4) of the outside objects themselves.

Beyond these there is the level of the Sun that illumines the outside, real world and that symbolizes the Good or the One, the source of all knowledge.

It may be worth pointing out that the shadows are not illusory. They are not figments of imagination but imperfect likenesses of what ultimately are real objects. So, the four awareness levels are levels of increasingly greater reality that the philosopher can use to get as close as possible to ultimate reality as his intellectual abilities permit.

Obviously, some readers may lack the necessary abilities to get very far. (Some Straussians come to mind.) Perhaps Plato is right in suggesting that the philosopher must go through the five mathematical disciplines (calculation and arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonic theory) before reaching dialectic proper.

In any case, in order to really understand something we must become as much like it as possible:

For surely, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate himself to them (Rep. 500b-c).

Hence the difficulty experienced by some to understand even basic Platonic concepts ....

An ideal triangle is a mathematical object conceived in the mind, but it is not a Form. The Form corresponding to the mathematical object “triangle” is Shape. — Apollodorus

Here I think you're confusing intellect and imagination.

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. — Edward Feser, Some Brief Arguments for Dualism

Another example: René Descartes uses the chiliagon as an example in his Sixth Meditation to demonstrate the difference between intellect and imagination. He says that, when one thinks of a chiliagon (a one-thousand-sided polygon), he "does not imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they were present" before him – as you do when you imagine a triangle. The imagination can only project a "confused representation," which is no different from that which it constructs of a myriagon (a polygon with ten thousand sides). However, you can clearly understand what a chiliagon is, on the basis of its verbal description as 'a polygon with one thousand sides'. Therefore, the intellect is not dependent on or the same as imagination.

Taking a geometrical figure, e.g., a triangle drawn on paper or in the sand, this would correspond to level (1) of the shadows on the wall, which is the level of sensibles. — Apollodorus

My gloss on it is that whenever you say that something 'is' something - e.g. that an apple 'is' red - insofar as the thing you're referring to is a material particular, then the 'is' in that construction is only an approximation. This goes back to the discussion of the nature of being, which is the discussion of the nature of 'what is'. Only 'what truly is' can be the object of a valid idea, because it is perfectly itself. Whereas all material particulars - sensable objects - are admixtures of being and becoming, so they don't truly exist, or rather, their existence is temporal and perishing. Whereas the ideas or principles that the individual particulars are instances of, are not temporal and perishing. This or that instance will come into and go out of existence, but the essence of the thing will neither come into or go out of existence. So the best approximation of a true 'is' statement is the equals sign '=' - when you say that a=a, then this is a completely unequivocal statement.

For Afrikan Spir the principle of identity is not only the fundamental law of knowledge, it is also an ontological principle, expression of the unconditioned essence of reality (Realität=Identität mit sich), which is opposed to the empirical reality (Wirklichkeit), which in turn is evolution (Geschehen).[26] The principle of identity displays the essence of reality: only that which is identical to itself is real, the empirical world is ever-changing, therefore it is not real. Thus the empirical world has an illusory character, because phenomena are ever-changing, and empirical reality is unknowable.

Can you see how the connection with Parmenides?

'How could what is perish? How could it have come to be? For if it came into being, it is not; nor is it, if ever it is going to be. Thus coming into being is extinguished, and destruction unknown.'

Not saying I accept it but I'm trying to paraphrase it in such a way that it is understandable.

I am in general agreement with the first part of this although I do not think it is simply a matter of his thought being unfinished. It is, rather, the nature of the apeiron, the unlimited, which stands with and against the peras, the limited.

As to the second part, it is a testament to Plato's art that he makes the artful appear artless, as if he is in the process of thinking through what in fact has been finely crafted.

As to the the third part, using his analogy, from the harbor the reality of the distant ship at sea would be grasped as a miniature ship not capable of transporting men or goods. Although some may be satisfied with this vision, it is not a satisfactory vision of the truth, but a serious distortion of it.

I wonder what 'looking into beings' might mean? — Wayfarer

He is talking about the things seen with the eyes.

So, not only 'the dead' can answer, if the soul is able to recollect being born and dying. — Wayfarer

Do you know anyone who can answer?

So, why do you think he does that? What might his motivation have been? — Wayfarer

It is part of a salutary exoteric teaching aimed at the development of just souls. A noble lie.

I think 'lie' is a pejorative in the context, as it implies an intention to deceive. 'Edifying tale' I think would be nearer the mark.

So, not only 'the dead' can answer, if the soul is able to recollect being born and dying.
— Wayfarer

Do you know anyone who can answer? — Fooloso4

If I said I had had a recollection from a previous life, I'm sure it would be dismissed as imaginary.

Here I think you're confusing intellect and imagination. — Wayfarer

I don't think so.

To begin with, sensory faculties, emotions, imagination, thoughts, contemplation, all are functions of the same one intelligence which ultimately is the nous. The nous is the experiencing subject in all cases.

Even imagination is ultimately an intellectual activity. However, the mathematical object is not visualized as in imagination, it is a purely abstract concept which is why it is in the domain of intelligibles and close to Forms. If it were visualized as in imagination, then it would belong to sensibles and would not be an ideal object.

To begin with, sensory faculties, emotions, imagination, thoughts, contemplation, all are functions of the same one intelligence which ultimately is the nous — Apollodorus

‘In Aristotle's influential works, ‘nous’ was carefully distinguished from sense perception, imagination, and reason, although these terms are closely inter-related. The term was apparently already singled out by earlier philosophers such as Parmenides.’

That Edward Feser blog post I linked to also makes this distinction.

Yes. But we are talking about Plato. In Plato, sensory faculties, emotions, thoughts, are part of the soul the essential core of which is the nous. The soul described by Socrates in afterlife situations is not just the nous but the entire soul which is capable of sensory perception, emotion, etc.

And an abstract concept conceived in the mind is not the same as a visually perceptible object created by the imagination.

And an abstract concept conceived in the mind is not the same as a visually perceptible object created by the imagination. — Apollodorus

Is this noesis?

an abstract concept conceived in the mind is not the same as a visually perceptible object created by the imagination. — Apollodorus

that's what I thought I said.

that's what I thought I said. — Wayfarer

And that's why I don't think I confused intellect and imagination :smile:

Fair enough. Murky area of discourse.

Is this noesis? — Shawn

Good question. Mathematics starts with dianoia and ends in noesis, after which the Forms take over. In other words, mathematics takes us from sensibles to intelligibles but stops at the threshold of the Forms.

We are out of the cave but we still see the objects in themselves (Forms) only in their reflection (e.g. ideal object).

I think 'lie' is a pejorative in the context, as it implies an intention to deceive. — Wayfarer

See the discussion of the noble lie in the Republic and the distinction between it and the "true lie" or "lies in the soul".

If I said I had had a recollection from a previous life, I'm sure it would be dismissed as imaginary. — Wayfarer

And would that be a true lie, a lie in the soul?

Even if I knew it as a simple truth, I know nobody would believe it because belief in re-birth is a strong cultural taboo. It can’t even be discussed on this forum.

See the discussion of the noble lie in the Republic and the distinction between it and the "true lie" or "lies in the soul". — Fooloso4

Is it said that the forms are the subject of such a ‘noble lie’? If they are so central to Plato’s philosophy, that would be unlikely, wouldn’t it?

Is it said that the forms are the subject of such a ‘noble lie’? If they are so central to Plato’s philosophy, that would be unlikely, wouldn’t it? — Wayfarer

Good point. According to Plato:

The tendency to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of Good is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality, which it is imperative that it should behold (Rep. 526e)

Plato makes it clear that in order to apprehend the Form of the Good, the philosopher must develop the power of abstract thought, which is why he emphasizes the study of mathematics for this purpose:

It [the study of geometry, etc.] would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned earthward (527b)

He then makes another important point:

It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled afresh by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes; for by it only is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine. For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning (527d-e).

Obviously, those who uncritically follow Strauss in the belief that Plato’s Forms are “an absurd doctrine”, belong to the second group.

IMHO the real absurd doctrine is to suggest that we spend years developing our power of abstract thought in the pursuit of the Good, only to discover, in our 50’s, 60’s, or later, that it is all just a “noble lie”. But then Strauss himself apparently believes in deception as an essential ingredient of government and one has to wonder to what extent his own teachings are an elaborate hoax ….

Even if I knew it as a simple truth, I know nobody would believe it because belief in re-birth is a strong cultural taboo. It can’t even be discussed on this forum. — Wayfarer

And yet, as you know since you have participated in it, there is a thread on just that. But I am not asking you to discuss your beliefs. I am asking you to ask yourself if this is something you know rather than a belief or opinion or just a possibility you don't want to deny.

Is it said that the forms are the subject of such a ‘noble lie’? If they are so central to Plato’s philosophy, that would be unlikely, wouldn’t it? — Wayfarer

It is about the difference between knowledge and opinion. The story about the ascent to the Forms is not about imparting knowledge. It leads the listener to an opinion not to the truth. He uses the term 'noble lie' to emphasize the fact that what is said is not the truth. But of course, telling someone a lie is not effective if you tell them it is a lie.

The intent of a noble lie is not to deceive but to edify. But what is edifying is not the same as what is true. We do not tell our children edifying stories in order to deceive them but to instill values, to set them on a safe path free of the doubts and confusion that they may still have to confront.

Some readers think that what is central to Plato's philosophy is some doctrine or set of doctrines including either a theory of Forms or the disclosure of Forms. What others take to be central is Socratic practice, what we see him doing in the dialogues. Dialogic inquiry not doctrine. The story of Forms is not exempt from the Socratic practice of critical inquiry.

I am asking you to ask yourself if this is something you know rather than a belief or opinion or just a possibility you don't want to deny. — Fooloso4

I had some vivid experiences in my early years which were like recollections. Part of it was realising that I am the necessary ground of all experience (not myself personally but the self of all beings). That is what lead to my interest in Eastern philosophy. I also had an acute sense of having known something of great importance at a time that must have been before I was born. It was a momentary realisation but very persuasive. It wasn't anything like remembering a previous identity, although I've read such accounts and they seem authentic.

what is edifying is not the same as what is true — Fooloso4

This is the crux of the issue. I think this is where the influence of modern culture frames the interpretive picture. The background to modern thought is that the Universe is valueless in itself, that it's up to humans to create and maintain a value system.

From the thesis I did in Buddhist philosophy:

Williams says that 'In the Indian context it would have been axiomatic that liberation comes from discerning how things actually are, seeing the true nature of things ('yathābhūtaṃ'). That 'seeing things how they are' has soteriological benefits would have been expected, and is just another way of articulating the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ dimension of Indian Dharma. The ‘ought’ (pragmatic benefit) is never cut adrift from the ‘is’ (cognitive factual truth).' (Quoted in Fuller, P. 2005. The Notion of Ditthi in Theravada Buddhism. New York, Curzon.)

Fuller points out that the ‘is/ought’ distinction is a modern one, originating with Hume. (Fuller, 2005, p9). The ‘is/ought’ distinction is now, however, very much a part of modern life, and it is generally taken for granted that science assumes a Universe which is inherently devoid of value; these are internal to human minds and are ultimately derived from, and reducible to, the requirements of survival.

As you recall from the thread on the Phaedo, Socrates rejects Anaxagoras' naturalist account of causation because it gave only explanations in terms of 'air and aether' and the like, which he compares tto 'bones and sinews' rather than 'real causes' which, he says, are intentional 98e.

That is just prior to Socrates' (and so, Plato's) introduction of the 'theory of forms'. I don't believe they are presented as an edifying tale, but as a hypothesis (although obviously not what we would regard as a scientific hypothesis).

. The story of Forms is not exempt from the Socratic practice of critical inquiry. — Fooloso4

According to Norman Gulley 'Plato's Theory of Knowledge', Plato introduces the theory of forms and anamnesis (Meno) because of his awareness of the limitations of the Socratic method of questioning, and in the attempt to develop a constructive theory of knowledge.

The tendency to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of Good is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality, which it is imperative that it should behold (Rep. 526e) — Apollodorus

A comparison from Buddhist literature:

I wish here to say a few words concerning the important psychological event known as Parāvṛtti in the Lanka and other Mahayana literature. Parāvṛtti literally means "turning up" or "turning back" or "change"; technically, it is a spiritual change or transformation which takes place in the mind, especially suddenly, and I have called it "revulsion" {nimmita) in my Studies in the Lankavatara, which, it will be seen, somewhat corresponds to what is known as "conversion" among the psychological students of religion.

It is significant that the Mahayana has been insistent to urge its followers to experience this psychological transformation in their practical life. A mere intellectual understanding of the truth is not enough in the life of a Buddhist; the truth must be directly grasped, personally experienced, intuitively penetrated into; for then it will be distilled into life and determine its course.

This Parāvṛtti, according to the Lanka, takes place in the Alaya-vijnana (All-conserving Mind), which is assumed to exist behind our individual empirical consciousnesses. The Alaya is a metaphysical entity, and no psychological analysis can reach it. What we ordinarily know as the Alaya is its working through a relative mind The Mahayana calls this phase of the Alaya tainted or defiled (klishta) and tells us to be cleansed of it in order to experience a Parāvṛtti for the attainment of ultimate reality.

Parāvṛtti in another sense, therefore, is purification (visuddhi). In Buddhism terms of colouring are much used, and becoming pure, free from all pigment, means that the Alaya is thoroughly washed off its dualistic accretion or outflow (asrava), that is, that the Tathagata has effected his work of purification in the mind of a sentient being, which has so far failed to perceive its own oneness and allness. Being pure is to remain in its own selfhood or self-nature (svabhava). While Parāvṛtti is psychological, it still retains its intellectual flavour as most Buddhist terms do. — D. T. Suzuki, The Lankavatara Sutra

There's another thing I want to try and spell out. Forms, ideas, numbers, principles and so on, are not 'existent things', they're not 'out there somewhere'. Rather they are better thought of as constitutive elements of reason. But they're also not simply subjective or a product of the mind (as conceptualism says), because they're deteminative or causal in nature herself (hence Wigner's 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural science') and the same for all who think (hence, objectively ideal). There's a kind of 'key-and-lock' relationship between reason and nature, which is how science has managed to discover so much about the Universe. But at the same time, because 'the nature of reason' or 'the nature of scientific laws' and such like are not themselves matters for empirical science, then modernity tends to want to disown the very faculty which has enabled it to make these discoveries. That is the thrust of the argument in this post.

Again, from the essay What is Math, Smithsonian Magazine:

“I believe that the only way to make sense of mathematics is to believe that there are objective mathematical facts, and that they are discovered by mathematicians,” says James Robert Brown, a philosopher of science recently retired from the University of Toronto. “Working mathematicians overwhelmingly are Platonists. They don't always call themselves Platonists, but if you ask them relevant questions, it’s always the Platonistic answer that they give you.”

Other scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Basically says it all, if you think it through.

I think, Plato's approach to the subject was quite practical. Those who try to guide, or awaken the others normally get kill by them.

Forms, ideas, numbers, principles and so on, are not 'existent things', they're not 'out there somewhere'. Rather they are better thought of as constitutive elements of reason. But they're also not simply subjective or a product of the mind — Wayfarer

Correct. One way of looking at it is that the Forms are within the Universal Consciousness or "Mind of God", in which case they are subjective to the One, but "objective" to the many. As the individual nous expands its field or sphere of awareness, it gets closer and closer to the World Nous and thereby acquires an ever-clearer grasp of the nature of the Forms. In any case, Buddhists and Hindus, especially those who have some experience of meditative states of consciousness seem to find it easier to understand the concept.

Regarding the “noble lie” theory, it is just a theory, typically advanced by those who believe in political propaganda like Strauss and his followers. In reality, it is far from clear that “noble lie” is the correct translation in the first instance.

Desmond Lee makes the following observation:

Plato has been criticized for his Foundation Myth as if it were a calculated lie. That is partly because the phrase here translated ‘magnificent myth’ (p. 145) has been conventionally mistranslated ‘noble lie’; and this has given rise to the idea that Plato countenances political propaganda of the most unscrupulous kind. In fact, as Cornford points out, the myth is accepted by all three classes, Guardians included. It is meant to replace the national traditions which any community has, which are intended to express the kind of community it is, or wishes to be, its ideals, rather than to state matters of fact. And one of Plato’s criticisms of democracy was, in effect, that it was government by propaganda, telling the right lie to the people (cf. p. 263).

- H. D. P. Lee, Plato The Republic, p. 156

If we look at it objectively, some important points become obvious:

Plato’s foundation myth is simply replacing an old myth with a new one. It is not replacing truth with a lie.

A myth taken as a whole, may be false but it also contains truth, as Socrates himself says (Rep. 377a).

Myth enables philosophical inquiry to reach its goal (Rep. 614a).

This is the key to understanding Plato’s myths: they serve a philosophical purpose as well as conveying a truth.

And, of course, nowhere does Plato say that the Forms or God are just myths!

On the contrary, it is imperative to remember that, in order to develop our power of abstract thought, Plato urges us to study mathematics not in any way but in a particular way that prepares us for the specific task of grasping the nature of the Forms.

Such studies he says, “guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being” (Rep. 525a), a statement he repeats several times.

Calculation and arithmetic, which “plainly compels the soul to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself”, focuses not just on numbers, but also on spatial arrangements (such as military formations in lines and columns) which prepare us for the next stage involving geometrical forms.

Geometry, “the knowledge of the eternally existent”, focuses on pure geometrical figures consisting of the lines that were introduced in the previous stage.

Astronomy, which “converts the natural indwelling intelligence of the soul from uselessness to right use”, focuses on the correlations of spatial and temporal relations among geometrical solids (heavenly bodies) whose movement gives rise to day and night, etc.

Harmony, the study of which “is of use only when conducted for the investigation of the beautiful and the good”, takes us beyond spatiality by focusing on the ratios expressed by the figures studied up to this point and including musical pitch.

Thus, Plato’s training program takes us from the one-dimensional to the two-dimensional, from the two-dimensional to the three-dimensional, from the three-dimensional to the three-dimensional in motion, and from the latter to time, thus covering all the dimensions of the material world and facilitating our understanding of the innermost structure of the world of becoming as constituted by intelligibles and dependent on being.

Plato’s statements are definitely no “lies”. The study of mathematics in the way suggested by Plato, does actually help in the development of the ability to think abstractly and to grasp abstract concepts.

It is true that Plato stops at the threshold to Forms having Socrates and Glaucon say:

You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm. But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm. Is not that so?” “Surely.” “And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal this, and that only to one experienced in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?” “That, too,” he said, “we may properly affirm.” (533a)

Still, we know that the method that takes philosophical inquiry forward and enables the philosopher to go beyond mathematical thought is dialectic, which further develops the soul’s internal capacity for insight until it is sufficiently finetuned to grasp the reality of the Forms. The Parmenides, Timaeus, and other works offer further points of departure in this direction.

In any case, it is clear that it is not sufficient to understand the inner structure of the world. Philosophical inquiry demands that we also understand the inner structure of the soul and the interrelation of soul and world. E.g., how does the individual nous relate to the Nous of the World Soul? The answer to this also provides the answer to the nature of the Forms and their relation to both the One and the many.

See also Mitchell Miller, Beginning the “Longer Way” – Research Gateway

'real causes' — Wayfarer

After calling the hypothesis of Forms simple, naive, and perhaps foolish, and later "safe and ignorant". (105 b), he reintroduces physical causes. (105b-c)

It should be noted how he blurs the distinction between Mind and his mind. First he makes the assumption that Mind would direct everything according to what is best. And so:

it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. (97d)

Socrates is never able to show that it is best that things be as they are. He does, however, attempt to live his life according to what seems best. In addition, he replaces the way Mind orders things with the way his mind orders things according to the hypothesis of Forms.

According to Norman Gulley ... — Wayfarer

Plato situates his most sustained criticism of the Forms in the Parmenides, which takes place when Socrates was a young man. In other words, contrary to what Gulley and other advocates of reading the dialogues according to developmental periods, Plato makes the problem of Forms something Socrates was aware of from the beginning.

In the Philebus Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad. The two sides of an indeterminate dyad are dependent on each other. There is not one without the other. The two together are one.

The Forms are each said to be one, of which there are many things of that Form. The Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, but the Forms are presented as if they stand alone and apart. There is, however, no ‘X’ without things that are ‘x’.

Each Form is one, but Forms are many. How many? In addition, each Form is both self-same and other. There is the Just itself and the Beautiful itself, but the Just is not Beautiful of the Beautiful the Just. The Forms themselves are an indeterminate dyad, same and other.

Becoming is supposed to be understood in light of being, things in light of Forms, the unlimited in light of the limited. Formulated in this way, the problem comes to light. How can the limited encompass the unlimited? When the many are reduced to one what it is that makes them many cannot be taken into account.

The Forms falsely represent the part as the whole. The undetermined as determined. The open-ended nature of philosophical inquiry as if it is completed and closed to further inquiry.

According to Norman Gulley 'Plato's Theory of Knowledge', Plato introduces the theory of forms and anamnesis (Meno) because of his awareness of the limitations of the Socratic method of questioning, and in the attempt to develop a constructive theory of knowledge. — Wayfarer

I figure the Parmenides dialogue argues that Gulley has the sequence backwards.

At 133, the separation of the forms from our reality creates the largest obstacle to using them as an explanatory principle. "If nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything."

During 134:

Parmenides: Whereas the knowledge in our world will be knowledge of the reality in our world and it will follow again that each branch of knowledge in our world must be knowledge of some department of things that exist in our world.
Socrates: Necessarily.
Parmenides: But, as you admit, we do not possess the forms themselves, nor can they exist in our world.
Socrates: No.
Parmenides: And presumably the forms, just as they are in themselves, are known by the form of knowledge itself?
Socrates: Yes.
Parmenides: The form we do not possess.
Socrates: True.
Parmenides: Then none of the forms is known by us, since we have no part in knowledge itself.
Soc: Apparently not. — Translated by F.M. Cornford

But Parmenides does agree at 135b to the use of the forms since we have few other options if we are to proceed through dialogue:

Socrates: I admit that, Parmenides, I quite agree with what you are saying.

Parmenides: But on the other hand, if in view of these difficulties and others like them, if, a man refuses to admit that forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite form in every case, he will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same, and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. But of that consequence I think you are only too well aware.

Socrates: True. — Ibid

From this point of departure, "developing a constructive theory of knowledge" requires the dialectic approach rather than the abandonment of it.

In regards to the subject of lies, noble or otherwise, Socrates does say this:

“But surely truth is also something that needs to be taken seriously. Because if we were speaking rightly just now, and a lie by its very nature is useless to gods, though useful to humans in the form of medicine, it’s clear that such a thing needs to be granted to doctors and not handled by laymen.”

“That’s clear,” he said.

“So it’s appropriate for the rulers of the city, if for anyone at all, to lie for the benefit of the city as far as either enemies or citizens are concerned, but for everyone else, such a thing is not to be touched. [389C] But we’ll declare that for a private citizen to lie to the rulers is the same thing, and a greater fault, as for a sick person not to tell the truth about the things happening to his body to a doctor, or someone in training to a trainer, or as for someone who doesn’t tell the helmsman the things that are about the ship or the sailors concerning the way he or any of his shipmates are doing.”

“Most true,” he said. [389D]

“Then if someone catches anyone else in the city lying, Any of those who are workmen for the public,
Prophet or healer of sicknesses or joiner of wood, he’ll punish him for bringing in a practice as subversive and destructive for a city as for a ship.” — Translated by Joe Sachs, Republic, 389B

The analysis of the shadows, part 1.

Shadows are cast. The 2D shadow of a child eating icecream in the train, reveals features of the true child. The true objects of the true world can not be known to one living in a cave onto which' walls only shadows are cast. The moment though it is seen that one casts shadows themselves, a new contemplation will be immanent.

To be continued...

In the first paragraph they deny the existence of the Forms in the world. In the second they confirm the necessity for the existence of Forms. One way to interpret this is to assume that the Forms exist in a transcendent realm, in a higher reality. But they also affirm that we have no knowledge of the Forms, and so cannot know that they exist in a higher reality. The affirmation of the existence of Forms, Parmenides says, is for the sake of speech and thought. It is the particular characteristic of each thing, not something other that the things of this world, that is the cause of the hypothesis of Forms, literally, that which stands under what is said and thought.

“But surely truth is also something that needs to be taken seriously. Because if we were speaking rightly just now, and a lie by its very nature is useless to gods, though useful to humans in the form of medicine, it’s clear that such a thing needs to be granted to doctors and not handled by laymen.” — Translated by Joe Sachs, Republic, 389B

This statement about lies begins with truth. Some lies told by those with the proper art and authority are for the sake of truth. If some lies are beneficial does this mean that the truth of the matter will prove to be harmful?

The statement regarding noble lies from the Bloom translation:

"Could we," I said, "somehow contrive one of those lies that come into being in case of need, of which we were just now speaking, some one noble lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not them, the rest of the city?" (414b-c)

There is a play on words here because the lie being discussed is about being born from the earth instead of from human parents. The ensuing discussion reveals the purpose of the lie is to diminish the power of inherited positions in society.

The Greek is:
γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν;

The first meaning of γενναῖος, the word translated as "noble", is to be true to one's birth. In this case, Socrates argues that the lie is said to reflect a truth our circumstances of birth misrepresent.

While on the topic of Greek words, the word translated as "lie" is from ψεῦδος. As a verb, it means to cheat as well as to speak falsely. However justified the practice may be or not, the text is not hiding from the unpleasant associations of the act as an act.

Glaucon says at 414d:

"“It’s not without reason,” he said, “that you were ashamed for so long to tell the lie.”