There is a play on words here because the lie being discussed is about being born from the earth instead of from human parents. The ensuing discussion reveals the purpose of the lie is to diminish the power of inherited positions in society. — Valentinus

This plays out on several levels. The myth that:

they were under the earth within, being fashioned and reared themselves (414d)

is like the myth of the living coming from Hades. It is not only the myth of the earth being their mother, the breeding program too conceals the truth of one's birth. In the myth there is no father, no procreation. I have not worked it out, but perhaps there is some connection with the generations of the regimes.

The lie also conceals the truth that:

... for the most part you'll produce offspring like yourselves. (415a)

The first meaning of γενναῖος, the word translated as "noble", is to be true to one's birth. — Valentinus

Being true to one's birth, also has the sense being true to one's nature in addition to the convention of the parent's social status.

"“It’s not without reason,” he said, “that you were ashamed for so long to tell the lie.” — Valentinus

Perhaps Plato intends to remind us of Achilles' criticizing King Agamemnon for being "wrapped in shamelessness". (Iliad, 1. 149)

The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous — Wayfarer

I think it positively freaks them out.

But what is really hilarious is the way Straussians are attempting to cover up their master’s true colors.

Strauss started his career as a teacher at a rabbinical seminary in Berlin.

In 1932 he left Germany for France on a Rockefeller fellowship. The Rockefellers were major sponsors of Fabian Socialist outfits like the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

From France Strauss moved to London, England, where he became a close friend of Fabian Socialists like H. R. Tawney who were connected with the Rockefeller-funded LSE.

In 1937, Strauss moved from London to New York under the patronage of Harold Laski, a Fabian Socialist and Marxist who taught political science at LSE and who also was a member of the Fabian Society and British Labour Party executives.

In New York, Strauss taught political science at The New School, a Fabian Socialist institution funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and Universal Oil, after which he moved to Chicago.

Not content with Judaism, Strauss also took a keen interest in Spinozism and Arabism and maintained close links to Arabists like Paul Kraus (who married Strauss’ sister). After studying anti-Platonists like Maimonides, Strauss developed the theory (or fixed idea) that Classical philosophers like Plato had a hidden political agenda which they concealed behind allegorical language.

Leo Strauss – Wikipedia

Strauss believed that governments and political philosophers (like himself) should hide the truth from the public by means of “noble lies”. So, we can see why it became so important for Strauss to propagate the myth of “Plato’s noble lie”. He was making a living out of it by using this myth to justify his own teachings!

In any case, it is clear that Strauss is either psychologically incapable of understanding Plato or deliberately misinterprets him for his own political agenda. And the same goes for his followers.

Take, for example the inability to understand that Forms can be at once transcendent to and immanent in the sensible world. I think everyone can see that the sun is above the world we live in but its light is immanent in it. Similarly, the Forms themselves are transcendent but their properties reflected in the sensible particulars are very much in this world.

As already noted, the phrase “noble lie” seems to be a (deliberate) mistranslation of the Greek original and it clearly distorts Plato’s intention.

As you can see, they cherry pick a bit of text to suit their agenda:

γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν

Moreover, they provide no translation! Not surprisingly, they are unable to say where exactly the text says “noble lie”. They expect us to believe that Plato needs 17 words to say just 2 :grin:

And, of course, nowhere does Plato say that the Forms are a myth or a lie.

This is why in addition to reading Plato we also need to keep a tab on his detractors, especially those with a hidden (or perhaps not so hidden) political agenda.

But what is really hilarious is the way Straussians are attempting to cover up their master’s true colors.

Strauss started his career as a teacher at a rabbinical seminary in Berlin. — Apollodorus

It's not just one intellectual, it's the whole cosmopolitan intelligentsia, and the thrust of modern academia generally, particularly in the English-speaking world. That's why I posted the link to the Jacques Maritain essay, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, on my profile. One excerpt from that:

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Compare this with:

In Aristotle, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. This therefore connects discussion of nous to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways.

And you can see the precedent for this in one of the passages quoted above:

if a man refuses to admit that forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite form in every case, he will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same, and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. But of that consequence I think you are only too well aware. — Parmenides

'The consequences' are, precisely, relativism, nominalism and empiricism:

Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence* of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism** in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver, Ideas have Consequences

*I would prefer 'reality'.
** Meaning 'scholastic realism', realism concerning universals.

Welcome to the modern world!

I've been trying to make a point of the dimunition of metaphysics in Western culture, generally, by way of responding to the OP. I notice it keeps getting diverted back to the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues - which, incidentally, I greatly value, as it is something I need to learn much more about. BUT, there's an underlying cultural dynamic here, which is generally not being commented on.

I've been trying to make a point of the diminution of metaphysics in Western culture, generally, by way of responding to the OP. I notice it keeps getting diverted back to the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues - which, incidentally, I greatly value, as it is something I need to learn much more about. BUT, there's an underlying cultural dynamic here, which is generally not being commented on. — Wayfarer

The Parmenides quote does challenge the basis for a relativity you have described as the basis for the Modern perspective. So, it is commenting upon the underlying cultural dynamic to notice there were disagreements at the time these statements were made.

The scholarship to pay attention to these old words is a testament against the relativity you abhor. If nothing can be learned from these old arguments, why bother?

The scholarship to pay attention to these old words is a testament against the relativity you abhor. If nothing can be learned from these old arguments, why bother? — Valentinus

Do you think I'm saying that 'nothing can be learned from these old arguments?' I hope I didn't convey that impression.

Am I wrong in believing that the grand Western tradition of metaphysics began with Parmenides, if we had to pick out a single figure?

My argument is that an important part of what has been lost in the transition to modernity is the capacity to understand metaphysics. It is preserved in Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, due to their having absorbed metaphysics into their theological philosophy, although I'm not advocating conversion to religion on those grounds.

It's not just one intellectual, it's the whole cosmopolitan intelligentsia, and the thrust of modern academia generally, particularly in the English-speaking world. — Wayfarer

Indeed. Straussianism is a whole school, mainly based in Chicago. There are hundreds of them!

And they are just the tip of the anti-Platonist iceberg. So, Maritain is perfectly right.

The fact is that Strauss was a follower of Maimonides who got the idea from Ibn Sina and al-Farabi that ancient philosophers had secret teachings concealed in their works. Maimonides said that people should avoid Plato because he uses too many allegories and should read Aristotle instead.

Strauss had a “better” idea. He decided to use the “noble lie” myth to develop his own political theory according to which governments and political philosophers must hide the truth from the public and disclose it to an initiated intellectual elite, only.

Of course Strauss was backed by Fabians and their financial sponsors because Fabianism believes in gaining influence and power through deception and “permeation”, i.e. propaganda, and their sponsors like the Rockefellers were among America’s most devious and ruthless industrialists and bankers who were notorious for using academics and politicians to promote their agenda.

The fraudulence of the Straussians and the wider anti-Platonist movement is evident from their spurious interpretation of Platonic texts. The fact is that the phrase “a noble lie” does not occur in the Greek text and it does not refer to the Forms.

Unfortunately, being themselves committed atheists and materialists, Strauss and other anti-Platonist ideologists obviously feel that Plato must have been an atheist and materialist, too. This is why they fail to examine their own assumptions. Their self-confident, dogmatic approach prevents them from even asking themselves why not every translation of the Republic has “noble lie”.

Let us look at the Wikipedia Article “Noble Lie”. It says:

This is his [Socrates'] noble lie: "a contrivance for one of those falsehoods that come into being in case of need, of which we were just now talking, some noble one...”

Note how the translation abruptly stops after “noble one”. What could the reason for this be? Simply put, the Greek text does not say “noble lie”!

And this illustrates the wider problem of a mainstream consensus being built by a (well-funded) intellectual elite that seeks to suppress all forms of opposition to its dogma. It has not yet completely taken over public sources like Wikipedia, but this is what it aims to achieve ….

Do you think I'm saying that 'nothing can be learned from these old arguments?' I hope I didn't convey that impression. — Wayfarer

You did not convey that impression. I meant to say that the "interpretation of the Platonic dialogues" is an engagement in metaphysics that you say has been lost in the transition to modernity. I don't accept the claim that the only path to engaging with the thinking is through the lens of preserved models.

The quote from Parmenides you cite is a call to carry on with the existence of forms despite all the difficulties he enumerated that faced anyone who would try. That includes us "moderns" who wrestle with those problems.

The historical conditions you see "moderns" being shackled to is itself a metaphysical proposition. I don't accept that confinement as an unavoidable fate.

My argument is that an important part of what has been lost in the transition to modernity is the capacity to understand metaphysics. — Wayfarer

My argument is to pay close attention to Plato's arguments. If one is to understand Plato's metaphysics consideration must be given to the indeterminate dyad, to the limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron).
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/599321

Once again, the affirmation of the existence of Forms is, as Parmenides says in the quoted passage above, for the sake of speech and thought. The Forms are not separate entities that exist in our world. They exist in thought. The Form, as he says in the next paragraph, refers to the particular characteristic of each thing, not something other than those things. The Forms are not supersensible or metaphysical entities. They are hypothetical, literally, that which is posited and stands under what is said and thought.

Am I wrong in believing that the grand Western tradition of metaphysics began with Parmenides, if we had to pick out a single figure? — Wayfarer

What's your ground for believing in that?

My argument is that an important part of what has been lost in the transition to modernity is the capacity to understand metaphysics. — Wayfarer

What are the causes for that loss?

Why is this so? Why can't the prisoner unshackle and free himself? — Shawn

The prisoner doesn't know that he is shackled. He doesn't know what being free means.
Maybe he doesn't even know that he is a prisoner.

My argument is to pay close attention to Plato's arguments. — Fooloso4

Not every philosophical argument comprises interpretation of Plato. I was agreeing with the sentiment:

modern day man seems comfortable inside the cave, where opinions, ignorance, and one's unconscious might be found. — Shawn

and commenting on why this is so, what lead up to it, what the historical causes are.

The Forms are not separate entities that exist in our world. They exist in thought. — Fooloso4

What is the relationship between thought, experience and world? It's very easy if you posit that the mind is one thing, the world is another, and that's that - but this is one of the problems of philosophy and it can't be dismissed so easily. This is why I raised the example of platonism in mathematics. The nature of the reality of number - whether, and in what sense, number is real - is an unresolved issue to this day. The mainstream consensus is that number too is a function of the mind, with no reality greater than that. But that begs the whole question of what Eugene Wigner described as 'the unreasonable efficiency of mathematics in the natural sciences'. I see that as a live philosophical issue.

The historical conditions you see "moderns" being shackled to is itself a metaphysical proposition. I don't accept that confinement as an unavoidable fate. — Valentinus

It isn't, if we're aware of it and question it, although it is a very difficult fate to avoid due to the pervasive influence of the culture we're immersed in.

Maybe he doesn't even know that he is a prisoner — Corvus

As long as the dark foundation of our nature, grim in its all-encompassing egoism, mad in its drive to make that egoism into reality, to devour everything and to define everything by itself, as long as that foundation is visible, as long as this truly original sin exists within us, we have no business here and there is no logical answer to our existence. Imagine a group of people who are all blind, deaf and slightly demented and suddenly someone in the crowd asks, "What are we to do?"... The only possible answer is "Look for a cure". Until you are cured, there is nothing you can do. And since you don't believe you are sick, there can be no cure. — Vladimir Solovyov

Not every philosophical argument comprises interpretation of Plato. — Wayfarer

But every argument about Plato necessarily requires an interpretation of Plato. The shadows in the OP refer to the shadows on the wall of Plato's cave.

You claim that metaphysics began with Parmenides and yet you have not said anything about Parmenides. You did, however, refer to Plato's dialogue Parmenides.

You say:

Western philosophy is after all 'footnotes to Plato'. — Wayfarer

but you want to discuss the footnotes and not the source?

You say:

I think you have a determindly secularist reading of Plato. — Wayfarer

but you do not want to examine how well my reading squares with Plato. The problem may not be that my reading is secular but that your assumptions and historical categories do not fit. It may be that what you call metaphysics may not square with the text. To the extent that is true, your historical construct falls apart.

I don't accept the claim that the only path to engaging with the thinking is through the lens of preserved models. — Valentinus

I agree, but divergence from an historical account should be marked out as such. Don't present your own ponderings as the essential Plato.

Sure, but I've noticed your responses are conditioned by a very specific perspective. And you have a reading of Plato that I don't always agree with. For every affirmation of the 'immortality of the soul' that is quoted, you will find something calling it into question. For every exploration of the reality of the Forms, you will find something calling that into question. 'He doesn't really mean it', or 'it's a poetic image', and so on. But I wonder how much of that interpretation is being driven by your own philosophical commitments? I mean, mine are, also, but I'm more than willing to admit that. I have, as I've tried to explain, tried to re-interpret the meaning of the 'ideas' as the 'universals' of later, Aristotelian and Scholastic realism, and I think that is quite a respectable interpretation, and one which makes them at least intelligible in modern terms.

Part of Plato's genius is that it is possible to find support for many different readings in his texts. I have learned a lot from your analyses of them, and hopefully will continue to, but I don't concur with your interpretation in some basic respects.

The below is adapted from another site I visit from time to time, by an independent scholar of Plato. He favours the reading of the Republic as an analogy for the human psyche.

...the Divided Line is principally concerned with moral epistemology: how do we know what to do ('what is best for us?'), both in general and at any given moment? Upon the answer to this eminently practical question all our well-being depends. Plato includes mathematical examples in the Divided Line, but this doesn't mean he's spliced in an investigation of mathematical or scientific epistemology amidst his great work on personal ethics. It's more plausible to see these as metaphors drawn from an explicit domain (mathematics) to illustrate corresponding aspects of a less clear one (moral judgement).

If we accept this view then what Plato seems to be saying in the Divided Line is that there is a special form of knowledge, noesis, which is a better basis for guiding our thoughts and actions than other, lesser forms of knowledge. It takes little sophistication to recognize that noesis is better than the more degenerate kinds of 'knowing' — i.e., the eikasia and pistis possessed by prisoners of the Cave. What is far more subtle and interesting, and what is therefore perhaps more important for Plato here, is the contrast between dianoia - discursive ratiocination - and noesis.

This distinction is vital. While dianoia certainly has benefits, we have a tendency to over-rely on it and to forget its limitations. The weakness of dianoia is that it must begin by taking as true unproven assumptions. We are, in effect, presupposing a model of reality before we begin our deliberations.

This is something I've learned from philosophy of science. For instance, there is a strong unstated presumption of the causal closure of the physical, meaning that all significant causes must be physical. Given that assumption, then the whole of philosophy can be re-interpreted accordingly, which is physicalism, probably the predominant attitude in the mainstream academy. The Professor of the Department where I studied undergrad philosophy was a commited materialist, his book was A Materialist Theory of Mind.

But no model, be it logical, geometrical, or moral, is perfect. Its conclusions may be, and frequently are, wrong. Our selection of assumptions, moreover, is bound to be influenced by our passions and prejudices. Dianoia tends to reflect the values and prejudices of whatever sub-personality is currently active. We then see reality partially. Moreover, the principle of cognitive dissonance may cause us to ignore, distort, or rationalize away any data which do not fit our preconceived model.

In contrast, noesis presupposes a psyche that has turned away from specific, ego-logical concerns to seek the Good itself. With this change in mental orientation — comparable to the Pauline metanoia, the Plotinian epistrophe or the Buddhist paravritti — we may then begin to see things more truly, and in their proper relation to one another (yathābhūtaṃ). We may better think, judge — and therefore act — according to natural law and right reason. We will consequently be more harmonized with the external world as well as within ourselves.

Noesis is the mental power or faculty associated with an immediate apprehension of first principles (Forms) of mathematics, logic, morals, religion, and perhaps other things. So understood, noesis, when concerned with moral Forms, resembles what is traditionally called Conscience. By Conscience we mean not a Freudian super-ego formed by the internalization of arbitrary social conventions, but an innate sense, resembling Socrates' daimon, and closely associated with consciousness itself (let us not forget that in some languages, such as French, the same word denotes both consciousness and conscience.) We need not commit ourselves to a particular religious creed to say that this moral noetic sense is a phenomenological reality — a clarifying, integrating, joyful, loving faculty of human consciousness.

The characteristic human flaw of turning away from the Good — and instead relying on our own fallible substitutes for divine Wisdom — is hubris, the fundamental sin against which Greek philosophy and literature so forcefully and persistently warns us.

That's the overall interpretive model that I favour, and I will continue to try and enlarge my understanding of it. My interpretation of the OP is that modern philosophy essentially tries to 'make the cave more liveable'.

It may be that what you call metaphysics may not square with the text. — Fooloso4

Do you think the subject called 'metaphysics' has any real reference? Or is it, as you said in your previous post, simply about the mechanics of speech and thought?

I agree, but divergence from an historical account should be marked out as such. Don't present your own ponderings as the essential Plato. — frank

We have some text that has survived until now. There are some historical accounts that have as well. I am trying to understand Plato, not speak for him. My attempts, like any other reader, may miss the mark.

Do you mean to say that an interpretation of the text can conflict with historical accounts to a degree that it becomes fanciful?

I am trying to understand Plato, not speak for him. My attempts, like any other reader, may miss the mark. — Valentinus

Exactly. The authenticity of each of the dialogues has been called into question at some time or other. It's not appropriate to be dogmatic about what Plato intended.

Do you mean to say that an interpretation of the text can conflict with historical accounts to a degree that it becomes fanciful? — Valentinus

That's possible, but I was just venting about people who become inflexible.

Let us look at the Wikipedia Article “Noble Lie”. It says:

This is his [Socrates'] noble lie: "a contrivance for one of those falsehoods that come into being in case of need, of which we were just now talking, some noble one...”

Note how the translation abruptly stops after “noble one”. What could the reason for this be? Simply put, the Greek text does not say “noble lie”! — Apollodorus

Here is Godfrey Stallbaum’s explication of this passage:

“‘Tis an oun hemin—‘ Verba sic inter se cohaerent [“these words cohere (intelligibly) in this way”]: tis an oun hemin mechane genoito, pseudomenous (hemas) yennaion ti hen twn pseudwn twn en deonti gignomenwn, wn nun de elegomen, peisai malista men kai autous tous archontas, ei de me, ten allen polin; Quomodo igitur, inquit, fieri poterit, ut unum aliquod honestum mendacium, ex his quae antea dicebamus necessaria esse, mentiri ipsis maxime moderatoribus, aut sin aliter, reliquis civibus persuadeamus? [“In what manner then,” he said, “could it happen, that some one honorable lie, of these which we were saying before were necessary, might be especially told to the rulers themselves, but if not, that we persuade the rest of the citizens?]
Loquitur paullo obscurius propter animi verecundiam, necdum rem ipsam commemorat, quam vult principibus reliquaeque civitati ita persuaderi, ut mendacium aliquod salubre adhibeatur. Patet vero ex his, quae deinceps exponuntur, commentum aliquod fabulosum ei videri excogitandum...[He (Socrates) speaks somewhat obscurely because of the shame in his soul, nor does he yet relate the very thing he wishes the princes and the citizenry to be persuaded of, such that some salubrious lie be applied. But it is clear from what follows that some fabulous contrivance seems to him ought to be thought out...]”

Soon afterwards, Glaucon says, “How like a man hesitant to speak you are,” (Bloom translation), but in reading the Bloom translation, we cannot understand this response, for his translation reads “noble lie” for “gennaion ti”. He should have written instead, “noble thing”. This would have better, and more faithfully to the Greek, conveyed Socrates’ hesitancy.

Nevertheless, O Deploradorus, it is clear from the context that Socrates speaks of a noble lie, even if he says “noble thing”. Stallbaum tells us why. As an analogy, if I were to converse with a female, and the conversation turn to certain intimate details of her peculiar anatomy, I wouldn’t use words like “vagina” and “clitoris”, but rather circumlocutions like “the things up in there,” or, “your privates,” etc.

"What are we to do?"... The only possible answer is "Look for a cure". Until you are cured, there is nothing you can do. — Vladimir Solovyov

Wayfarer — Wayfarer

What would you do if / after having been cured?

For every affirmation of the 'immortality of the soul' that is quoted, you will find something calling it into question. For every exploration of the reality of the Forms, you will find something calling that into question. ' — Wayfarer

If the text supports such questioning then Plato gives us reason to question. After all, this is exactly what Socrates says he does.

But I wonder how much of that interpretation is being driven by your own philosophical commitments? — Wayfarer

This is true of all of us. The question is, how well does the text support one interpretation rather than another? This is not to say that there is a final, definitive, interpretation. Any interpretation should be subject to revision in light of what is found in the text.

The below is adapted from another site I visit from time to time, by an independent scholar of Plato. — Wayfarer

Perhaps it is just an oversight that you did not identify John Uebersax. Given his own interpretive commitment I am not surprised you agree.

Do you think the subject called 'metaphysics' has any real reference? — Wayfarer

No, the term is used in a variety of ways to mean different things. I identified the indeterminate dyad as one of Plato's metaphysical principles.

Or is it, as you said in your previous post, simply about the mechanics of speech and thought? — Wayfarer

It is Parmenides in the dialogue, not me. And this is not what he says. It is not about the mechanics of speech and thought.

Soon afterwards, Glaucon says, “How like a man hesitant to speak you are,” (Bloom translation), but in reading the Bloom translation, we cannot understand this response, for his translation reads “noble lie” for “gennaion ti”. He should have written instead, “noble thing”. This would have better, and more faithfully to the Greek, conveyed Socrates’ hesitancy. — Leghorn

However, Bloom is a Straussian, is he not?

But I wonder how much of that interpretation is being driven by your own philosophical commitments? — Wayfarer

I would say philosophical and political.

It is important to understand that Greek ψεῦδος pseudos is not the same as English “lie”. It is less strong and it has a broader range of meaning than the English word. It can mean story, tale, poetic fiction, faint, etc., not just plain falsehood or lie.

More honest translators like Desmond Lee actually point this out in their commentaries. Lee’s translation reads:

‘Now I wonder if we could contrive one of those convenient stories we were talking about a few minutes ago, I asked, ‘some magnificent myth that would in itself carry conviction to our whole community, including, if possible, the Guardians themselves?’
‘What sort of story?’
‘Nothing new – a fairy story like those the poets tell and have persuaded people to believe about the sort of thing that often happened “once upon a time”

In my view, this captures Plato’s intention much better than translations that insist on indiscriminately using “lie” to make Plato sound like Lenin or Stalin.

Once the meaning of pseudos has been clarified, the correct reading becomes obvious from Socrates’ own answer to the question “What sort of story?”: “Nothing new. A fairy story like the one poets tell”.

Clearly, what he has in mind is a story (literally, “a Phoenician tale”) to replace the existing one. Hence, “nothing new” (meden kainon).

If you take a look at the Talk pages where editors discuss Wikipedia articles you’ll get an idea of what’s happening behind the scenes. Below is a comment on “Noble Lie”:

Does anyone know where Plato said:
"The noble lie will inform them that they are better than those they serve and it is, therefore, their responsibility to guard and protect those lesser than themselves"?
This quote is in the article, but with "citation needed." I've been searching for a few hours, and I can't find it. I emailed a professor of ancient philosophy, and he denied that Plato ever said it. This is mind boggling because hundreds of websites and articles attribute this to Plato, but none can specify where in the Republic. Perhaps we should remove it from the article? Lumentenebra (talk) 20:05, 5 March 2010 (UTC)

Talk: Noble lie – Wikipedia

In any case, we should not assume that academics and their financial sponsors have no subversive political and cultural agendas.

Perhaps it is just an oversight that you did not identify John Uebersax. — Fooloso4

It was adapted from John Uebersax but I think this interpretive framework is not unique to him, I selected it because I thought it representative.

Compare the 'edifying tale' with the Buddhist conception of Upaya.

Upaya (Sanskrit: upāya, expedient means, pedagogy) is a term used in Buddhism to refer to an aspect of guidance along the Buddhist paths to liberation where a conscious, voluntary action "is driven by an incomplete reasoning" about its direction. Upaya is often used with kaushalya (कौशल्य, "cleverness"), upaya-kaushalya meaning "skill in means".

Upaya-kaushalya is a concept emphasizing that practitioners may use their own specific methods or techniques that fit the situation in order to gain or impart enlightenment. The implication is that even if a technique, view, etc., is not ultimately true it may still be an expedient practice to perform or view to hold; i.e., it may bring the practitioner closer to the true realization in a similar way. The exercise of skill to which it refers, the ability to adapt one's message to the audience, is of enormous importance in the Pali Canon.

From wikipedia. See in particular the parable of the burning house.

It is important to understand that Greek ψεῦδος pseudos is not the same as English “lie”. It is less strong and it has a broader range of meaning than the English word. It can mean story, tale, poetic fiction, faint, etc., not just plain falsehood or lie. — Apollodorus

Prove that claim, with examples to support the opinion.

If you have any respect for Liddell and Scott, they are not going to help you with this interpretation.

No, the term is used in a variety of ways to mean different things. I identified the indeterminate dyad as one of Plato's metaphysical principles. — Fooloso4

The problem of how to see the "unlimited" in a relationship with the "limited" is the central focus of Plotinus in the Enneads. The separations between the One, Intelligence, and the Soul are based upon judgments of what Plato and Aristotle said touching upon the matter.

In my view, this captures Plato’s intention much better than translations that insist on indiscriminately using “lie” to make Plato sound like Lenin or Stalin.

Once the meaning of pseudos has been clarified, the correct reading becomes obvious from Socrates’ own answer to the question “What sort of story?”: “Nothing new. A fairy story like the one poets tell”.

Clearly, what he has in mind is a story (literally, “a Phoenician tale”) to replace the existing one. Hence, “nothing new” (meden kainon).

If you take a look at the Talk pages where editors discuss Wikipedia articles you’ll get an idea of what’s happening behind the scenes. Below is a comment on “Noble Lie”: — Apollodorus

The actual format of the noble lie is a little difficult to distinguish, because Plato wants everyone to be fooled by it. I understood it as supporting his proposed eugenics. Breeding of human beings was to be controlled, like we would control the breeding of dogs. However, in order to be successful, the controlled breeding needed to be hidden from the public. The proposal was some sophisticated lottery system which would be held to determine who got to mate. The lottery would be rigged.

In my view, this captures Plato’s intention much better than translations that insist on indiscriminately using “lie” to make Plato sound like Lenin or Stalin. — Apollodorus

That it makes Plato sound like a tyrant, O Deploradorus, is your own prejudice, not that of the translators. And why you use the term “indiscriminately” is beyond me, since they used a certain discrimination, that the same word be translated in the same way, as their guiding principle. When you allow a translator to translate his text according to some “interpretation”, you cannot know that that interpretation is correct unless you have yourself learned to fluently read the original. Can you say that you have verified the authenticity of the translation you quoted, from your own intimacy with Plato’s Greek? Answer me! Either avow it or deny it.

It's worth noting that the discussion of the 'noble lie' entered this thread at the point where we were talking about the proof of the immortality of the soul (Phaedo) and the argument from recollection (Meno).

So, why do you think he does that? What might his motivation have been?
— Wayfarer

It is part of a salutary exoteric teaching aimed at the development of just souls. A noble lie. — Fooloso4

In none of the references I have read in the subsequent discussion has the 'noble lie' been said to describe the arguments for the immortality of the soul.

Is it argued elsewhere that these arguments in the Phaedo and Meno can be taken to be examples of a 'noble lie'?

Did Plato believe in a realm of the Unformed to match the Forms?

In none of the references I have read in the subsequent discussion has the 'noble lie' been said to describe the arguments for the immortality of the soul.

Is it argued elsewhere that these arguments in the Phaedo and Meno can be taken to be examples of a 'noble lie'? — Wayfarer

I think that because the precise nature of "the noble lie" is not well established by Plato, it is just sort of allowed for in principle, through mention, this inclines people to judge anything in Plato which they think might be a dishonest representation (even if this determination might be produced from misunderstanding), as "the noble lie".

In none of the references I have read in the subsequent discussion has the 'noble lie' been said to describe the arguments for the immortality of the soul. — Wayfarer

You are right, what is said in the Meno and Phaedo are not identified as noble lies, but as was also pointed out, you don't tell someone you are trying to persuade that what you are saying is not the truth. As always with Plato, it is important to keep in mind who Socrates is talking to and what the setting is. In both cases, the argument fails and is replaced by myth.

The myth of the metals in the Republic is called a noble lie, but it is not the only one of its kind. Once again:

Could we," I said, "somehow contrive one of those lies that come into being in case of need ...(414b)

Even if Socrates believed in the immortality of the soul, presenting that opinion as the truth is a lie. Following the closing myth in the Phaedo he says:

“No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places …” (114d)

His myths do not reveal the truth, they provide something he thinks it is beneficial for them to believe is true. But what they may believe to be true is not the same as what is true

Compare the 'edifying tale' with the Buddhist conception of Upaya — Wayfarer

There is no doubt that there are parallels. Straussianism itself is like a religious cult with a subversive political and cultural agenda.

Whilst teaching political science at the University of Chicago, Strauss indoctrinated Allan Bloom, Seth Benardete, Joseph Cropsey, Stanley Rosen, and many others who have contributed to the wider anti-Platonist movement, acting as self-appointed “translators” and “interpreters” of Plato and other Classical authors.

However, as already stated, Strauss and his crew are just the tip of the worldwide anti-Platonist iceberg. If we take a closer look, we discover other leading anti-Platonists from the same notorious University of Chicago, such as Paul Shorey (“Professor of Greek”), whose “translations” of Plato have been propagated by the Loeb Classical Library. As is well-known, the Loeb Library was founded in 1911 by James Loeb, senior partner at Kuhn, Loeb & Co., America’s No 2 private investment bank (after J P Morgan & Co).

From 1936 the Loeb series was co-published by Harvard University which was controlled by the same Rockefellers who sponsored Strauss and bankrolled the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the National Bureau of Economic Research (NY), The New School (NY), the Social Science Research Council (NY), the American Council of Learned Societies (NY) and many other similar outfits in America and Europe!

Incidentally, David Rockefeller himself in the 1930’s studied economics at Harvard and LSE (which was bankrolled by his father John D. Rockefeller Jr.), wrote a graduate thesis on Fabian Socialism, and completed his studies at the University of Chicago which had been founded by his grandfather in the 1890’s (D. Rockefeller, Memoirs).

Beardsley Ruml of the Rockefellers’ University of Chicago, was put in charge of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund and its fellowship program. Together with other University of Chicago operatives like Wesley Clair Mitchell and Charles Edward Merriam Jr, Ruml led America’s Progressive Movement and poured Rockefeller resources into the social sciences and related fields in line with their “progressive” agenda.

The informal name of Rockefellers’ New School whose operatives included anti-Platonists like Strauss and Benardete was “The New School for Social Research”.

Social research for what purpose, one may ask?

As revealed on its website, “formally named The New School, the university has grown to include five colleges, with courses that reflect the founders' interest in the emerging social sciences, international affairs, liberal arts, history, and philosophy”. The same website also states that “The New School for Social Research has upheld The New School's legendary tradition of challenging orthodoxy” and urges its students to “be a force of new thought, knowledge, and ideas in the world. “

The New School

Why were America’s top bankers and industrialists sponsoring anti-Platonist academics? Who were they? What were they up to? What was their agenda? Why have they been seeking to influence, manipulate, and control Western philosophy including, in particular, political philosophy, as well as political science and political psychology?

What does “challenging orthodoxy and replacing it with new thought” mean? Whose “new thought”?! Who challenges the challengers? Is there an attempt to deconstruct Western culture by cancelling its classical foundations? In whose behalf is this being done and why?

I think these are important questions that philosophers should not ignore or sweep under the carpet. And forums should foster, not stifle discussion of this topic.