The Wiki article does not mention a similar concept in Mahayana Buddhism -- upaya, "skillful means". — baker

Perhaps it should.

As a matter of fact, ancient civilizations had a different understanding of the concept of "lie". Although telling a lie with harmful or criminal intent was universally condemned, telling lies in general, was not always seen as reprehensible. On the contrary, being skilled at telling lies was often seen as a virtue. The Greek heroes (and even the Gods) were particularly good at lying and deceiving.

The absolutist distinction between truth and lie in the Western world was introduced by St Augustine. This is one of the reasons why I am saying that we must avoid interpreting Plato's "Phoenician tale" in the modern sense of "lie".

But if you have reliable sources for the Buddhist "upaya" you can always register with Wikipedia as an editor and suggest it to them :smile:

In a reversal of the turning of the soul toward the Forms in the Republic, there is a turning of the soul to itself, toward self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is guided by knowledge of our ignorance. We do not know the Forms. We do not have a vision of the Forms. The question then is: which way do we turn? Do we turn away from the "human things" in pursuit of some imagined (and it must be imagined if it is not something seen or known) reality or toward it? Do we deceive ourselves by imagining we have escaped the cave because we can imagine something knowable outside the cave attainable either through reason or revelation? — Fooloso4

That's Straussianism though, isn't it?

As Socrates states quite clearly, when the soul focuses on itself and is itself by itself, then it sees realities that are like itself:

But it [the soul] thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality (Phaedo 65c)

We do not (yet) have a vision of the Forms, but neither do we have a vision of the self. So, by your logic, we should not even attempt to know ourselves.

Plato does not say that we have a vision of either the Forms or the self, but he suggests ways of how such a vision may be a attained.

If we do imagine something, we may or may not "deceive" ourselves (imagination is not always "deceptive"!). However, no one is talking about "imagining" anything. On the contrary, Plato urges philosophers to inquire into reality by means of pure, unalloyed reason.

Thanks for two helpful posts. Strauss must have been a good teaher.

Is the way the soul structures reality rational or willful? — Fooloso4

I can't see how the convergence of rational thought with the rational order of the cosmos can be denied. Human reason is not all-knowing but it doesn't mean that it knows nothing. We've weighed and measured the Cosmos. This is why I keep returning to the point about mathematical platonism and the 'unreasonable effectiveness of maths' arguments. I can't see any effective rebuttal. (Incidentally have discovered a contemporary advocate of mathematical platonism, James Robert Brown, who's book is here.)

We do not have a vision of the Forms. — Fooloso4

If we re-imagine forms as moral principles and universals, then surely we do. It permeates the activities of rational thought, it is what makes philosophy possible. As Gerson says, the idea of the intelligible domain is the particular concern of philosophy, as distinct from science, deny it and philosophy has no subject matter.

We do not know the Forms. We do not have a vision of the Forms. The question then is: which way do we turn? Do we turn away from the "human things" in pursuit of some imagined (and it must be imagined if it is not something seen or known) reality or toward it? — Fooloso4

But this is the confusion of contemporary culture. There is no compass, nothing higher, nothing lower, all has been dissolved in the 'acid of Darwin's dangerous idea'. The problem is the entrenched naturalism of modern culture, that only what is 'out there' is real. Seeing through that is not 'going within' except in the sense of being aware of the nature of thought.

That's Straussianism though, isn't it? — Apollodorus

Oh, if it’s “Straussianism”, then it’s bad, eh Deploradore? This is just another example of your ad hominem attacks.

The "rational order of the cosmos" is a big question to deal with. That is not the only factor in proposing the world is integrated with our understanding of it. In the vision of Plotinus, for example, the nature of our understanding, the experience of ourselves as creatures made possible by the existence of soul, and the production of everything and person we encounter is all connected. Approaching experience from that point of view gives one a perspective not available to an ego in a bunker.

I don't think that the view is challenged by scientific frameworks of provable facts more than other kinds of alienation. The tradition that fostered that idea of integration also gave rise to life as as struggle against natural inclinations. Pauline Christianity says our souls will be judged on a case by case basis; Our experience here is connected to an experience outside the world.
Copernicus noticed the Earth is not the center of the universe. I could go on.

The problems and opportunities of being individuals seem to involve more than an indulgence in "scientism".

This is just another example of your ad hominem attacks. — Leghorn

On the contrary. Your comment is just another example of YOUR uncalled-for ad hominems.

As is well-known, Strauss offers no proper scholarly analysis of Plato's Theory of Forms. He simply dismisses it as "an absolutely absurd idea".

So, as you can think for yourself, Straussianism cannot make a positive contribution to the topic.

IMO statements like "We do not know the Forms", "We do not have a vision of the Forms", "We turn away from the "human things" in pursuit of some imagined reality", etc., are just an expression of Straussian dismissal of Platonism. Repeating them ad nauseam does not constitute discussion but the opposite of it.

Besides, Foolo is a self-described follower of Strauss. Calling his comments "Straussian" should not be offensive to him in any form or shape. If anything, it is your calling him "Morosophos" that should be offensive to him. :grin:

Speaking of which, I don't see what contributions you are making to this thread aside from calling people names and feeling "offended" on someone else's behalf!

As Gerson says, the idea of the intelligible domain is the particular concern of philosophy, as distinct from science, deny it and philosophy has no subject matter. — Wayfarer

Correct. Gerson's statement "Platonism is philosophy and anti-Platonism is antiphilosophy" is a valid and important observation.

Anti-Platonists seem to be trying to reduce philosophy to science - or, in Strauss' case to politics - whereas Platonists seek to go beyond science and explore new areas of thought and experience.

IMO exploring and discovering is the very essence of intellectual endeavor and should not be suppressed in the name of scientism (or anything else).

I can't see how the convergence of rational thought with the rational order of the cosmos can be denied. — Wayfarer

If we re-imagine forms as moral principles and universals..... — Wayfarer

That’s how.

I’m learning from this discussion, so I won’t taint the classical content of it with Enlightenment speculative metaphysics, but when the idea of forms is moved....re-imagined as moved....from the Platonic cosmos, to the predicates of rational thought alone, the convergence is easily denied, because the “rational order of the cosmos” disappears. The subsequent convergence then undeniable, is rational thought with the natural order of the cosmos.

when the idea of forms is moved....re-imagined as moved....from the Platonic cosmos, to the predicates of rational thought alone, the convergence is easily denied, because the “rational order of the cosmos” disappears. — Mww

Purely because Galilean science excludes the realm of value. The only reason modern science understands is the efficient/material cause, not the reason why anything is. 'Rationality' in our age means 'a scientific explanation'. Bones and sinews.

I guess I shoulda just plain asked what you meant by “rational order of the cosmos”. I took the statement to tacitly affirm an intrinsic quality the cosmos possesses. Doesn’t sound like you, even from an Eastern perspective, for it hints that the cosmos, the other-than-mind, thinks.

But, as I said, I have no wish to take the discussion into an arena foreign to it.

Bones and sinews. — Wayfarer

Aye. The flexible to bond the rigid. The pure to structure the practical.

[Edited for clarity]

I can't see how the convergence of rational thought with the rational order of the cosmos can be denied. — Wayfarer

In the Timaeus two kinds of cause are identified, intelligence and necessity. Necessity covers physical processes, contingency, chance, motion, and chora. Befitting its indeterminacy the chora does not yield to simple definition. It is the space or place within which things are and occur, but it is not an empty space. As with the place one lives, the place is not separate from what happens there.

Rather than begin with cosmology, the Timaeus begins with the question of the polis at war. Two points to make on this. First, Socrates wants to see the city he makes in the Republic in action. In line with twofold causation, the story of the city in the Republic is incomplete. It is a city without chance and contingency. Second, the dialogue begins with the polis because an account of the whole must take human life into account.

Here again an indeterminate dyad is at play. The fixed intelligible world, the world of Forms is not the whole of the story. The Forms are part of a whole that is indeterminate, a whole in which there is necessity, contingency and chance.

Besides, Foolo is a self-described follower of Strauss. Calling his comments "Straussian" should not be offensive to him in any form or shape. If anything, it is your calling him "Morosophos" that should be offensive to him. :grin: — Apollodorus

I think he would be more offended by you calling him “Foolo” than me calling him Morosophos; indeed, I have called him that very many times, and he has never objected to it, or even referred to it in any way. I don’t think he would ever have chosen the user-name he did if he wasn’t open to such an appellation as I have given him. Indeed, should he ever wish to change his user-name to my nickname for him, it would be both apt (linguistically), and I would be honored.

As for the nickname I have given you—and it wasn’t my original idea: someone else suggested it—it too is very apt; and not linguistically, but rather because you deplore anything you consider anti-Platonist or Straussian, etc., and ignore patent evidence, like the evidence that I presented to you in another thread: that Plato, in his speech to the citizens who acquitted him, in the Apology, reminds us many times that the things he is relating about the afterlife are only “things said.” I showed you there that his repetitions were not stock formulae, as you suggested, yet you ignored and dismissed that evidence, indeed discounted it as Straussianism, and this proves that you are not open to learning anything from anyone else, but are stuck fast in your own prejudices, and persistent in name-calling.

You remind me of Thrasymachus; you are bright and knowledgeable and persuasive—but there is something in your soul that is too recalcitrant, too blind to evidence, too entrenched in an already solidified belief-system...

...your occasional smiley-faced punctuational emojis tell it all: you are a man of style, of the moment; but you lack weight, true gravitas.

Yet to study the Timaeus. I was recently reading a book on philosophy of physics which notes that the young Heisenberg was very absorbed in it. (Maybe we should do a thread on that, although it would be a big undertaking and at this time I'm busy with other stuff.)

Anyway, as regards causation, I think philosophy looses something if it abandons Aristotle's final and formal causation. But that again is probably another thread.

You remind me of Thrasymachus; you are bright and knowledgeable and persuasive—but there is something in your soul that is too recalcitrant, too blind to evidence, too entrenched in an already solidified belief-system... — Leghorn

You seem to be confused. Perhaps you should examine your own solidified belief-system.

First, as I said, I don’t see what your comments are contributing to this thread.

Second, you (deliberately?) misunderstand the point I am making. Quite possibly, because you know little, if anything, about Strauss.

For your information, Strauss believes that, to begin with, Plato’s Theory of Forms is “utterly incredible”, “very hard to understand”, “apparently fantastic”, and “absolutely absurd”.

According to Strauss, “No one has ever succeeded in giving a satisfactory or clear account of this doctrine of ideas.”

Strauss believes that according to Plato every single thing has an idea conforming to it, and he doesn’t understand “what is the use of such a duplication”.

Strauss says he doesn’t understand how Forms can be said to be separated from the things which are what they are by participating in a Form.

Strauss complains that Glaukon and Adeimantos accept the doctrine of ideas with greater ease than absolute communism.

Strauss believes that philosophy points to the need for a movement beyond the cave, but he declares dogmatically that this is unattainable.

Strauss’ idea of “reviving ancient philosophy” is to reconstruct Plato without the Forms and without metaphysics, but with a political agenda. Which is not surprising as Strauss is an atheist political scientist!

IMO, this being the case, it is not difficult to see why a Straussian reading of Plato cannot contribute much to the topic from a philosophical perspective - aside from dogmatically rejecting anything that Platonists say ....

The Forms are part of a whole that is indeterminate, a whole in which there is necessity, contingency and chance. — Fooloso4

This condition is reflected in Aristotle's explanation for why there can be no science of accidental being:

A sign of this is the fact that no science, be it practical or productive or theoretical, take the trouble to consider it. For the builder who is building a house is not producing at the same time the attributes which are accidental to the house when built, for these are infinite; for nothing prevents the house from being pleasant to some men, harmful to some others, useful to still others, and distinct so to speak from any other thing, but the art of building produces none of these attributes. — Metaphysics, Book Epsilon, 1026b, translated by H.G Apostle

Rather than begin with cosmology, the Timaeus begins with the question of the polis at war. Two points to make on this. First, Socrates wants to see the city he makes in the Republic in action. In line with twofold causation, the story of the city in the Republic is incomplete. It is a city without chance and contingency. Second, the dialogue begins with the polis because an account of the whole must take human life into account. — Fooloso4

One way that war as an element of human life shows how the reality of eternal qualities differs from ours is the way virtues contend with each other. In the Statesman, the Stranger compares the vigorous benefit of the "fast and aggressive" to the benefits of the "slow and moderate:"

Young Socrates: What kind of evils do you mean?
Stranger: Of course I mean all which concern the organization of the community as a whole. Men who are notable for moderation are always ready to support 'peace and tranquility.' They want to keep to themselves and to mind their own business. They conduct all their dealings with their fellow citizens on this principle and are prone to take the same line in foreign policy and preserve peace at any price with foreign states. Because of their indulgence of this passion for peace at the wrong times, whenever they are able to carry their policy into effect they become unwarlike themselves without being aware of it and render their young men unwarlike as well. Thus they are at the mercy of the chance aggressor. He swoops down on them and the result is that within a very few years they and their children and all the community to which they belong wake up to find that their freedom is gone and that they are reduced to slavery. — Statesman, 307e, translated by J.B. Skemp

You remind me of Thrasymachus; you are bright and knowledgeable and persuasive—but there is something in your soul that is too recalcitrant, too blind to evidence, too entrenched in an already solidified belief-system... — Leghorn

He is more like Meletus in the Apology than Thrasymachus. When reviewing his posts, a view is revealed of a Socrates who he has passed out of the world of opinion and is basking in the light of true knowledge next to the pool outside of the cave. The restless pursuit of Socrates, the investigator, has come to an end. This attainment of the telos is combined with a mystical view of Plotinus where the order of the divine is argued as the best possible true belief. We have transcended the realm of discursive reason and all the problems attendant upon the activity.

So, when the Gift of Apollo is challenged on the claim that Socrates has wrapped up his work as an investigator, he treats the idea as blasphemy against his true God. This is a crime in the Polis of the Gift.
When Strauss and his band of Jewish buddies come to town in order to destroy it, the Trojan Horse they used to sneak in was not turned away at the gate. They must be put on trial for crimes against the City.

Thrasymachus may have been rude and abusive but at least he had the virtue of causing a conversation to begin. Meletus was only interested in silencing unbelievers.

P.S: There is more to Plotinus than his mysticism, but that is an account for another time.

This condition is reflected in Aristotle's explanation for why there can be no science of accidental being — Valentinus

Connecting this back to the Timaeus, what a craftsman makes, whether he is a house builder or the craftsman of the universe, human or divine, is more than what is crafted.The builder is not producing the attributes, but they are there as a result of what he did.

We might think of the house as a chora:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/601558

As the song goes:

"A house is not a home":
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vDtQzuqtrtg

... the reality of eternal qualities differs from ours is the way virtues contend with each other. — Valentinus

Good point. This raises important questions about the relation between Forms and things. If the Forms are paradigmatic, then how useful they are diminishes the further the distance between Forms and "the city at war", that is, our world.

Foolosopher:

The wisdom of a fool
Wise about fools

Good to see that you are talking to yourself!

BTW, have you found out where Plato says "a noble lie" yet, or do you require more time? :grin:

I feel that were it not for the Platonic ideas or forms, we would not have the culture we have today. Eastern cultures were arguably on the same level or even in advance of the ancient Greeks at that time, yet the scientific and industrial revolutions were birthed in the West. And why? Because Eastern philosophies were lacking in the analysis of substance and form and the doctrines of finding rational explanations for observable phenomena. Plato is rightly viewed as a seminal figure in Western culture as it was his dialogues that laid the foundation for these developments. The ethical quandary of modernism comes from keeping the mathematical philosophy of the ancients ('book of nature written in mathematics') but rejecting the 'idea of the Good' as the basis for an ethical philosophy. So what modern culture lacks is a metaphysics of quality, a footing for a real good, a summum bonum, which is now an individual and private matter, leading to:

Cartesian anxiety, which refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".

Richard J. Bernstein coined the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis.

So, when the Gift of Apollo is challenged on the claim that Socrates has wrapped up his work as an investigator, he treats the idea as blasphemy against his true God. — Valentinus

This might explain why Deploradorus flinched when I brought up the topic of Jesus. In an earlier thread, I made a comparison b/w Socrates and Jesus, noting that the former accepted his sentence, while the latter didn’t (scene in Garden of Gethsemane). The Deplorable One wouldn’t touch the topic with a ten-foot pole! He objected that I was the one who had brought up Jesus, and that he preferred to talk about Plato on his own terms (which he doesn’t).

This makes me wonder...is Deploradorus a closet Christian? Does he require that Socrates believe in God because he does?

When reviewing his posts, a view is revealed of a Socrates who he has passed out of the world of opinion and is basking in the light of true knowledge next to the pool outside of the cave. — Valentinus

I know what he will bring up to support this belief, O Strongman: he will cite the passage at Rep. 533a, where Socrates responds to Glaucon’s desire to know the power and character of dialectic by saying, “You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon.” This is proof to Deplorado that Socrates IS basking by the pool outside the cave—just that he is unable to express that experience to mere mortals. How would you respond to this citation?

@Valentinus

Btw, I think that is the only occasion in the Republic when Socrates refuses to answer to a request of his interlocutor, and the interlocutor doesn’t insist that Socrates comply.

I feel that were it not for the Platonic ideas or forms, we would not have the culture we have today ... — Wayfarer

That’s exactly where the problem with the Straussian position lies. Strauss purports to “revive Classical philosophy” but the truth becomes apparent only when you find that his true intention is to reconstruct Plato without the Forms and without metaphysics!

True to form, Strauss’ disciples fail to see that someone who by his own admission is incapable of even remotely comprehending Plato’s Theory of Forms, really has nothing to offer in the discussion.

IMHO some form of psychological deficiency seems to be involved here ….

I feel that were it not for the Platonic ideas or forms, we would not have the culture we have today. — Wayfarer

I agree. The Platonic forms are fundamental in shaping our culture.

What I am suggesting is that there is another side of Plato's philosophy. The indeterminate dyads. According to the dramatic chronology of the dialogues Socrates was aware of the problem of the concept of forms from an early age. This suggests that all of the dialogues are informed by these difficulties

The indeterminate dyads cuts across the distinction between Forms and things. In various places both are spoken of as "the beings". See, for example, the passage in the Phaedo about Socrates second sailing at 99d discucces above. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/598406

The Timaeus points to another difficulty:

If the Forms are paradigmatic, then how useful they are diminishes the further the distance between Forms and "the city at war", that is, our world. — Fooloso4

Forms are not the whole of being, they are part of an indefinite dyad.

The indeterminate dyads cuts across the distinction between Forms and things. — Fooloso4

I will have to study that some more.

Forms are not the whole of being, they are part of an indefinite dyad. — Fooloso4

And so what?

IMO all these so-called "difficulties" are more imagined than factual. If you start from Strauss' bizarre and totally unscholarly premise that Forms are "incomprehensible" and "absurd" then of course there will be an infinite number of "difficulties". In which case why take the trouble to read Plato in the first place?

The fact of the matter is that Plato's dialogues (and his Academy) were not about endless philosophical speculation. They were logoi intended to serve as a theoretical basis for a philosophical way of life.

It was left to Plato's successors to develop his ideas and establish a more comprehensive system. However, Plato's teachings are perfectly logical and they point to the attainment of higher truths, ethical and metaphysical or whatever they turn out to be.

This is precisely why Plato says that the first principle or the Good is knowable but that the philosopher must go beyond hypotheses (and, presumably, endless idle speculation) to arrive at it.

In which case why take the trouble to read Plato in the first place? — Apollodorus

This was not Strauss’ own opinion. From Bloom’s encomium to him: “He was able to do without most abstractions and to make those readers who were willing to expend the effort look at the world around them and see things afresh. He presented things, not generalizations about things. He never repeated himself and always began anew although he was always looking at the same things. To see this, one need only read the chapter on the Republic in The City and Man and observe what he learned about thymos and eros as well as about techne in what must have been his fiftieth careful reading of the Republic.”

You should read the entirety of this epitaph of Bloom’s to his master, O Deploradore. You might just learn that Strauss was not a man to be so summarily dismissed.

The indeterminate dyads. — Fooloso4

I studied Plato a lot, and never heard of an indeterminate dyad. What is it, like "matter" in Timaeus?

See this post https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/599321

Thanks Wayfarer, I thought I was reading the thread, but I must have skimmed over, or forgotten that part. I'm going to express my opinion below.

In the Philebus Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad. The two sides of an indeterminate dyad are dependent on each other. There is not one without the other. The two together are one.

The Forms are each said to be one, of which there are many things of that Form. The Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, but the Forms are presented as if they stand alone and apart. There is, however, no ‘X’ without things that are ‘x’.

Each Form is one, but Forms are many. How many? In addition, each Form is both self-same and other. There is the Just itself and the Beautiful itself, but the Just is not Beautiful of the Beautiful the Just. The Forms themselves are an indeterminate dyad, same and other.

Becoming is supposed to be understood in light of being, things in light of Forms, the unlimited in light of the limited. Formulated in this way, the problem comes to light. How can the limited encompass the unlimited? When the many are reduced to one what it is that makes them many cannot be taken into account.

The Forms falsely represent the part as the whole. The undetermined as determined. The open-ended nature of philosophical inquiry as if it is completed and closed to further inquiry. — Fooloso4

I believe that what Plato expresses here in the Philebus, is a simple, or basic version of Aristotle's hylomorphism. Simply put, the "unlimited" is matter and form is the limited. In the world, we observe a combination of these two, particular things which are composed of matter (understood as inherently unlimited), and form, which is the limit. Existing things are a sort of balance between these two, and that balance Socrates describes as a third category. Then he proceeds to propose the need for a fourth category. The fourth category is the cause of this balance, the cause of the mixture, the cause of the existence of particular things which are each am individual balance, or equality within. He demonstrates why the cause, as the fourth category, must necessarily be conceived of as distinct from the third category , the mixture of unlimited and limited (matter and form).

I believe that this is an extension of the problem he addressed in the Timaeus. There he faced the problem of how a particular thing receives the precise form which it actually has. The "form" is conceived of as something general, a universal, or type. And it is obvious that in living things the form or type of being precedes and predetermines the type which will come from the seed or embryo. The issue which must be grappled with is that the form which appears to predetermine, is a universal type, but the thing which comes to be has a particular form, unique to itself. So there is an unexplained, and apparently unintelligible, gap between the universal form which is supposed to predetermine, and the actual form which comes to be, as a particular form.

Aristotle closes this gap with the concept of "accident". The universal form is somewhat deficient because it does not account for the accidentals. But this proposal creates a clear separation, a division between the two senses of "form". The form of the particular is necessarily unintelligible, due to this division, and this is due to the role of "matter" in the composition of the particular (matter being what is inherently unlimited). There is debate even today, as to whether accidents are properly attributed to matter or to the particular form, but understanding of this will only be produced by referencing what Socrates called the fourth category, the cause of the union between matter and form.

This so-called "fourth class" or fourth category is the point which Aristotle comes to by way of his cosmological argument as well. Matter provides the potential for substantial being, and it appears to be unlimited, it could be potentially anything. In actual fact, all the matter we encounter is limited, having a particular form. Our minds designate matter as unlimited, but material existence demonstrates that it is always limited. In other words every instance of material existence is as a particular form. This implies that there is a cause, a further type of actuality (beyond the actuality of material existence), which is prior in time (as cause), to material existence, to account for this fact that matter always has a form..