??? — 180 Proof

I guess what I said might be entirely inscrutable in not explicitly explaining that I took you to be saying that "a priori" was a function of the brain automatically interacting with the world. I imagine your use of the term here was to point out that our brain affects our world before we experience it, or that it is our experiencing in general. The reason I then said "We would like the functions of the brain (science) to be responsible for our connection to the world" is because, though science could tell us about how our brain affects our experience, it only makes it philosophically relevant if our brain was more involved in how we are connected (and disconnected) from our world, how to make clear-headed (realistic) judgments in it, see it for the dog-eat-dog power struggle that it really is, don't get caught in flights of fancy, etc. What I took it to come down to--though not necessarily in response to your comment--is only a desire to have the certainty of brain functions be the measure of our situation, carry our responsibility for us.

As a contrast, I was describing a priori's traditional use to distinguish between the types of reasoning used in the act of making judgments, in which a priori rationale come prior to our experience, but this in the sense of prior to me participating in a situation (with its associated entanglements of my feelings and interests). But how we judge, what matters to us, our standards, are in our lives already (prior to) and are categorically necessary (without me) in that if an expression doesn't fit into the criteria of an apology, it just isn't a real apology. A priori rationale would be: you must be sincere, you must understand what you did, you must say I'm sorry, your forgiveness is contingent on its acceptance by the other, etc.).

-""That which..."?
Reality includes many "that which"!
Reality is a label of an abstract concept...not a label of a thing.
Reality as a concept accomodates every entity, process or property that manifest and interact in the realm we experience.
It has nothing to do with concepts like "absolute reality" or "ulitmate reality".
Its practical value is to distinquish things that are real within a known empirical system opposed to proposed imaginary entities.

Tell me where my thinking goes wrong. — 180 Proof

Not so much wrong, as insufficient. The brain is responsible for everything, but it is not known how the brain does what seems other than strict adherence to natural law. That it does is given; how it does is not.

And from that, I rather think....

So, no need for some quasi-platonic "transcendental deduction" ... pace Kant et al — 180 Proof

....that is a mistake, insofar as we do need, or perhaps convince ourselves we need, a theory of human cognition, for the same reason as we need theories for anything we don’t already know, as the means for logical explanation. Even if some cognitive theory is found deficient, we’ve lost nothing, because we don’t have the fullest knowledge the theory represents anyway. And we’ve gained nothing, for to find a theory deficient is to generate another to replace it, and that under exactly the same conditions but merely with alternative major premises. The only way to falsify a metaphysical theory is with empirical proofs, which more than likely we will never have. Even without empirical proofs, we are still entitled to grant to ourselves warrant for non-contradictory logical explanation.

Ask yourself.....if some measurement of the brain can be displayed that shows your deepest darkest secret, would you then feel as if you don’t really have one? It follows that if you don’t feel the display, while certainly existing in reality because it represents as a quantity in space and time, is the definitive interpretation of the secret as it really seems to you, there is a necessary qualifiable distinction between the two.

If A is in B and if B is in C, then A is in C is true, iff all A’s, B’s and C’s are the same kind, or inhere with congruent modality. If reason is in the brain and if the brain is in reality, then reason is in reality.....just doesn’t work, because they aren’t, and they don’t.

Or so it seems......

I think experience is the which we are most acquainted with out of everything. — Manuel

Yeah, we would disagree a lot on that. The justification for the disagreement in contained in your own proposition, in that your “I think” is antecedent to that which you’re thinking about, which is always the case, without exception. The subjective condition is that which holds the greatest acquaintance, insofar as it is absolutely impossible to escape your own personal state of affairs.

Think of it this way: what you experience is always contingent on circumstance and you have no promise of knowledge given from it, but that the experience belongs to you alone is undeniable, thus impossible not to know with apodeitic certainty. Doesn’t it then seem that the greatest acquaintance would be that which is inescapable?
————-

But I don't think it's the main a priori facet, that is inscrutable to us. It's part of a process of which we only become aware of a tiny part. — Manuel

Now that I do agree with.

real is best conceived as a rational quality
— Mww

Again, the abstraction of reality into a quality...... — Antony Nickles

Notice the difference?

Cool thing about a 240 yo hole? Nobody’s successfully filled it in. Scoffed at it, ridiculed it, bastardized it, FUBAR’ed it....but never showed its irrationality.

I think Mww may be trying to make the distinction between empirical and epistemological knowledge such that the world is something we can point to, something which is "publicly available". He'll correct me. — Manuel

Yep. The empirical domain we can point to, the rational domain we can point with.

The knowledge of each is as different in kind as the domains themselves, re: public as opposed to private, from which it is quite apparent the method sufficient for acquisition of one must be somewhat distinct from the method of acquisition of the other, partially reflected in your “tiny bit aware”.

what you experience is always contingent on circumstance and you have no promise of knowledge given from it, but that the experience belongs to you alone is undeniable, thus impossible not to know with apodeitic certainty. Doesn’t it then seem that the greatest acquaintance would be that which is inescapable? — Mww

If I follow, the "I think" that accompanies experience, would form a part of experience. And thus be a part of reality (for me).

Yes, I'd agree with your last sentence.

I should say that I use the word experience very broadly.

If I follow, the "I think" that accompanies experience, would form a part of experience. And thus be a part of reality (for me). — Manuel

Is it your contention.....your understanding, your belief, your mindset/worldview......that you experience, say, basketballs, as such?

If as such you mean "in itself", no. Of course not.

Basketballs are the results of a complex interplay of the a-priori, which includes some aspects of concept formation, plus the recognition of sensible qualities with whatever is "out there" that results in me calling that thing "a basketball".

Most of the work is done by me, automatically and in large parts unconsciously. If I were to limit myself to what is "out there", minus the a-priori, I wouldn't know if I could even perceive anything at all, much less a basketball.

So reality would be essentially non-existent. As Cudworth put it "the book of nature is legible only to an intellectual eye". Only those things that arouse something "native and domestic" in us, can we call real.

I don't say much more than this.

As a contrast, I was describing a priori's traditional use to distinguish between the types of reasoning used in the act of making judgments, in which a priori rationale come prior to our experience, but this in the sense of prior to me participating in a situation (with its associated entanglements of my feelings and interests). — Antony Nickles

Well okay, then we're talking past each other since my aside

(So, no need for some quasi-platonic "transcendental deduction" ... pace Kant et al). — 180 Proof

dismisses the "traditional use" of a priority. My conception is that "participating in a situation ... with its associated entanglements" is the a priori (e.g. Merleau-Ponty's flesh, Buber's dialogical encounter, Witty's forms-of-life, Freddy's bodily perspectivism, Hume's empirical customs & habits of mind, Benny Spinoza's bondage ... re: embodied / enactive cognition). Thus, my focus on 'brain organization – experiencing, judging, reasoning are brain-effects (outputs) and not causes (e.g. "categories" that "constitute experience").

Reality _ the current dream. — unenlightened

:up:

Not so much wrong, as insufficient. The brain is responsible for everything, but it is not known how the brain does what seems other than strict adherence to natural law. That it does is given; how it does is not. — Mww

This is a neuroscientific problem of brain-functioning, and no longer a (premature, underdetermined) "transcendental" question of "categories of reason", which is mostly begged in a schema with platonic fiats (pace Kant et al). It's this pseudo-science of Kantianism that I find "insufficient". I prefer affirming and exploring (epistemic, cognitive) gaps in themselves rather than anachronistically positing (meta-cognitive) "forms" / "categories"-of-the-gaps instead to pacify my (our) not yet knowing.

I don't think "things in themselves" can be studied empirically... So I agree with the spirit of the argument, but I don't think we can study MUCH of "what interests us", in much depth. From phenomenal properties such as colors and sounds to political organizations. We just can't get much depth empirically about these things. — Manuel

I'm not suggesting an emperical investigation. Instead of projecting (the "essence") into a thing, subject ahead of time to certainty, we are investigating what is important to a thing being what it is--what is said to be an essential distinction of a color? Unlike objects, if we have the same color on two objects, we say there is one color, not two instances of the same color. This is part of what color is; how a priori we judge the sameness of color, compared to saying there are two colors, meaning different colors, not different instances. These criteria are embedded in our lives and we grow into them. They are the depth to our unexamined connections to the world.

This looks to me as an attempt to (try to) clarify the phenomenal properties we add to the world. Yes, we grow into certain molds - set forth by nature - we don't know exactly how, aside from saying that genetics play a role.

But I think that novels explore these things you are speaking of quite well.

real is best conceived as a rational quality
— Mww

Again, the abstraction of reality into a quality......
— Antony Nickles

Notice the difference? — Mww

I didn't differentiate, because it doesn't matter. Rational or not, it is ascription of a "quality" to the world that starts the slippery slope. "Rational' easily slides towards predetermined, complete, self-enclosed, and, most importantly, certain. Of course, if you did not mean to say quality, but simply that the world is best conceived as rational, then I misunderstood.

Cool thing about a 240 yo hole? Nobody’s successfully filled it in. Scoffed at it, ridiculed it, bastardized it, FUBAR’ed it....but never showed its irrationality — Mww

Yes, it is understandable. It involves the fear of separation from the world and so the desire to impose a solution to ensure our relation. The fear is very real, and the desire is understandable.

Well okay, then we're talking past each since my aside (So, no need for some quasi-platonic "transcendental deduction" ... pace Kant et al). — 180 Proof
dismisses the "traditional use" of a priori. — 180 Proof

I understand you want to avoid "quasi-platonic 'transcendental deduction' " but that is not to dismiss what "a priori" is, but only what you think are the necessary conclusions based on the implications of the criteria for inclusion in its class of reasoning. I disagree with what I take as your understanding of what the criteria are for being a priori, as well as your assumption the above are the only outcomes.

My conception is that "participating in a situation ... with its associated entanglements" is the a priori (e.g. Merleau-Ponty's flesh, Buber's dialogical encounter Witty's forms-of-life, Freddy's bodily perspectivism, Hume's empirical customs & habits of mind, Benny Spinoza's bondage ... re: embodied / enactive cognition). Thus, my focus on 'brain organization – experiencing, judging, reasoning are brain-effects (outputs) and not causes (e.g. "categories" that "constitute experience"). — 180 Proof

To call judging an effect of the brain is of course true in the sense our brains affect everything we do, but it does not have control over everything. The criteria for judging a good example of a dog breed are set by the American Kennel Club. The criteria for what we say is "reality", I could agree, are embedded in the forms of our lives, with each form (concept, category) having its necessary criteria to be walking, seeing, thinking, compromising, understanding, etc. To reduce these to effects of the brain is to gain knowledge and certainty, but only in overlooking all the depth of the history of life.

The reason to distinguish judgments based on a priori reasoning is that we want to have the necessity of criteria of a category for our judgment: that if I'm going to claim you're not seeing reality, only specific questions are expected to be asked, categories of evidence considered, and only certain answers will be accepted (within the lines of our a piori criteria and their types of justifications). "You need to face reality, they are not coming back." would be followed by "I know they will!" which could lead to "You're dreaming; I'm done." Also, "You're not experiencing the real world." would be met with something like "I'm only going to stay with my parents until fall." Now you can say whatever you like, but "I am!! I'm participating!!" seems to lose the thread on not only how but why we differentiate reality a priori.

Now I am not minimizing the a posteriori as Kant wanted to (out of a desire for certainty). It is critical to put a concept like reality into a context in drawing out the implications, and, when we make judgements, we not only must consider the context (applicable to that concept), but that I am also personally, individually, involved sometimes in how things come off (it's not all about knowledge), though not that my "experience" determines anything (outside of my past participation), nor that the "situation" is our brain/body (other than maybe times when the brain is not functioning normally).

Is it your contention (...) that you experience, say, basketballs, as such? — Mww

If as such you mean "in itself", no. Of course not. — Manuel

Cool. So, can we say this.....

Most of the work is done by me, automatically and in large parts unconsciously. — Manuel

.....is what your.....

the "I think" that accompanies experience — Manuel

....is meant to indicate?

If such is the case, and it is as well the case that what you experience is not the object itself that is in reality, then how can your experience be part of it?

Do you think perhaps you might be using the word “experience” too broadly?
—————

As Cudworth put it "the book of nature is legible only to an intellectual eye". — Manuel

If this is true, must’nt the intellectual eye be outside that which it views? If the intellectual eye is a placeholder for “I think”, and if either view the book of nature, re: reality, then both must be other than, or outside, reality.

Yes? No?

Do you think perhaps you might be using the word “experience” too broadly? — Mww

Yeah, I do use it very broadly, in part because consciousness is over used these days.

For me, the conscious part of the mental is experiential goings-on, at this moment. What goes through me or in me as I write these letters or think about the words I'm using. Or shut my eyes and listen to the fan, and so on.

....is meant to indicate? — Mww

The way I see it, it's not as if when I look out my window, it's "I" or "me" looking at this window. It's more like making sense of a green pattern and later on a complex process these sensations gets labeled as "a tree". Yes, it's always subjective.

If such is the case, and it is as well the case that what you experience is not the object itself that is in reality, then how can your experience be part of it? — Mww

I don't think we need to say that we experience "reality-in-itself" in order to say that we experience part of reality. Any experience whatsoever will be conditioned by subjectivity, so the "things in themselves" will remain an issue.

But my representations are part of reality, which are formed by my innate faculties in conjunction with sense data from the world. They may be a step removed from the realizing grounds of whatever appears, but this doesn't make them any less valid as a part of reality. But this is true of any creature and whatever world they experience. Whatever they experience is part of reality for that creature.

If experience is not part of reality as appears to us, I would have no reason to trust my manifest image for anything.

If experience is not part of reality as appears to us, I would have no reason to trust my manifest image for anything. — Manuel

:up:

Ok. Thanks.

It's this pseudo-science of Kantianism.... — 180 Proof

Possibly a label applied by people who have not understood what they're labeling?

"Science" is in some usages ambiguous or unclear as to what it applies to and specifies. Let's see if we can clarify it and gain anything by the effort.

I take the science of the laboratory, experimental science, to be about the mainly empirical study of causes and effects such that given certain causes, it comes to be understood there will be certain consequent effects - and maybe why. And given certain effects, the causes reverse-engineered out.

Science also applies to logic, the tool and expression of reason. In this science, of course, premise/truth, validity/conclusion take the place of the cause-and-effect of experimental science. I am not aware of any experiments done by Kant relevant to his critiques. Thus to call him a pseudo-scientist is a plain mistake unless either 1) some experiment of his is referenced, or 2) his reasoning fails.

As to his critiques, as reasoned models, I think @Mww's remark

Cool thing about a 240 yo hole? Nobody’s successfully filled it in. Scoffed at it, ridiculed it, bastardized it, FUBAR’ed it....but never showed its irrationality. — Mww

stands untouched. "Buzzing confusion" is incident on the sense organs, and they and a machinery, a mind, behind them make a sense of them. And how can it do that? Kant's account does not pretend to be an electro-biochemical mechanical explanation - how could it be? But I suspect that when the laboratory scientists work it out - if they ever do - Kant's general description will stand as an accurate model.

Until then, it seems incumbent on critics to be explicit as to any failure of his, and lacking that, to move on to something else.

This looks to me as an attempt to (try to) clarify the phenomenal properties we add to the world. — Manuel

Not sure what "this" is (gonna assume everything I said, which seems like an oversimplification may be coming), but no, I am talking about everything. Just not differentiating/separating a "reality" from something we don't quite get at, or only get at rationally, or through "phenomenal properties".

Yes, we grow into certain molds - set forth by nature - we don't know exactly how, aside from saying that genetics play a role. — Manuel

What I am saying is that we do know how to look into ourselves and our world, if only we get past our paralyzing need for certainty (say by falling back to only genetics).

But I think that novels explore these things you are speaking of quite well. — Manuel

It wouldn't be the first time philosophy was looked down upon as stylistic, but I agree with you, only I take our expressions as more than novel. The implications we find when we say, for example, "You live in your own reality." are more concrete than all the machinations about what "reality" is.

Of course, if you did not mean to say quality, but simply that the world is best conceived as rational, — Antony Nickles

Nope, would never mean to say that, seeing as how being hit by a bus has certain altogether empirical implications on the one hand, but my subjective condition will be affected in an entirely different way in the other. A broken pelvis is hardly anything like self-recrimination for being clumsy.

"Rational' easily slides towards predetermined, complete, self-enclosed, and, most importantly, certain. — Antony Nickles

Yes, absolutely, and why shouldn’t we wish for certainty in some form or another? If we trust the principle of law with respect to empirical science, why not the principle of sufficient reason for pure metaphysics?

Reality is like.... this thing, you know. This big vast thing that, like, we are all a part of, you know? It's like, everywhere.. Reality is you, me, the trees outside. The sky above. The ground below. Its like this vast cosmic web of interconnected interdependent web of being. And its like, composed of these tiny little things called atoms, made of eternal energy. And it burst into existence before there was time or space. Reality is a trip, dude.

Not sure what "this" is (gonna assume everything I said, which seems like an oversimplification may be coming), but no, I am talking about everything. Juts not differentiating a "reality" from something we don't quite get at, or only get at rationally, or through "phenomenal properties". — Antony Nickles

"This" meaning your approach, as I understood it. Sure, I mean, if we look at the ocean, the blueness we see and the wetness we feel are surely part of the reality of the ocean (for us). But we can't study the blueness or the wetness. This doesn't mean they aren't important, I'm not saying that. What I am trying to say is that I think it's likely that we cannot study scientifically those aspects of the world which we find most interesting:

Music, colours, politics, most aspect of experience, history and so on.

We have some interesting ideas and categorizations, but not "theoretical depth". But surely these things matter a good deal.

What I am saying is that we do know how to look into ourselves and our world, if only we get past our paralyzing need for certainty (say by falling back to only genetics). — Antony Nickles

I agree. Certainty is not attainable for creatures like us.

The implications we find when we say, for example, "You live in your own reality." are more concrete than all the machinations about what "reality" is. — Antony Nickles

In a sense, yes, because in that phrase, reality is anchored more clearly as belonging to the way a person views and relates to the world. If we speak of "reality" without such specifications, the conversation will be broad as we aren't yet specified by what we agree to take as aspect of reality that are relevant.

Some may include God in reality or be dualists, etc.

I don't think we need to say that we experience "reality-in-itself" in order to say that we experience part of reality. — Manuel

Good, because experiencing anything “-in-itself”, is impossible. Again, under the auspices of a representational cognitive system operating with logical predication. Even without the “-in-itself” signifier, given the definition that reality is the totality of all possible experience, and because the accumulation of all experience is impossible, it is clear the experience of reality is a non-starter. So not only do we have no need to speak of it, we actually have no business with it at all, except as an unconditioned, pure a priori conception used to terminate an ontological infinite regress.
————-

Whatever they experience is part of reality for that creature. — Manuel

If experience is not part of reality as appears to us..... — Manuel

The first makes explicit an object of experience as part of reality, the second suggests experience is the object of reality. Only one of these can be true.

It’s fine, no harm-no foul. We just each have quite diverse conceptions of reality, that’s all.

given the definition that reality is the totality of all possible experience, and because the accumulation of all experience is impossible, it is clear the experience of reality is a non-starter. — Mww

If you take that definition, then you will end up with your conclusion. I wouldn't put it like that, but I can see the legitimacy of defining it that way.

The first makes explicit an object of experience as part of reality, the second suggests experience is the object of reality. Only one of these can be true. — Mww

If you want to think in terms of subject and object you can, it is often helpful. We can say that we are simultaneously subject and object. We can speak of events instead.

Call it an subjective affectation, a partial object, the disclosure of being. I think experience is part of reality.

It’s fine, no harm-no foul. We just each have quite diverse conceptions of reality, that’s all. — Mww

And that's why I wanted to talk to you, you force me to try to be clear. I don't aim to convince, only to get a better grasp of what I think is true.

So thanks. I do appreciate it.

We experience things that are not part of reality. They are common enough to have a name - illusions.

The other day I saw my favourite weeding fork in a garden bed a few meters away. I went to get it, but it wasn't there. Backtracking and looking again, what I had experienced as a weeding tool was a leaf bent in such a way as to appear the shape and colour of the handle o the weeder. I was mistaken.

Sometimes folk disagree as to what they are experiencing.

Illusions, mistakes and disagreements are most simply accounted for if what is the case is different to what is thought to be the case.

Reality is not what one experiences. Reality is what is the case.

I mean, if we look at the ocean, the blueness we see and the wetness we feel are surely part of the reality of the ocean (for us). — Manuel

You can take out "the reality" and, if you take out "surely" (certainly), then you can even take out "(for us)". We may turn out (afterwards) to be mistaken (in a waterpark, say), yet the world does not come crashing down--only our desire to be sure beforehand.

What I am trying to say is that I think it's likely that we cannot study scientifically those aspects of the world which we find most interesting:

Music, colours, politics, most aspect of experience, history and so on. — Manuel

Well the scientific method only works with certain things. But also, particular topics do not respond to a requirement for certainty. We may not be ensured of a result in a moral conversation, but it does not make it irrational.

We have some interesting ideas and categorizations, but not "theoretical depth". — Manuel

As I said, our ordinary criteria allow us to rigorously dig into these topics with specificity, precision, accuracy, distinction, clarity, etc. So there may be something else causing you to overlook philosophy's insights into color (which I mention above), and its ability to add to the discussion of justice.

The implications we find when we say, for example, "You live in your own reality." are more concrete than all the machinations about what "reality" is. — Antony Nickles

…If we speak of "reality" without such specifications, the conversation will be broad as we aren't yet specified by what we agree to take as aspect of reality that are relevant. — Manuel

This is how philosophy removes the context of a concept in order to slip in the criteria that something be certain. The thing is that we don’t speak of anything without the specifications and implications of it in our lives, so if we don’t remove them but focus on them, they are what we intellectually can grab onto about something.

You can take out "the reality" and, if you take out "surely" (certainly), then you can even take out "(for us)". We may turn out (afterwards) to be mistaken (in a waterpark, say), yet the world does not come crashing down--only our desire to be sure beforehand. — Antony Nickles

I can take away "the reality" only in the sense that reality can be honorific, as I've said elsewhere. If someone says "this is a real waterpark", they aren't implying that there are two waterparks: waterparks and real waterparks, it's a matter of emphasis.

I use "surely" as a word implying confidence, not certainty, we could remove it if you prefer. I don't have such high aims. Water looks transparent in small amounts and at night, it's practically black, not blue.

I can't remove "for us" in any meaningful sense. I don't think birds or panthers think about, cognize or speculate about waterparks or anything else. They may even be in one (what we call a "waterpark") and be oblivious to it, outside of finding plenty of chemically treated water, it's not an issue.

As I said, our ordinary criteria allow us to rigorously dig into these topics with specificity, precision, accuracy, distinction, clarity, etc. So there may be something else causing you to overlook philosophy's insights into color (which I mention above), and its ability to add to the discussion of justice. — Antony Nickles

That's fine. I don't have a problem with that. Only that in being philosophy, agreement is not as common as it is in other areas. Which is not bad, just the way philosophy is.

This is how philosophy removes the context of a concept in order to slip in the criteria that something be certain. The thing is that we don’t speak of anything without the specifications and implications of it in our lives, so if we don’t remove them but focus on them, they are what we intellectually can grab onto about something. — Antony Nickles

We could. But at this level of abstraction ("what is reality") as opposed to "what should be counted as real", the vagueness of the issue at hand can cause people to pursue different paths, with little by way of common criteria which could help establish agreement.

But not certainty. I think it's futile to chase this idea much.

why shouldn’t we wish for certainty in some form or another? If we trust the principle of law with respect to empirical science, why not the principle of sufficient reason for pure metaphysics? — Mww

Wittgenstein will say we are compelled (to strip our world of any measure and replace it with a requirement for certainty). We may hope that a moral discussion will end in agreement, but the temptation is to define our morals beforehand so we are ensured of what is right. We may see the world as intelligible, capable of telling us its secrets, but not if we require that it be certain knowledge or necessarily stem from a cause.